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PREFACE - During the 1994 Regular Session of the Kentucky General
Assembly, 1309 bills and 263 resolutions were introduced.
Of
these, 367 were Senate bills and 942 were House bills.
Of this
number, 146 Senate bills and 311 House bills passed both chambers
and were delivered to the Governor for signature. In addition, 54
joint and concurrent resolutions were p~~sed.

Among the aforementioned bills were eight labor and employment
bills which passed both chambers and were signed into law by the
Governor.
In addition, one House Concurrent Resolution dealing
with OSHA compliance was passed by the House.
By far, the most sweeping of the labor and employment bills was
House Bill 928, the workers' compensation reform legislation. Due
to its length and complexity, it will be the last enactment covered
in this outline.
HOUSE BILL 762 - The relevant section of this bill provides that no

employer may require, as a condition of employment, that a
prospective employee waive, agree to arbitration, or otherwise
diminish any right to which the prospective employee is entitled
under state or federal law.
The provisions of this bill will be
added as a new section to· Chapter 336 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes.
This bill was in reaction to the practices of a number of large
employers in Kentucky who specifically required on applications for
employment, as .a condition of employment,
that prospective·
employees waive their right to sue in court and agree:to binding
arbitration with respect to all allegations of personal rights
violations such as age discrimination, sex discrimination, race
discrimination, etc ...
SENATE BILL 331 - This bill mlrrors House Bill 762.
HOUSE BILL 719 - Under current Prevailing Wage laws (those dealing

with construction by public authorities), employees must be paid
overtime for all hours worked in excess of eight hours a day and
forty hours a week.
This bill increases the maximum hours from eight hours a day to ten
hours a day before overtime pay is mandated in those instances in
which the employer and employee voluntarily enter into a written
agreement prior to the employee working anyone day in excess of
eight hours, or where provided for in a collective bargaining
contract.
The bill will be codified as an amendment to KRS
337.540.
The bill was introduced at the behest of the Associated General
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Contractors of Kentucky. The executive director of AGC stated in
committee hearings that many workers lived in one part of the
state, worked in another and desired to work four ten hour days as
opposed to five eight hour days in order to have longer weekends to
spend with their families.
Under current law, contractors were
unwilling to allow the ten hour days because of the necessity of
paying overtime for all hours in excess of eight hoursa·day.
HOUSE BILL 661 - This bill allows the Labor Cabinet to place a lien

on all property of an employer who
penalty imposed pursuant to the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.
a new section of Chapter 338 of the

has failed to pay a monetary
provisions of the Kentucky
This bill will be codified as
Kentucky Revised Statutes.

The lien shall not be filed until all administrative and judicial
appeals have been exhausted or the time for same has expired.
p~ace a lien
on all property of an employer who has failed to pay a penalty
imposed pursuant to the wage and hour laws of Chapter 337 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
This bill will be codified as a new
section of Chapter 337 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.

HOUSE BILL 660 - This bill allows the Labor Cabinet to

As in House Bill 661, the lien shall not be filed until all
administrative and judicial appeals have been exhausted or the time
for same has expired.
SENATE BILL 271 - KRS 337.010 currently exempts from the definition
of employee "[a] ny individual employed as a babysieter in an
employer's home, or live-in companion to a sick, convalescing, or
elderly person whose principal duties do not include housekeeping."

The significance of these exceptions is that "employees" must be
paid overtime pursuant to Chapter 337.
Over the years a problem arose with respect to the definition of
" Ii ve- in companion."
Wage and hour investigators have defined
"Ii ve-in" a number of ways over the years.
The most recent
definition requires that the companion stay for at least twentyfour hours at a time in order to be considered as a "live-in" .
. This was unfair to those persons in nursing homes who had
companions who stayed with them at night only or to individuals who
lived at home, but only had companions during the day.
This bill deletes the term" live-in" and therefore exempts from the
definition of "employee" a companion to a sick, convalescing, or
elderly person. The bill mirrors the language in fed~ral wage and
hour laws.
SENATE BILL

284

-

This bill makes

it unlawful and contrary to

public policy for an employer to require another employer to waive
its rights under the workers' compensation laws in order to be
awarded a contract. It further makes it illegal for an employer to
give a preference to one employer over another for voluntarily
waiving rights under the workers' compensation laws,
This bill was in response to situations in which prime contractors
were making waiver of workers' compensation subrogation rights by
sub-contractors a condition precedent to receiving a contract.
This bill will be codified as an amendment to KRS 342.700.
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 60 - This resolution directs the
Interim Joint Committee on Labor and Industry to perform a study
with respect to the issue of independent contractors and compliance
wi th unemployment insurance laws, income tax withholding, and
workers' compensation laws.
The resolution further directs the
committee to report its findings to the Legislative Research
Commission no later than October I, 1995 and recommend any
legislation necessary to assure compliance by employers and
independent contractors with both federal and state OSHA laws.
This resolution was in response to a fear that many employees are
being treated as independent contractors in· an effort by their
employers to circumvent employment and OSHA laws.
928 - This bill is the workers' compensation reform
legislation.
The bill contained an emergency clause and became
effective on April 4, 1994, the date the Governor signed it. This
bill contains so many changes to prior law, that it will:be divided
into topic areas for the purposes of this outline.
HOUSE BILL

Definitions
The
bill
excludes
compensation
claims
for
psychological, psychiatric or str~ss-related conditions unless they
resuit from a specific physical"· injury.
The so-called mentalmental claims will no be longer be compensable. KRS 342.0011.
Reorganization - All components of workers' compensation, with the
exception of the Uninsured Employers Fund, are now consolidated
within the Kentucky Labor Cabinet.
KRS 336.015.
Board Authority - The Workers' Compensation Board, which heretofore
exercised administrative functions as well as appellate functions,
is limited to deciding appeals from the Administrative Law Judges.
KRS 342.215.
Additional Administrative Law Judge - The bill" provides for an
increase in the number of Administrative Law Judges from 15 to 16
and provides for the appointment of a Chief Administrative Law
Judge.
The Chief Judge shall be responsible for overseeing
caseload assignments and dockets
and otherwise assist the
Commissioner of Workers' Compensation.
KRS 342.230.
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Medical disputes - In those instances in which an injured employee
and the employer are in disagreement with respect to the planned
performance of a medical procedure, such as surgery, the bill
provides for a speedy resolution of the dispute. KRS 342.735.
Commissioner of Workers' Compensation - The Commissioner will be
appointed by the Governor from a list of three nominees submitted
by the Workers' Compensation Nominating Commission.
Senate
confirmation of the appointment is required. KRS 342.213.
Ombudsmen
The bill provides for the creation of ombudsmen
positions within the Department of Workers' Claims. The ombudsmen
are charged with the responsibility of advising all parties of
their rights and obligations, answer inquiries, and perform such
other duties as required by the Commissioner through administrative
regulations. This change will appear in a new section of Chapter
342.
Alternative Dispute Resolution - The bill provides for alternative
dispute resolution.
This change will appear in a new~section of
Chapter 342.
Medical Costs Reduction - Within 100 days after the effective date
of the act, the Commissioner shall promulgate a fee schedule which
effects a 25% reduction in the total medical costs within the
workers' compensation system. KRS 342.033
Litigation-related Fee Schedule
By December 1, 1994, the
Commissioner shall establish a fee schedule for charges by medical
providers for testimony presented and medical reports furnished
within the course of litigation. KRS 342.033.
Twenty-four Hour Coverage - The bill allows for pilot projects for
twenty-four hour coverage if approved by the Commissioner of
Workers' Claims and the Commissioner of Insurance and if In
conformi ty wi th administrative regulations to be promulgated by the
Commissioner of Workers' Claims. This change will be codified in
a new section of Chapter 342.
Permanent Partial Disability - The bill provides for the payment
of
functional
impairment benefits rather than occupational
disability benefits to an injured worker who returns to work at his
or her pre-injury· salary unless the worker establishes a greater
degree of disability as determined by KRS 342.0011 (11)
In that
event, benefits may not exceed two times the functional impairment
rating. KRS 342.730.
If an injured employee establishes an occupational disability
exceeding fifty percent, he or she will receive permanent partial
disability benefits for 520 weeks rather than 425. KRS 342.730.
The provisions of Chapt~r 342 with respect to permanent partial
disability remain the same for those injured employees who do not
return to work at their pre-injury wage.
. -
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Teledyne - The bill provides that only work-related disability may
be taken into consideration in determining whether an employee is
totally disabl~d for purposes of a lifetime award.
KRS 342.730.
Reduction of Benefits
The' bill proves for a 10% per year
reduction in benefits beginning at age 65 until the worker reaches
the age of 70 at which time the benefits will be frozen at 40% of
the original benefit amount. KRS 342.730.
RIB Benefits
RIB benefits.

Working miners will no longer be eligible to receive
KRS 342.732.

Calculation of Benefits - For purposes of computing benefits, the
average weekly wage figure shall remain frozen for two year's, then
remain permanently two years behind the then current average weekly"
wage. KRS 342.143.
Competitive State Fund - The bill provides for the creation of a
competitive state workers'
compensation fund known as the
Employers' Mutual Insurance Company which must be ready to issue
policies no later than September I, 1995. . This change will be
codified in a new section of Chapter 342.
Attorney's Fees - The bill caps attorney's. fees
attorneys at $15,000. KRS 342.320.

for claimants'

Managed Care - The act requires the Commissioner to promulgate
adrninistrati ve regulations incorporatirig managed Care . into the
workers' compensation system. KRS 342.033.
There are many other changes contained in House Bill 928, but the
above changes are the ones which seem to excite the most interest
from practitioners and adrninistratorsin the workers' compensation
system.
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Introduction 1
On June 3, 1993, the united states Department of Labor issued
Regulations (29 CFR Part 825) designed to address questions
unanswered by the text of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
("FMLA") .
The following presentation is an overview of these
significant regulations, together with an analysis of the FMLA's
relationship to the ADA and workers' compensation.
FMLA QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1.

Does this law apply to all employers?

No, employers are covered only if they have employed at least
50 employees for 20 or more calendar workweeks in either of the
last two years. Thus, as of August 5, 1993, an employer must count
the number of employees employed in both calendar years 1992 and
1993 to determine if it employed at least 50 employees during 20 or
more weeks in either year.
In determining whether or not 50 or more employees have been
employed for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar
weeks, the Regulations state that "employ" is intended to mean
maintain on the payroll.
It is thus not necessary that every
employee perform work on each working day to be counted.
The
Regulations also specify that part-time employees and employees on
leaves of absence will be counted, but those on long-term or
indefinite layoff will not.
2.

My home office in another s~ate has over 50 employees,
yet my satellite operation has only 25 employees. Must
I grant a family medical leave to each one of my
employees?

Not necessarily.
The law does not cover any employee of a
site with fewer than 50 employees unless 50 or more employees work
for that same employer wi thin 75 miles of the employee's work site.
The 75-mile distance is based on surface miles on public
roads. Also, the Regulations provide that this judgment concerning
distances and numbers of employees is to be made when the employee
requests the leave, although the employee is then free to renew
his/her request at a later date when circumstances may have
changed.

1Portions of this written text have been reproduced with the
permission of M. Lee Smith Publishers & Printers, which publishes
the Kentucky Employment Law Letter i .. Edi tor Richard S. Cleary f
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald.
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3.

Are all employees eligible for leave?

No. In order to be eligible, an employee must have worked for
his/her employer for at least 12 months, with no less than 1,250
hours of work during that 12-month period.

All hours worked under federal wage/hour guidelines will be
counted toward the 1,250 hour mark.
Salaried exempt employees
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) are presumed to have met
the 1,250 hours or work requirement where no hours-worked records
have been kept.
4.

When is an eligible employee entitled to leave?

There are four circumstances under which an eligible employee
is entitled to family leave:
a)

Birth of a son or daughter and in order to care for the
child;

b)

Placement of a son or daughter with the employee for
adoption or foster care;

c)

Care for the employee's spouse, child, or parent with a
"serious health condition"; or

d)

Care for the employee's own "serious health condition"
that makes the person unable to perform the functions of
the job.

For adoption leave, the Regulations do not require use of
licensed adoption agencies.
However, the definition of "foster
care" requires state action rather than just an informal
arrangement to take care of another person's child.
"Spouse" is to be defined under applicable state law.
Unmarried, domestic partners do not qualify for family leave to
care for their partner ..
The "son or daughter" may be a minor or a child 18 years or
over who is "incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical
disability" as defined under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) •
5.

What is a "serious health condition"?

A "serious health condition" means an illness,
impairment or physical or mental condition involving:
a)

injury,

A period of incapacity or treatment connected with
inpatient care (i.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital,
hospice, or residential medical care facility; or
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b)

A period of incapacity requiring absence of more than 3
calendar days from work, school, or other regular daily
acti vi ties that also involves continuing treatment by (or
supervision of) a health care provider; or

c)

continuing treatment by (or supervision of) a health care
provider for a chronic or long-term health condition that
is incurable or so serious that, if not treated, would
result in a period of incapacity of more than 3 calendar
days; or for prenatal care.

For a "serious health condition, 11 the health care provider may
be required to certify:
a)

For family medical leave, that the employee is 1Ineeded to
care for" the family member; this encompasses both
physical and psychological care;

b)

For employee medical leave, that the employee is unable
to perform the functions of his or her position.
This
encompasses the employee's inability to work at all or to
perform any of the essential functions of the job within
the meaning of the ADA; and .

c)

For leave taken intermittently or on a reduced schedule,
"the medical necessity for such leave."

6.

What does "continuing
provider mean?

treatment"

by

a

health

care

continuing treatment includes:
a)

Two or more visits to a health care provider;

b)

Two or more treatments by a health care practitioner
(e.g., physical therapist) under orders or referral by a
provider; or

c)

One visit to a health care provider that results in a
regimen of continuing treatment under supervision of the
provider; or

d)

A situation where the person has a serious long-term or
chronic incurable condition and the person is under the
continuing supervision of, cbut not necessarily being
actively treated by, a health care provider (e.g.,
persons with Alzheimer's or persons in the late states of
cancer) .

Remember, for any condition other than one that requires
inpatient care, the employee or family member must be receiving
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continuing treatment by a health care provider for the employee to
qualify for leave.
7.

What about voluntary or cosmetic treatments?
serious health conditions?

Can they be

Generally, no, unless inpatient hospital care is required.
However, restorative dental surgery after an accident or removal of
cancerous growths would be included.
Routine physical exams are
explicitly excluded.
Treatments for allergies, stress, and
substance abuse also are included in the definition if all other
conditions of the Regulations are met.
8.

What is a "health care provider"?

A health care provider is either an appropriately licensed
doctor of medicine or osteopathy, or any other person determined by
the secretary of labor to be capable of providing health care
services.
The Regulations define this second category to include only:
podiatrists,
dentists,
clinical psychologists,
optometrists,
chiropractors under certain circumstances, nurse practitioners and
nurse midwives, and Christian Science practitioners listed with the
First Church of Christ, scientist in Boston, Massachusetts. (Where
a second or third certification is being sought by an employer, it
may require that the certification be from a health care provider
other than a Christian Science practitioner.)
9.

How much leave is an eligible employee entitled to take?

An eligible employee may take a total of 12 workweeks of leave
during any l2-month period. The employer may choose from among the
four following methods to determine the "12-month period" in which
the leave entitlement occurs:

(1)

Calendar year;

(2)

Any fixed 12-month "leave year" (e.g., fiscal year; year
based on employee's anniversary date) ;

(3)

12-month period forward from the date any employee's
first FMLA leave begins (e. g., an employee would be
entitled to 12 weeks of leave during the year beginning
on the first date the FMLA leave is taken; the next 12month period would begin the first time leave is taken
after completion of any previous 12-month period); or

(4)

A "rolling" 12-month period measured backward from the
date an employee uses any FMLA leave (may not extend back
before August 5, 1993).
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10.

Must the employer use the same method for determining the
12-month period with every employee?

Yes. The method used to determine the 12-month period must be
applied uniformly to all employees. An employer may change methods
only if it gives at least 60 days' notice to all employees and does
not prevent employees from retaining the full benefit of the 12
weeks of leave during the transition.
11.

By what date must childbirth, adoption, or foster care
leave be concluded?

Leave taken for childbirth, adoption, or foster care placement
must be concluded at the end of the 12-month period following the
date of the birth, adoption, or placement unless otherwise
permitted by the employer or state law.
12.

We have many families who work for us.
Is each family
member entitled to a full 12-week leave each year?

Generally, yes. However, a husband and wife who work for
same employer may take only 12 weeks of leave in the aggregate
the birth of a child, adoption, or foster placement, or for
care of a sick parent (not parent-in-law). For the employee's
or a child's serious heal th condition, each parent would
entitled to the full 12 weeks.
13.

the
for
the
own
be

If husband and wife both use a portion of the total 12week leave for the birth of a child, adoption, or foster
care placement, are they entitled to take any more leave
in the event of personal illness, or for the care of a
sick child or the other spouse?

Yes. Each spouse would be entitled to the difference between
the amount he or she has taken individually and 12 weeks.
14.

Can the employer require that" the 12-week leave period be
taken all at once or is the employee entitled to use it
intermittently?

For birth of a child, adoption, or foster placement, an
employer may decide to require that the 12-week period be taken at
one time. However, an eligible employee who requests the leave due
to the serious health condition of the employee or a spouse, child,
or parent may take the leave intermi ttently or on a reduced
schedule leave when medically necessary.
"Intermittent leave" is
defined as leave taken in separate blocks of time for a single
illness or injury and may include leave of periods from an hour or
more to several weeks.
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15.

What is "reduced schedule leave"?

"Reduced schedule leave" is a leave schedule that reduces an
employee's usual number of working hours per workweek or hours per
workday. While there is no limit on the size of a leave increment
of an intermittent or reduced schedule leave, an employer may limit
such leave increments to the shortest period of time used by its
payroll system to account for absences or use of leave.
16.

Are there any protections for the employer when an
employee requests an intermittent leave or a reduced
schedule leave?

Yes, a few.
If the employee's need for intermittent or
reduced schedule leave is foreseeable based on planned medical
treatment, the employee must make a reasonable effort to schedule
the treatment so as not to IIdisrupt unduly the employer's
operation. II
The employer also has the option of temporarily
transferring the employee to an available alternative job that
better accommodates the necessary periods of leave than the
employee's regular position.
The employee must be qualified to
perform the alternative job and the job must have equivalent pay
and benefits.
It is important to note that transfer to an
<alternative position may require compliance with an existing
collective bargaining agreement, federal law such as the ADA, and
state law.
17.

How is the amount of used leave determined where an
employee takes leave intermittently or on a reduced
schedule?

Only the amount of leave actually taken may be counted toward
the 12 weeks of leave entitlement (e.g., 8 hour days: 4 hours of
leave = 1/2 week of leave each week affected).
Leave for employees who work part-time schedules or variable
hours is determined on a pro rata basis by comparing the new
schedule with the employee's normal schedule (e.g., 30 hours per
week: 10 hours of leave = 1/3 of a week).
For employees whose schedules vary from week to week, a weekly
average of the hours worked over the 12 weeks prior to the
beginning of the leave period is used to calculate the normal
workweek.
18.

Where leave is unpaid, mayan employer deduct hourly
amounts from an employee'S salary without affecting the
employee'S exempt status under the Fair Labor Standards
Act?

Yes. An employer may deduct from the exempt employee's salary
for any hours taken as intermittent or reduced schedule FMLA leave
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within a workweek without affecting the employee's exempt status
for purposes of the FLSA.
19.

Are employees entitled to pay for the time they are on
leave?

No, but if the employer offers paid vacation, personal leave,
family leave, sick or medical leave, then the employee may choose
or the employer may require the employee to sUbstitute any such
accrued paid leave as applies for all or any-part of the l2-week
period. Unless the employer permits otherwise, paid family leave
may be substi tuted only under circumstances permi tted by the
employer's family leave plan.
Only paid leave under circumstances which qualify as FMLA
leave counts against the 12-weekleave period. For example, paid
sick leave used for a medical condition not considered to be a
serious health condition does not count against the 12 weeks' leave
entitlement.
An employee using paid leave must comply only with the
employer's requirements for use of paid leave and not the more
stringent FMLA notice or certification requirements unless the
employee wishes to extend a paid leave period with unpaid FMLA
leave; then the notice and certification requirements apply as of
the first date of the leave period.
20.

Does the employer designate whether the leave is paid or
unpaid?

Yes.
It is the employer's responsibility in all cases to
designate at the time of the leave request whether the leave is
paid or unpaid, whether it is FMLA-qualifying (based on what the
employee tells the employer), and whether any paid leave must be
substituted for unpaid leave.
21.

Must the employer continue the employee1s benefits during
the leave period?

An employer must maintain the employee's insurance coverage
under any group health plan throughout the period the employee is
out on leave under this law. Coverage under the plan must be the
same as though the employee were not on leave.
An employee may
choose not to retain health coverage during FMLA leave but must be
reinstated to coverage upon return on the same terms as prior to
taking the leave, Le., no qualifying period, physical examination,
or exclusion of pre-existing conditions.
Where an employee has
informed the employer of intent not to return from leave, the
employee fails to return from leave or the- employee has exhausted
FMLA leave entitlement, the employer's obligation to maintain
health benefits ceases unless COBRA applies or the employee is a
"key" employee as defined below.
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22.

How may employees on FMLA leave pay their share of health
benefit premiums?

If the leave is paid, the employee's share of premiums must be
paid by the method normally used during any paid leave. If leave
is unpaid, the employer may require payment at the same time as it
would be made if by payroll deduction, on the same schedule as
under COBRA, in accordance with a cafeteria plan, according to the
employer's existing rules for payment by employees on IIleave
without pay" as long as such rules do not require prepayment, or
any other system voluntarily agreed to by the employer and
employee.
23.

What happens if the employee fails to make timely health
plan premium payments?

An employer may discontinue health insurance coverage if the
employee's premium payment is more than 30 days late. However, the
employee's failure to pay does not change any other obligations the
employer has under the law, e.g., reinstatement of the employee's
coverage/benefits upon return from leave equivalent to those the
employee would have had if leave had not been taken or premium
payment(s) had not been missed.
24.

May the employer recover premiums it paid for maintaining
"group health plan" coverage during FMLA leave?

Yes. Besides the circumstances discussed at 21, 22, and 23,
an employer may recover any such premiums paid on the employee's
behalf if he or she fails to return to work after FMLA leave has
been exhausted, except where the failure to return is due to:
(1)

The continuation, recurrence, or onset of a serious
health condition, unless the employer requests that the
employee provide medical certification from the health
providers of the employee· or the employee's family
members within 30 days, and the employee fails to do so.

(2)

Other circumstances beyond the employee's control, e.g.,
the employee's spouse's unexpected transfer to a job
location more than 75 miles from the employee's worksite;
a serious health condition of a relative or individual
other than an immediate family member, requiring the
employee to provide care; the employee's layoff while on
leave i the employee's status as a "keyll employee as
defined in Question 28.

In all other circumstances, the employer may recover both its
share and the employee's share of the health benefit premiums that
the company paid during the course of the leave. No health benefit
payments may be recovered for any periods of paid leave.
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25.

What means may the employer use for recovering health
insurance premium payments made for the non-returning
employee?

Under Kentucky Wage-Hour Law, if a written authorization is
signed by the employee, an employer may deduct the amount due from
any sums owed to the employee, e.g., vacation pay, final paycheck,
etc.
A self-insured employer may only recover its share of
allowable "premiums" as would be calculated under COBRA, excluding
the 2 percent administrative fee.

26.

Is the employee guaranteed the same job upon returning
from leave?

Generally, yes, but where such is not possible, the employee
may be given an equivalent position involving equivalent employment
~enefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.

27.

What is an equivalent position?

An equivalent position is one having the same pay, benefits,
and working conditions, including privileges, perquisi tes, and
status, as well as the same or substantially similar duties and
responsibilities
entailing
substantially
equivalent
skill,
responsibility, and authority.
The employee is also entitled to
any new or additional benefits not dependent upon seniority or
accrual during the leave period. An employee must also be given a
reasonable opportunity to fulfill job requirements upon return to
work where the employee's special qualifications for the position
may have lapsed during the employee's leave.

28.

What is a 1Ikey" employee?

A "key" employee is any salaried employee among the highest
paid 10 percent of all salaried and non-salaried, eligible and
ineligible employees within 75 miles of his or her worksite. If a
"key" employee's job restoration would cause "substantial and
grievous economic injury" to the operations of the employer, the
employer need not reinstate the employee following the expiration
of leave.
The determination of whether a salaried employee is among the
highest paid 10 percent must be made at'the time of the request for
leave.
In determining which employees are "key," year-to-date
'earnings (wages, premium pay, incentive pay, all bonuses already
earned) are divided by weeks worked by the employee, including
those weeks in which leave is taken.
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29.

What does
mean?

"substantial

and grievous

economic

injury"

The test is not whether the employee's absence will cause such
harm or injury, but instead whether restoring the employee to his
or her position will have that effect. Factors used in determining
sUbstantial and grievous economic injury include the employer's
ability to replace the "key" employee on a temporary basis i whether
permanent replacement is unavoidable; and, if so, what effect it
would have on company operations to reinstate the employee in an
equivalent position.
Minor inconveniences and costs that the
employer would experience in the normal course of doing business
would not constitute "substantial and grievous economic injury."
30.

What are the employer's duties with respect to "key"
employees?

The employer must provide written notice to the employee at
the time of the leave request that the employee qualifies as a
"key" employee. No later than the commencement of the employee's
leave, the employer must also fully inform the employee of the
potential consequences relative to reinstatement and maintenance of
health benefits if the employer believes it is likely that the
"key" employee will not be reinstated because of substantial and
grievous economic injury to the employer's operations. Failure to
provide timely notice will result in the employer's loss of its
right to deny restoration for any reaspn.
31.

What must the employer's notice contain?

The employer must serve notice, ei ther in person or by
certified mail, stating the basis for the employer's finding that
sUbstantial and grievous economic injury will result.
If the
employee is already on leave, the notice must provide a reasonable
time to opt to return from the leave.
Unless the "key" employee indicates that he or she \vill not
return to work after notice of non-restoration of his or her
position, the employer is obligated to maintain health benefits and
cannot recover its cost of health benefit premiums paid under the
FMLA leave provisions. A "key" employee who opts to continue leave
after notification of non-restoration of his or her position may
seek reinstatement at the exhaustion of the leave period. At this
point, the employer must determine whether substantial and grievous
economic injury still exists and so notify the employee on writing.
32.

Is an employer obliged to notify employees
rights under this law?

of their

Yes.
Covered employers must post a notice describing the
Act's provisions.
Employers must also furnish notice and
information to employees on their rights and obligations for FMLA
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leave through applicable employee handbooks or other written
policies used by an employer. If an employer does not have written
policies, manuals, or handbooks, the employer must provide separate
written guidance about the law to its employees at the time they
request leave.
In addition, when an employee applies for FMLA leave, the
employer must provide a detailed explanation of the employee's
+ights and obligations which may apply particularly to that
employee's situation, such as any requirement to furnish medical
certification
sUbstantiating
a
serious
health
condition,
arrangements for paying the employee IS portion of the insurance
premiums during the leave period, his/her status as a "keyll
employee, and any requirement for medical certification of fitness
to return to work.
33.

Must the employee notify
family and medical leave?

the

employer before

taking

Only where the need for the leave is foreseeable due to
childbirth, foster care, or planned adoption, or for planned
medical treatment. In such cases, employees are generally required
to give at least 30 days' advance notice or as much notice as
possible.
There is no notice requirement for an unforeseeable
leave, but an employer may require notice provided as soon as
possible under the circumstances, ordinarily within one or two
business days of when the employee learns of the need for such
leave.
Verbal and even telephonic notice to the employer is
sufficient. An employee's spouse or other family member may give
such notice if the employee is unable to do so due to a serious
health condition.
34.

Does the employer have a right to verify the existence of
a "serious health condition?!'

Yes.
The employer may require certification from a health
care provider to support FMLA leave requests to care for a serious
health condition. Employees must provide such certification in lIa
timely manner," defined as within 15 calendar days unless
impracticable.
Employers must inform employees in writing that
such certification will be required.
35.

Mayan employer question a medical certification?

Yes.
If there is reason to doubt the validity of the
certification, the employer may get a second opinion at its own
expense.
The second health provider may not be employed on a
regular basis by the employer.
If a conflict exists between the
first and second opinions, the employer and employee may approve
getting the opinion of a third medical provider at the employer's
expense. Both parties must act in "good faith. II If good faith is
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lacking on either party's part, the medical opinion unfavorable to
that party's position will be binding.
If an employee fails to provide timely certification within 15
days (where practicable) of the employer's request and the need for
such leave was foreseeable, the leave request may be denied until
the certification is produced.
If the need for leave is not
foreseeable, the employee must still attempt to provide the
certification within 15 days of the employer's request, or as soon
thereafter as practicable.
36.

Are recertifications permissible?

Yes, as long as they are requested on a reasonable basis. The
employer may request such recertification not more than once every
30 days unless (1) the employee requests an extension of leave; (2)
changed circumstances occur regarding the illness or injury; or (3)
the employer receives information that casts doubt upon the
continuing validity of the most recentccertification.
37.

Can an employer require periodic reports from the
employee on his present status and/or intent to return to
work?

Yes. However, if the employee states an intention to return
to work, even if the statement is somehow qualified, he/she remains
enti tIed to the remainder of the leave. Where an employee gives an
unequivocal notice of intent not to return to work, so ends the
employer's obligations to reinstate the employee as well as to
restore the employee as well as to restore the employee's medical
insurance coverage (subject to COBRA).
38.

Can the employer require medical evidence
employee is capable of returning to work?

that

the

Yes, as long as the employer's policy is applied uniformly to
all similarly situated employees and complies with ADA and similar
laws, or any applicable collective bargaining agreement. Note that
an employer may seek such fitness-for-duty certification only with
regard to the particular health condition that caused the
employee's need for leave. Also, the certification need only be a
simple statement that the employee can "return to work. Of course,
an employer must comply with ADA requirements that any return-towork physical be job-related. Notice of the need for a "fitnessfor-duty" certification must be given by the employer either at the
time the leave is requested or immediately after the leave
commences. No second or third fitness-for-duty certifications may
be required.
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39.

How will the Act be enforced?

Both individual employees and the Department of Labor can
bring suit against an employer who doe3 not comply with the Act.
40.

What is the statutory time limit for bringing an action?

A court action must be brought within two years of the date of
violation except where the violation is willful, in which case the
action must be brought within three years of the date of the last
event constituting the violation.
41.

What happens if an employer is notified of a violation of
the posting requirement?

If the Department of Labor determines that the posting
violation is willful, a notice of penalty (of as much as $100 per
affected employee) will be served on the employer in person or by
certified mail.
42.

Mayan employer appeal the penalty assessment for willful
violation of the posting requirement?

Yes. A review may be obtained from the Wage and Hour regional
administrator for the region in which the violation occurred by
filing a petition in writing containing. the legal and factual bases
for the petition wi thin 15 days of receipt of the notice of
penalty. The decision resulting from the petition constitutes the
final order of the secretary.
43.

What happens if the employer does not pay the penalty
assessment?

The regional administrator may seek recovery of the unpaid
final order along with interest and penalties. The final order may
also be referred to the solicitor of labor for collecting, or the
secretary of labor may file suit in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
44.

What records must be kept to comply with FMLA?

•

Records containing basic payroll information similar to
that required under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

•

Dates of FMLA leave taken by the employee to include
requests for leave, etc. (and leave must be designated as
FMLA leave). The records must not include leave provided
under state law or an empl9yer's plan not covered by
FMLA.
Where leave is taken in increments of less than
one full day, a record must be kept of the hours of the
leave.
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•

Copies of employee notices of leave given to the employer
and all notices, general and specific, given to the
employees relative to FMLA leave.

•

Any documents describing employee benefits or employer
policies and practices regarding the taking of paid and
unpaid leave.

•

Premium payments of employee benefits.

•

Records relative to any dispute between the employee and
employer regarding matters pertainin~ to FMLA leave.

•

Records and documents relating to medical certification,
recertification, or medical histories of the employee or
the employee's family members.
(Such records should be
treated as confidential, maintained in separate files,
and released on a "need to know" basis.)

•

Records must be kept for a period of three years, and an
employer may not be requested to submit books or records
for audit more than once a year unless the Department of
Labor has reasonable cause to believe a violation exists.

45.

What if an employer is not subject to the FLSA
recordkeeping regulations for purposes of minimum wage or
overtime compliance?

In that case, an employer need not keep a record of actual
hours worked as long as:
(1)

Eligibility for leave is presumed in the case of
employees who have been employed for at least 12 months;
and

(2)

The employer and employee agree on an employee's normal
schedule or average weekly hours worked, and such
schedule is reduced to a written agreement where an
employee takes leave intermittently or on a reduced
schedule basis.

46.

How do other laws, employer practices, and collective
bargaining agreements affect employee rights under FMLA?

An employer must observe any employment benefit program or
plan that provides greater family or medical leave rights than
those under FMLA. Any provisions of a law or collective bargaining
agreement which diminishes rights under the law are superseded by
the FMLA.
Where employers are also covered by state law, such as under
maternity leave statutes, etc., and the leave requested qualified
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under both FMLA and the applicable state law, the leave used counts
against the employee's entitlement under both laws. The converse
is also true. If applicable state or local laws provide for leaves
which do not qualify as FMLA leave (e.g., for care of a parent-inlaw), such leave must be given in addition to the 12-week FMLA
leave.
47.

What about FMLA leave and the ADA?

Where the employee is "qualified disabled" under the ADA, the
employer must make reasonable accommodations but at the same time
afford an employee his or her FMLA rights.
For example, if an employee became disabled, a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA might be accomplished by providing the
employee with a part-time job with no health benefits.
However,
FMLA would permit an employee to work a reduced schedule leave
until 12 weeks of leave were used, witbhealth benefits maintained
during this period. At the end of the FMLA leave entitlement, an
employer is required to reinstate the employee in the same or an
equivalent position to that which the employee held when leave
commenced, with equivalent pay and benefits. The employer's FMLA
obligations would be satisfied if the employer offered the employee
an equivalent full-time position. If the employee were unable to
perform the equivalent position because of a disability, and the
employee had exhausted his or her FMLA entitlement, the ADA might
permit or require the employer to make a reasonable accommodation
at that time by placing the employee in a part-time job, with only
those benefits provided to part-time employees.
If FMLA entitles an employee to leave, an employer may not, in
lieu of FMLA leave entitlement, require an employee to take a job
with a reasonable accommodation. However, ADA may require that an
employer offer an employee the opportunity to take such a position.
If an employer requires certifications of an employee's
fitness for duty to return to work, as permitted by FMLA under a
uniform policy, it must comply with the ADA requirement that a
fitness-for-duty physical be job-related.
/:;

48.

What about FMLA leave and workers' compensation?

The
primary
conflict between the
FMLA
and workers'
compensation involves light duty work and temporary total
disability benefits.
If the FMLA qualifying condition is in
connection with a workers' compensation claim, the employer may
attempt to return the empoyee to work in a light duty position,
thus decreasing workers' compensation payments. However, under the
FMLA the employee may be entitled to refuse the light duty work and
continue on unpaid leave.
Of course, any such refusal should
result in the termination of temporary total disability payments.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Overview. In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") primarily in response to
growing concerns regarding the inadequate standards and safeguards
then applicable to the establishment, operation and funding of
employee benefit plans. ERISA §2, 29 U.S.C.S. §1001b.
While the
initial congressional focus centered around abuses in the area of
retirement plans, ERISA coverage was extended to encompass other
employee benefit plan programs as well.
ERISA's broad scope can easily be detected by reviewing its
table of contents.
Title I is intended to protect employees and
plan participants by establishing minimum standards regarding (i)
reporting and disclosure (ERISA §§101-111, 29 U.S.C.S. §§10211031); (ii) participation and vesting (ERISA §§201-211, 29 U.S.C.S.
§§1051-1061)i (iii) minimum funding standards (ERISA 55301-308, 29
U.S.C.S. §51081-1086) i (iv) fiduciary responsibility (ERISA 55401414, 29 U.S.C.S. §§1101-1114) and; (v) administration and enforcement (ERISA 5S501-515, 29 U.S.C.S. 551131-1145).
Substantive additions to Title I of ERISA were enacted in the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA")
imposing continuation coverage requirements under group health
plans. COBRA health care continuation requirements are contained
in Part 6 of Title I of ERISA. (ERISA §§601-608, 29 U.S.C.S.
§§1161-1168) .
Corresponding tax provisions are contained in
section 4980B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
("Code").
In addition to participant rights and employer obligations,
Title II of ERISA also governs the tax treatment associated with
employee benefit plans.
In many instances you will find that a
particular requirement will be codified in both the provisions of
the Code and the Labor provisions of the united States Code. This
means that the requirement is imposed as a condi tion of tax
qualification and the employer or the participant has enforceable
duties or rights.
Examples include minimum vesting standards
(ERISA 5203, Code S411), the exclusive benefit rule (ERISA
S402 (c) (1), Code S401(c) (1», written plan requirements (ERISA
§402(b), Code 5401(a», benefit distributions forms (ERISA S205,
Code §401(a) (11) and 417), and benefit accrual requirements (ERISA
5204, Code S411).
Title II further establishes registration and information
requirements, a declaratory judgement procedure relating the
qualification of retirement plans and internal operational
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requirements for the Internal
employee benefit issues.

Revenue

Service

in

monitoring

Title III of ERISA governs the jurisdiction, administration
and enforcement of employee benefit plans, establishes a Joint
Pension, Profit Sharing and Employee Stock ownership Plan Task
Force, commissions other Congressional studies involving employee
benefit issues, and establishes a Joint Board For The Enrollment of
Actuaries.
A comprehensive federal insurance plan for the termination of
defined benefit employee pension benefit plans is included in ERISA
Title IV.
Passage of ERISA created the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, which is charged with the responsibility of monitoring
the termination insurance program. Plans subject to Title IV are
required to pay annual premiums and are subject to strict termination procedures. Addi tionally, employers maintaining plans subj ect
to Title IV also risk exposure for the under funding of terminated
plans.
1.2 Plan Types. Most practitioners view ERISA as mandating
legal requirements for "qualified" retirement plans.
In fact,
employee pension benefit plans providing retirement benefits are
governed by ERISA and probably receive more attention under ERISA
than other plans.
Employee pension benefit plans can either be
"qualified" or "non-qualified."
Qualified retirement plans
entitle plan sponsors,
the plan and plan participants to
preferential tax treatment. Non-qualified retirement plans do not
afford the same degree of preferential tax treatment but are
generally not subject to the stringent qualification rules
otherwise imposed on qualified plans.
Many of the provisions of ERISA also apply to welfare plans,
which are plans that.are established and maintained for the purpose
of providing medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death, unemployment,
vacation, apprenticeship or other training programs, day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services. During the
infancy stages of ERISA employers, employees and many governmental
agencies virtually ignored or were unaware of the application of
ERISA to employee welfare benefit plans.
As a result· of the
developing crisis in the health care industry our national focus is
now being shifted towards welfare benefit plans.
Undoubtedly,
mounting pressures resulting from the budget deficit will require
a decline in federally funded benefits such as Medicare. Assuming
such a trend, it is likely that Congress will implement even more
far reaching changes in the welfare benefit plan area in the
future.
1.3 Legal Authorities. In reviewing potential ERISA claims
it is important to note that ERISA's provisions impose restrictions
applicable to both sUbstantive claims as well as the tax treatment
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associated with employee benef i tplans. In many instances there is
an overlap between legal requirements imposed upon a plan, giving
participants rights under the plan, as well as detrimental tax
treatment for failure to abide by tax rules. Overall, it is easy
to view ERISA as two components -- tax and non:-:-tax. Tax components
of ERISA are embodied in 29 U.S~C.while the tax provisions are
embodied in the Internal Revenue Code .'
Because of the overlap of tax and labor provisions, on August
10, 1978 the President issued ERISA Reorganization Plan No. 4 for
the purpose of clarifying jurisdiction of issues relating to the
Department of Treasury and the Department of Labor.
2.

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS

2.1
Administrative Enforcement.
section 502 of ERISA (29
U.S.C.S. §1132) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to investigate
civil and criminal violations of ERISA and related laws and to
forward violations to the Attorney General for appropriate action.
(a) The Secretary may sue to enjoin any act or practice
which violates the reporting and disclosure requirements, or the
participation, vesting and funding rules of ERISA, or to obtain any
other appropriate relief necessary to enforce those rules. ERISA
§502(a) (5) i 29 U.S.C.S. §1132(a) (5).
(b) The Secretary may not bring an action for equitable
relief for violation of the participation, vesting or funding rules
of ERISA in the case of a qualified plan, or a plan for which an
application for qualification is pending, unless requested to do so
by the Secretary of the Treasury. ERISA §502(b) (1) (A) i 29 U.S.C.S.
§1132 (b) (1) (A) .
(c) Participants, beneficiaries or plan fiduciaries may
request that the Secretary exercise enforcement authority with
regard to the participation, vesting or funding rules.
ERISA
§ 5 02 (b) (1) (B) i 29 U. S • C. S • S113 2 (b) (1) (B) •
(d) The Secretary may sue a plan fiduciary in order to
secure restitution to the plan for any losses resulting from a
breach of fiduciary duty and to seek the removal of the breaching
fiduciary.
(e)
The PBGC has authority to make investigations and
may sue in federal district court for appropriate legal and/or
equitable relief in order to enforce the termination insurance
provisions of ERISA. ERISA S4003; 29 U.S.C.S. S1303.
(f) The Department of Labor's ("DOL") preferred method
of handling ERISA violations is through voluntary compliance unless
immediate action is necessary in order to preserve plan assets or
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to protect participants' rights.
(g) In d~tel:;'1nining whether immediate action is necessary
the DOL will consider . such factors as the flagrancy of the
violation and the threat of loss of plan assets or records during
the voluntary compliance period.
(h)
Judicial review of DOL regulatory actions is
governed by the Administrative Procedures Act which is specifically
incorporated into the labor provisions of Title I of ERISA.
(i) Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over actions for judicial review brought under Title I of ERISA.
Such actions are to be brought in the district court in the
district where the plan has its principal office or in the District
of Columbia federal district court.
ERISA §502(f), 29 U.S.C.S.
§1132(f).
2.2

Private Actions.
(a)

Right to Bring Action

(i)
A fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary
may bring a private action under sections 502(a) (1) and (a) (3) of
ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. §1132) in order to enjoin any act or practice
which violates the: provisions of ' Title I of ERISA, the rules-for
the protection of employee benefit rights, or the terms of the
plan, or in order to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to
redress such violations.
(ii)
A civil action may be brought· by . a plan
participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due, enforce rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan. ERISA §502{a)(1); U.S.C.S.
§1132 (a) (1) .
(iii)
section 510 of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. § 1140)
prohibits anyone from discharging, fining, 'suspending, expelling,
disciplining or discriminating against a participant or beneficiary
for exercising rights protected by ERISA or taking part in a legal
proceeding under its provisions.
(b)

Standing to Sue

(i)
outside parties who deal with an employee
benefit plan do not have standing to sue to enforce their rights
~gainst the plan under ERISA.

(iii)
The courts have generally held that a plan
participant who has received a lump sum distribution is no longer
a participant with standing to bring suit under ERISA because such
participant is no longer eligible to receive benefits under the
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plan.
In an action by a former pension plan participant the
Seventh Circuit, while holding that the participant lacked
standing, stated that there was "merit to the argument that a
former employee who has already received vested benefits should be
allowed to bring an action within a reasonable amount of time
against the administrator for failure to provide information and in
order to ascertain the accuracy of the amount already received."
The court, however, refused to find standing as the participant
waited three years from her date of termination to file suit.
Winchester v. Pension Committee of Michael Reese Health Plan, etc.,
942 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1991).

(iii) The Fourth Circuit, invoking its prerogative
to create federal common law under ERISA, held that the federal
courts have jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a plan
administrator under Section 502(a) (1) (B) of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S.
§1132).
The court held that while section 502(a) (1) (B) of ERISA
provides a federal cause of action only for participants or
beneficiaries, an ERISA action governed by federal common law
arises under federal law where the issues in dispute are of central
concern to the federal statute.
Provident Life and Accident
Insurance Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1990) cert. denied,
111 S.ct. 512 (1990).
(iv)
In Kennedy v. Connecticut General Life Ins.
Co., 924 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1991), the court held that a health
care provider has standing under ERISA to sue for benefits assigned
to him by a participant in an employee welfare benefit plan. The
court held that in such a situation the health care provider was a
beneficiary within the meaning of ERISA.
(v) The court in Hawaii Teamsters v. City Express
Inc., 751 F.Supp. 1426 (D. Haw. 1990), held that where a union is
the bargaining representative of. plan participants, the union has
standing to sue under ERISA to vindicate rights under the plan on
behalf of its members.
(vi) The Supreme Court recently held in Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 60 U.S.L.W. 4242 (March 24, 1992),
that the term "employee",
as used in ERISA,
incorporates
traditional agency law principles for identifying employer-employee
relationships. The court held that where a statute, such as ERISA,
does not define the term "employee," it is presumed that Congress
intended an agency law definition unless clearly indicated
otherwise.
The Court adopted a multi-factor common law test for
determining who is an "employee" and held that all of the incidents
of the employment relationship must be assessed and weighed, with
no one factor being. decisive, in order to determine whether an
individual will be considered an employee under ERISA.
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2.3

statute of Limitations.

(a)
ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations
period for suits brought to enforce its provisions except for
actions brought for breach of fiduciary duty or for actions under
the special provisions relating to multi-employer plans.
(b)
The controlling limitation period will be that
contained in the most analogous state statute of limitations.
Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Committee, 966F2d 190 (6th Cir.
1992), applying an ohio 15 year state statue in a benefit claim
case.
The courts will apply the statute of limitations of the
state in which the operative events relating to the cause of action
occurred.
(c) Generally, a participant's cause of action is said
to arise when the participant becomes aware of the facts necessary
to state a claim, not when the participant discovers that he or she
has a possible legal claim based upon those facts.
(d)
According to section 413 of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S.
S1113) claims based upon a breach of fiduciary duty, absent fraud
or concealment, may not be brought after the earlier of;
(i) 3 years after the complaining party has actual
knowledge of the breach or after the filing of a report with the
Secretary of Labor from which the complaining party could have
reasonably been expected to obtain knowledge of the breach; or
(ii) 6 years after the date of the last action
constituting a breach, or, in the case of an omission, the last
date by which a fiduciary could have acted to cure the breach.
Ziegler v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1990), held that not all actions for breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA require that harm occur as a result of the breach
before they will accrue.
The court stated that the language of
section 413 of ERISA clearly states that actual knowledge, and not
harm, triggers the limitations period.
The court applied a two
part test in determining when the statute of limitations period
should commence, looking first at the time that the alleged breach
or violation occurred and secondly at the time that the plaintiff
had actual knowledge of such breach or violation. The court noted
that to require actual harm before an action may be brought for
breach of fiduciary duty would prevent the prosecution of breaches
of fiduciary duty which Congress intended should be prosecuted in
enacting ERISA.
Such breaches include the failure to perform
fiduciary duties for the exclusive benefit of participants and
their beneficiaries or the transfer of plan assets to parties in
interest.
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Another case which recognized the stringent requirement of
actual knowledge, not merely constructive knowledge, for barring
claims against fiduciaries prior to the expiration of the six year
statute of limitations was Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 15 E.B.C. 1095
(3rd Cir. 1992). The court held that "actual knowledge of a breach
or violation" as required under section 413 of ERISA requires that
a plaintiff have actual knowledge of all material facts necessary
to understand that some claim exists.
Such facts might include
necessary opinions of experts, knowledge of a transaction's harmful
consequences, or actual harm.
In the case of fraud or concealment, fiduciaries remain
vulnerable to suit for a period of six years from the discovery of
their breach or violation.
The courts are divided as to whether
the term "fraud or concealment" refers to the action giving rise to
the ERISA claim or only to actions by the fiduciary to hide the
breach.
2.4

Pre-Litigation Claims Procedure.

Section 503 of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. §1133) requires that
every employee benefit plan establish special appeal procedures
which provide for written notice of a claim denial to the
participant or beneficiary making the claim for benefits and a
reasonable opportunity for a full and fair review of the decision
denying the request.
Many courts require the exhaustion of interplan claim
procedures as a prerequisite to bringing a suit for benefits under
ERISA. In Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1991),
the court held that a plan participant who is not provided with a
written denial of benefits, as required under ERISA, may still be
required to appeal the claim denial before proceeding in federal
court.
The court held that even though a written denial of
benefits was not issued, the participant, who had a copy of the
plan document, was notified of the denial and could have sought
review.
Springer v. Wal-Mart Associates' Group Health Plan, 908
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1990), held that a plan administrator's refusal
to process a claim did not excuse a participant from the
requirement that the participant exhaust the administrative
remedies available under the plan prior to filing a suit for
benefits.
This prerequisite may be waived if the appeals procedures
would be futile or if there has been a wrongful denial of access to
such procedures.
In Curry v. Contract Fabricatory. Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan, 891 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1990), the court permitted a
participant to maintain an action under ERISA for the denial of
benefits despite the participant's failure to exhaust the plan's
administrative remedies. The plan administrator failed to provide
the participant with plan documents describing the remedies
available under the plan or to document the reasons for the denial
of the participant I s claims.
The court held that the plan
administrator's actions denied the participant meaningful access to
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the review process and therefore exhaustion
administrative remedies was not required.

of

the

plan's

In Graphic Communications v. GCIU - Employer Retirement
Plan, 917 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1990), the plan stated that a claim
for benefits would initially be reviewed by the plan administrator
whose decision could then be appealed to the fund trustees. If a
participant was dissatisfied with the trustees decision, a
participant could take the remaining step in the plan's
administrative process which was final and binding arbitration. A
participant in the plan declined to arbitrate and instead filed
suit in Federal District Court under section 502 of ERISA (29
U.S.C.S. §1132) contending that the arbitration provisions in the
plan were unenforceable.
The court held that judicial review of
the benefit claim denial was unavailable due to the participant's
failure to follow the plan's mandatory arbitration procedures. The
court stated that arbitration clauses are unenforceable when the
claim in question is one that arises under ERISA, but are
enforceable where the claim involves plan interpretation.
The
court held that ERISA does not forbid enforcement of an agreement
to arbitrate questions of coverage under ERISA plans.
2.5

Jurisdiction and Venue.

(a)
Except in the case of a civil action under ERISA
section 502 (1) (B) by a participant or beneficiary to recover
benefits, enforce rights or to clarify rights under a plan, Federal
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions
brought by participants, beneficiaries or plan fiduciaries. ERISA
section 502(e) (1).
(b) The federal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction
with state courts in actions brought by participants and
beneficiaries to recover benefits, enforce rights or clarify
rights.
(c)
Venue for civil actions under ERISA is the place
where the plan is administered, where the breach that is the
subject of the suit occurred, or where the defendant resides or may
be found.
ERISA section 502(e) (2).
2.6

Availability of Jury Trial.

(a)
ERISA has generally been regarded as an equitable
statute, and since it does not expressly provide for jury trials,
the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial has generally been
held not to apply to ERISA actions.
(b) There is, however, a split of authority whether jury
trials are required under the Seventh Amendment. The Third, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, and a district court in the
First Circuit have ruled that neither ERISA nor the Seventh
Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in actions to
recover benefits.
(c)

Supreme Court cases have indicated that remedies
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other than equitable ones may be available under ERISA.
In
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S.ct. 948 (1989), the
Court compared benefit claims to breach of contract actions which
are legal in nature, and in Ingersole-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111
S.ct. 478 (1990), the Court indicated that compensatory damages, a
legal remedy, are within the scope of ERISA.
In light of these
developments, courts have begun to re-examine the issue of the
right to a jury trail under ERISA.
3.

PREEXPTION

3.1

The Preemption Clause.

ERISA section 514 (a) provides in part: "Except as provided in
sUbsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and
title IV shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in
section 4(a) [29 USCS § 1003(a)] and not exempt under section 4(b)
[29 USCS § 1003 (b)]."
This statute, known as the "preemption
clause," cannot, according to its terms, supersede state laws if
the employee benefits do not constitute an employee benefit plan.
Assuming that an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a)
and not exempt under section 4(b) of ERISA exists, the question
then becomes whether the state law "relates to" the plan.
The Supreme Court has held that the phrase "relate to" should

pe given a broad common-sense meaning, "such that a state law

relaters] to a benefit plan in the normal sense of. the phrase, if
it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105
S. ct. 2380, 2389 (1985) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983».
In fact, the Court has stated that the
preemption clause was designed to displace all state laws falling
within its scope, even laws that mirror ERISA's SUbstantive
prOV1Slons. Id., 105 S. ct. at 2389 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 9899) .
The Court has emphasized, however, "that the pre-emption
clause is not limited to state laws specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans." See pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 47-48, 107 S. ct. 1549, 1553 (1987) (quoting Shaw, 463
U.S. at 98).
This broad interpretation of the preemption clause is
consistent with the legislative history of the statute, and the
Supreme Court has noted that congressional purpose is the "ultimate
touchstone" in determining whether a state law is preempted by
federal law.
Id. at 45, 107 S. ct. at 1552.
3.2
The Savinq Clause. The preemption clause is qualified
by section 514 (b) (2) (A) of ERISA.
That section, known as the
"saving clause," provides, "Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
nothing in this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance . . . . 11
29 U.S.C.S. S 1144(b) (2) (A) (Law. Co-op. 1990). For a state law to
be "saved" from the application of the preemption clause, it must,
according to the Supreme Court, pass a test which may, depending on
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the facts of the case, have two parts.
The first prong of the
test, which is present in every case, is whether a law "regulates
insurance." To determine whether a law regulates insurance, the
Supreme Court has devised a two-step test. First, it asks whether
the statute in question regulates insurance from a "common-sense
view." See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48, 107 S.
ct. 1549, 1553 (1987).
To pass this test, "a law must not just
have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically
directed toward that industry." See ide at 50, 107 S. ct. at 1554.
The second part of the "regulates insurance" test asks whether the
law at issue meets certain criteria used to determine whether a
particular practice falls within the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
q~ference to the "business of insurance."
Those criteria are:
" [FJirst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured; and third i whether the practice is limited to entities
within the insurance industry. " See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743, 105 S. ct. 2380, 2391 (1985)
(quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129,
102 S. ct. 3002, 3008 (1982»
(emphasis in original). If a state
law passes both the "common-sense" and the McCarran-Ferguson tests,
it will fall under the "regulates insurance" language of the saving
clause.
Even if the state law passes the "regulat [ing] insurance"
hurdle, it still might not be held to be saved from preemption. In
pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52, 107 S. ct. 1549,
1555 (1987), the Court found that because "the state cause of
action seeks remedies for the improper processing of a claim for
benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan, our understanding of the
saving clause must be informed by the legislative intent concerning
the civil enforcement provisions provided by ERISA S 502 (a), 29
u. S. C. § 1132 (a) . " In other words, where the state law at issue is
remedial in nature, the Court found that it had to consider not
only the tests for meeting the "regulates insurance" language of
the saving clause, "but also the role of the saving clause in ERISA
as a whole."
See ide at 51, 107 S. ct. at 1555.
The Court in
pilot found that the civil enforcement scheme set forth in section
502 (a) was intended to be the exclusive remedy for asserting
improper processing of claims, and that this exclusivity would be
undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries could
obtain relief under varying state law remedies that were rejected
by Congress when it crafted ERISA. In holding that the state law
cause of action for improper processing of an insurance claim was
not saved by the saving clause, and was therefore preempted by the
preemption clause, the Court noted that the most important factor
in its decision was Congress' intent that
ERISA's civil
enforcement provision be exclusive. See ide at 52, 54, 57, 107 S.
ct. at 1555-56, 1558. Consequently, in cases where the state law
in question might affect the remedies section of ERISA, it is not
enough that the state law meets the "regulating insurance" test; it
must also pass the "role-of-the-saving-clause-in-ERISA-as-a-whole"
test.
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3.3 The Deemer Clause.
Even if a state law meets all the
applicable requirements of the saving clause test, it still may be
preempted by virtue of section 514(b) (2) (B) of ERISA, known as the
deemer clause. That clause provides:
"Neither an employee benefit plan described in section
4 (a) [29 USCS § 1003 (a)], which is not exempt under
section 4 (b) [29 USCS § 1003 (b)] (other than a plan
established primarily for the purpose of providing death
benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan,
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer •
or to be engaged in the business of
insurance.
• for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies •
[or]
insurance contracts . • . • "
The Supreme Court has interpreted the effect of the deemer
clause: "(I] f a plan is insured, a state may regulate it indirectly
through regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance
contracts; if the plan is uninsured, the state may not regulate
it." See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. ct. 403, 411 (1990). As a
result of the Court's holding in FMC, employers attempting to
implement self-insured plans affecting employees in different
states should not have to confront "conflicting or inconsistent
state and local regulation of employee benefit plans." FMC Corp.,
111 S. ·ct. at 411 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines. Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 99, 103 S. ct. 2890, 2901 (1983»
(quoting remarks of Sen.
Williams).
In summary, preemption analysis can be broken down as follows:'
step one: Determine whether the law at issue relates to an
employee benefits plan. If so, go to step two; if not, the law is
not preempted and the analysis is at an end.
step two: Determine whether the law is saved by the saving
clause.
This determination can consist of one or possibly two
tests:
1.

Does the law regulate insurance? This prong of the
saving clause analysis always applies and consists
of two questions:
(a) Taking a common-sense view
of the saving clause language,
is the law
specifically
directed
towards
the
insurance
industry?, and (b) Does the law meet any or all of
the three McCarran-Ferguson Act factors:
(i)
whether the practice has the effect of transferring
or spreading a policyholder's risk; (ii) whether
the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured;
and (iii) whether the practice is limited to
entities in the insurance industry?
If the law
passes these two tests, it regulates insurance~ It
mayor may not be saved from preemption, however,
depending on whether the second prong of the saving
clause analysis applies and whether the law can
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survive the second prong.
2.

The second prong of the saving clause analysis,
which mayor may not apply depending on the facts
of the case, is whether the law is consistent with
the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole.
In one case, the Supreme Court has held that
allowing a state remedial law to survive preemption
would defeat the civil enforcement scheme of ERISA,
and the court considered this the most important
factor in preempting the law.
If the state law passes all of the saving clause
hurdles, it still must be determined whether or not
the deemer clause preempts the law in spite of the
saving clause.

step three:
Determine whether the state law purporting to
regulate insurance deems an employee benefit plan to be an
insurance company or other insurer or to be engaged in the business
of insurance. If so, the law is preempted by the deemer clause; if
not, the law survives preemption analys is. practically, the deemer
clause will apply to preempt a state law if the law attempts to
regulate plans directly or to regulate self-insured plans directly
or indirectly.
Although the principles set forth above seem relatively
straightforward, they have proved difficult to apply in practice.
3.4

Application of Preemption Tests - Insurance.

One of the landmark cases that dealt directly with health
insurance arrangements was Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.
v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. ct. 2380 (1985). In that case,
the Court considered whether a Massachusetts statute, which
required
minimum
mental
health
benefits
be
provided
to
Massachusetts residents who were insured under a general insurance
policy, an accident or sickness policy, or an employee health-care
plan covering hospital and surgical expenses, was preempted by
ERISA. See ide at 727, 105 S. ct. 2382-83. Because the Attorney
General of Massachusetts found that appellant insurers Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company and Travelers Insurance Company were issuing
policies outside of Massachusetts which failed to provide the
requisite mental health coverage mandated by the statute, and
because the insurance companies reserved the right to challenge the
applicability of the statute to any policy they issued to an ERISA
plan within Massachusetts, he brought suit for declaratory and
~njunctive relief to enforce the statute.
Id. at 734-35, 105 S.
ct. at 2386. The insurers asserted, inter alia, that the mandatedbenefits statute was preempted by ERISA, while Massachusetts argued
that the statute, as applied to insurance companies that se-ll
insurance to ERISA plans, was a law regulating insurance and was
thereby saved by virtue of the saving clause from the operation of
the preemption clause. See ide at 733-34, 105 S. ct. at 2385-86.
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The Court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts had found that the statute related to a benefit plan
and thus would be preempted by ERISA unless it fell under one of
the exceptions to the preemption clause.
The lower court found
that the statute was a law which regulated insurance and therefore
was not preempted by ERISA. It rejected the insurers' claim that
the saving clause was intended only to save "traditional" insurance
laws (such as laws directly regulating insurers and laws regulating
such matters as the way insurance may be sold), finding no such
limitation in ERISA's language. In so finding, however, the lower
court understood the saving clause to apply only to state laws that
were unrelated to ERISA's sUbstantive provisions.
Because ERISA
did not regulate the content of welfare plans, the court declared
that state regulation of insurance that indirectly affected the
content of the plans themselves was not preempted by ERISA.
Further, the lower court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
embodied Congress' intent that federal laws should not be found to
supersede state laws regulating the business of insurance. Because
the statute in question affected insurance and insurance policies,
the court found that it was protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act
and that therefore it was not preempted by ERISA. See ide at 73537, 741, 105 S. ct. at 2387, 2390.
The Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, although it
employed a broader reading of the saving clause. ·See ide at 758,
105 s. ct. at 2399.
In arriving at its ultimate holding that the
statute was not preempted by ERISA, the Court first examined
whether the statute was related to ERISA within the meaning of the
preemption clause.
Noting that the phrase "relate to" was to be
given a broad reading, the Court found that although the statute
was not designated as a benefit plan law, it bore indirectly on but
significantly affected all insured ERISA plans, because it required
them to purchase the mandated benefits specified in the statute
when they purchased certain kinds of insurance policies. Thus, the
Court agreed with the lower court that the statute related to ERISA
plans and thus fell within the preemption clause. See ide at 739,
105 s. ct. at 2388-89.
The Court found that the saving clause saved the statute from
preemption. See ide at 744, 105 S.ct. at 2391. In arriving at its
conclusion, the Court first examined the statute from a common
sense point of view. It noted that because on its face the statute
regulated the terms of certain insurance contracts, it seemed to be
saved from preemption by operation of the saving clause as a law
which regulated insurance. See ide at 740, 105 S.ct. at 2389. The
Court stated that its interpretation was reinforced by the deemer
clause, which prov,ides that a plan "shall not be deemed to be an
insurance company for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies • . • [or] insurance contracts . •
." Id. at 740-41, 105 S. ct. at 2389 (quoting 29 U.S.C. S
1144(b) (2) (B»
(emphasis in original). The Court continued:
By exempting from the saving clause laws regulating insurance
contracts that apply directly to benefit plans, the deemer
clause makes explicit Congress' intention to include laws that
regulate insurance contracts wi thin the scope of the insurance
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laws preserved by the saving clause. Unless Congress intended
to include laws regulating insurance contracts wi thin the
scope of the insurance saving clause, it would have been
unnecessary for the deemer clause explicitly ~o exempt such
laws from the saving clause when they are applied directly to
benefit plans.
Id. at 741, 105 S. ct. at 2389-90.
The Court then turned to the question of whether the statute
met the criteria for defining the business of insurance under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
As to the first factor, the Court found
that the statute effected the spreading of risk, as it was enacted
to spread the risk of mental health patients through more risk
pools.
Second, the Court found that the statute regulated an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured by defining the type of insurance that an insurer could
sell.
Finally, the Court found that the practice was limited to
entities within the insurance industry, as the mandated-benefit law
imposed its requirements only on insurers.
In light of the fact
that the statute met the common-sense definition of regulating
insurance and all three McCarran-Ferguson factors, the Court held
that mandated-benefit statutes such as the one in question were
saved from the preemption clause by virtue of the saving clause.
See ide at 743-44, 105 S. ct. at 2391.
The Court expanded on its analysis of the saving clause in
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S. ct. 1549
(1987). In Pilot, Dedeaux, an employee of Entex, Inc. ("Entex"),
injured his back in an employment related accident. Entex had in
place a disability benefit plan which it established by purchasing
a group insurance policy from Pilot Life Insurance Co. ("Pilot
Life"). Dedeaux sought permanent disability benefits following his
accident, but Pilot Life terminated his benefits two years after
the accident. Subsequently, pilot Life reinstated and terminated
Dedeaux's benefits several times. Five years after the accident,
Dedeaux sued pilot Life for tortious breach of contract, breach of
fidu~iary duties, and fraud in the inducement.
Pilot Life argued
that Dedeaux's claims were preempted under ERISA, and the district
court agreed, granting Pilot Life's motion for summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit reversed.
Id. at 43-44, 107 S. ct. at 1551.
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Fifth Circuit.
Id., 107 S. ct. at 1551.
The Court quickly dispatched of the
question of whether the common law causes of action related to an
employee benefit plan; it held that they did.
See ide at 47-48,
107 S. ct. at 1553.
The Court next turned to the question of
whether the saving clause saved Dedeaux's cause of action for
tortious breach of contract/bad faith.
The Court found that the
cause of action for ,bad faith did not meet the common-sense prong
of the regulating insurance test.
See ide at 48, 107 S. ct. at
1553.
The Court stated that in order for a law to regulate
insurance, it "must not just have an impact on the insurance
industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry."
Id. at 50, 107 S. ct. at 1554. Noting that the Mississippi Supreme
Court had identified the law of 'bad faith with the insurance
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industry, the Court nevertheless held that the foundation of the
law could be found in general principles of tort and contract law.
Further, the Court found that the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors did
not support Dedeaux's claim that the bad faith law regulated
insurance.
The Mississippi common law of bad faith could not be
said to effect a spreading of policyholder risk, the Court noted,
nor could it be said under the third factor that the law was
specifically directed towards entities within the insurance
industry, as the law of bad faith had derived from general
principles of tort and contract law.
Although the Court
acknowledged that the common law of bad faith could be construed to
concern the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured, it found that the relationship was tenuous. See ide at 5051, 107 S. ct. at 1554-55.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Court, noted:
[TJhe common law of bad faith does not define the terms of the
relationship between the insurer and the insured; it declares'
only that, whatever terms have been agreed upon in the
insurance contract, a breach of that contract may in certain
circumstances allow the policyholder to obtain punitive
damages.
Id. at 51, 107 S.ct. at 1555.
The Court went on to state that it had to be guided not only
by the factors it considered in Metropolitan Life, but also by "the
role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole." Id., 107 S. ct. at
1555. The Court noted that in this case, unlike Metropolitan Life,
the plaintiff was seeking remedies for improper processing of a
benefits claim, and therefore the court had to consider the civil
enforcement provisions of ERISA.
The Court found that the civil
enforcement provisions of ERISA were intended to be the exclusive
means by which ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting
improper processing of a claim for benefits could recover, based on
the language' and structure of the statute and the legislati ve
history of the statute. See ide at 51-52, 107 S. ct. at 1555.
Thus, the Court held that based on the common-sense and the
McCarran-Ferguson prongs of the regulating insurance test and the
congressional intent that ERISA's civil enforcement provisions be
exclusive, the common law cause of action for bad faith was
preempted by ERISA. See ide at 57, 107 S. ct. at 1558.
After the Court's decision in pilot Life, a question that many
of the lower courts addressed was whether a statutory claim for
improper handling of claims/unfair settlement practices would
survive the preemption analysis laid down in pilot Life.
For
~xample, one court addressed the issue of whether a statutory cause
of action under the California insurance code for failure to pay
claims promptly was preempted by ERISA. See Kanne v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 906 (1989). The Kannes sought reimbursement for airline fare
to transport their son for surgery, as well as compensation for
emotional distress caused by the delay in payments for the airline,
doctor, and hospital bills. The lower court had awarded the Kannes
over $750,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
Id. at 491.
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The court noted that California Insurance Code S 790.03(h)
prohibited unfair insurance practices with respect to the
processing of claims.
Among the unfair practices listed in the
statute was an insurer's failure "to acknowledge and act reasonably
promptly upon communications with respect to claims arising under
insurance policies."
Id. at 493 (quoting Cal. Ins. Code S
790.03(h) (2».
The Kannes argued that the statute was not
preempted by ERISA because it was saved as a law regulating
insurance. The court granted them the assumption that the statute
was a law regulating insurance within the meaning of the saving
clause. Nevertheless, the court decided that the private right of
action for violation of the statute was preempted by ERISA. Id.
-

-

In deciding- that the California statute was-preempted, the
court noted that the Supreme Court "made [it] abundantly clear that
its preemption holding [in Pilot Life] was equally based [on the
regulation of insurance test and] on its acceptance of the
Solicitor General's view that Congress had clearly expressed an
intent that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA S 502(a) be
the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for
benefits." Id. at 494 (quoting pilot Life, 107 S. ct. at 1555).
In interpreting the Supreme Court's language, the court held that
it could not allow a state statute like the one in question to
supplement the ERISA civil enforcement provisions.
As a result,
the court found that the Kannes' statutory cause of action for
failure to pay claims promptly was preempted. See ide
Further, the decision of the Court in pilot Life has - been
extended to preempt a state common law holding that an insurer of
a group employment health plan was required to notify plan
participants of the cancellation or modification of the insurance
policy caused by failure of the employer to pay the insurance
premiums. See Presley v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, 744 F.
Supp. 1051 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
Charlotte Presley went to work for
Benum Corporation ("Benum") on October 2 6 ,1987. Benum had at that
point established and maintained an ERISA plan whereby participant
employees could receive health and medical benefits.
Under the
terms of the plan, however, an employee was not eligible to
participate in the plan until 90 days after the date of employment.
The plan also provided that before coverage would begin for an
employee or his dependents, the application would have to be
completed, submitted and accepted. Thus, Presley was not eligible
to participate in Benum's health plan until January 26, 1988. Id.
at 1053.
Presley had filled out an application card for health coverage
under the plan for herself and her family on the date of her hire.
Benum forwarded the application to Blue Cross and Blue Cross
accepted Presley's application. On January 27, 1988, Larry Presley
suffered a heart attack· and was admitted to a hospital.
On
February 1, 1988, all of Benum's employees were laid off for an
indefinite period, and Benum became delinquent in its premium
payments to Blue Cross as of January 15, 1988. Blue Cross notified
Benum's personnel manager that it would carry a laid-off. employee
for a period of two months and would bill in arrears for the
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coverage.
In.the third month, if payment was made in full, then
coverage would be maintained; otherwise, the employee's coverage
would be cancelled effective the date of the last payment. Neither
Benum nor Blue Cross contacted Presley to tell her of the payment
arrangement for Benum's employees.
Blue Cross paid a nominal
amount of Larry Presley's bills in relation to his heart attack,
but refused all other claims.
Among other things, plaintiffs
claimed that Blue Cross,
by failing to notify the plan
beneficiaries of Benum's failure to pay premiums, violated the rule
laid down in an Alabama Supreme Court case that an insurer of a
group employment health plan was required to notify participants in
the plan of the cancellation or modification of the insurance
policy due to a failure by the employer to pay the premiums due on
the policy. See id. at 1053-55,1059.
Taking into account the broad construction that the Supreme
Court had given to the "relate to" phrase, the·court held that it
was clear that the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court was
subject to the preemption clause unless. it was saved by the saving
clause.
The court further found that the decisional rule was
specifically directed towards the insurance industry, and thus met
the common-sense prong of the regulating insurance test. It found,
however, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors were less clearly
resolved concerning whether the rule was one regulating the
business of insurance.
The court found that the rule did effect
the spreading of a policyholder's risk by affording him the
opportunity to maintain in effect his policy which would allow him
to spread the risk insured against to the insurance industry as a
whole. The court found that the second factor was not met by the
rule.
It stated that compliance with the rule might create a
relationship between the insurer and the insured, but as there was
no such direct relationship prior to the employer's default on
payments of the premiums, the rule could not represent an integral
part of the relationship.
The third factor was met because the
rule was specifically directed towards the insurance industry. The
court acknowledged that the question of preemption under the
circumstances of the case was a close one; however, guided by the
Supreme Court's language.in pilot Life that courts should look to
the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole, it found that
the decisional rule requiring notification was preempted by ERISA
and was not saved by the saving clause. See id. at 1060-61. In so
holding, the court commented that, "[TJhe lower courts have been
instructed py the suprem~ Court that they are to find state laws
within the saving clause in only the clearest of circumstances."
Id. at 1061.
Given that the lower courts appear extremely reluctant to find
that the saving clause in fact saves an insurance statute or common
law relating to insurance from preemption, the facts of the case
and plaintiff's motivation for claiming damages become pivotal in
a court's decision whether to preempt a state statute.
For
example, in Smith v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 781 F.
Supp. 1159 (N.D. Miss. 1991), the plaintiff sued Blue Cross for
violation of state statutes involving a group health policy under
which the plaintiff was insured.
The plaintiff requested as
damages
$30,000
for
mental
distress,
punitive
damages,.
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embarrassment and humiliation, together with attorneys' fees, costs
and expenses. The plaintiff conceded that his damages were to some
degree measured by the amount of benefits he would have received
but
for
the
defendant's
alleged
fraud
and
negligent
misrepresentation. The defendants argued that because the essence
of the complaint was an alleged wrongful refusal to pay benefits
under an ERISA plan, the complaint fell under the exclusive remedy
scheme set forth in ERISA.
Id. at 1160-61.
In response, the
plaintiff alleged that his cause of action was in fact based on
acts of fraud "in which an unlicensed insurer, BSC ~ife Insurance
Company [( "BSC") ], through the defendants acting as unlicensed
agents, sold policies and fraudulently assigned policies to an
insolvent unlicensed insurer, Galaxia Life Insurance," in violation
of the Mississippi insurance statutes. Id. at 1.161.
Specifically, the complaint alleged that when the policy in
question was issued, BSC did not have a license and was· not
registered or authorized to do business in Mississippi. Further,
the complaint asserted that the plaintiff and other employees were
fraudulently induced by the defendants to purchase theBSC policy
because the defendants represented that defendant Blue Cross backed
the policy and that BSC was licensed and authorized to do business
in Mississippi, and thereby covered by the Mississippi guaranty
fund.
After BSC suffered operational losses, the defendants
(stated the complaint) conspired to defraud plaintiff by assigning
insurance policies to Galaxia and, by silence, misrepresented that
Galaxia was authorized and licensed to do business in Mississippi
and therefore covered by the Mississippi guaranty fund. Plaintiff
also asserted that the defendants were guilty of gross negligence
by their failure to investigate Galaxia's ability to underwrite the
assigned policies and/or fraud in knowing that Galaxia would be
unable to pay BSC claims as they came due. The complaint further
alleged that defendant Ritchey, an employee and agent of Blue Cross
and BSC, assisted in the solicitation and issuance of the'
plaintiff's policy as the soliciting agent. The complaint alleged
negligence per se in violation of several statutes, one of which
made it unlawful for any person as an insurance agent or broker to
make, solici t or aid in the transaction of insurance except as
authorized under the provisions of the chapter.
The plaintiff
asserted that the defendants' failure to comply with the statutes
deprived him of the right to participate in the Mississippi
guaranty fund intended to protect insureds in the event of an
insurer's insolvency. See ide at 11.62-63.
Noting that the complaint did not allege improper processing
of a claim, the court found that the statutory scheme met the three
McCarran-Ferguson criteria for laws regulating the business of
insurance.
It stated that the requirement that an insurance
company be licensed to do business in the state ensured that the
risk w~s shared through Mississippi's guaranty fund.
As to the
second factor, the court noted that the laws were integral to the
relationship between the insurer a,nd the insured in that they
limited insurers who might lawfully enter into an insurance
contract in Mississippi. Further I the court noted that with regard
to the third factor, the statutes applied only to entities within
the insurance industry. Consequently, the court found that there
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was a possibility of a valid state law claim based on, inter alia,
the Mississippi insurance statutes. See ide at 1164-65.
A review of
the health
insurance
arrangement
cases
demonstrates that claimants who sue insurance companies under the
state insurance codes will not usually be successful if they are
suing for benefits. A plaintiff's state law claims, however, might
survive ERISA preemption analysis if they are framed in such a way
as to implicate the insurer's actions above and beyond a claim for
improper processing of benefits.
state laws can also escape preemption if they fall under the
"too tenuous, remote and peripheral" exception to preemption
analysis.
For example, in BeneFax Corp. v. Wright, 757 F. Supp.
800 (W.O. Ky. 1990), the court found that notwithstanding that the
Kentucky administrator licensing statutes did not relate to an
ERISA plan within the meaning of the preemption clause, it believed
that the statutes would fall within the "too tenuous, remote and
peripheral" exception to ERISA preemption.
Id. at 804.
BeneFax
was a Kentucky corporation which served as a third-party
administrator for employee benefit health plans.
Plaintiffs
Underwood,
Harden,
and Glogower were
licensed third-party
administrators who each owned one-third of the outstanding capital
stock in BeneFax.
In July, 1990, the Kentucky Commissioner of
Insurance directed plaintiffs to cease doing business as thirdparty administrators and directed the individual plaintiffs to
surrender their administrator licenses, holding that plaintiffs
failed to meet the statutory requirements necessary for an
administrator license. The plaintiffs then sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, claiming that the commissioner had no authority
to regulate their activities pursuant to the Kentucky administrator
licensing statutes because the plaintiffs acted solely as thirdparty administrators for self-funded employer health plans.
Consequently,
the
plaintiffs
asserted
that
the
Kentucky
administrator licensing statutes were preempted by ERISA. Id. at
801-02.
The court found that it had to determine whether the statutes
at issues "relate[d] to". an employee benefit plan within the
meaning of the preemption clause in a manner which was not tenuous,
remote, or peripheral. See ide at 803.
The court noted that the
administrator licensing statutes applied to everyone acting as
administrators in Kentucky regardless of whether a person provided
services to ERISA plans. The court then likened these statutes to
licensing statutes for attorneys, physicians, chiropractors, and
accountants, and noted that the statutes at issue did not relate to
ERISA plans any more than the other licensing statutes did.
Instead, the court found that Kentucky was regulating the conduct
of administrators regardless of whether the administrators serviced
ERISA plans. The court noted that the licensing statutes were not
directed towards an ERISA plan, represented a traditional area of
state authority, and did not affect the relationship between
principal ERISA entities, i. e., the employer, the plan, the plan
fiduciaries, and the plan beneficiaries.
As a result, the court
found that the statutes did not relate to an ERISA plan and were
not preempted by ERISA in any case because their connection with
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ERISA plans was too tenuous, remote, or peripheral. See ide at 80304.
4.

FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY

4.1 General. section 402(a) (1) of ERISA provides that every
employee benefit plan must be established and maintained pursuant
to a written instrument providing for one or more named fiduciaries
who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage
the operation and administration of the plan. A named fiduciary is
a fiduciary who is either named in the plan instrument or who may
be identified pursuant to a procedure specified in the plan by the
employer and/or employee organization maintaining the plan.
According to section 405 (c) (1) of ERISA, a plan may expressly
provide for the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities (other
than trustee responsibilities) among named fiduciaries and for the
named fiduciaries to designate persons other than themselves to
carry out their fiduciary responsibilities.
A fiduciary is defined as anyone who exercises discretionary
authority or control over the management of plan assets, renders
investment advice for a fee,: or has discretionary authority or
responsibility in the administration of the plan.
4.2 Fiduciary Duties. certain statutory duties are imposed
upon plan fiduciaries requiring them to act (i) exclusively for the
benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries, (ii) prudently,
(iii) to diversify plan assets, and (iv) in accordance with the
plan documents so long as the plan documents are consistent with
ERISA.
There are a number of cases challenging fiduciary breaches of
the exclusive benefit rule. In many instances allegations of this
nature are asserted in conjunction with violations for the breach
of other fiduciary obligations. Despite the lack of standards as
to what constitutes adherence to the exclusive benefit rule,
~~idance has been issued by the Internal Revenue Service in the
area of investment of plan assets allowing an employer sponsoring
the plan to incidentally benefit from plan investments so long as
the following conditions are satisfied: (i) the cost of the asset
does not exceed the fair market value at the time of purchase,
(ii) a fair return commensurate with the prevailing rate must be
provided except with respect to obligatory investments in employer
securities by a stock bonus plan, (iii) enough liquidity must be
maintained for required distributions under the plan, and (iv) the
investment must have sufficient safeguards and diversity to be
prudent. Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88.
4.3 Fiduciary Liability. A plan fiduciary who breaches any
of the fiduciary duties will be personally liable to make good to
the plan any losses resulting from the breach and to restore to the
plan any profits the fiduciary made through the use of plan assets.
The plan fiduciary will also be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as a court may deem appropriate, including the
removal of the plan fiduciary.
ERISA §409 (a).
Plans may not
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contain any provision which relieves a fiduciary of personal
liability for breach of
fiduciary duties.
Plans may, however,
purchase insurance to cover liabili ty losses due to acts or
omissions by plan fiduciaries.
A fiduciary will not be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty
committed before becoming a fiduciary or after ceasing to be a
fiduciary.
Nevertheless, a fiduciary may be liable for the
investment decisions of another fiduciary. In Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1984), the Supreme Court
refused to find a right under ERISA to contribution and indemnification among plan fiduciaries.
Since Russell, most courts have
generally held that no right of contribution or indemnity exists
under ERISA. In Chenung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland,
14 EBC 1169 (2d Cir. 1991), the plan sponsor sued Sovran, a former
fiduciary, for lack of prudence and due diligence with respect to
investments made by a previous fiduciary and continued by Sovran.
Sovran filed a third-party complaint against the prior fiduciary
seeking contribution or indemnification. The Court determined that
federal courts are authorized to develop a federal common law under
ERISA, guided by the principles of traditional trust· law which
clearly provides for a right of contribution among fiduciaries.
Attorneys and accountants are not considered fiduciaries
merely because they provide services to a plan. However, applying
the principle of "knowing participation" courts have, until
recently, held non-fiduciaries liable for breaches of fiduciary
duty of which they had knowledge. Liability has usually been found
only in situations where egregious facts have existed.
See
Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988); Whitfield v.
Tomasso, 682 F.Supp. 1287 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benvenuto v. Schneider,
678 F.Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). In the case of Diduck v. Kaszycki
& Sons Contractors Incorporated, No. 83 civ. 6346 (C.E.S.) (S. NY
filed Apr. 24, 1991), the court found evidence of a tacit agreement
between plan fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries to deprive plan
participants of benefits and contributions to the plan fund. The
court held the non-fiduciaries jointly and severally liable for the
plan fiduciary's breach of duty. Other courts have refused to find
that ERISA provides fbr a cause of action against non-fiduciaries
for alleged· participation in a breach of fiduciary duty.
See
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134 (1985); Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988).
In Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial
Consultants of New Jersey, 930 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1991), the Third
Circuit held that an insurance company was not a plan fiduciary
within the meaning of ERISA where the insurer entered into a
geposit authorization contract with an employer to fund the
employer's defined benefit plan.
The contract provided for the
employer to make annual contributions to the insurer in the form of
premiums which were credited to a "guaranteed fund account." This
fund was a bookkeeping device in which interest was credited at a
guaranteed minimum rate with the possibility of higher returns at
the discretion of the insurer. The premium payments were held as
part of the insurer's general assets and when a plan participant
retired, the insurer issued a guaranteed annuity pursuant to the
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terms of the plan. The cost of the annuity was then deducted from
the guaranteed fund account. The court concluded that the deposit
authorization contract was a guaranteed benefit policy because the
contract provided benefits to participants, the amount of which
were guaranteed by the insurer in the form of an annuity.
Since
section 401(b} (2) of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. §1101) states that amounts
paid by a plan to an insurer under a guaranteed benefit policy are
not considered plan assets, the court held that the insurer was not
a plan fiduciary as it did not have discretionary authority or
control over plan assets.
In reaching this conclusion the Third Circuit rejected the
Seventh Circuit's analysis in Peoria Union stock Yard Co.
Retirement Plan v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320 (7th Cir.
1983), in which the Seventh Circuit held that a similar contract
was comprised of two phases: an accumulation phase, during which
premium payments were held by the insurer in its general account
for investment purposes; and a payment phase, during which the
insurer made payments to plan participants in the form of annuities
upon retirement. The Seventh Circuit concluded .that the contract
was not a guaranteed benefit policy since the premiums paid to the
insurance company during the accumUlation phase were not used to
provide "benefits, the amount of which is guaranteed by the
insurer," as required by the section 401(b} (2) (29 U.S.C.S. S1101)
exception.
The Third Circuit concluded that such contracts do not fail to
satisfy the guaranteed benefit policy exception merely because the
benefits provided under the contract are not delivered immediately.
The court stated that the variable interest credited to the
guaranteed fund does not vary benefits payable to participants, but
merely shifts a portion of the investment risk from the insurer to
the employer.
The Third Circui t ' s holding suggests that the
investment component of such contracts are irrelevant if the
insurer guarantees the participants' benefits, regardless of the
amount of control the insurer exercises over the amounts available
to pay such benefits.
4.4
Liability of Non-fiduciaries.
In the case of nonfiduciaries, the recent Supreme Court case of Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates, 113 S. ct. 2063 (1993}, has substantially eliminated
the ability to recover monetary damages against non-fiduciaries.
In this case, the Petitioner represented a class of former
employees of Kaiser Steel Corporation who participated in a Kaiser
Retirement Plan. Hewitt Associates was the plan actuary that had
assisted Kaiser, as a plan sponsor in its actuarial valuations. In
the course of the litigation it was alleged that the plan actuary
~ailed to change actuarial assumptions to reflect additional costs
of the plan associated with early retirements resulting from plant
shut-downs. Ultimately, plan assets became insufficient to satisfy
benefit obligations and the plan was taken over by the PBGC. Plan
participants were then entitled only to guaranteed benefits which
were substantially lower than fully vested pension due under the
plan.
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The issue confronting the Supreme Court was whether ERISA
authorized suits for monetary damages against non~fiduciaries who
knowingly participated in a fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty.
ERISA makes fiduciaries liable for their breach of fiduciary duties
and specifies remedies that are available against them.
Those
remedies include personal liabili ty to make good plan losses,
restitution for profits and other equitable or remedial relief as
the Court may deem appropriate. The civil enforcement provisions
of ERISA are limited, however, to fiduciaries.
Non-fiduciary
liability is imposed under ERISA Section 502 (a) (3) authorizing a
civil suit to join any act or practice violating ERISA, to obtain
"other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of ERISA or the terms of the
plan.
"Noting that non-fiduciaries maybe liable for
monetary damages in certain circumstances, the Court went on to
hold that no provision of ERISA explicitly required non-fiduciaries
to avoid participation, either knowingly or unknowingly, in a
fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty. Noting that monetary damages
are the classic form of legal relief, the Court went on to hold
that non-fiduciaries are not liable for participation in fiduciary
breaches.
4.5
Prohibited Transactions.
ERISA and the Code prohibit
transactions between a plan and a "party in interest" (referred to
as "disqualified persons" in the Code).
"Parties in interest"
include such individuals as the plan sponsor, a plan fiduciary, a
plan service provider or plan advisor, an employee, officer,
director or 10% or greater shareholder of the plan sponsor, a
spouse or descendant of any of the prior parties, and a union
covering plan participants. ERISA §406, Code §4975. Transactions
between the plan and a "party in interest" violate ERISA even
though the transaction was operated in good faith and competitively
priced.
Violations of the prohibited transaction rules may be
penalized by the imposition of liability, as a breach of fiduciary
duty, and the imposition of statutory penalties imposed under Code
section 4975. Jurisdiction for enforcing penalties rest with the
Internal Revenue Service and jurisdiction for enforcing liability
rest with the u.S. Department of Labor. Reorganization Plan No.4
of 1978.
Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 the
Department of Labor has been assigned enforcement responsibility
for regulations, rulings, opinions and exemptions for prohibited
transactions.
section 408 of ERISA specifically authorizes the
establishment of procedures permitting the issuance of individual
and class exemptions from the application of the prohibited
transaction rules.
These exemption procedures are contained in
proposed ERISA Regulation §2570, 29 C.F.R. §2570.
5.

SURVIVOR RIGHTS

5.1 Pre-retirement Benefits. The Retirement Equity Act of
1984 ("REA") requires that the spouse be the named beneficiary of
a portion of the death benefits payable under a qualified plan.
The only way to name a non-spouse beneficiary for the benefits
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otherwise payable to the surviving spouse is with the written
waiver of the participant and the written consent of the spouse.
One of the most difficult decisions for a court to make
involves the enforceability of antenuptial agreements.
Often we
are confronted with situations where spouses enter into antenuptial
agreements specifically addressing the disposition of assets at
death, including qualified plan assets.
That was the case in
Callahan v. Hutsell, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34005 (6th Cir. 1993,
unpublished decision), where the husband died only 2 months after
his marriage.
Immediately prior to marriage the participant
(husband) and surviving spouse entered into an antenuptial
agreement which provided that the retirement plan assets of the
deceased spouse would remain separate property in the event of
death. The participant died without having signed new beneficiary
designation forms providing for his written waiver of spousal
rights, as well as the spouses consent to the waiver.
The only
beneficiary designation, other than plan language, was a signed
document designating a non-spouse beneficiary, which was executed
prior to the marriage.
Provisions of the antenuptial agreement specifically stated
that the non-participant spouse consented, effective upon marriage,
to the participant's election to waive a qualified joint survivor
annuity form of benefit under the participant's retirement plan.
Although
the
antenuptial
agreement
contained
a
written
acknowledgement by the surviving spouse waiving benefits under the
qualif ied plan and agreeing to execute all further documents
requested of the participant to evidence the consents and waivers
contained in the agreement, there was not a waiver signed after the
individual actually became the participant's spouse.
After the
death of the husband, the surviving spouse filed a declaratory
judgment action in the Western District of Kentucky seeking a
determination that the surviving spouse was entitled to death
benefits under the retirement plan.
Although the plaintiff prevailed on ERISA arguments at the
district court level, the initial decision by the District Court
has been vacated and remanded to Federal District Court for
determination of whether the surviving spouse's failure to execute
a beneficiary designation form constituted a breach of obligations
under the antenuptial agreement.
In contrast, an Illinois appellant court held that an antenuptial agreement was suff icient to waive a surviving spouse's
right to receive benefits under the deceased participant's pension
plan where the surviving spouse had not executed a spousal consent.
In re Estate of Hopkins, 14 E.B.C. 1145(111. App. 1991).
The
ante-nuptial agreement provided that each party would retain his or
her separate property and would have no rights in the estate or
property of the other upon the termination of the marriage by death
or legal proceeding. The court held that it was clear the parties
intended that the surviving spouse would waive any current or
future right to the deceased participant's retirement benefits.
Although the deceased participant had named a minor child from his
previous marriage as the plan beneficiary the surviving spouse had
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not completed a spousal consent form, the court held that the antenuptial agreement was a sufficient waiver of the surviving spouse's
rights, since the agreement included a waiver which was in writing
and notarized as required under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984
("REA").
The court, citing to a Seventh Circuit decision, also
noted that it had previously been held that a surviving spouse may
waive their interest in plan benefits under REA without following
its specific waiver requirements.
5.2
Beneficiarv Designations.
A district court in
Pennsylvania held that the exercise of a general power of attorney
by a participant's attorney-in-fact is ineffective to change the
participant's beneficiary designation where the power of attorney
does not specifically authorize changes in beneficiary designations
under employee benefit plans.
Clouse v. Philadelphia, B.& E.R.
Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2256, (E.D. Pa. 1992). The court held
that the black letter law of the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
regarding powers of attorney, applies to ERISA governed plans. The
court followed the· Restatement position that general powers of
attorney are limited to acts done in connection with the act or
business to which the authority primarily relates, and that any
specific authorizations tend to show that more general authority is
not intended.
6.

COBRA CONTINUATION COVERAGE

6.1 General. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985
("COBRA"),
as amended by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986 ("OBRA 86"), the Tax Reform Act of 1986
("TRA 1986"), the Technical and Miscellaneous Review Act of 1988
("TAMRA") and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 ("OBRA
89") requires continuing health care coverage at group rates for
employees and· their dependents who would otherwise lose health
benefits upon the occurrence of certain specified events. Both the
Code and ERISA contain statutory provisions added by COBRA.
The COBRA requirements are found in section 4980B of the Code
and sections 60l through 608 of ERISA and apply to all employers.
However, employers who employed fewer than 20 employees during a
typical business day in the preceding calendar year will be exempt
from the COBRA requirements. An employer is considered as having
normally employed fewer than 20 employees during a particular
calendar year if it employed less than 20 employees on at least 50%
of its working days during that year.
Federal and state
governments, governmental agencies and instrumentalities, and
charities, other than churches, will also be exempt from COBRA.
6.2 Coverage. COBRA applies to any group health plan of an
employer who provides medical care to its employees, former
employees, or the families of such employees or former employees,
whether directly or through insurance, reimbursement or otherwise.
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Dental Maintenance
Organizations (DMOs) maintained by an employer are also subject to
COBRA.
If an employer maintains a cafeteria plan which offers
health care as one of its options, then COBRA continuation coverage
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is applicable only with respect to those individuals who actually
receive health care coverage under the cafeteria plan.
Any
individual who is or was provided coverage under such a group
health plan due to the performance of services for one or more of
the persons maintaining the plan, will be eligible for COBRA
continuation coverage.
An individual who is merely eligible for
coverage under a group health plan is not eligible for continuation
coverage if the individual is not or has not been actually covered
under the plan. Agents, independent contractors (their employees,
agents and independent contractors) and corporate directors will be
treated as employees if they are covered by the plan.
Leased
employees who provide services to an employer will also be treated
as employees of that employer.
COBRA continuati«n coverage is available to all "qualified
beneficiaries." Qualified beneficiaries are employees and former
employees who are covered under a group heal th plan and are
referred to as "covered employees."
A qualified beneficiary is
also any individual who, on the day before a qualifying event for
a covered employee, is a beneficiary under a group health plan as
the spouse or dependent child of the covered employee.
[Nonresident aliens who receive no u.s. source earned income from their
employer will not be considered qualified beneficiaries.]
6.3 Qualifying Events.
COBRA continuation coverage is
available to qualified beneficiaries upon the occurrence of anyone
of the following "qualifying events" which results in the loss of
heal th insurance coverage: (i) the death of the covered employee;
(ii)
the voluntary or involuntary termination of the covered
employee (unless terminated for gross misconduct); (iii)
a
reduction in a covered employee's hours of employment; (iv)
the
di vorce or legal separation of the covered employee from the
employee's spouse; (v) the covered employee's becoming entitled to
Medicare coverage; (vi) the cessation of coverage for a dependent
child under the terms of the plan; and (vii)
bankruptcy
proceedings of an employer under Title 11 of the U. S. Code,
commencing on or after July 1, 1986.
Effective for 1990 plans
years, a loss of coverage will also be treated as a qualifying
event.
6.4
Election of continuation Coverage.
The period during
which continuation coverage may be elected must begin no later than
the date coverage would otherwise cease due to the occurrence of a
qualifying event.
The election period must last at least sixty
days, and may not end earlier than 60 days after coverage
terminates due to a qualifying event or after the qualified
beneficiary receives notice of his or her continuation rights.
~ere there is a choice among types of coverage under a plan each
qualified beneficiary will be entitled to make a separate election
from among the types of coverage offered. Any election to receive
continuation coverage by a spouse or covered employee will b~
deemed to include an election of continuation coverage on behalf of
any other qualified beneficiary dependent who would lose coverage
under the plan by reason of the qualifying event.
However, a
decision to reject benefits by a spouse or covered employee will
not be binding on other qualified beneficiaries.
A qualified
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beneficiary who,
during the election period, waives COBRA
continuation coverage may revoke the waiver at any time prior to
the end of the election period and elect to receive continuation
coverage.
If a qualified beneficiary waives COBRA continuation
coverage and later revokes the waiver and elects coverage, coverage
is not required to be provided retroactively.
6.5 Claims During Election Period. According to the proposed
regulations under section 4980B of the Code, claims incurred by a
qualified beneficiary during the election period are not required
to be paid before an election is made by the beneficiary.
Group
health plans that provide health services, such as HMOs or walk-in
clinics, can require that a qualified beneficiary who has not
elected and paid for COBRA continuation coverage choose between
either electing and paying for the coverage or paying the
reasonable and customary charge for the plan services if a claim is
made prior to the election. A qualified beneficiary who chooses to
pay for the services must be reimbursed within thirty (30) days if
they later elect COBRA continuation coverage.
6.6 Type of Coveraqe Provided.
The continuation coverage
provided must consist of coverage which, as of the time the
coverage is provided, is identical to the coverage provided to similarly situated beneficiaries under the plan with respect to whom
a qualifying event has not occurred. If coverage is modified under
the plan for any group of similarly situated beneficiaries, such
coverage must also be modif ied in the same manner for those
individuals receiving continuation coverage.
While the group of
qualified beneficiaries who
are
entitled to
elect
COBRA
continuation coverage is closed as of the day before the qualifying
event family members of COBRA beneficiaries may be added as
dependents to the same extent and under the same terms as family
members of active employees. Family members who are added in this
manner will not, however, become qualified beneficiaries.
6.7 Period and Cost of continuation Coverage.
The
continuation coverage period begins with the date of the qualifying
event.
However, beginning with 1990 plan years, a group health
plan may chose to provide that the period of coverage begins with
the date of coverage loss.
The duration of the continuation
coverage will depend on the qualifying event that triggered the
loss of coverage.
If loss of coverage was triggered by the termination of the
employee or a reduction in the employee's employment hours,
continuation coverage may be elected for up to 18 months. For plan
years beginning on or after December 19, 1989, qualified
beneficiaries who are determined to have been disabled at the time
of the termination or reduction in work hours by the Social
Security Administration may elect to extend the continuation
coverage for an additional 11 months.
The spouse and certain dependents of the covered employee may
elect up to 36 months of coverage if loss of coverage is triggered
by the death of the covered employee, if the covered employee
becomes entitled to Medicare benef its, or if an employer, from
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whose employment the covered employee retired 'at any time,
commences bankruptcy proceedings under Title 11 of the U.S. Code.
If the covered employee's dependent child loses dependent status
under the Plan such child may elect up to 36 months of continuation
coverage.
If an additional qualifying event, other than bankruptcy,
occurs within the initial 18 month period of continuation coverage
(or during the extended 29 month period for disabled qualified
beneficiaries), coverage must be provided for an additional 18
months for a total of 36 months (or 47 months for a disabled
qualified beneficiary) of continuation coverage after the initial
qualifying event.
continuation coverage may not be terminated
upon coverage of a qualified beneficiary under the group health
plan of an employer, other than the employer providing the
continuation coverage, if such plan contains any exclusion or
limitation with respect to any preexisting condition of the
qualified beneficiary.
COBRA continuation coverage may not be conditioned upon
evidence of insurability.
If coverage provided to similarly
situated active employees is modified or eliminated but the
employer continues to maintain one or more group health plans, the
employer must permit the qualified beneficiary receiving COBRA
continuation coverage to elect to be covered under any of the
remaining group health plans maintained by the employer for
similarly situated active employees.
6.8 Cost of Coveraqe. An employer may require an employee to
pay the cost of the continuation coverage, even if the employer
subsidizes some or all of the coverage for active employees and
their dependents. If the plan is insured, this premium charge may
not exceed 102% of the applicable premium. The applicable premium
is the cost to the plan for the period of coverage for a similarly
situated employee for whom a qualifying even has not occurred. For
self insured plans the applicable premium is equal to a reasonable
estimate of the cost of providing coverage for the period to a
similarly situated individual.
In situations where a qualified
beneficiary is determined to have been disabled, employers may
charge 150% of the applicable premium for the additional eleven
(11) months coverage which must be provided.
A plan may not
require the payment of any premium until 45 days after the day on
which the qualified beneficiary made the initial election for
continuation coverage and a plan must permit a qualified
beneficiary to elect to pay the premium on a monthly basis.
6.9 Loss of Coverage. A qualified beneficiary will lose the
right to continuation coverage should the beneficiary fail to make
timely payment under the plan or become covered under another group
health plan that does not contain limitations or exclusions for
preexisting conditions. A qualified beneficiary will also lose the
right to continuation coverage in the event the beneficiary becomes
entitled to medicare benefits or if the employer no longer
maintains any group health plan.
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6.10 COBRA Litigation. For the most part, COBRA Litigation
has focused on rights of employees in the context of COBRA
notification, coverage and elections. In Swint v. Protective Life
Insurance Co., 779 F. Supp. 532 (S.T. Ala. 1991), a dependent child
brought an action claiming that there had been insufficient notice.
In this case the plan provided for coverage of a dependent to age
19 and beyond if participant continued as a full-time student.
Shortly after the dependent child's 19th birthday the child was
involved in a serious accident leaving him comatose and incurring
large medical expenses. The insurance company initially paid all
of the claims of the dependent child, but 7 months after the
accident the inSurance company completed an investigation which
resulted in a determination that the individual was not a
dependent.
The insurance carrier promptly terminated coverage,
returned all premiums and refused to pay additional claims.
In
this case the court held that a COBRA election was deemed to have
been made because, had the defendant given the dependent his COBRA
notice at the time it should have been provided, the defendant
would have made the election.
Courts have also been confronted with determining whether
incapacity tolls the election. In Branch v. G. Bernd Company, 955
F. 2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1992), the Court held that the 60-day
election period was tolled until a personal representative could be
appointed. The participant had been shot and become semi-comatose
and never regained consciousness.
Despite the fact that the
employer had provided sufficient notice and had signed a form
declining
COBRA
coverage
for
his . dependents,
the
legal
representative was appointed more than 60 days after notice was
provided to the employee.
Meadows v. Caqle's, Inc., 14 E.B.C. 2513 (11th Cir. 1992),
held that an employer and its medical benefits plan insurer who
failed to provide a SPD outlining the COBRA continuation coverage
election requirements to an incapacitated plan participant's
guardian could not rely on plan documents to deny continuation
coverage.
The court held that notice of benefit continuation
rights to an incompetent beneficiary will be ineffective unless
accompanied by relevant plan documents which allow an informed
decision to be made by the person who must make the coverage
election for the incapacitated beneficiary.
At the time the employer notified the participant, who had
lapsed into a persistent vegetative state, about her COBRA rights
her husband, who was acting as her guardian, requested an
explanation of the election requirements. A representative of the
employer claimed that the husband was told that the COBRA election
was necessary to obtain coverage once the employer's coverage
expired; however, the husband alleged that he misunderstood the
need for the election. The court held that while oral statements
allegedly made to the participant's husband would not prevent the
employer and plan insurer from denying coverage if those
representations were inconsistent with written plan documents, the
fact that neither the employer nor the insurer provided the husband
with a SPD made the COBRA notice invalid. The court held that for
a COBRA election notice to be valid, the notice must be sent to a
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person not only legally capable.of acting on it, but also capable
of acting intelligently on it. In this situation the husband never
received the information which was necessary to evaluate whether
COBRA continuation coverage should be elected for his wife.
The court in Truesdale v. Pacific Holding Co./Hay Adams, 778
F.Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1991), held that an employer satisfied the COBRA
notice requirements by twice mailing a notification and election
form to a terminated employee's last known address in accordance
with normal office procedures.
The court stated that employers
"must be allowed to rely in good faith on the information provided
by their employees.
To require employers to confirm receipt of
what they believe to be properly mailed notices is outside the
requirements of COBRA.
The court held that an employer or plan
administrator is acting in good faith compliance when they send
notice, by first class mail, to the employee's last known address.
A district court ruled that an employer will satisfy the COBRA
notice requirements through the use of a computer-automated mailing
system unless an employee can prove that notice was never actually
received.
Martin v. Marriott Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4713
(D. C. Dist. Col., 1992). The court held that one former Marriott
employee was entitled to a trial on the issue of whether the COBRA
continuation notice was actually received as the notice had been
mailed to the wrong address and Marriott's Human Resources division
had been previously informed of the employee's newer, current
address. However, with regard to another employee involved in the
suit the court held that Marriott was entitled to a presumption of
receipt a s i t had proven that the COBRA continuation notice
generated by the system had been mailed to the employee's correct
and last known address.
In Gaskell v. Harvard Cooperative Society, 762 F.Supp. 1539
(D. Mass. 1991), the court held that an employee's 18.month COBRA
continuation coverage period comm~nced upon the. employer's actual
notice of coverage rather than the date the employee experienced a
reduction in hours. The court held that under ERISA, an employer
is obligated not only to provide continuation coverage but to give
an employee proper notice of his rights to that coverage. Unless
and until such notice is given to the employee the court held, the
continuation coverage period cannot begin to run.
In National Companies Health Plan v. Saint Joseph's Hospital,
929 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit held that
while an employer is not required to provide continuation coverage
to a terminating employee who is covered under his spouse's
existing group health insurance plan, if the employer represents
that continuation coverage will be available and the employee
detrimentally relies on that information, the employer is precluded
from later denying coverage.
The court noted that since COBRA
continuation coverage is a part of every ERISA plan, equitable
estoppel may be applied in a situation where an employee has relied
on oral or informal interpretations of his COBRA rights under the
plan.
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Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has held that equitable estoppel
cannot be used to hold plan fiduciaries to oral promises or
modifications concerning COBRA continuation coverage which are not
incorporated in the written terms of the ERISA plan.
Leiding v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 940 F.2d 1538 (lOth Cir. 1991). The
court stated that permitting oral modifications of ERISA plans
would undermine a central policy goal of ERISA since employees
would not be able to rely on written plans if their expected
retirement benefits could be radically affected by funds disbursed
pursuant to oral agreements.
7•

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the proper standard
of review which should be applied with respect to the denial of
benefit claims in Firestone v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
The
Court held that a denial of benefits which is challenged under
Section 502(a) (1) (B) of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. Sl132(a) (1) (B» should
be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the plan gives the
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.
However, the Court held that if the administrator or fiduciary is
operating under a conflict of interest, the conflict must be
weighed as a factor in determining whether an abuse of discretion
has occurred.
The courts in applying and interpreting
Firestone have
generally been unable to agree on the degree of specificity
necessary in the plan language to confer sufficient discretion to
insure review under an arbitrary and capricious standard. In many
cases, language conferring discretion on plan administrators and
trustees to "construe and interpret" the plan has been deemed
sufficient.
See Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir.
1990); Dewitt v. State Farm Ins. Co. Ret. Plan, 905 F.2d 798 (4th
Cir.
1990) .
Other courts have
required
an unambiguous
authorization of discretion with respect to the specific issue
before the court. See~, Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182 (8th Cir.
1989) .
In Baxter the plan stated that the trustees had "final
authority" to determine all matters of eligibility for the payment
of claims.
The Eighth Circuit held that such language did not
grant the discretionary'authority necessary within the meaning of
Firestone to interpret ambiguous plan terms, and therefore a de
novo standard of review should be applied.
The court in Firestone did not clearly define the meaning of
de nQYQ review or the extent to which evidence not presented to
plan administrators must be considered.
In Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990) the
court interpreted Firestone narrowly and limited de novo review to
the evidence before the plan administrator.
The sixth Circuit
stated that a primary goal of ERISA was to provide for the
inexpensive and expeditious resolution of disputes concerning
benefits, and that permitting courts to hear evidence not presented
to plan administrators will result in employees and their
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beneficiaries receiving less protection than Congress intended.
However, in Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86'
(11th Cir.1989), the Eleventh Circuit held that Firestone permits
a court conducting a de novo review to consider facts not availableto the plan administrator at the time the final determination was
made. According to the court, restricting the facts on review to
only those which were available to the plan administrator would
afford less protection to employees and their beneficiaries then
existed before the enactment of ERISA.
There is a split among the Circuits as to whether a plan
administrator's factual, as well as interpretive, determinations
are subject to de novo review.
The Third Circuit in Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, and
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176 (3d cir. 1991), held that the de
novo standard of review should be applied to a plan administrator's
fact-based determinations where the plan does not confer authority
on the plan administrator to decide disputes between beneficiary
claimants or require deference to the plan administrator's factual
determinations. The court stated that the factual determinations
of a plan administrator should not be given deference due to the
fact that plan administrators are often lay persons who lack
training, experience, or an understanding of ERISA, the rules of
evidence, or the legal procedures necessary to assist them in fact
finding.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Pierre v. Connecticut
General Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir. 1991), held that the
de novo standard of review applies only to instances of plan
interpretation in which the facts are not in dispute, and that a
plan administrator's factual determinations in such a situation
should be entitled to deference.
According to the court, the
discretion to make factual determinations is inherent in the nature
of the plan administrator's job and, unlike the Third Circuit, the
court believed that plan administrators are qualified to make such
factual determinations.
The Second Circuit has held that even where it is undisputed
that a
plan confers discretionary authority to determine
eligibility and to interpret the plan,
if an eligibility
determination turns on a question of law, the reviewing court must
apply a de novo standard of review.
Weil v. Retirement Plan
Administrative Committee of the Terson Co., 913 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir.,_
1990), vacated in part on rehearing, 933 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991). ~
Under Firestone, if a plan provides the plan administrator
with discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits
and to cOl1strue the terms of tl1e plan, decisions of the plan
administrator will be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious
standard rather than the de novo standard.
Some courts have interpreted the arbitrary and capr1c10us
standard to require an evaluation of the reasonableness of a
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fiduciary's determination. In Lister v. Stark, 942 F.2d 1183 (7th
Cir.
1991),
the Seventh Circuit held that a
fiduciary's
interpretation of the plan should be given deference unless it is
unreasonable.
The court stated that a plan administrator's
decision will be considered unreasonable where the fiduciary fails
to consider important aspects of the issues involved, offers an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence, or
where the decision is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of the fiduciary's expertise.
other courts have rejected the arbitrary and capricious
standard in favor of an abuse of discretion standard. While most
courts use the terms arbitrary and capricious and abuse of
discretion interchangeably, the court in Nunez v. Louisiana Benefit
Committee, 757 F.Supp. 726 (E.D. La. 1991), rejected the arbitrary
and capricious standard in favor of an abuse of discretion standard
stating that the court in Firestone explicitly rejected the
arbitrary and capricious standard which would require the
affirmation of a plan administrator's decision if any evidence
existed to support it.
In Yusuf v. Yusov, 920 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth
Circuit held that under the arbitrary and capricious standard a
court may reverse a denial of benefits only where a decision is
made in bad faith, is not supported by SUbstantial evidence, or is
erroneous on a question of law.
According to Firestone the existence of a conflict of interest
on the part of a plan fiduciary is relevant to the determination
whether the fiduciary's decisions will be entitled to deference.
In Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 898
F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S.ct. 712 (1991), the
Eleventh Circuit held that "when a plan beneficiary demonstrates a
SUbstantial conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary
responsible for benefit determinations, the burden shifts to the
fiduciary to prove that its interpretation of plan provisions was
not tainted by self interest."
Id. at 1566.
Brown involved an
insured group health plan which was administered by the insurer
providing coverage.
The court held that an inherent conflict of
interest existed between the roles assumed by the insurance
company, since an insurance company pays claims out of its own
assets rather than out of a trust, which places the insurance
company's fiduciary role in conflict with its profit making role as
a business.
In such a situation, the court held that the
fiduciary's determination will be arbitrary and capricious if it
advances the fiduciary's self interest at the expense of the
peneficiary, unless the fiduciary can justify its interpretation on
the basis of the benefit provided to the entire class of plan
participants.
8•

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

It has generally been held that ERISA does not provide for the
recovery of extra-contractual damages. According to section 409 (a)
of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S. Sl109), which establishes liability for
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breach of fiduciary duties, any fiduciary who is liable for a
breach of fiduciary duty will be required to make good to the plan
losses resulting from the breach, to restore to the plan any
profits which the fiduciary received due to the improper use of
plan assets and "shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including
removal of such fiduciary." section 502(a) of ERISA (29 U.S.C.S.
S1132(a», which provides for civil enforcement procedures under
ERISA, states that an action may be brought under Section 409 for
breach of fiduciary duty by the Secretary of Labor, a participant,
beneficiary or plan fiduciary for appropriate relief under section
409 or for "other appropriate equitable relief." The courts have
generally held that neither Section 409 Ca) or 502 (a) of ERISA
permits the recovery of extra~contractual or punitive damages.
The Supreme Court in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 105 S.ct. 3085 (1985), held that section 409(a) of ERISA
does not provide a cause of action for extra-contractual damages by
a plan participant or beneficiary.
The Court held that while
section 502 Ca) (2) of ERISA authorizes participants or beneficiaries
to bring actions against a fiduciary for violation of Section 409
of ERISA, recovery for such violations inures to the benefit of the
plan as a whole and not to the individual participant or
beneficiary.
The Court stated that the legislative history of
ERISA indicated that the primary concerns in drafting Section 409
of ERISA were the possible misuse of plan assets and remedies that
would protect the entire plan rather than the rights of an
individual beneficiary.
Additionally, the Court noted that the
statutory provisions under section 502(a) of ERISA are silent as to
the recovery of extra-contractual damages.
The Court concluded
that in enacting a comprehensive legislative scheme such as ERISA,
which includes an integrated system of procedures for enforcement,
Congress deliberately omitted any such remedy. The Court declined
to address the issue whether section 409 of ERISA authorizes the
recovery of extra-contractual compensatory or punitive damages in
an action by a plan against a fiduciary.
In Drir~water v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 Fe2d 821 (1st
Cir. 1988), the First Circuit noted that while the Supreme Court's
decision in Russell was limited to remedies available under section
502 for violations of section 409 of ERISA, the Court expressly
reserved the question of whether extra-contractual damages might be
a form of "other appropriate equitable relief" available under
section 502. However, the First Circuit agreed with and followed
the holdings of other circuits that extra-contractual damages are
unavailable under section 502, and that the term "equitable" is
meant to intend injunctive or declaratory relief.
Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors. Inc., 737 F.Supp. 792
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), held that punitive damages could not be sought
under section 409 of ERISA.
The court stated that the section
409(a) grant of authority permitting a court to award equitable
relief does not encompass extra-contractual or punitive damages.
In reaching its decision the court looked to the analysis of the
circuits in determining whether section 502(a) of ERISA encompasses
extra-contractual or punitive damages for fiduciary violations.
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The court concluded that Congress intended for ERISA to incorporate
the fiduciary principals of the law of trust, under which trustees
are generally not liable for puni ti ve damages for breach of
fiduciary duty.
Additionally, the court stated that ERISA's
legislative history with regard to remedies for breaches of
fiduciary duty contemplates traditional forms of equitable relief
such as injunctions, constructive trusts, and the rem.oval of
fiduciaries.
Although the Seventh Circuit in a previous decision left open
the possibility of extra-contractual recovery under Section 502 of
ERISA, the court held that such damages were not available where
the only extra-contractual damages sought by the plaintiff were
punitive in nature and the allegations in the complaint did not
support a claim for such damages.
The court, relying on the
supreme Court's holding in Firestone, supra, that ERISA is to be
construed consistently wi th the common law of trusts, denied
punitive damages as such damages are generally unavailable in the
trust context.
Petrilli V. Drechsel, 910 F.2d 144.1 (7th Cir.
1990).
In Gaskell v. Harvard Cooperative Society, 14 E.B.C. 1290 (D.
Mass. 1991), the plaintiff, relying on the Supreme Court's decision
in Ingersoll - Rand Co. v. McClendon 111 S.ct. 478 (1990), in which
Justice O'Conner, in dicta,. suggested that compensatory and
puni tive damages were wi thin the power of federal courts to
provide, sought such damages in relation to an ERISA violation by
his employer.
However, the court held that if the Supreme Court
had intended to expand the realm of potential relief available
under ERISA and to overrule its prior holdings, it would have done
so explicitly and not in dicta. The court refused to overrule the
express holding of the First Circuit in Drinkwater, supra, without
a clear indication that the law will provide for extra-contractual
damages under ERISA·.
In Novak v. Anderson Corp., 15 E.B.C. 1127 (8th Cir. 1992).
The court found that an ESOP participant was not entitled to
monetary damages due to the employer's failure to notify the
participant that his plan distribution could be rolled over into a
tax deferred plan.
The court held that the reference in section
502(a) (3)(B) of ERISA to "other equitable relief" does not include
monetary damages. The court concluded that neither the statutory
language or the legislative history permits an expansion of the
traditional equitable relief available - injunctive and declaratory
relief and the imposition of a constructive trust - to include
monetary damages.
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INTRODUCTION
Concern over employee privacy rights is increasing
as employer techniques for employee surveillance and
monitoring are growing dramatically.

The clash

between our society's strongly held belief in the
"right to be left alone" and the increasing arsenal of
employer monitoring techniques is a guarantee for
litigation and legislation throughout the near future.
Consider, for example, the cautionary tale of Papa
Gino's.

The case is reported as O'Brien v. Pap Gino's

of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986).

An

employer had received information that an employee was
using drugs off-duty -- not necessarily in the
workplace, but on Ifhis own time."

The employer then

required the employee to take a polygraph test.

While

some of the questions related to employment, some were
outside the scope of employment concerns.

When asked

whether he used drugs, the employee answered that he
did not.

The polygraph examiner concluded that the
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employee was lying in his denial.

The trial jury

found, and the First Circuit confirmed, that the
interrogation techniques were invasive of the
plaintiff-employee's privacy, and awarded damages in
the amount of $400,000.
This, however, is not the end of Papa Gino's'tale
of woe and difficulty.

Not content merely to

administer an intrusive polygraph test, cC?mpany
management apparently also decided to use the
discharge as an example to others.

The company told

third parties that the employee was terminated for
violating company drug policies.

Even though that

statement was arguably at least partially true, the
jury also awarded damages to the plaintiff for
defamation.

The plaintiff had contended, and the jury

apparently believed, that the employee had also been
discharged for refusing to promote the godson of the
owner.

Thus, the employer allegedly misstated the

reason for the discharge, relying on drug use (which
apparently was viewed by the jurors as a pretextual
reason), rather than truthfully stating the real
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reason --- the refusal to knuckle under to management's
attempt at nepotism.
This case undoubtedly created a very bad day for
someone at Pap Gino's.

The company believed that it

had validly terminated an employee for violating its
important drug. policy, and it had corroboration of the
drug use through the modern technique of the
polygraph.

Instead, it found itself liable in tort

damages for both defamation and invasion of privacy to
an ex-employee whom it had considered to be a drug
user.;

The jury's "20/20 hindsight" proved to be very

different fr9m the employer's attempt to implement its
drug policy.

The point is not necessarily that the

employer was bumbling, but rather than an
investigation which management believes is wellintentioned can be judged highly critically in
retrospect by a finder of fact.
The New York Times recently reported a story about
a newly popular el.ectronic investigative technique.
While video cameras have been commonplace in stores
and restaurants for a number of years, there has been
a growing·trend toward the use of hidden microphones.
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See In a Growing Number of Stores, Hidden Security Microphones are

Listening, May 28, 1994 at p. 6.

The story reported

that a very large customer in the Northeast was the
Dunkin' Donuts chain.

A security consultant commented

that the system was particularly helpful in preventing
employees from pocketing cash paymentsby·customers,
rather than depositing them properly in the register.
While the monitoring devices raise interesting
questions under federal wiretap legislation, the
companies involved apparently attempted to deal with
such problems by posting small stickers with
disclaimers such as "Audio monitoring on the
premises. l1

A later Times story reported that the

franchisor company discouraged the use of the audio
surveillance, but suggested that it was apparently a
choice of the individually-owned franchisees whether
to install them •.
Such audio surveillance techniques are so new that
there are apparently no reported cases.

They raise

interesting questions concerning the store's potential
liability, not only to employees, but also to
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customers who may also find their otherwise private
conversations the subject of monitoring and possible
recording.

Nevertheless, employers seem enthusiastic.

The Times quoted a Kentucky businessman who was a
Dairy Queen franchisee and who supported the new
surveillance techniques.

He had successfully obtained . .

confessions from twelve employees that they were
giving away free food to their friends and family
members.
Finally, the newspaper reported a video technique
which may give consumers pause:

the use of video

cameras behind one-way mirrors in clothing store
dressing rooms.

Apparently, the venerable

Bloomingdale's displays signs stating, "These dressing
rooms are

monitored by an inventory control checker."

Whether Bloomingdale's uses cameras in changing areas
or not, the liability issues raised by the use of oneway mirrors and cameras are obvious.
A.

WORKPLACE INVESTIGATIONS
i

Employers can institute many types of practices
which affect·the privacy of their employees.
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The two

most frequently utilized by employers are workplace
investigations and the testing of employees.
The most common of the employer practices are
workplace investigations.

They involve a

struggl~

between the employer's right to know what is going on
within the busiriessand the~cemp16yee's right to
privacy, even within the workplace.
1.

Questioning Employees.

The first thing

to consider when questioning an employee is whether
the subject of the inquiry relates to the business
itself.

If the employer is legitimately concerned

about a conflict within the business, the employer is
probably allowed to question the employee on matters
relating to that conflict.

For example, since the

Christian Science church teaches that homosexuality cis
against its teachings, a inquiry into a prospective
employee's sexual orientation is not an invasion of
privacy.

Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d

1160 (1985).

But if the employer does not have a business
concern in mind when questioning an employee, courts
have held such questioning to be a privacy invasion.
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See Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc.,
711 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1983)

(holding that an

employer invaded employee's privacy since the employer
had no business need for information regarding
employee's sexual activities).
If the employer can demons-trate a business
interest in the information requested from the
employee, the next thing for the

employer to consider

is the manner in which the questioning is done.

The

more aggressive the manner of questioning, the more
likely that the questions will be considered intrusive
on the employee's rights.
Questioning must be reasonable.

In Hall v. May

Dep't Stores Co., 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126,

(1981),

it was unreasonable for an employer to question and
threaten an employee against whom the employer had
very little evidence of wrongdoing.

But several

courts have held that requesting information from
employees at the time they are hired is not
unreasonable.

In Spencer
v. General Tel. Co, 551 F.
,

Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1982), an employer who requires
employees to fill out an information sheet is not
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violating the employee's privacy since the request for
publiC information wouldn't be offensive to a
reasonable person.
Where does all of this leave the employer?
Employers may be able to justify their questions by
showing an employee's consent ... If an employee makes
certain information public, he/she cannot· later claim
that questions on that information are an invasion of
privacy.

Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp.

983 (N.D. Ind. 1986).

Employer may ask their

employees questions, so long as they are business
related and reasonably executed.
2.

Workplace
Searches.
,

There is again a

balancing of interests with regard to searches in the
workplace.

On one hand is the employer's business

interest in knowing what is going on.
the employee's right to privacy.

On the other is

The most prominent

case with regard to workplace searches is O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S. ct. 1492 (1987).

The

basic issue in this case was to determine what an
employee's "reasonable expectation of privacy" was
within the workplace.
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Since most employees do have some expectation of
privacy, it becomes important to determine at what
point employers can cross the line and institute a
workplace search.

The Court in Ortega held that there

was a two-part test:

(1) was the search justified (did

there seem to be reasonable ground to suspect some
wrongdoing)? and (2) was the search permissible in
scope (was the method of the search reasonable)?

If

the answer to both of these questions is yes, the
employee will have no claim for invasion of privacy.
The privacy expectation that an employee has is
lowered by notice from the employer that employee's
personal things are subject to random searches.

Since

the employee then has no reasonable expectation of
privacy, there is no invasion be an employer's search.

Am. Postal Workers' Union v. U.S. Postal Service, 871
F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1989).
If the employer is to remember only one thing when
conducting a search within the workplace, it should be
that the search must be reasonable.

There must be a

reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before a search is
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done, and the intrusiveness of the search must be
reasonable under the circumstances.
3.

Surveillance and Monitoring of Employees.

Observation of employees is not an invasion of privacy
so long as the observation is in a public place and
there is a good business reason for it.

Employers may

watch their employees in order to monitor job
performance or to investigate wrongdoing.
In several cases courts have not found violations
of an employee's privacy right when the employer was
observing in order to moni tor performance on the job.
See Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265
(Fla. Dist.ct. App. 1980)

(holding that non-malicious

surveillance in the workplace by an employer does not
invade an employee's privacy).
Employers also have the right to watch employees
who are being investigated for wrongdoing, whether the
employee is in the workplace or in a public area while
off duty.

A detective who followed an employee

suspected of wrongdoing and observed him in open,
public places did not violate that employee's privacy.
Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp .., 66 Md. App. 133,
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502 A.2d 1101, cert. denied, 479
571

u.s.

s.

984, 107

ct.

(1986).
The employer must be aware that these previous

cases all relate to observation of an employee in a
public place.

In most states, it would violate a

person's right to privacy to observe a member of the
oppasite sex in a private dressing room.

White v.

Davis, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P. 2d 222 (1975)

(en

banc) .
The other method of employer surveillance is
telephone monitoring.

Most states and the federal

government prohibit any interference with telephone
communication.

Listening devices for phones are also

prahibited by federal law if the employee has a
reasanable expectation of privacy when using the
phone.

There are two recognized exceptions to this

general rule which wauld allow an employer to monitor
the telephone conversations of their employees.
The first exception allows an emplayer to monitor
calls fram an extension phone for reasonable business
purposes.

The other exceptian allows wire

communication service providers to. manitor calls to
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investigate quality control.

Both of these exceptions

must be for valid business reasons and must reasonable
in the invasion of private phone calls.
If the monitoring of the telephone is for business
purposes, employers may not be in violation of
employees privacy rights.

See Schmukler v. Ohio Bell

Tel. Co, 116 N.E.2d 819, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 213 (1953)
(holding that the monitoring of calls to confirm
. proper service is not an invasion of privacy) .
a.
Legislation.

Proposed Federal Monitoring

As this short outline no doubt makes

clear, the pace of advance of technology in the field
of electronic workplace monitoring and surveillance
has far outstripped the pace of development of
legislation and cornmon law.

As a result, Congress is

playing catch.,..,up with proposed legislation to address
perceived gaps in current privacy law coverage.
Currently pending in the House of Representatives
is H.R. 1900 (perhaps H.R. 1984 would have been a
better number to capture its sponsors' concerns).
This bill, known as the Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act, has had relatively strong Democratic

D -12

support in the House.

As noted be'low, similar

legislation, S. 984, sponsored by Sen. Paul Simon, has
also been introduced in the Senate.
While the final version of this legislation has
yet to be determined, the bill would, if adopted in
anything like its current form, present major
limitations on the use of electronic monitoring in the
workplace.

The bill would reach broadly to the

collection or recording of data concerning employees'
activities by electronic means.

Included would be

computer based monitoring, telephone monitoring,
review of performance by techniques such as keystroke
assessment, remote duplication of individual workers'
computer screens, the use of electronic devices
indicating an individual's whereabouts, data collected
from key cards, video camera surveillance, audio
surveillance, and similar techniques.

Whether its

scope extends to such traditional methods of
monitoring as "time clocks" (which often now are
electronic or computer-based in nature) is also an
issue.
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Following are some key points surrounding the
proposed legislation.
-- The legislation seeks to limit not
just the techniques or the frequency
of the use of information, but also
the manner in which an employer can
use it.

As noted below, employee

evaluation and discipline based on
these techniques are also restricted.
-- The legislation would
significantly limit the use of
monitoring devices and techniques in
dressing areas, locker rooms, arid
bathrooms.
-- Following a disclosure model, the
bill would require that employers
using such monitoring techniques
inform the employees that they are
potentially subject to monitoring
and, further, that their performance
may be evaluated based on monitoring.
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-- Apparently because of the
widespread practice of telephone
monitoring, employers engaged in such
practices would have to give
employees access to an unmonitored
phone for personal calls.

This will

undoubtedly produce a whole new set
of management issues and headaches
for companies seeking to limit
personal phone calls while on the
job.
-- There are limits on the frequency
with which such monitoring can take
place, depending on job tenure.

In

the present version of the bill,
employees who have worked under 60
days can be monitored an unlimited
number of times; those who've worked
more than 60 days but under two years
can be monitored up to 40 times per
month; and those veterans who have
survived for two or more years are
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protected from any monitoring more
than 15 times monthly.
-- The bill would permit continuous,
contemporaneous video monitoring for
security purposes, such as is common
. now.· .. However, it would impose
restrictions on after-the-fact review
of such monitoring (presumably by
systematic review of video tapes
after they've been recorded).

See M.

Crichton, Rising Sun.
The bill limits exclusive reliance
on quantitative data as a method of
evaluation or discipline.
Ironically, such a provision could be
an incentive to rely more heavily on
subjective data, which raise their
own kind of employment problems .
. Examples would be providing raises or
discipline to keyboard-based
employees solely on the number of
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keystrokes recorded over a computer
network.
-- The bill would impose strict
limitations on periodic or random
monitoring.

It would, for example,

be difficult to monitor a single
individual; rather, most monitoring
would have to be a part of an overall
Hbona fide service observation
program."
-- Discipline as a result of such
monitoring would further be limited.
For example, any action which may
have a "significant adverse effect"
may need to be undertaken within as
short a period as twenty ..... four hours
after the monitoring.
The final legislative outline is not yet clear.
However, some problematic provisions also lurk in the
Senate version, S. 984.

Particularly unclear is a

provision which would limit monitoring of employees
who were in the act of "exercising First Amendment
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rights."

Such a provision would have the effect of

importing a series of rules concerning freedom of
expression which, except for union-oriented
activities, are typically not protected in the private
sector.

The House bill does not presently contain

such a provision, and it willbefwoith watching to see
which version prevails.
b.

E-mail in the Workplace.

One of the

more intriguing topics involving privacy in the
workplace is that of E-mail.

Briefly, E-mail is a

system of electronic mail which connects computers
within a business and allow the direct transmission of
notes and memoranda over a network without the
traditional printing of the memo and physical sending
and receipt.

E-mail is more typical among larger

businesses which have computer networks, although it
is becoming more common in smaller businesses and
firms as network technology becomes available outside
the ranks of Fortune 500 businesses.
E-mail inherently presents opportunities for
employer review and monitoring of messages, because
the messages are generated and transmitted through the
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computer network system owned, installed, and
maintained by the employer.

In addition, all E-Mail

systems have a feature of central storage of messages
on a hard disk or file server somewhere in the system.
Thus, while there appears to be an "original" message
on the computer of the recipient, and a copy in the
"outbox" of the sender, the message is always
physically stored centrally in a computer file.
Moreover, all networks are serviced and maintained by
systems operators ("sysopSH) who have high levels of
"security" which allow them access to files throughout
the system, including E-mail.
E-mail also has a certain allure for those who are
not technophobes.

Users can quickly send messages,

reply to messages, copy them, and communicate in
apparent privacy.

There is not the opportunity for

physical eavesdropping that a phone presents, although
a message can always be read by a supervisor or coworker off the screen where it's being sent or
received.

E-mail offers the seductive opportunity for

an apparently private, surreptitious note to a coworker.

Not surprising, E-mail messages can be
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antiestablishmentarian, expressing opinions contrary
to the public posture and propriety of a larger
business.

Intercepted personal E-mail can be

embarrassing to the sender, may indicate disloyalty or
an"attitude," or may actually disclose illegal acts
by an employee.

Conversely, E-mail presents a

temptation to the curious employer or supervisor with
security access to the system:

an apparently risk-

free way to read other people's mail, to browse
through others' messages from the security of one's
own terminal:

mail interception without breaking and

entering.
Employers do have legitimate interests in having
access to the system.

First, their system operators

have a real need to service and maintain the system.
Second, the system represents a major capital
investment by them, probably much larger than the
telephone system.

Third, personal use of the E-mail

for non-business related reasons presents significant
problems to the business.
sending, reading, and

At the least, time spent

rec~iving

personal E-mail

messages is a diversion of time and resources away
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from the business' activities, just like personal
telephone calls.

Moreover, the personal messages take

up "disk space" on the system -- always a scarce
commodity in a growing network.

Finally, to the

extent that E--mail is being used to implement breaches
of company security, theft~- or otheriliegai Clctivity,
the business has some legitimate interest in seeing
that its capital investment is not used against its
own interest.
The law on employer surveillance of E-mail right
now is decidedly murky.

Again, this phenomenon

presents a perfect example of technology rapidly
outrunning the law.

There is in place a relatively

recent statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), 18 U.S.C. § § 2510-2520.

EPA

was an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
The statute creates both civil and criminal
penalties for the intentional interception,
disclosure, or use of wire, oral or electronic
communications.

18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)i § 2511.

The;r-e

are, however, exceptions to and exemptions from the
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act which provide potential broad defenses to the
review of E-mail by company supervisors.
Perhaps most important is the provision in the Act
which excepts from its coverage communications where
one party to the communication has given his or her
consent.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2) (d).

Interestingly,

only one side to the communication need consent, not
both, so an employer would have two bites at the
consent apple:

one with the sender and the other with

the receiver of E-mail.
At least one court has construed consent to
include implied consent.

Griggs-Ryan, v. Smith, 904

F.2d 112 (1st Cir. 1990).

Thus, an employer could

develop a strong defense of consent by developing and
publicizing broadly a policy that indicates that Email is not private, that the systems operators and
other company officials reserve the right to review Email just as they would any regular company business
file, that E-mail is not to be used for personal
communications, and that the company reserves the
right to monitor E-mail communications either
regularly or randomly.

While not bullet-proof, a
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clear and well-distributed policy would go a long way
toward establishing implied consent and a lack of
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of
employees.
In addition, there is a statutory exception from
ECPA for private communications providers in certain
circumstances.

When the ECPA was passed, the

principal focus of the drafters was on public
communications such as telephones, and not on E-mail.
Thus, for private providers, there is an exception for
interception or disclosure that is a "necessary
incident to the rendition of ... service or to the
protection of the rights or property of the provider
of that service."

18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2) (a) (i).

While

the application of this section is unclear in the
context of E-mail, its language suggests that it is
related to routine tasks performed by systems
operators for system maintenance rather than random or
focussed surveillance by supervisors for other
purposes.

In addition, a "business extension"

exception, obviously designed for extension phones
rather than E-mail, could have some application as

D - 23

well.

18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (a).

Courts have generally

read this interpretation rather narrowly.

Watkins v.

L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th eire 1983);
Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420
(5th Cir. 1980) ..
:tnconclusion~ ·the law surroundinq·E-mail is far

from clear.

At the state level, appellate cases

concerning whether E-mail surveillance violates any .
common law privacy principles have not emerged to
provide reliable guidance.

At the federal level, the

Electronic Communications Privacy Act provides some
general rules which probably apply to E-mail, even
though the statute is not well-drafted to cover it.
The implied consent doctrine, along with the
exceptions for system maintenance by private
communications systems, probably provide E-mail system
owners the upper hand.

However, both the case law and

state and federal statutory law are sure to develop in
this area.
4.

Investigative Reports.

Sometimes

employers may hire an independent investigator to
gather information on employees or prospective
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employees.

In order to fully protect an employer from

invading the privacy of the employee and to meet the
requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15

u.s.c.

§ § 1681-1681t, the employer must get the

consent of the applicant or employee before obtaining
any personal information.

The employer should be

completely open with the employee about the objectives
of the investigation.

While the consent of the

employee is usually required, it is only in the case
where a person has requested a job or a promotion.

If

the employer investigates an employee for a promotion
that the employee is not aware of, the employee's
consent is not required.
B.

TESTING OF EMPLOYEES.

An emerging trend in employer practices is the
testing of

employees~

Today, employers use many tests

in order to make a number of different employment
decisions.
1.

Drug Testing.

Federal agencies have been

among the first to participate in the drug testing of
employees.

They began by testing those in sensitive

positions such as national security, health, or
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safety.

In fact, the Drug--Free Workplace Act of 1988,

41 U.S.C. §

§ 701-707 (1988) mandated that every

government contractor and grantee have a drug-free
workplace.
The Americans with Disabilities Act sets but
special rules concerning drug testing.

First, section

104(d) (1) of the Act states that na test to determine
the illegal use of drugs shall not be considered to be
a medicalexamination."'Medical examinations are
otherwise severely restricted under the provisions of
section 102(d) of the Act.

Moreover, the Act excludes

from the definition of disability any employee
currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs.
Section 104(a).

However, the Act eliminates from the

exclusion individuals who have successfully completed
a supervised rehabilitation program, or anyone
participating in ,a supervised rehabilitation program
who is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
Section 104(b) (1),

(2).

Finally, the ADA sets out

certain assurances that ernployer,....imposed prohibitions
against work-place drug use are not to be considered
in violation of the Act.

Section 104(0).
r----
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Most of the federal court decisions regarding the
drug testing of employees deal with testing only
public sector employees.

The courts have held that if

the testing is in the governmental interest, then it
will be permitted without threatening an employee's
privacy.

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 109·

S. ct 1402 (1989).

See also Nat'l Treasury Employees

Union v. Von Rabbb, 489 u.S. 656, 109
;

(1989)

s.

ct. 1384

(holding that an employer could test an

employee even without reasonable suspicion if the
employee is required to carry a gun) .
Of the private sector employees the courts have
held subject to drug tests are those in safetysensitive positions.

These include employees in

industries that are regulated.

Regardless of whether

the employees are in the public or the private sector,
the testing must be based on reasonable suspicion and
it must serve a compelling societal interest.
2.

Other Forms of Employee Testing.

There

are three other types of employee testing that are
frequently used:
testing,

(1) polygraph ("lie detector")

(2) honesty testing, and (3) genetic testing.
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The polygraph test is otherwise known as a "liedetector" test.

It is both physically and

psychologically intrusive and the results are not
completely accurate.

It is so unpredictable that its

use is largely forbidden federally by the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act, 29

u.s.c.

1990), with only limited exceptions.

§ 2001

(Supp.

In O'Brien v.

Papa Gino's of Am., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st eire 1986), the
court went so far as to hold that the use of a liedetector test can give an employee a cause of action
for invasion of privacy.

Even if the use of the test

is not forbidden completely, the types of questions
that can be asked are restricted so as to not get
personal answers that would result in an invasion of
the employee's privacy.
Another type of employee testing done by employers
is honesty testing.

Honesty tests avoid some of the

problems of the lie-detector tests since the honesty
tests are handwritten.

The honesty tests are not

forbidden, but questions are restri.cted as well.

The

employer must be very careful not to illicit personal
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answers in response to their questions so as to invade
the employee's privacy.
The third type of employer testing is genetic
testing.

Genetic testing leads to serious privacy

problems because there is nothing more personal that
the results of tests on someone's genetic makeup.
There are also problems with the disclosure of those
results.

There must be special precautions made to

ensure the employee's privacy and confidentiality are
kept in a situation of genetic testing.

c.

Investigating Employee Possession, Use, and
;

Sale of
Drugs.
If an employee is suspected of having, using, or
selling drugs, the first thing an employer should do
is gather more information.

This information can be

collected using many of the practices considered in
the first part of this discussion.

The employer

should adopt a practice based on the seriousness of
the problem.

If the facts say that the problem is

serious, the employer will be more justified in using
more drastic steps in the investigation, even if the
employee's privacy is invaded.
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For example, if an employee is only accused of
stealing $20, a strip search is not warranted.
Bodewig v. K-Mart, 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657,
review denied, 644 P.2d 11287 (Or. 1982).

But the

employer may use other methods of investigation,
depending on the circumstances.

These include: drug

testing, the use of an undercover agent to·discover
more facts, and various types of searches.
If an employer must investigate an employee, the
employer should limit disclosure only to those who
"need to know" of the resulting facts in order to
protect both the employee and the employer.

See

generally Hudson v. S.D. Warren
Co., 608 F. Supp. 477
,
(D.C. Me. 1985)

(discussing publication of information

discovered during an investigation) .
D.

"Off Duty" Conduct.

Here is a genuine struggle between the employer
and the employee.

Employees often feel that what they

do on their own time is their own business, while the
employer's view is that an employee's off duty conduct
can affect employer's reputation or employee's job
performance.
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In order for the employer to be justified in
basing employment decisions on off duty conduct, the
conduct must have an adverse effect on the employee's
job performance.

In Thorne v. City of EI Segundo, 726

F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469

u.s.

979

(1984), the court held that the employer had no right
to inquire into the sexual matters of job applicants
if they had no relation to that person's job
performance.

In Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serve Bd., '79

F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1986), the Court held that sexual
activities that were engaged in on the job did concern
job performance and could be discovered by the
employer without invading the employee's privacy.
Private sector employers have generally needed to
show the same type of business reasons for gaining
personal off duty information regarding employees.

An

employer must have legitimate business reasons for
firing, demoting, etc. and employee based on off duty
relationship or misconduct.
Ins. Co.
(1986)

v~

See Federated Rural Elec.

Kessler, 131.Wis. 189, 388 N.W.2d 553

(holding that a company can forbid an

employee's relationship with another married employee,
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so long as the policy applies equally to everyone);
See also Kinoshitav. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 803
F.2d 471

(9th Cir. 1986)

(holding that an employer may

terminate an employee for misconduct if the misconduct
will reflect badly on the employer).
There are no bright line rules on what off duty
conduct an employer may use in making adverse
employment decisions.

But an employer must be sure

that there is a connection between the employee's
misconduct and a legitimate business concern for the
employer.

Otherwise, to use an employee's off duty

conduct to injure the employee is to create potential
liability for invasion of the employee's privacy.
As with many other areas of the law involving
privacy, whether employee conduct is permissible or
wrongful depends on whether it's reasonable.

While

such a rule is easy to remember, its application in
planning is uncertain.

All a human resources manager

or attorney can know for sure is that a group of
jurors some years later can sit in a group and second
guess his or her advice as to what's reasonable.
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That

sobering thought, on which we close, should be
powerful counsel for self-restraint.
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SECTIONE

INTRODUCTION
Temporary employment services is one of those industries where everyone
can end up happy; the clients/employers because they get trained workers at costeffective prices and the workers because they get experience that may lead to
permanent jobs with good pay~
The temporary services industry has evolved from the white-gloved Kelly Girl
office worker into a popular source of employment for women and men in fields
ranging from the traditional office and custodial positions to drafting and
engineering jobs. Corporations these days can find a temporary employee to replace
a vacationing or ill receptionist or secretary for one day or several weeks, or they
can find someone to help with a special engineering project that might last as long
as two years.
Hiring temporary employees is a financially sensible move. The temp agency
is responsible for recruiting, salary, and other financial matters, leaving the
corporation free of paperwork and the costly burden of hiring someone full time.
But before business do business with temporary service providers, they should be
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mindful that the American workplace is changing and along with it, traditional
employment relationships. Companies are establishing smaller "core" work forces
and supplementing them with part-time, temporary, and other contract workers in a
variety of flexible staffing arrangements.
The growth of staffing services has raised issues regarding the legal
relationships between the staffing firm, the employees it supplies, and the customers
that use their services--including the potential liability of the customer to the staffing
firm's employees. "Co-employment" is the term used to refer to this relationship and
its legal consequences. Although co-employment historically has not posed
significant problems for users of staffing services, it remains a subject of uncertainty
and confusion.
The following information reviews some of the legal and operational
implications of co-employment in a number of areas such as civil rights, workers'
compensation, labor relations, employee benefits, and other areas affecting the terms
and conditions of employment. For an in~depth look at the general subject of coemployment, see Linder, The Joint Employment Doctrine--Clarifying Joint
Legislative--Judicial Confusion, 10 Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 321
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(1989).
11

Staffing services" is used throughout as a generic reference to the range of

personnel supply services, including temporary help, employee leasing, facilities
management, etc. The more specific term is used when needed to clarify or to
distinguish between services when laws and regulations may affect them differently.
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I..

DEFINITIONS
A.

TEMPORARY HELP

Temporary help companies recruit, train, and test their own employees and assign
them to Clients in a wide range of job categories. Temporary employees fill in
during vacations and illnesses, meet temporary skill shortages, handle seasonal or
other special workloads, and help staff special projects. The National Association
of Temporary Services officially defines "temporary help service" as:

... a service whereby an organization hires its own employees and assigns
them to clients to support or supplement the client's workforce in work
situations such as employee absences, temporary skill shortages,
seasonal workloads, and special assignments and projects. "
This definition, or variations of it, has been adopted in a number of states exempting
temporary help services from laws designed to curb employee leasing abuses in the
workers' compensation area.

B.

EMPLOYEE LEASING

The business purpose of employee leasing is very different from temporary help.
According to the National Staff Leasing Association:
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"Employee leasing company means a company which, in a majority of
its contractual relationships, for a fee, places the employees of a client
company onto its payroll and leases said employees to the client
company on an ongoing basis ... "
Thus employee leasing generally involves the transfer by an employer of all or most
of its work force to the payroll of an employee leasing firm. The purpose is to
"completely fill the accounting and internal administration duties related to payroll".
It appeals primarily to small and mid-sized employers who find it cost-effective to

lease their employees rather than hire a full-time payroll and human resources staff.
Employee leasing companies charge a "service fee" based on a negotiated
percentage of the client's payroll costs.
Employee leasing differs from temporary help in two key ways:. (1) leased
employees generally are the client1s former employees, and (2) leased employees
work on a regular, ongoing basis. In contrast, temporary help involves providing
employees as a temporary supplement to the customer's work force. It does not
involve managing the customer's work force or assigning employees on regular,
full-time basis.
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Because of abuses by some employee leasing firms in the workers' compensation
and health insurance areas, employee leasing is becoming a regulated industry.
Some states are enacting laws to require leasing firms to maintain separate workers'
compensation policies for each customer.

c.

PAYROLLING

Many temporary help companies offer a service sometimes referred to as
"payrolling." Here the customer, not the temporary help company, recruits the
worker and then asks the temporary help company to hire the person and assign
them to perform services for the customer. Payrolling is used when the client has
specialized needs and is in the best position to screen applicants for the required
skills. Other uses involve employees nearing retirement who are engaged in a
project that is expected to continue beyond the employee's scheduled retirement
date. Such workers can be payrolled with a temporary help firm until the project is
completed.
Payrolling is not the same as employee leasing because the individuals are assigned
to temporary assignments or projects, and the arrangement generally does not
involve taking over a customer's entire full-time work force to area of operation. But
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I

patrolled employees may be considered lease employees under federal or state laws
regulating employee leasing arrangements if they work on a long-term, open-ended
basis.

D.

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT

"Facilities management" (also sometimes referred to as "outsourcing") refers to
arrangements in which the staffing firm contracts with a customer not just to provide
personnel but to perform some specific business function that is generally peripheral
to the customer's core business. Examples include operating a mail room or data
processing center, supplying cafeteria services, landscaping services, guard services,
or maintenance and janitorial services. In these arrangements, customers do not
supervise or control the details oithe work performed by the contractor's
employees. Therefore, co-employment issues generally should not arise.

II.

WHAT IS CO-EMPLOYMENT

Co-employment describes a legal relationship between two or more employers in
which each employer has actual or potential legal rights and duties with respect to
the same employee or group of employees. Employers have many legal obligations

E-7

to their employees. These include providing wages and benefits, payment and
withholding of employment taxes, providing workers' compensation insurance,
complying with civil rights and labor laws, maintaining a safe work environment,
and so on. Employers also may have obligations to third parties jf the employees'
work-related activity causes harm to others.
It should be noted that courts and statutes generally do not use the term" co-

employment" to describe the relationship we are discussing. "Joint employment,"
or, in the case of workers' compensation, "general" and "special" employer, are the
terms most often used.
Staffing companies and their customers often have enough contacts with the
assigned employees that both will be viewed as employers. The staffing company
pays the employee, pays and withholds all payroll taxes, provides workers'
compensation coverage, has the ultimate right to p.rre and fire, hears and acts on
complaints from the employee about working conditions, etc. Customers, on the
other hand, frequently supervise and direct the employees' day-to-day work, control
working conditions at the worksite, and determine the length of the assignment.
Therefore, it many staffing arrangements, co-employment is an inherent aspect of
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the relationship between the staffing firm and its customers.
The precedents show that customer liability issues generally arise where the
customer violates some law, or where the customer deals with a supplier that fails to
meet its employer obligations. In one key area--workers' compensation--the
customer's co-employer status often actually protects the customer from liability.

III.

WORKER'S COMPENSATION
A.

"General Employer" and "Special Employer"
As every employer knows, state workers' compensation laws provide

benefits, on a no-fault basis, to employees accidentally injured on the job. The basic
premise of these laws is that, in return for such protection, employees are barred
from suing their employer for damages. In other words, workers' compensation
generally is the employee's exclusive remedy for workplace injuries.
In a long line of cases, courts have extended the exclusive remedy provisions of

state workers' compensation laws to customers of temporary help firms. In reaching
this conclusion, courts have applied the common law "loaned" (or "borrowed")
servant doctrine under which the customer is a "special employer" (the temporary
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help fInn being the "general employer") of the loaned worker.
The key elements in establishing a customer's special employer status are (1) that
the customer supervises the work of the individual and (2) that the assigned
.~

employee has consented to the arrangement.
In another twist, a few states follow the common law rule that the employer who
directs the employee's activities at the worksite is the employer for workers'
compensation purposes. In such states, the customer will be directly liable to the
staffing company's employees for the payment of workers' compensation benefits
even where the staffing company has expressly agreed to provide the coverage. In
states where the customer is viewed as the employer for workers' compensation, the
staffing company may be exposed to liability for negligence if sued by its own
employee who is injured on the job since it cannot claim immunity as an employer.
B. Speical Rules for Employee Leasing Companies
Special state laws may apply to employee leasing fmns with respect to
workers' compensation liability. In response to abuses involving employers
transferring their employees to leasing company payrolls to avoid high experience
modifications, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NArC) and
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the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCD have adopted model
regulations that are in the process of being promulgated by state insurance
departments. Temporary help services generally are excluded from these rules.
Under the model rules, any entity that provides workers pursuant to a leasing
arrangement must register with the state insurance department or face criminal
penalties. "Employee leasing" is defined broadly to include any arrangements
whereby one business leases workers to another business. The rules provide that
leasing company customers must secure workers' compensation benefits and
maintain appropriate levels of coverage unless the leasing company secures
coverage in accordance with the rules.

IV..

EMPLOYMENT TAXES (FICA, FUTA, SUTA)

As employers, staffing companies pay all employment taxes. They pay the
employer's share of social security (FICA) as well as federal and state
unemployment taxes (PUTA and SUTA). Any staffing firm that doesn't do this, but
instead sends its employees out as "independent contractors," exposes itself and its
customers to substantial risk if the workers are held to be employees rather than
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independent contracts. In general, it is unlikely that a staffing firm will be able to
establish that the workers it supplies meet the IRS or Department of Labor
definition of an independent contract.
If staffing firms discharge their obligations as employers by paying all employment

taxers and making all appropriate withholdings, customers generally shouldn't have
to worry about liability for these payments as a co-employer. Temporary help firms
have been expressly recognized by the IRS as employers for employment tax
purposes.

V.

CIVIL RIGHTS

A.

Title VlI Claims
In 1984, a federal court in New York held a temporary help customer

to be a co-employer for the purpose of a suite brought by a temporary employee
under Title VlI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Amamae v. Merrill Lynch, 611 F.
Supp 344 (DCNY 1984). The temporary alleged that the customer discharged her
from her temporary assignment and refused to hire her on permanent basis because
of her sex, race, and national origin. The customer moved to dismiss the case,
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arguing that it had to employer-employee relationship with her. The employee
asserted that the customer was an employer because the customer "controlled her
work hours, workplace, and work assignments; hired, trained, and assigned her; and
ultimately discharged her."
The court agreed that there was enough of an employer-employee relationship to
support a Title vn claim against the customer.
B.

Americans with Disabilties Act

The ADA makes clear that staffing firms cannot discriminate against their disabled
employees or applicants which includes accepting discriminatory customer orders.
For example, if a customer refuses to accept a qualified individual because of his or
her disability, it would be unlawful for the staffing firm to fill the order. The staffing
firm must make reasonable accommodations to enable its disabled employees to
perform the essential function of the job.
In addition to Title VII and the ADA, customers may be considered co-employers

under other EEO laws such as the Age Discrimination Act of 1967, the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, and laws prohibiting sexual harassment.
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VI.

LABOR RELATIONS
Another important area in which the co-employment relationship may impose

legal duties on the customer involves collective bargaining arrangements. The
..•.

c

--National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and at least one federal court have held
that the relationship between a staffing firm and its customer gives rise to a coemployment relationship and that the employees assigned to the customer may be
included in the customer's collective bargaining suit.

VII. OSHA
The loaned servant principle has been applied in determining who bears
responsibility for worksite safety and for maintaining records of work-place injuries
under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act).
All employers have a general duty under the OSH Act to maintain a safe workplace
and to comply with the Act's safety and health standards.
In a pivotal case in 1976, a major staffing company was cited by OSHA as soley
responsible for the safety violation that led to the death of one of its temporary
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employees. This was later over-ruled by an OSHA administrative law judge saying,
"it would be unconscionable" to request temporary help firms to satisfy the safety
requirements of each and every work situation.

VIII.

WAGE AND HOUR ISSUES
In a 1968 ruling, the Department of Labor held that temporary employees

assigned to work for various customers are "typically" employed jointly by the
temporary help company and its customers--and customers may be jointly held
responsible for overtime and minimum wage. In the case of overtime, it's dependent
on the employee having worked more than 40 hours in the week.

IX.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Strictly speaking, a customer can't "fire" temporary employees. It can only

ask that they be removed from the assignment. Only the temporary help company
has the right to hire and fire, and employees removed from an assignment at the
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customer's request may be immediately reassigned to another customer. Temporary
employees generally understand that even if the assignment purports to be for a·
specified period, the customer has an absolute right to terminate the assignment.
. We know of nQ case in which a court has held that a temporary employee has the
right to bring a wrongful discharge suit against a customer.

X.

BENEFITS
This is not a co-employment question. Congress, in 1982, as part of that

year's tax code amendments, passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act or
"TEFRA". Section 414(n) does not say that the customer is a co-employer. It
simply says the customer must include in its head count any contract employees who
meet the service requirements. Generally, anyone working 1,500 hours in a year is
considered to have worked "substantially full-time" and must be counted. Section
414(n) does not, however, give leased employees any right to benefits under the
customer's plans.
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XI.

IMMIGRATION--I9 VERIFICATION

Regulations issued under the Immigration Reform on Control Act of 1986,
makes clear that customers using contract services do not have any obligation to
verify the employment status of the contracted employee.· The regulation provides
that "in the case of an independent contractor or contract labor or services, the term
'employer' shall mean the independent contractor or contractor and not the person or
entity using the contract labor."
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CONCLUSION
It wasn't that long ago when the temporary work force was limited to secretaries and

other administrative personnel. Today, you can find short-term contract employees
performing virtually any business task. From engineers to computer programmers to .
interim chief executives, the temporary help industry grew 20 percent in 1993.
The increase in temporary workers is largely due to a trend called "outsourcing,"
farming work out to other companies. This trend is likely to dramatically change
how many of us work in the future.
Companies often outsource certain noncritical business functions to specialized
firms and individuals who can perform these services cheaper and more efficiently.
Mail rooms, security forces, employment departments and data processing centers
have all been outsourced. In fact, it's becoming increasingly rare to find a business
function that has not been outsourced by some company at some time.
As these dynamic changes take place in the American workplace, it is reasonable to
expect that businesses will use even more staffing services as part of their overall
human resource management strategies. As we have seen, co-employment
historically has been a concern but has had minimal legal impact on the use of
r -
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staffing services. As these services evolve in response to work force changes, it is
reasonable to assume that the legal environment also will change. With common
sense and intelligent planning, those issues should prove to be manageable in the
new workplace as they have been in the old.
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-General
It is the policy of the University of Kentucky to pay all

,""orkers in accoldance >;ith Internal Revenue Service
guidelines. Pa}~ents to individuals for services shall be
made through the Payroll Department utilizing the Payroll
Authoriiation Record (PAR), when the individual is deemed to
be an employee. When the individual is deemed to be an
independent contractor, payment shall be made directly using
a Departmental Authorization and Voucher (DAV) for amounts
that do not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
Payments in excess of one thousand dollars shall be on a
Personal Service Contract, payable to a bona fide Independent
Contractor.
Proper classification of a worker as an EMPLOYEE or an
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR is mandated by Internal Revenue
Service guidelines, and failure to do so may result in
significant penalties to the University. The remainder of
this section details the University's policies and procedures
for classification of workers.
B.

Policy
1.

The department head or the employing official shall
determine whether a worker is an l1Employeet1 ~r and
"Independent Contractor 11 prior to any performance of
work or service.

2.

Each Sector Personnel Office shall provide guidance and
assistance in the classification of workers in their
respective sectors.

3.

The University shall adhere to the ttCommonLaw Factors"
as the primary source of information to assist in the
classification of a worker. (liThe Common Law Rule" and
the "Common Law Factors l1 are stated in detail in the
following procedures.)

4.

The Controller/Treasurer Division, Accounts Payable
Department and Payroll Department shall perform the
final review of all classifications before approval for
.payment.
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Selected groups of workers have been clas~ified as
follows. These workers should be classified and paid
accordingly when employed to perform the services
described.
a.

C.
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Continuing Education Instructors: Categorically.
individuals hired to teach continuing education
courses shall be paid as Independent Contractors.

Procedures
1.

Classification of workers, as an employee or
independ~nt contractor, shall be in accordance with the
"Common Law Rule" and "Common Law Factors" as stated by
the Internal Revenue Service and listed. below.
Employing departments may also seek information and
assistance from their Sector Personnel Off'ice and the
Controller/Treasurer Division, Accounts Payable
Department.

2.

Internal Revenue Service Guidelines for Classifying a
Worker as Employee or Independent Contractor.
a.

The Common Law Rule: For all three employment
tax laws, a worker is an employee under the .
common law rules if the person for whom he/she
works has the right to direct and control him/her
in the way he/she works, both as to final results
and as to the details of when, where and how the
work is to be done. However, the employer need
not actually·exercise the control; it is
sufficient that he/she has.the right to do so.
Where the employer does not possess that right,
the individual is an independent contractor, not
an employee.

b.

There are a number of factors that may aid in the
determination of whether or not the requisite
right of direction and control exists in a given
situation. No one or small group of these
factors is necessarily controlling. The factors
are to be weighed against those that indicate an
independent contractor·status.
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Note that the relative importance of anyone factor may vary
depending on the occupation under consideration. The
following is a list of some of the factors that might be
considered:
( 1)

A person who is required to comply with instructions
about when, where and how the person is to work is
ordinarily an employee. Again, it is the employer's
right to instruct, not the exercise of that right, that
is important. Instructions may be oral or in written
procedures or manuals.

(2)

Training of an individual by an experienced employee
who works with the worker (or individual) is a factor
of control because it indicates that the employer wants
the services performed in a particular method or
manner. Independent contractors ordinarily use their
own methods and receive training from the one who
purchases their services.

(3)

Integration of the person's services in the business
operations generally shows that the worker is subject
to direction and control. That is, when the success or
continuation of a business depends to an appreciable
degree on the performance of certain kinds of services,
those performing the services must necessarily be
subject to a certain amount of control by the owner of
the business.

(4)

If services must be rendered personally and if the
employer is interested in who does the job as well as
in getting the job done, it indicates that the employer
is interested in the methods used as well as the result
of the services rendered.

. (5)

Hiring, supervising and payment by an employer
generally show control over the persons on the job.
Sometimes one worker will hire, supervise and pay other
workers under a contract in which the one worker is
responsible for the attainment of a given result. In
such a case, that worker is an independent contractor,
not an employee.

E - 23

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY BUSINESS PROCEDURES
SUBJECT
OFFICE OF CONTROLLER AND TREASURER
7. Non-Payroll Payment for
Individual Services
2. Employee versus Independent
Contractor

Page 4 of 7

Number: E-7-2
Date Effective: 2-1-90
Date Issued:
2-1-90
Supersedes:
Prepared By:
TMD & RSw
Approved:
H.C.O.

(6)

The existence of a continuing relationship between an
individual and the person for whom the individual
performs services is a factor tending to indicate the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Services may be continuing even though they are
performed at irregular intervals, on a part-time basis,
seasonally, or over a short term.

(7)

The establishment of set hours of work by the employer
is a factor indicative of control since such a
condition bars the worker from being the master of the
worker's own time, which is a right of an independent
contractor.

(8)

i

If the worker must devote full time to the business of
the employer, rather than engaging in other gainful
work, then the worker is probably an employee. An
independent contractor, on the other hand, is free to
work when, for whom and for as many employers as the
worker pleases.' Note that full time does not
necessarily mean an eight-hour day or a five-day work
week. Its meaning will vary depending on the intent of
the parties.

(9)

Doing the work on the employer's premises is not, of
itself, indicative of control but it does imply
control, especially if the work is of such a nature
that it could be performed elsewhere. One who works in
the employer's place of business is at least physically
within the employer's direction and supervision.
.
Conversely, however, the fact that work is done off the
employer's premises does not, of itself, mean that no
right to control exists.

(10)

If a person must perform services in a prescribed
sequence, it shows that the person may be subject to
control. Here, too, it is the right to set the
sequence, not the exercis~ of that right, thai
controlling.

(11)

Regular reports, submitted by the worker, indicate
control.
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(12)

Payment for ,-;ark done by the hour, weel~ or month is
usually-the manner for compensating employees;
independent contractors are customarily paid by the job
in a lump sum or on a commission basis. The guarantee
of a minimum salary or the granting of a drawing
account over earnings tends to indicate the existence
of an employer-employee relationship.

(13)

Payment by the employer of the worker's business and/or
traveling expenses is a factor indicating control over
the worker. But, a lack of control is indicated where
the worker is paid on the job basis and has to take
care of all the workers expenses.

(14)

The furnishing of tools, materials and the like by the
employer is indicative of control over the worker. If
the worker furnishes tools and equipment, it indicates
a lack of control subject to recognition of the fact
that in some jobs it is customary for the employees to
use their own hand tools.

(15)

A significant investment by persons in facilities used
by them in performing services for another tends to
show an independent contractor status. Facilities
include, generally, equipment or premises necessary for
the work, but not tools, instruments, clothing ~nd the
like that are provided by employees as common practice
in their trade.

(16)

A person who is in a position to realize a profit or
suffer a loss as a result of the person's services is
generally an independent contractor, while an employee
is not in such a position.

(17)

The fact that a person makes services available to the
general public is usually indicative of an independent
contractor status. "Making services available" may
include hanging out a "shingle", holding business
licenses, supplying advertising and telephone
directory listings, etc.

(18)

The right to discharge is an important factor in
determining whether the one possessing that right is an
employer of an employee. An employee exercises control
through threat of dismissaL An independent
contractor, on the other hand, cannot be fired so long
as a result that measures up -to ~he contract
specifications results. The fact that a right to
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discharge may be limited under a collective bargaining
agreement does not detract from the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.
(19)

An employee has the right to end the relationship with
the employer at any time without incurring liability.
An independent contractor usually agr€es to complete a
specific job and is responsible for its satisfactory
completion or is legally obligated to make good for
failure to complete the job.

3.

Payment to an Employee
to employees must be made in accordance with
the University of Kentucky Business Procedures E-14

Pay~ents

4.

Payments to Independent Contractors ($1,000.00)
a.

Contracts in excess of One Thousand Dollars
$1,000,00)
Pay~ents to Independent Contractors for amounts
in excess of One Thousand dollars ($1,000.00)
must be on a Personal Services Contract, and in
accordance with University of Kentucky Business
Procedure B-9-11. (See B-9-11 for Details)

b.

Contracts of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or
Less
Payments to Independent Contractors for One
Thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or less, may be made
by Departmental Authorization and Vouchers as
follows;
1.

Prepare a Departmental Authorization and
Voucher (DAV), payable to the Individual.

2.

The description on the DAV must contain the
following:
a.

What work was completed. (A
description of the actual task
performed)

b.

When the work was performed.
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c.

Where the work was performed. (Were
University facilities, tools~and ~quip~ent
used?)

d.

How the amount paid for the work was
determined. (Was the Contractor paid an
hourly amount, or a contracted amount?)

The following statement must be on the DAV, and signed
by the responsible University official.

HI have reviewed the University of Kentucky procedures
for classifying an Employee/Independent Contractor, and
I believe this individual meets the criterion to be
classified as an Independent Contractor."
6.

Attach a completed 111099 Information Sheet" to the DAV
(See University of Kentucky Business Procedure E-7-1
for details) Attachment A.

I.

Attach a complete copy of the "University of Kentucky
Agreement Between Independent Contractor and Client".
Attachment B.

8.

Forward the completed DAV to the Accounts Payable
Department for final revievL
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APPENDIX 2

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
AGREEMENT BETWEEN
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND CLIENT
WHEREAS. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----:_.,.-_.....,-___ ("CUEI\'Y') intends to contract with
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (independent contractor -- "IC") for the performance of certain tasks;
WHEREAS. Ie's principal place of business is located at the following address:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-"; Ie's Employee Identification Number _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _....:.

WHEREAS. CUENTs principal place of business is located at the follOwing address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--'_-'WHEREAS. IC declares that IC is engaged in an independent business and has complied with all federal, state and local
aws regarding business permits and licenses of any kind that may be required to carry out the said business and the
asks to be performed under this agreement
WHEREAS. IC declares that IC is engaged in the same or similar activities for other clients and that CUENT is not Ie's
-ole and only client or customer.
THEREFORE. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING REPRESENTATIONS AND THE FOlLOWING TERMS AND
CONDITIONS. THE PARTIES AGREE:
].

SERVICES TO BE PERFORMED. CUENT engages IC to perform the following tasks or services:

2.

TERMS OF PAYMENT. CUENT shall pay IC according to the [allowing terms and conditions:

IC shall submit invoices to CUENT for the payments called for in this paragraph.
3.

INSTRUMENTAUTIES. IC shall supply all equipment. tools. materials and supplies to accomplish the
designated tasks except as follows: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~

4.

CONTROL. IC retains the sole and exclusive right to control or direct the manner or means by which the
work described herein is to be performed, CUENT retains only the right to control the ends to insure its
conformity with that specified herein.

5.

PAYROLL OR EMPLOYMENT TAXES. No payroll or employment t,axes of any kind shall be withheld or
paid with respect to payment to IC. The payroll or employment taxes that are the subject of this
paragraph include but are not limited to FlCA, FUTA. federal personal income tax, state personal income
tax. state disability insurance tax. and state unemployment insurance tax.

6.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION. No workers' compensation insurance has been or will be obtained by the
CUEI\'T on account of IC or IC's employees. IC shall comply with the workers' compensation laws with
respect to IC and Ie's employees.

7.

TERMINATION. This agreement shall end on
and may not be terminated earlier
(except for cause) without
days prior written notice form one party to the other.

Agreed to this ____ dayof _ _ _ _ _--', 199_, at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _" State of _ _ _ _ _ _--'CLIENT:

8Y:--7N71a-m-e-a-n-d~T~it7Ie-------------

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR:
By:.,-_ _--=-=--:-__________

Name and Title
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APPENDIX 3
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
1099 INFORMATION SHEET

Please Type or Print

1.

NAME:
(First)

2.

(Middle In.)

(Last)

HO¥£ ADDRESS: ___________________________________________________

ZIP CODE:
3.

VOUCHER NUMBER:

4.

ACCOm.TT NUMBER:

OBJECT CODE:

----------------

------- USER CODE: --------

DOCUMENT l'.TUMBER:

5.

DAV., P.O., etc.

6.

REASON FOR PAYMENT:

7.

AMOUNT:

8.

1099 CODE:

9.

ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT:

SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

DATE:

Instructions:

1. .. _ The University Department reques.ting payment must complete all items above
except item No. 3 and item No.8.
2.

Items No. 3 and No. 8 will be completed by the Accounts Payable Department.

3.

Attach the completed form to the paying document. (DAV or P.O.)

FORM PA-l
Revised 6-87
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APPENDIX 4

UNIVERSITY
OF KENTUCK

AuOW1."G "POltyable Department
331 Peterson Service Building
University of Kentucky,
Lexington, Kentucky 4050~5
606-257-1402
Fax Number 606-2574805

January 16, 1992

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Deans, Directors, Departmental Chairpersons,
and Admi~.st
ative. Officers

FROM:

H.C. Owen
Controller easur r ~

RE:

Nonresident Alien Contractors

na. ~ V

This memorandum is to clarify federal tax withholding requirements on
compensation for services performed by nonresident alien contractors.
These payments generally are for guest lectures, speaking engagements,
consulting services, honoraria, and other activities.
Federal Tax Withholding Requirements
1.

The University is required by federal tax law to withhold
taxes equal to 30% of the gross amount paid for services
unless specifically exempted by tax treaty between the
nonresident alien's country of residence and the United
States of America.

2.

Tax withholdings V>7ill be deposited with the Internal
Revenue Service under the name and social security
number of the individual. (A tax identification number
will be assigned by the Office of the Controller Treasurer
if the individual does not provide the University with a
social security number.)

3.

Internal Revenue Service Publication 515 provides tax
information relating to payments for services performed
by nonresident alien contractors. Publication 515 can be
obtained directly from the Internal Revenue Service.

An Equal Opportunity University

E - 33

Procedures for Payment by Department Authorization Voucher (DAY)
1.

Review University of Kentucky Business Procedures
Manual Section E-7-2 to determine that the individual
meets the tests to qualify as an independent contractor.

2.

Complete a DAV with the individual as payee. Include .
complete mailing address.

3.·

Provide a complete description of the services performed
and state the reason for requested payment by DAV.

4.

Attach a completed 8233 form (original and one copy)
when the individual claim~ to be exempt from
withholding. *See note below.

5.

Attach a copy of the individual's Visa.

6.

Forward the DAV and attachments to the Accounts
Payable Department, Room 331, Peterson Service
Building 0005.

* Note:

A sample of form 8233 is-attached. Additional forms
may be obtained from the I.R.S. or the University
Payroll Department.
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APPENDIX 5
Form

8233

Exemption From Withholding on Compensation
for Independent Personal Services of a
Nonresident Allen Individual

(!'lev. hcust 1990)
~rtment of tht lrusuf)'
·In\emal Re.enU<! SeM~

OMS No. 1S4~795
~7·31·93

This exemption is applicable for compensation for calendar year 19 ___ • or other tax year beginning ____________ .19 ___ •
and ending ____________ • 19 ___ .
.

(Students, teachers, and researchers: 'See Genef7JllnstructJons.
Taxpayer identification number ______________________ _
(see instructions)
~~~ress~(~~~-r-a-~~~-rH-t7).~n~tht-U~n7n~~Su~t~~------------------~ United States visa number (If any) ____________________ _
Nonresident Alien Individual

City. SUIte. and ZIP code

CItizens of Canae. or Muico complete enht, line> la and III or I~ 2; all othtrfile1$ Complete lines la. Ib,.nd 2.

III Country issuing passport ______ ..: ______ -' ____ ~ ___ _ _
b Passport number

2 Permanent foreign address

___________________________ _

3 Compensation for independent personal services:
• Description (see instructions) __________________ ~ _______________.________________________________ _

----------------------------------------------------------~--------------------~----b Amount
(see instructions) $ ________________________________________________________
:.. _____ .": ___ _

c If compensation is exempt from withholding because of a U.S. tax treaty. provide;
(1) Taxtre~ty and provision under which you are claiming exemption from withholding

(2) Your country of residence

___________. __________________ _

___________ .____ "'_~ _________________ ~ _____________________________ _

cf Is your compensation otherwise exempt (or will it be otherwise exempt) from income tax during the tax year? . . • 0 Yes 0 No
(If you checked "Yes •• 8ttach a statement explaining why.)
e Additional facts to justify the exemption from withholding ______________________ • _________________________ _

5 Number of dayS in the period during which indePendent personal

.. Number of personal exemptions you are claiming (see
instructions ~

services are to be

rlormed in the United States •

Under pena~ie$ of periUf")', I declare that t havoe eltllm.~ this form.nd.ny accompanying sute_nlS .• nd. to the bes1 of my knowledge a~ belief, they Ire true. COfTect, and

complete.lats.o declare. under pe,..,atties of pe'juf)'. thai lam ncrt a citizen Of resident of the

Uni1~

Sutes.

Signature of nonresident alien individual •.
Withholding Agent Certification

Oate

~

Employer I6entlflcatlon number
AcIaress (number ana ~rHt)

Cny. ~ate ••nd ZIP coOe
Onder penaltres of perjury, I certify that 1 havoeexami~ this form and any accompanyi"€ ~atements. that I am gtisfte<1 tna: an exemption from witllholdlTli is """rantea . and
that I do not knol>'.or have ruson to know thai the nonres~nl alien indMClual's compensation IS ncrt entnled to the exempllOn or that the i:lieibilny of the nonr~idenl ahen's
compensatIOn for the exempt.on aTnnot be readily determine~.

Signature of withholding agent.

General Instructions
(Section references are to the internal
Revenue Code unless otherwise indicated.)

tperwork Reduction Act Notice.-We ask
.....r the information on this form to carry out
the Internal Revenue laws of the United
States. If you ¥.tant to receiv!! exemption from
withholding on compensation for independent
personal services, you are reqUIred to give us
the information. We need it to ensure that you

Date ..
are complying with these laws and to allow us
to figure and collect the right amount of tax.
The time needed to complete and file this
form will vary depending on individual
circumstances. The estimated average time is:
Recordkeeplng
26 mins.
lurnlng about the ~w or the
form
12 mins.
Preparing and ~endlng the form
41 mins.
to IRS
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If you have comments concerning the
IIccuracy ofthese time estimates or
suggestions for making this form more simple.
we would be happy to hear from you. You can'
write to both the Internal Revenue Service,
Washington. DC 20224. Attention: IRS
Reports Clearance Officer. T:FP. and the
Office of Management and Budget.
Paperwork Reduction Project (1545·0795).
Washington, DC 20503.

rom> 8233 (Rev. 8-90)
DO NOT send the tax form to either of these
offices. Instead, give it to your withhoiding
agent as specified in the instructions under
·Purpose of Form.·
Students, Teachers, Researchers.- Form
8233 should be used by nonresident alien
students. teachers, and researchers to claim
exemption from withholding on compensation
for services that is exempt from taxation under
a U.S. tax treaty. Students must provide the
information required by Revenue Procedure
87-8,1987-1 C.B. 366. Teachers and
researchers must provide the information
required by Revenue Procedure 87·9, 1987-1
C.B. 368. All these individuals must also
f)rovide the information required by Form
8233, disregarding references to independent
personal services. Then, they should submit
the form to their withholding agent.
Purpose of Form.-In general, section 1441
requires that 3096 of a mounts paid to a
nonresident alien individual as compensation
for independent personal services (i.e., services
performed where there is no employer·
employ" relationship) be withheld by the
person paying the amount (the withholding
agent) to the individual. This form is used by
nonresident alien individuals to claim
exemption from withholding on compensation
for independent personal services (under
section 1441 and its regulations) if the
exemption is based on a U.s. tax treaty or on
the personal exemption amount. The form is
complete'd by the nonresident alien individual
claiming exemption and presented to the
withholding agent for review. If the withholding
agent accepts form 8233, the withholdi"6
agent so certifies on the same form and
forwards it to the Director, Office o-f
Compliance, Assistant Commissioner
(International), at the address shown under
Part II on this page. An accepted form 8233- is
effecti"'E only for the tax year shown on tne
form. Do not use Form 8233 if you have an
office in the United States regularly available to
you for performing personal services. If you
have an office in the United States regula rly
Ivailable to you, contact the !!lirector, Office of
Compliance, Assistant CommissiQner
(International). for more information.

Definitions
Nonresident Alien Individual.-Any
individua I who is not a resident or citizen of
the United States is a nonreSIdent ahen
individual. The term also includes a
nonresident alien fiduciary. An alien
individual meeting either the "green card .
test· or the "substantial presence tes~· for the
calendar year is a resident. Those no~ meeting
either test are nonresident alien indlvldua!s.
Note: Nonresident 'lien individuals married
to U.S. citizens or resident aliens may choose
to be treated as lesident aliens fOI income tax
purposes (e.g., for purposes of filing a Joint
income t,x return). However, these
individuals _ considered nonresidents for
purposes of withholding taxes on nonresident
.Iiens. For further information on residen!
and nonresident alien status, the teslS lor
residence. and the exceptions to them, se£
Publication 519, U.S. Tax Guide for Ahens.
available from the !RS .
Nonresident Allen Fiducilry (£States and
Trusts).-A nonresident alien fIdUCIary is a
nonresident allen guardian, trustee. exeCI..'tor,
administrator, receiver. conservator. or o!ner
person acting in any fiduciary capacity for any
person. However, a nonresident alien
fiduciary is not a nomInee.
Compenutlon for Independent Personal
Services.-lndependent persOn2 1Sf'vlces
are personal services perfo~med '" tn~ Un!led

stites by an independent nonresident alien
contractor, rather than by a nonreside:1! alien
employee. Included in compensation are
payments for professional services, such as
fees of an attomey, physician, or acco:mtant
made directly to the person performing the
services, consulting fees, .n.d paymems for
performances by public entertainers, such as
artiSts, actors, musicians, and athletes. For
further information, see Publication 51 S,
Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Ahens and
foreign Corporations, available from the IRS.
Withholding Acent.-Any person required to
withhold tax on payments made to a
nonresident alien individual is a withholding
agent. Generally, the person who pays or
conveys the item of U.S. source income to the
nonresident alien individual (or to his Of her
agent) is liable for the tax and must witnhold,
The withholding agent may be an individual,
corporation, partnership, trust, association, or
any other entity. For further information, see
Publication SIS.

Specific Instructions
Part I
Taxpayer Identification number.-If you area
nonresident alien individual (other than a
nonresident alien estate ortrust)and yo:.: have a
social security numbergryou ere require:lto get
a social security number,you must use it when
an identific:atiQn number is required for Federal
tax purposes. If you do nat have a socia! Hcurity
number. applyfor one on form 5S·S,
Application for a Social Security Card, which you
can get at Social Security Administration offices.
When the number is received, promptly give it to
the withholding agent. In some cases. if~u do
not have a social security number or are not
otherwise requireato getone, YOIl may usean
IRS-issued identification number.if.an
application has been made for a numbe~!lut it
has not been received, write "TIN ap;lh~ for"
and1he date you applied in thespace provided
on this form. for (non-residentalien) eS:2tes or
trusts, use your employer identific:ation number.
Unes la, Ib, and 2.-AlI filers must complete
lines la.lb, and.2. except citizens of Car.ada or
Mexico, who can complete either lines 1a, 1b,
or line 2.
line 3a.-Describe the independent ~rsonal
services for which the compensation is Qelng
(or will be) received, and describe the r..anner
of compensation (e.g., lump sum, momnly
payments, etc.).
line 3b•....;Enterthe amount of compe:1Sation
for independent personal scervices you ....ill be
receiving during the tax year to which this
Form 8233 applies. Enter an estimatec
amount if the exact amount is not knoy;~.
line 3d.-lf the exemption from inCOl'r1t talC
withholding is (or will be) nased on othe: than a
U.S. tax treaty (e.g., the personal exem;tion
amount), explain this in an attached sta1ement.
line 4.-Fordetermini"6the amount C'! .
compensation exempt from 30% withnc!:ling
because ofthe personal exemptionamo~nt.. one
personal exemption is allowed a nonresillent
alien indi",idual who is not a resident of C2nada
or Mexico, or'is n01a U.S. national durinithe
tax year. However. a nonresident alien
indIVidual covered by a U.S. tax treaty w;:'" his
or her country may be entitled to exemv.·ons for
a spouse and dependents under ce 1'1 a It:
circumstances. See the applic.a!lle tax t!eatyfor
further information. A nonresideirtalte~
individual who is a resident of Canada c· Mexico
orisa U.S. national isgenerallyallowec:~e .
same personal exemptiOns as a U.S. cittlen or
resIdent. (Forfu:'ther information. see
PublIcatIon 519.) Each aUowatlleexem::,o'l
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must be prorated according to the number of
days in the period during which the-personal
services are to be performed in the United
States (line 5 on Form "8233). To figure the daily
proration amount for each allowable exemption,
divide the personal exe.mption amount (for
example, $2,050 if the individual's tax year
begins in 1990) by 365 (366 for a leap year).
Round off the result the nearest cent. Note:
The personal exemption amount for any year
can be obtained from the IRS.
$ignature.-The nonresident alien individual,
or his or her legally authorized representative,
must sign and date Form 8233 in the
appropriate place.

to

Part II
Withholding Agent's Responsibilities
_Reguding Form 8233.-When the
nonresident alien individual gives you Form
8233, review it to see if you are satisfied that
the exemption from withholding is warranted.
If you are satisfied, based on the facts
presented, certify that you accept the form
8233 by completing and signing Part II.
Within 5 days of your acceptance, forward
form 8233 and any Ittachments to:
Assistant Commissioner (International)
Director, Office of Compliance
IN:C:E:62 .
Intemal Revenue Service
950 L'Enfant Piau South, S.W.
Washington, DC 20024
Give a copy of the completed Form 8233 to
the nonresident alien individual. Attach a copy
of Form 8233 to the Form 1042, Annual
Withholding Tax Return for U .S•.Source Income
of foreign Persons, that you file with the IRS.
Keep a copy of Form 8233 for your records.
Note: Each copy of Form 8233 must also
include any attachments originally submftted
by the nonresident alien individual.
The exemption from withholding becomes
effective for payments made at least 10 days
after you have mailed Form 8233 to the IRS.
(See the instructions for Part I,line 4, for
information on amounts exempt from
withholding because of the personal
exemption amount.)
Ypu must not accept Form 8233 if either of
the following applies:
• if you know or have reason to know that
any of the facts or statements on form 8233
maybe false; or
• You know or have reason to knowthatthe
eligibility of the nonresident alien indIvidual's
compensation for the exemption cannot be
readily determined (e.g., if you know or have
reason to know that a nonresident alien
individual has an offIce in the United States
regularly available for performing personal
servic.es).
If you accept Form 8233 and subsequently
find that either of the situations described
.
immediately above applies, you must promptly
notify the D,rector, OffIce of Compliance,
Assistant CommiSSIoner (International), in
writing, and you must withhold on any amounts
not yet paid. If you are notified by that office
that the eligibility for the exemption of the
nonresIdent alien individual's compensation is
in doubt Of that the compensation is ineligible
for the exemption. YOI: must withhold. See
Regulations section 1.1441-4(b)(2)(iii) for
examples illustrating these rules.
Signature.-The withholding agent, or a duly
authorized agent of the withholdi"6 agent,
must sign and date form 8233 in the
appropriate place. (See Regulations section
1.1441·7(b) fOf further information regarding
duly au1horized agents.)
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SECTIONF

HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:
PITFALLS AND PREVENTIVE PRACTICES

Richard G. Griffith
STITES & HARBISON
I.

INTRODUCTION.
The unveiling of allegations that the President of our country

engaged in workplace misconduct before taking office graphically
demonstrates

the

increased

today's business climate.
significant
address

and

numerous

scrutiny

employers'

In that same vein,

comprehensive
workplace

of

federal

issues

and

and

in

the enactment of

state

the

actions

statutes

steady,

and

that
often

dramatic, annual increases in the number of workplace claims filed
by employees have led many employers to the breaking point.

There

can be no doubt that an employer's survival in this era of multimillion dollar verdicts in employment law cases may depend upon its
ability to manage its human resources effectively.
This outline is designed to provide an overview of some of the
most significant issues faced by human resource professionals and
to provide suggestions concerning the manner in which these issues
should be addressed.
II.

THE NEED TO BE AWARE OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS.
No

employer

can

hope

to

have

effective

human

resources

management without a general understanding of the laws that govern
its operations.

Although a comprehensive review of all laws that

touch on human resource issues is beyond the scope of this outline,
every employer needs to be aware of certain basic obligations and
principles.
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A.

Issues Relating To Employment Terminations.
The Employment-At-Will Doctrine.

Kentucky Courts

have long endorsed the employment-at-will doctrine, under which a
person's employment may be terminated for any reason or even no
reason.

See, e.g., Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, Ky., 666

S.W.2d 730, 731

(1984)

("Ordinarily an employer may discharge his

at-will employee for good cause, for no cause, or for a cause that
some might view as morally indefensible.").
Though

the doctrine

is

still viable,

significantly eroded in recent years
certain

common

law

principles

and

its

reach has

been

through the evolution of

the

enactment

of

numerous

statutes and ordinances.
2.

The Principal Exceptions To The Employment-At-Will
Doctrine:
a.

Employment Contracts.
(1)

that

Express Contracts.

an employer generally is

free

written contract with an employee.

to

It is beyond question

enter

into an express,

Thus, an employer may choose to

obtain from an employee a covenant not to compete, an agreement not
to disclose confidential information and virtually any other type
of contractual commitment.
contractually

an

An employer also may choose to alter

employee's

at-will

status

by,

for

example,

agreeing that it can terminate the person's employment only under
certain conditions.
(2)

Implied Contracts.

In recent years courts

throughout the nation, including those in Kentucky, have shown an
increased willingness to find the existence of implied contractual
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relationships between employers and employees.
absence

of

a

written

employment

contract

Thus, even in the

an

employer

may

be

restricted by an implied contract in its ability to terminate a
person's employment.

See, e.g., Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber

Corp., Ky., 655 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1983).
b.

The Tort Of Wrongful Discharge.

In Kentucky it

is unlawful for an employer to terminate a person's employment
where the motivation for the termination is the person's "failure
or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment" or the
"employee's

exercise of

legislative enactment."
(1985).

a

right

conferred by well-established

Grzyb v. Evans, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399, 402

The employee does not have a viable cause of action where

the legislative enactment provides both rights to the employee and
a remedy for the violation of those rights.
of statutes that do not prescribe a

Id. at 401.

remedy,

Examples

and therefore may

provide a basis for a wrongful discharge claim, are:

KRS 38.460

(prohibiting retaliation against a member of the Kentucky National
Guard on active militia because of military duties); KRS 118.035(2)
(prohibiting
exercising

retaliation
his

or

her

against
right

an

to

employee

vote);

KRS

for

properly

311.800(5) (6)

{prohibiting retaliation against employees and other who refuse to
participate in the performance of an abortion); KRS 427.140(4) (a)
(prohibiting

the

discharge

of

an

employee

whose

earnings

are

garnished for one .indebtedness) ; KRS 436. 165 (prohibiting employers
from discriminating against employees who refuse to work on Sundays
or their Sabbath).
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c.
ation.
is

statutes Or Ordinances That Prohibit Discrimin-

An important exception to the employment-at-will doctrine

embodied in the many statutes and ordinances

employment discrimination.

The protection granted by these laws

includes, but is not limited to,
discharge. based upon

the

that prohibit

the prohibition of an unlawful

employee's

gender, age, national origin, etc . . .

specific

traits,

such

as

The principal statutes that

Kentucky employers are governed by are cited in the endnotes. 1
B.

Other Legal Issues.
1•

statutes Or Ordinances That Prohibit Discrimination.

The statutes that prohibit discrimination in employment prohibit
unlawful termination and unlawful discriminatory treatment in any
of the terms and condition of employment.
2.

Wage And Hour Laws.

State2 and federa1 3 statutes

generally govern the method in which wages are paid to employees.
3.

Organized Labor.

Federal statutes primarily govern

the regulation of organized labor relations. 4
4.

Employee Benefits.

A federal

statute primarily

governs the area of employee benefits. s
5.

Workplace

Safety.

State6

and

federa1 7

statutes

address issues pertaining to workplace safety.
6.

Unemployment

Compensation.

StateS

and

federa1 9

statutes address issues pertaining to the rights of persons to
receive unemployment benefits.
7.

Workers' Compensation.

A state statute primarily

governs the area of Workers' Compensation.lO
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8.

Common Law Obligations.

Employers need to be aware

of common law theories that impose certain restrictions on their
conduct,

such

as

the

tort

of

wrongful

implied contract 12, promissory estoppel 13 ,

discharge lI ,
defamation,

breach

of

invasion of

privacy, tort of outrage, tortious interference with prospective or
existing business relations and negligent hiring and retention.
9.

Miscellaneous Statutes.

There are numerous statutes

that govern miscellaneous aspects of the employment relationship.
Examples of the substantive issues addressed by such statutes are
the right to require an employee to take a polygraph examination 14 ,
the restrictions on an employer in effecting a plant closing or
mass layoff0,
care

the obligations of an employer to provide health

continuation

coverage

to

a

departing

employee l6 ,

the

obligations of certain employers to adopt a drug-free workplace
policyl7,

and

the

obligations

of

an

employer

to

obtain

basic

information from prospective employees about their citizenship.18
III. THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP FROM START TO FINISH.
A.

Events That Should Precede The Employment Relationship.

An employer's best opportunity to avoid liability is before
the employment relationship begins; the old adage that an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure is nowhere more true than in
the area of employment law.
significant

steps

that

an

Discussed below are some of the more
employer

can

take

to

avoid

serious

problems.
1•

Personnel

Regular Review And, Where Appropriate, Revision Of

Policies.

Because

employment
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laws

have

changed

so

dramatically

in

recent

years,

and because

the pace of

change

continues to escalate, every employer should periodically review
its forms and policies.
are

particularly

There are certain forms and policies that

likely to

be

oui:dated

and

thus

in

need of

revision.
Application Forms. Any employer that continues

a.

to use the same applicatiori form it used in the 1980's is almost
certainly at risk.
in

such

forms

Among the high-risk questions frequently found

are

detailed

questions

about

the

applicant's

health19, questions that elicit from the applicant, either directly
or indirectly, his or her age, and questions about the applicant's
arrest or conviction
There

also

are

re6ords.~

some

provisions

tha t

an

employer

consider inserting in its standard application form.
•

A provision

exp~essly

should

They include:

informing the applicant that if he

or she becomes employed it will be on at-will basis.

See

discussion ofd{scla{mers, infra. n
•

A provision authorizing the employer to check references
and run a thorough background check on the applicant.

•

A provision waiving any claims against former employees
arising out of the provision of information about the
applicant.
b.

Employee Handbooks.

Employers are not required

by ·law to utilize employee handbooks, and whether any particular
employer

should

prepare

a

handbook depends·· upon

factors,

including the size of the employer,
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a

number

of

the regularity of

employee turnover and the complexity of the employer's operations.
If an·· employer chooses . to issue an employee handbook, among
the most critical policies to be included in the handbook are:
(1 )

Equal· Employment Opportunity statement.

A clear, comprehensive equal employment opportunity statement can
be a valuahle piece of evidence in a discrimination suit.
statement

should

be

reviewed

periodically

and

revised,

The
where

appropriate, to include newly protected traits, such as a person's
HIV-positive or smoking status.
(2)

Disclaimer.

Every

employer

should at

least consider inserting in its handbook a disclaimer providing
that the handbook does not create contractual rights
employees continue to be·terminable-at-will.

and that

The disclaimer also

should provide that only one person has the authority to enter into
an employment contract with employees and that the specified person
may only bind the company if the contract is in writing and he or
she signs it.
of

It is generally considered advisable to include all

the above information on an acknowledgement

form

that each

employee signs at the inception of the relationship.
(3)

Anti-Harassment Policy.

It is now widely

recognized that every employer, large or small, should adopt and
disseminate to all employees an effective anti-'-harassment policy.
At a minimum,
harassment
level

of

the policy should condemn all forms of unlawful

(not just sexual harassment),
confidentiality

and

prompt

promise an appropriate
action

and

provide

an

alternative reporting mechanism (include several reporting options
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and do not, under any circumstance, require the employee to report
the harassment only to the person's immediate supervisor)

and a

specification of actions, including termination, that will be taken
if harassment has occurred.
(4)

Flexible Approach To Employee Discipline.

It is not unusual for an, employee handbook to contain a section
that sets forth'in great detail the behavior the employer deems
,

inappropriate' and the process by which the employer will address
that behavior.

Although an employee discipline section is not

always unacceptable, it is very important to draft such a section
so that the ,employer retains discretion to handle in an appropriate
manner all types of employee conduct.

This' can be accomplished by,

among other things, clearly stating that the list of "bad acts" is
not exhaustive and by expressly reserving the right to impose any
form of di.scipline, including discharge, that is appropriate under
the circumstances.

(5)

Other Policies.

Other policies that an

employer may wish to include in a handbook are policies that set
forth:

,•

hiring and promotion policies;

•

the manner in which employees will be paid; and

•

safety rules
c.

Performance Appraisal Forms.

The performance

appraisal form may be the single most important document in the
employer's

formbook

because

of
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its

frequent

appearance

on

claimants' trial exhibit lists.

Notwithstanding its importance,

the form is rarely scrutinized and is too often designed in such a
way that it invites risk.

An employer reviewing its ,appraisal form

should at a minimum consider eliminating the following:
(1)

"Satisfactory"

Ratings.

Experience

teaches us that_supervisors and others involved in the evaluation
process cannot resist the temptation to give a satisfactory rating
to marginal or even poor employees.
force

a

example,

supervisor

to

provide a

The appraisal form should

meaningful

assessment.

For

the form could, provide only the following performance

ratings:

Excellent,

improvement, and poor.

consistently

meets

expectations,

needs

By employing these, or similar ratings I the

employer is more likely to receive mecmingful information and is
less likely to find itself explaining an inflated appraisal to a
j ur'y.

(2)

"Overall" Ratings.

contain an overall rating,

Although most forms

it is our experience that the use of

such a rating leads to the same problems that arise from the use of
a,

"satisfactory"

rating.

This

is

especially

true

where

employee who is being evaluated is generally performing at

the
an

acceptable level, but has severely deficient performance in one or
two areas.

If such an employee receives an acceptable overall

rating T, the employer will find it hard to justify a discharge even
where the discharge is supported by the performance in the problem
areas. 22
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2.

Preparation Of Lawful Advertisements And Other Forms
Every employer should exercise great

Of Employee Solicitation.
care

in the crafting of

employee

solicitation.

employers

job advertisements
There

are

many

frequently make with respect

communications,

or

other

serious

forms

mistakes

of

that

to these pre-employment

including the use of language that may create a

binding employment contract with the persons who are solicited and
.the use of language that

is either facially discriminatory or

reflects a policy that has a discriminatory impact on a protected
group. 23
3.
conceiv~d

Interviews Of Prospective Employees.

As with poorly

advertisements, interviews, where poorly conducted, can

lead to significant exposure for

employers~

The person cOnducting

the interview should, among other things, avoid suggesting that the
posi tion

which

the

applicarit

is

seeking

is

guaranteed

for

a

particular duration and should not characterize the wages or salary
in annual terms. 24
The

person

conducting

the

interview

also

should

avoid

eliciting information that may not be lawfully relied upon in the
employment decision,

such as whether the· applicant is pregnant,

disabled, or over 40.
It

is

important

to remember in. carrying out

the employee

selection process that in the EEOC's view an employer does not
typically ask a question unless it intends to be influenced by the
answer it receives.
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4.

Reference Checks.

an applicant's
Presently,
concerns:

references

employers
the

need

find
on

Employers generally should check

before

offering

themselves

their

part

that

caught

to· be

person

between

diligent

a

job.

competing
in

seeking

information about applicants 25 and the reluctance on the part of
the persons and entities who could provide information to expose
themselves to defamation or related claims.

Although the pursuit

of information about an applicant may not yield much that can be
used in the selection process,

the mere fact that the employer

tried to obtain information should be useful in the
claim for

ne~ligent

5.

defens~

of a

hiring or retenti6n.

Negotia tioris

Wi th

Prospective

Employees.

,Each

employer should determine before the beginning of the employee
sblicitationprocess whether.it has any unique goals that it wishes
to pursue or assets
process.
•

that must be protected as

Among the issues that should

b~

a

part of the

considered are:

whether the employer wishes to offer the prospective
employee the opportunity to purchase all or a portion of
the· business;

•

whether the employer has trade secrets or other tangible
or intangible assets that it wishes to protect during the
life of and following the employment relationship; and

•

whether the employer wishes to obtain a covenant not to
compete from the prospective employee.
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Armed with the answers to these questions, an employer will be
able to negotiate with prospective employees with the reassuring
knowledge that it has planned for the future effectively.
6.

Offer Letters.

An offer letter should be drafted

carefully so that, if the offer in it is accepted, it will not be
deemed to alter inadvertently the employee's at-will status.

For

example, an, offer that sets forth the proposed wage or salary in
annual

terms may be construed to create a

contract.

one-year employment

Similarly, the offer letter alSo should not contain an

assurance that the relationship cannot be terminated 'except "for
cause" or other such bases. 26
7.,

Creation' Of Employment Contracts.
a.

Express Contracts.

It is beyond the scope of

this outline to' discuss in detail the provisions that typically
should be included in an express written employment contract.

It

is important to recognize" however, that an employer that wishes to
utilize written employment contracts should at the outset determine
its objectives in light of the industry and the business climate
which it functions.

i~

Thus, a medical P.S.C. may need a markedly

different contract from that of a manufacturer.
b.

Implied

Contracts.

There

has

been

a

significant amount of litigation throughout the country during the
last decade in which the issue was whether an oral statement or a
statement in an employee handbook or other writing should be deemed
to create an implied contract.

Kentucky courts have not avoided

this trend.
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The Kentucky cases that have been rendered to date provide the
following guidance to human resource managers and labor lawyers:
(1 )

It is risky to characterize the early period of

employment as "probationaryll27
terms.~

wage or salary in annual
(2)

or to characterize an employee's

It is advisable where it will not create an

undue risk of a union organizing campaign (assuming the employer
wishes to maintain a union-free setting) to include a disclaimer in
an employee handbook that says that the handbook is not contractual
and that all employees are terminable at will.29
8. .

Pre-Employment Physical Examinations. Historically,

many employers required applicants or even new employees to take
physical examinations before beginning their employment.

Employers

in today's legal environment must follow strictly the procedures
governing such examinations that are set forth in the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
a.

They are:

The examination should take place only after an

offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to
the commencement of the employment duties of such applicant.
b.

The offer of employment may then be condi tioned

on the results of the examination if:
•

all

entering

employees

.are

subj ected

to

such

an

examination regardless of disability;
•

information obtained regarding the medical condition or
history of the applicant is collected and maintained on
separate forms

and in separate medical
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files

and

is

treated

in

almost

all

respects~

as

a

confidential

medical record; and
•

the

results

of

the

examination

are

used

only

in

accordance with the employment title of the ADA.
The Employment Relationship.

Ih

1.

employer

Consistent Enforcement Of Personnel Policies.

should,

to

the

maximum

extent

personnel policies in a consistent fashion.

possible,

Every

enforce

its

The failure to enforce

policies consistently can. lead to serious morale problems in the
work force and ultimately to employment disputes.
consistent

enfo~cement

The need for

of policies has never been greater because

virtually every employee is a member of at least one protected
group and therefore any preferential treatment of an employee could
be relied upon as proof of discrimination by another similarly
situated, but less favbrably, treated employee.
2.

Performance Reviews And Promotions.

As noted above,

performance appraisal forms are frequently introduced as evidence
at trial because too often they reflect evaluation inflation.

In

addition to revising the form that it uses, an employer also should
consider maintaining its review program on a regular basis to be
sure that

the performance· assessments

are accurate and do not

reflect the consideration of impermissible criteria.
Proper training of supervisors also is a critical component of
a successful performance appraisal system.

It is unrealistic to

believe that superv,isors will have an inherent ability· to assess

F -14

the performance of subordinates accurately; in fact, the contrary
is typically true.
Among the components of a satisfactory program are:
•

educating the supervisors concerning the job duties of
tlie employees whom they are evaluating and the objective
performance criteria,

if any,

by which the employees'

performance will be evaluated;
•

informing the supervisors that their performance will be
judged in part based on the accuracy of the evaluations
they complete;

•

informing the supervisors of· the basic employment laws
that

govern

their

conduct

and the many factors

that

cannot lawfully influence the appraisals; and
•

informing the· supervisors concerning the. very various
risx-s that can flow from inflated appraisals.

Every employer also should consider the need to devise an
effecti ve policy for handling promotions.

One of the principal

advantages of a formal promotion policy, especially if the policy
incorporates

objective

criteria

for

advancement,

is

that

the

promotions that are given under it can be defended more easily.
3.

Progressive Discipline.

It is widely recognized

that an employer should adopt a progressive discipline policy and
follow it whenever possible.

Such a

policy should give each

employee an opportunity to improve performance,

provide to the

employee a specific time frame within which the improvement should
or must be made and provide to the employee a clear explanation of
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the

consequences

that

will

flow

from

a

failure

to

improve

performanc8..
There are some circumstances, of course, in which it is not
possible or ,advisable tO,exercise progressive discipline, such as
where an employee has stolen money or engaged in other
improp~r

_conduct.

cle~rly

It is for this reason that an employer must, not

articulate, orally or in writing, a strict progressive discipline
policy that does not give it the flexibility it needs.
A critical'component of any progressive discipline policy is
the documentation of .each step.in'the process.
document

that

is

generat~d

in' the

employment

As with any other
relationship,

a

document that memorializes a, step in the progressive discipline
process should be carefully drafted so that, if necessary, it will
support the employer's defense in litigation.

c.

Termination Of Employment.

There are' several

steps

that

an employer

should consider

taking whe'nit appears that it may need to terminate a person's
employment. :31
1•

step

to

take

Careful Review Of Documents.
is

to

review the employee's

employer's personnel policies,

The first essential
personnel

file,

the

and any other tangible materials

that may relate to the decision.

Such materials can be powerful

evidence at an administrative hearing or trial and therefore the
employer should carefully consider their content before making a
final decision to terminate a person's employment.
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2.

It is fairly

Unbiased Assessment Of The Facts.

common for a supervisor on whose recommendation the termination
decision is based to have an emotional investment in the decision.
Consequently, it is wise for the employer to appoint someone else

T

- typically a personnel manager --to review the situation and make
By doing this, . the employer may avoid .

an unbiased assessment.
making an

ill~advised

decision and will also have the benefit of

demonstrating to a jury or other fact finder that its procedures
are fair and include apprppriate safeguards.
The empioyer should consider including as a part of the review
process the completion of a termination checklist by the unbiased
reviewer.

The purpose of this step is to require certain basic

questions

to . be answered before any employment

approved.

The checklist could include. the following items:

•

terJuination

is

Do the documents and o'thertangible data support the
decision?

This question includes, but is not limited to,

whether the decision is consistent with written personnel
policies and, where the decision is based on the person's
unsatisfactory

performance,

whether

the

decision

is

supported by performance appraisals and other documents
relating to performance.
•

Is

the decision consistent with the manner

in which

similar situations have been handled in the past?
not,

is

there a

lawful explanation for

.appr°ctch?
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If

the disparate

-Would the decision result in the infringement of any of
the person's statutory or other legal
di~cipline

right~?

•

Has progressive

been exercised?

-

Have other, less extreme options been employed?

This can

isdisab~ed

. be especially important if the employee

and

is therefore entitled to a reasonable accommodation.
-

Has the employee been given an adequate opportunity to
express his or.her vieWpoint?
3..

The Termination Meeting.

termination meeting

shou~d

In most circumstances the

be carried out in the presence of two

management-level employees and in an otherwise private setting.
The employees who are chosen to conduct the meeting. should be
prepared to explain concisely the basis for the decision.

The

failure

the

to

adopt

and

communicate

a

consistent· basis

for

discharge, beginning with the termination interview and continuing
through a trial, can be damaging proof of pretext.
The employer also should admonish the employees who are chosen
to conduct the meeting to remain calm at all times..
uncommon

for

a .terminated

employee

to

become

upset

It is not
during

a

termination meeting, .and the failure of the employer's agents to
resist the urge to respond emotionally can significantly increase
the risk of litigation arid related problems.
4.

separation Agreements.

An issue that frequently

arises at the· time of an employee termination is whether to enter
into a

separation agreement with the employee.

The principal

purpose of entering into such an agreement is to obtain a release

F -18

of claims from the employee ~

As a general rule, an employer should

consider seeking a release only if it concludes that offering the
release. will not increase the likelihood that the employee will
file a claim and only if,it is prepared to offer compensation or
benefi ts to the employee in addition to tpose to which the employee
otherwise would be entitled.
If the employee is over 40 years of age, a covered employer
will not be able to enforce the release unless the release complies
with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended
by the
621,

Old~i

Workers' Benefit Protectiori Act,

et seq.

29 U.S.C. section

The Act requires the release to include numerous

provisions to be effective and sets forth different procedures for
obtaining· enforceable releases from a single employee 32 and from
groups of employees 33 •
The separation agreement should include, among other things,
an agreement by the employee that he or she will not reapply with
the Company in the future.
D.

Ev~nts Following Termination.

An employer must
termination.

Indeed,

continue to

act

prudently following

the

it is often post-termination conduct that

leads to litigation.
1.

The Unemployment Compensation Hearing.

Aithough

there has been a significant amount of focus on whether a decision
rendered by an unemployment
preclusive effect in other
in

Kentucky. 35

compensation agency should have

litigation,~

Nevertheless,

the
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a

that is no longer an issue

events

that

unfold

at

an

unemployment compensation hearing can be guite important.
above,

an employer can significantly increase its

changing

in

titigation

discharge . from
hearing.
for,

that

its' explanation

offered

at

the

of

the

As noted

exposure by

reason

unemployment

for

a

compensation

Accordingly, an employer that decides to contest a claim

unemploym~ntbenefits

should be prepared to explain the basis

for the discharge in a concise, and consistent fashion.

2.

Requests

For

References.

The

continues., to be

that

an employer

I?revai'ling
,

,

view
'

should provide ver,y

limited

information -- typically the dates of employment, arid the position
,

,

held -- in re~po~se to a reference request.

.It is important to

note, however, that this view has been questioned recently by some
commentators because it arguably leads to the Gontinuep employment
of poor or:even dangerous employees and makes it less likely that
the formel:' employer which gives the limited reference will receive
helpful information froin other employers when it is making an
employment

decision.

See

Reuben,

Advice, A.B.A.J., June, 1994 at 32.
some academic support for
referral . . Id.

Employment

Lawyers

Rethink

In addition, there is at least

the creation of' a

tort of negligent

Accordingly, this' is an area where the evolving law

should be reviewed regularly.
'Regardless of the approach the employer takes' -- that is,
whether it provides much or little information

it should adopt

a policy on references that requires all requests to be routed to
a single person or department.

If all employees believe they are

free to respond to reference requests as they see fit, the employer
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almost

certainly

will

eventually

find

itself

litigating

the

propriety of an employee's statements.
3.

Anti-Retaliation

discrimination

Rules.

contains

statute

a

Virtually
provision

every

that

anti~

prohibits

retaliation against any person who files or otherwise participates
in

the

pursuit

of ... a

discrimination

claim.36

Because

of

the

sUbstantial obligations imposed by the various anti-retaliation
statutes,

an employer should regard any person who has filed a

charge or who has in any way participated in a proceeding under the
relevant statutes as having a level of protection, and an adverse
employment

decision

with

respect

to

such

a

person

should

be

carefully scrutinized.
The

risks

under

these

anti-retaliation

statutes

do

not

necessarily go away when the protected person's employment ends,
even where the separation is voluntary.

There is authority for the

proposition,

dissemination

for

example,

that

the

of

adverse

employment Ireferences can constitute a violation of Title VII if
motivated by discriminatory intent.n
4.

Reducing Exposure.

Occasionally an employer will

find itself in the unenviable position of realizing that it has
violated an employee's rights and is facing significant exposure.
Where

this

prospecti ve

occurs,
damages

the
by

employer
making

should
an

reinstatement to a terminated employee.
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consider

unconditional

cutting

off

offer

of

Another

loss

reduction

method

that

is

available

after

litigation has commenced is the making of an offer of judgment
under Rule 68 of the state or Federal Civil Rules.
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ENDNOTES

1.

See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206; Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621,
et seq.; The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act
of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2012, et seq.; Veterans Reemployment
Rights Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2021, et seq.; Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.§ 12101, et seq.;
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, (amends portions of The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); KRS Chapter 344; The Equal Opportunities Act, KRS
207.130, et seq.; Kentucky's Equal Pay Law, KRS 337.420, et
~

2.

See KRS Chapter 337 (relating to wages and hours); KRS
339.205, et seq. (relating to child labor) .

3.

See The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
(relating to wages and hours) .

4.

See, e.q., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §
167, et seq.; Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. § 141, et seq.

5.

See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §
1001, et seq.

6.

See KRS Chapter 338.

7.

Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651, et seq.

8.

See KRS Chapter 341

9.

See 26 U.S.C.

10.

See KRS Chapter 342.

11.

See discussion at page 3 of the outline.

12.

See discussion at pages 2-3 of the outline.

13.

See McCarthy v. Louisville Cartaqe Co., Ky. App., 796 S.W.2d
10 (1990) (recognizing doctrine of promissory estoppel in
non-employment context).

§ 3301, et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 501, et seq.
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14.

Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001,
et seq. (prohibiting use by employers of results of
polygraph examinations and other lie detector tests except
under speaific circumstances) .

15.

Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN"),
29 U.S.C.§2101, et seq.

16.

Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
("COBRA"), as amended (COBRA added several new statutes and
amended others) .

17.

Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701, et se0.

18.

Immigration Reform and Control act of 1986 ("IRCA"), 8
U.S.C. § 1324 (a).

19.

Such questions are.expressly prohibited by the Americans
With Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d) (2) (A) ("a
covered entity shall not conduct 'a medical examination or
make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such
applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the
natur6~ or severity of such disability"); 29 CFR Part 1630,
Appendix (providing interpretive guidance on Title I
(employment] of the ADA) ("An employer may not use an
application form that· lists a number of potentially
disabling impairments and ask the applicant to check any of
the impairments he or she may have.")

20.

Such a question could consist of an express request for the
applicant's date of birth or a detailed request for
information.about the applicant's educational background,
which includes a request for the years of attendance.

21.

The beneficial effect of such a provision is demonstrated in
Novosel v.Sears Roebrick & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich.
1980), in which the court held that the employee's
recognition of at-will employment through the execution of
an application form containing disclaimer language prevented
the employee from successfully pursuing a wrongful discharge
claim.

22.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") takes
the position that a policy of declining to hire a person
because that person has been convicted of a crime has an
adverse impact on blacks and hispanics and therefore is
violativ~ of Title VII unless the policy can be justified
by"business necessity" . The EEOC is even more critical of
questions about an applicant's arrest record.
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23.

For example, the EEOC maintains that the use of preselection inquiries which determine an applicant's
availability to work during an employer's scheduled working
hours violates Title VII "unless the employer can show that
it: (1) did not have an exclusionary effect on its employees
or prospective employees needing an accommodation for the
same practices; or (2) was otherwise justified by business
necessity. 11 29 C.F.R. § 1605.3.

24.

Such a statement could be construed to alter the person's at
-will status and imply that the. employment will continue for
at least one year.
See Putnam v. Producers Livestock
Marketing Assoc., Ky~, 75 S.W.2d 1075 (1934).

25.

It is generally recognized that employers face greater risks
today of defending claims of negligent hiring and negligent
retention than in the past. See generally Peteren and
Massengill, TheNegl~gent Hiring Doctrine - A Growing
Dilemma For Employers, ,15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 419(1989-90).

26.

See, e.g., Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., Ky., 655
S.W,.2d 489 (1983).

27.

See Trusty v.Big Sandy Health Care, Inc., 38 K.L.S. 4 at 5,
Motion for Discretionary Review' Denied and Court of Appeals
opinion ordered not to be published, 38 K~L.S. 11 at 30
("While an employer need not establish personnel 'policies or
practices, ,where anemployer.chooses to establish such
policies and practices and makes them known to its employees
the employment relationship is presumably enhanced . . . It
is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own
interest, to create an environment in which the employee
believes that, whatever the'personnel policies and
.
practices, they are established and official at any given
time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and
uniformly to each employee.") . '

28.

See Putnam v. Producers Livestock Marketing Assoc., supra at
note 24.

29.

See Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 824
(1987) .

30.

The records may be released under certain circumstances.
See 42 u.s.c. §12112 (l1supervisors and managers may be
informed regarding necessary restrictions on the work or
duties of the employee and necessary accommodations; first
aid and safety personnel may be informed, when appropriate,
if the disability might require emergency treatment; and
government officials investigating compliance with this Act
shall be provided relevant information on request") ~

,
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31.

This section of the outline focuses on involuntary
employment terminations in anon-reduction'inforce context.

32.

The,waiver of·a federal'age discrimination cla.im'Dy an
individual will only be effective if it:
.,
(a)

'(b)

33.

refeis
act;

spe~.ificallytb

claims under the federal

~aive

(c)

does
not purport
to
r
•
fUDure conduct;

(d)

is,given iil exchange for 'consideration over arid
above any benefit for payment to which the
employeeisentitle<;i;

(e)

proyidesthatthe employee has been advised to
consult with an attorney before signing it;

(£)

gives the'employee at least 21 days to review and
sign it;

, (g)'

29

is part of a written agreement that 'is readily
understandab+e by the employee;

u~s.c.

claims arising out of

gives the employee at least 7 . days to revoke it
~fier signing it . .

§ 626.

The waiVer of a federal age discrimination claim in cases of
a group exit incentive program must include the statements
set forth in endnote 32' and in addition must:
(a)

give the employees at least 45 days to review and
sign it;

(b)

disclose:
•

the group of employees elig.ible for the
program;

•

the program requirements;

•

any time limitations under the program; and

•

the job titles and ages of all employees
eligible or selected for the program and the
same information for those not "eligible or
. selected.

29 U.S.C. § 626.
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34.

See, e.g., Kelley v. Tyler Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188
(3d Cir. 1988).

35.

See K.R.S.341.420(5) .("No finding of fact or law, judgment,
conclusion, or final order made with respect to a claim for
unemployment compensation under this chapter may be
conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent action
or proceeding in another forum, except proceedings under
this chapter, regardless of whether the prior action was
between the. same or related parties or involved the same
facts. ") .
.

36.

See, e.g~, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3("It shall be an unlawful
employment pr-actice,for an 'employer, to discriminate against
any of its· employees or applicants. for employment, . . .
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, as~ist~d,or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proce~ding, or hearing under
this subchapter. ") ;KRS 344.280 (lilt shall be an unlawful
practice . . . [t]o retaliate or diScriminate in any manner
against a person because he,has opposed a practice declared
unlawful by this chapter, or because he has made a charge,
filed a complalrit/ testified, assisted/ or participated in
any manner in any investigation, proceeding/ or hearing
under this chapter;.. . .1.1).

37.

See, e.g., London
(9th Cir. 1981).

v~

Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811
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SECTIONG

HARASSMENT: A PRACTITIONER'S PRIMER

I.

INTRODUCTION
Since the Senate Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas in

1991, the issue of sexual harassment has continued to grab the attention of headline writers and
the general public.

The U.S. Navy, in the celebrated "Tailhook" inquiry, has undergone

scrutiny of its treatment of female officers and the responsibility of senior officers for the
apparent "beer party" atmosphere of the Tailhook Convention.

President Clinton faces

embarrassing litigation by a former Arkansas state employee who alleges then-Governor Clinton
sexually harassed her. These are not isolated incidents.
While racial harassment has not received the same degree of public attention, it is equally
unlawful, and courts have not failed to sanction employers who permit acts of racial harassment.
Damages assessed against offending employers can be huge.

Recently, the

Commonwealth of Kentucky agreed to pay six women over $500,000 in damages for the sexual
harassment of them by a male supervisor in the Cabinet of Human Resources. This settlement
is not unique. Obviously, a small company might experience severe financial ramifications if
found liable for even a fraction of such damages.
Further, general commercial liability policies seldom cover the expense of litigation of
these cases, or the damages assessed.

So-called "boutique" policies for employment-related

claims are available, but only at great expense.
To prove claims of harassment, complainants generally must prove four elements:
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A.

Unwelcome

B.

Conduct

C.

That causes injury or harm

D.

For which the employer bears responsibility

These elements will be discussed throughout this paper.

II.

GOVERNING STATUTES
Harassment is prohibited by state and federal statutes, as well as by local ordinances in

Lexington, Louisville and Jefferson County.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1962, 42

u.S.C. §2000e-2(a) provides that it is unlawful for an employer:
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
(1)
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2)
To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees in each of twenty (20) or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.c. §2000e(b).
The Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344.040 tracks the language of Title VII. The Act
applies to employers of eight or more employees within Kentucky in each of the twenty (20) or
I

more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. KRS 344.030(1).
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The Ordinances of Louisville and Jefferson County apply to employers of two or more
employees in each of four or more calendar weeks in this or the preceding calendar year. An
administrative complaint may be filed with the Louisville and Jefferson County Human Relations
Commission within 90 days of the offending act. Louisville Ordinances §98.15-21. See also,
Jefferson County Resolution No. 15, Series 1978.
Lexington/Fayette County also has a local commission to review and rule on alleged
violations of its anti-discrimination ordinance.

m.

EEOC GUIDELINES
Under current EEOC guidelines (29 CFR§1604.11), "[u]nwelcome sexual advances,

requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment" violative of Title VII in certain delineated situations.
The EEOC has issued new guidelines covering harassment. The comment period for
these guidelines ended on November 30, 1993. No date has yet been scheduled for final action.
Generally, the proposed guidelines (Fed. Reg. Vol. 58, No. 189, p. 1266; proposed 29
CFR §1609) are more expansive than the current ones. (29 CFR §1604.11). While 29 CFR
§1604.11 addresses sexual harassment,l the text of the proposed regulation applies to
"[h]arassment on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability
... " and cites the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA, 29 U.S.c. §621, et seq.);
The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA; 42 U.S.c. §12101, et seq.); and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 701, et seq.) in addition to Title VII.

lA footnote stated, "The principles involved here continue to apply
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to race, color, religion or natural origin."

In a broad stroke, the proposed regulation defines harassment as "verbal or physical
conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion towards an individual because of his/her
race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age or disability," and which has an effect on the
individual's employment.

Harassing conduct is delineated.

The Commission adopts a

"reasonable person" of the alleged victim's situation or class standard.

IV.

FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Case law and the EEOC regulations recognize two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro

quo harassment and hostile environment harassment.
A.

Ouid pro guo harassment exists where "submission to the unwelcome sexual

advances of supervisory personnel was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits
or a tangible job detriment resulting from the employee's failure to submit to the sexual demands
of supervisory employees." Highlander v. KFC Nat. Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th
Cir. 1986). It must affect the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).

B.

Hostile environment harassment arises where verbal or physical conduct of a

sexual nature permeates the work environment and unreasonably interferes with the employee's
ability to work or creates a hostile and intimidating environment which interferes with her work.
See §V infra.
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v.

CASE LAW

A.

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson:
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 91 L.E.2d 49, 106 S.Ct. 2399

91986), the Supreme Court recognized that sexual harassment constitutes a violation of Title
VII's prohibition against sex-based discrimination. The Vinson Court recognized the two forms
,-'

of actionable sexual harassment, hostile environment (so called environmental harassment) and
quid pro quo harassment.
The Vinson court firmly rejected the defense of voluntariness to allegations of
harassment, "in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will."
Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the [alleged victim] by her conduct indicated that the
alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome.... "

477 U.S. at 68.

Relevant to this

determination, according to Vinson, are such factors as the nature of the sexual advances; the
context in which they arose; and the complainant's sexually provocative speech, conduct and
dress at work.
Further, the Court held that economic lflJUry need not be present for the
harassment to be actionable. "For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment. '" 477 U.S. at 67, citing, Henson v. City of Dundee, supra.

B.

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
In its second consideration of sexual harassment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed

its holding in Vinson that hostile environment harassment violates Title VII. The Court refined
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its vision of actionable harassment, choosing "a middle path between making actionable any
conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a psychological injury." 510

u.s. __, 126 L.Ed.2d 295, 302, 114 S.Ct. __ (1993). Rejecting the Sixth Circuit's
peremptory affirmance of the District Court's requirement of psychological injury, the Court
held that one need not suffer severe psychological injury to have a claim for environmental
-

-

harassment.
The Court then established a two-pronged test for proof of hostile environment
claims:
(1)
The conduct must be pervasive or severe enough to create
a work environment which a reasonable person would find hostile
or abusive (an "objectively hostile or abusive" environment), AND
(2)
The complainant must
environment to be abusive. "

"subjectively

perceive

the

126 L.Ed.2d at 302.
Rejecting a "mathematically precise" test to determine the severity of the
harassment, the Court directed fact finders to look at the totality of the circumstances. It aided
in this analysis by listing guides to consider, including:

the frequency of the conduct, its

severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or merely an offensive utterance,
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. 126 L.Ed.2d at
302-303. Psychological injury is one factor that may be considered.
C.

The Kentucky Cases
In determining claims of discrimination pursuant to KRS 344.010, et seq., our

state courts look to federal precedent.

Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v.

Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Justice, 586 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

G- 6

In Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1992),
the Court (Leibson, 1.) considered multiple challenges to a Fayette County jury's verdict
awarding $100,000 to a female victim of hostile environment sexual harassment.

First, it

analyzed whether the Kentucky Worker's Compensation Act (KRS 342.690) preempts the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act and whether it is an exclusive remedy where the complainant alleges
damages arising not only from emotional distress and humiliation, but also from a disabling
panic disorder related to work place harassment. Justice Leibson declined to assume a causal
connection between the claim for emotional distress and that for the panic disorder, and
interpreted the jury's verdict as one for generally characterized "emotional distress" rather than
the specific mental disability.

He found support for this proposition from the fact that the

instructions included the panic disorder in the "overall claim" for the emotional injury, and did
not provide a separate instruction on this disorder.
Justice Leibson then dispensed with any lingering questions regarding whether
future litigants might revisit this issue by applying rules of statutory construction and found that
KRS 344.010, et seq. is a specific statute, thereby controlling "as contrasted with the general
law on the subject in the Worker's Compensation Law." 840 S.W.2d at 819. While the "two
statutes might provide alternative sources of statutory relief, the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
provides an independent cause of action for damages arising out of discrimination in the
workplace." Id.
Justice Leibson next considered the evidence necessary to prove sexual
harassment, adopting the Vinson standard of "sufficiently severe and pervasive" conduct. The
opinion deferred to the fact finder to determine the sufficiency of the severity and pervasiveness
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for purposes of proof, and declined to review the trial court's finding de novo.

It noted,

however, that there is ample evidence of severe and pervasive harassment in the record to
support the jury's verdict.
Finally, for purposes of this chapter,2 the Court gave its imprimatur to the use
of "but for" language in instructions on the cause of alleged retaliatory or sex-based discharge
. in

miXed motive cases. Citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 US. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775,

104 L.Ed.2d 268, (1989) and Board of Trustees of U of Ky. v. Hayes, 782 S.W.2d 609 (Ky.
S.Ct. 1989), it found such language does not mean "solely because of," but, rather, that the
illegal sexual discrimination is a "contributing and essential factor" to be considered by the jury.
In a recent case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered the effect of Harris

v. Forklift Systems. Inc., supra, on jury instructions in a quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment case brought pursuant to the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.

Hall v. Transit

Authority of Lexington-Fayette County, 41 K.L.S. 3, 1994 WL 83226 (Ky.App., 3/18/94). The
court approved the following jury instructions as conforming to the Harris standards:
Do you believe from the evidence:
(a) that Patrick Hamric subjected Barbara Hall, because of her
female sex, to unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature;
(b) that such conduct was so severe and pervasive that it had the

purpose or effect or unreasonably interfering with a reasonable
female employee's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment for a reasonable female
employee;

2The opinion also analyzes issues of statutory attorney's fees and the right to a jury trial under the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act.
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AND
(c) that such conduct caused injury to the psychological well-being
of Barbara Hall?
There was no discussion of 3(c) of the instructions requiring a showing of
psychological harm, in apparent contravention of Harris.
The Court also approved admission of evidence relating to plaintiff's well-known
extra-marital affair with a co-worker as relevant and not outweighed by possible prejudicial
effect.

VI.

RACIAL HARASSMENT
While it has not received as much publicity as sexual harassment, racial harassment is

equally violative of Title VII and KRS 344.010, et seq., and can prove just as costly to
employers found to have condoned it.
The Sixth Circuit first recognized a claim of racially motivated hostile environment
harassment in Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
den. 475 U.S. 1015 (1986), a case presaging Vinson, but tried under 42 U.S.c. §1981 and not
under Title VII. Applying a two-part standard requiring a finding of repeated racial slurs and
management's tolerance of the harassment, the Court affirmed an award of both punitive and
compensatory damages.
In Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. den., 109 S.Ct.
3166 (1988) the Court distinguished between sexual and racial harassment cases, concluding that
proof of racial harassment claims may be determined by the standards set forth in Erebia, and
not by the more demanding sexual harassment standards in Vinson or Rabidue v. Osceola
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Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 481 U.S. 1041, 95 L.Ed.2d 823, 107
S.Ct. 1983 (1987). However, in Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d
475 (6th Cir. 1989), the court revised this position, and held that the same standards apply in
both racial and sexual harassment cases.
In a recent racial harassment case, a District Court analyzed the claims according to the
same standards as sexual harassment claims. In Gardinella v. General Electric Co., 833 F.Supp.
617 (W.D.Ky. 1993), the court applied standards enunciated in Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc.,
supra. in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment.

VII.

OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION
A.

Tort Claims.
Allegations of tortious conduct can be effective when pled alternatively to statutory

claims.

In fact, they are a necessary vehicle when an employer has fewer than eight (8)

employees precluding reliance on KRS 344.010 et~, or fifteen (15) employees precluding use
of Title VII. A summary of possible tort claims include the following:
1.

Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress:
Kentucky recognized this tort in Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d. 247

(Ky.Sup.Ct. 1984) adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §46(1):
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the
other results from it, for such bodily harm.
The Court held that "the essence" of the tort is the right to be free of emotional distress due to
acts of another.

The conduct complained of must be considered truly outrageous "as· to go
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beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community." Humana of Ky., Inc. v. Seitz, 796 S.W.2d 1,3 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1990).
The Court of Appeals, however, in Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville,
853 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. App. 1993), has attempted to limit this claim to situations where it may
be used as a "gap filler" where no other traditional common law tort actions apply. Restatement
(Second) of Torts §47 (1965). See, however, Capital Holding v. Bailey, _

S.W.3d __ , 41

K.L.S. 3 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1994) holding that no physical contact or injury is necessary to establish
the tort. See also, Bednarek v. Local Union 227, 780 S. W.2d 630 (Ky. App. 1989) (the tort of
outrage did not apply on the facts in a retaliatory discharge case); Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715
ESupp. 1361 (W.n Ky. 1988) (use of polygraph on employees did not constitute outrageous
conduct).
2.

Invasion of Privacy involves the intentional or unreasonable intrusion into

the private solitude or affairs of another.

There are no reported Kentucky cases involving

invasion of privacy in harassment cases.

However, other jurisdictions have recognized this

cause of action. See, for example, Busby v. Truswal Systems Corp., 551 So.2d 322 (Ala. 1989)
(finding an invasion of privacy for hostile environment harassment where defendant intruded into
plaintiffs' lives in an offensive manner); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services. Inc., 711
E2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that questions about plaintiff's sexual proclivities constitutes
intentional intrusion in to the solitude of another, and that publication is not a necessary
element).
3.

Assault; assault and battery: Kentucky has long recognized a civil cause

of action for assault and battery involving sexually wrongful touching. Ragsdale v. Ezell, 49
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S.W. 775 (Ky. 1899). Hatchett v. Blacketer, 162 Ky. 266, 172 S.W. 533 (Ky. 1915). See
also, Koch v. Stone, 332 S.W.2d 529 (Ky.App., 1960); Fowler v. Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250
(Ky. Sup. Ct. 1984).
4.

Other tort actions include (a) false imprisonment and (b) loss of consortium

for the spouse of the harassed employee.
5.

Statutory civil rights claims in addition to Title VII inClude allegations

pursuant to 42 US.c. §§ 1981 and 1983. While a discussion of these statutes is beyond the
purview of this paper, see, for example, Gardinella v. General Electric Co., supra.

VIII. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF ITS EMPLOYEES

The courts have constructed a multi-tiered structure for analysis of employer liability for
the alleged sexually harassing acts of employees. An excellent overview of the Sixth Circuit's
view of the law can be found in Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992),
cert. den., 113 S.Ct. 831 (1992).

In Kauffman, Judge Boggs reiterated the Vinson court's view that common law agency
principles should be applied to determine liability, and that strict liability does not lie in all
cases. 3 The court then reviews precedent and outlines employer liability as follows:
A.

Hostile Environment Cases
1.

Co-Worker discrimination cases: Citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,

805 F.2d611, 621 (6thCir. 1986), cert. den., 481 US. 1041,107 S.Ct. 1983,95 L.Ed.2d 823

3In Vinson, the Court also held that "absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from
liability. 477 U.S. at 72.
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(1987), the court will find liability where "the employer ... knew or should have known of the
charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action."
See also Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988) (no liability where
employer takes reasonable steps to correct harassment by
2.

non~supervisory

personnel).

Supervisor Harassment Cases will be decided by application of traditional

agency principles. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987). The court set up
a two-pronged test for supervisory environmental claims: (1) whether the harassing actions were
foreseeable or fell within the scope of the agent's employment, and, if they were, (2) whether
the employer "adequately and effectively" acted to "negate liability." Kauffman at 184. (See
§IX, infra.) Important for the determination of whether the acts took place within the scope of
employment are: when the acts took place; where; whether the employer had prior notice of
similar behavior; and whether the supervisor had "significant input over ... conditions of
employment." Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 185.
B.

Under the QUID PRO QUO theory, strict liability applies to the acts of

supervisory employees with "plenary authority" over hiring, advancement, dismissal, discipline
or who otherwise exercise significant control over the conditions of complainant's employment.
Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 186, citing, Highlander v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644
(6th Cir. 1986). Economic loss is not required.
The Sixth Circuit has recently held that an employer's prompt remedial action in response
to a complaint of hostile environment harassment relieves the employer of liability for the
harassment. Reed v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 19 F.3d 19,1994 WL 56930 (6th Cir., 2/4/94); reh.
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den., 4124/94, Case No. 93-5031. See also, Gardinella v. General Electric Co., 833 ESupp.
617, 620 (W.D. Ky. 1993).

IX.

LITIGATION AVOIDANCE: PREVENTION OF CLAIMS
Employers can take measures to prevent claims from ever being filed. The enactment

of str~ng ~assmenf policies, their iniplementation and consistent application, and training of
supervisory employees may well be the best defense an employer has to the initial filing of
claims and their eventual successful resolution. Since Meritor Savings Bank: v. Vinson, courts
have recognized the mitigating effect of implemented harassment policies. See, for example,
Kauffman v. Allied Signal. Inc., supra.
A well-written harassment policy should include:
1.

A policy statement that harassment on the basis of race, color, religion,
gender, national origin, age or disability is against the law and the policy
of the employer;

2.

A definition of harassment (see §IV, supra);

3.

Examples of harassing conduct;

4.

The possible sanctions for engaging in harassment, including termination;
and

5.

A complaint procedure which identifies more than one individual who may
take complaints in the employer's organization, and which assures prompt
investigation and the confidentiality of the complainant.
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The policy should be distributed in the same manner as other employment policies; and
should be included in an Employee Handbook if the employer has one.
The person(s) identified to receive the complaint can include the alleged victim's
supervisor, but must also include other individuals in case the supervisor is the harasser or
harbors bias against the complainant.

Yates v. Avco Com., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987)

(supervisor with responsibility for reporting harassment was the harasser; employer liability thus
established). The investigation of the complaint should be initiated immediately upon notice of
the complaint. 4 It should be thorough and fair, and should include interviews with both the
complainant/victim and the alleged harasser, as well as any witnesses either identifies. Paucity
of witnesses should not doom a

co~plaint

since quid pro quo sexual harassment frequently is

committed without witnesses.
If it is determined that harassment occurred, sanctions are advisable, depending on the
severity and duration of the harassment, its likely repetition, and the effect on the

victim~

Minimal sanctions might include a period of suspension without pay, probation, or a transfer
within the organization. More serious sanctions include demotion, geographical transfer, and
termination. While separation of the harasser and victim within the organization might suffice
(moving the harasser and not the victim to avoid allegations of retaliation), investigating
personnel should attempt to obtain the victim's written acknowledgement of the sufficiency of
this action. Mediation is also an option if the parties agree.

4navis v. Monsan1D Chemical Co., 850 E2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988) (no employer liability where employer takes reasonable
steps to correct or prevent harassment by nonsupervisory employees).
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Investigations should be fully documented to protect the employer from subsequent formal
complaints of harassment and from actions for defamation. Should the accused employee later
allege defamation, an employer can claim a qualified privilege under certain circumstances.
Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 ESupp. 1361 (W.D. Ky. 1988); Wyant v. SCM Corp., 692
S.W.2d 814 (Ky. App. 1985). However, to assert such a claim, the employer must confine
investigatory information to those with a need to know of the investigation.
Under no circumstances should the complainant be discharged for filing his or her
complaint. Title VII prohibits retaliation against complainants, even if it is later determined that
the complaint is without merit.
In addition, where feasible, the employer should provide training to all employees on
intercultural understanding, race and gender awareness, and the availability of the employer's
procedure for the resolution of complaints.

x.

CONCLUSION
With increasing racial and sexual integration at all levels of employment, harassment.

cases will, no doubt, provide fertile territory for litigation in the years ahead. Litigation and the
harmful, costly effects of harassment can be minimized, however, by careful planning and
increased emphasis on professionalism and mutual respect.
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I.

COVERAGE
A.

---

t

Federal Law: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the
major federal wage hour law.
In general it regulates
four areas: minimum wages, equal pay, overtime and child
labor standards. Employees covered by the FLSA include:
1.

Employees who are engaged in interstate commerce,
producing goods
for
interstate
commerce,
or
handling, selling or working on goods or materials
that have been moved in or produced in interstate
commerce.
For most employees an annual dollar
volume test of not less than $500,000 applies.

2.·

certain employees covered are covered regardless of
dollar volume including hospitals; companies taking
care of the sick, aged, mentally ill or disabled;
schools and federal, state and local agencies.

3.

Employees who do not meet the $500,000 annual
dollar test may be covered in any workweek in which
the employee is engaged in interstate commerce, the
production of goods for interstate commerce, or an
actively closely related and directly essential to
the production of such goods.

4.

Domestic service workers are covered if they work
more than 8 hours in a week for one or more
employers or receive at least $50 in wages in a
calendar quarter.

5.

certain classifications of employees are exempt
from the FLSA overtime and maximum wage provisions.
They include:
administrative

a.

Executive,
employees;

b.

Employees
of
seasonal
recreational companies;

c.

Employees of small newspapers and switchboard
operators of small telephone companies;

d.

Seamen on foreign vessels;
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and

professional

amusement

or

e.

Employees engaged in fishing operations;

f.

Farm workers on small farms (i.e. less than
500 man-days in any calendar quarter); and,

g.

Casual babysitters and persons employed
companions of the elderly or disabled.

as

There are certain other classifications of employees who
are exempt or partially exempt only from the FLSA
overtime requirements.
B.

state Law - KRS Chapter 337 contains the
provisions on wage and hour requirements.

state law

Under KRS 337. 010 (2), an "employee is any person employed
by (or permitted to work for) an employer, with the
following exceptions:
a.

Individuals employed in agriculture;

b.

Individuals employed in bona fide executive,
administrative,
supervisory
or
professional
capacity, including outside salesmen and outside
collectors;

c.

Employees of the United states;

d.

Individuals employed
private home;

e.

certified
learners,
apprentices,
handicapped
workers and sheltered workshop employees;

f.

certain
Employees
of
industries,
hotels,
operations;

g.

Baby-sitters and newspaper delivery persons; and,

h.

Employees of non-profit camps, religious or nonprofit educational conference centers in operation
for less than seven months in any calendar year.
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in

domestic

retail
motels

service

in

a

stores,
service
and
restaurant

II.

Employer obligations
A.

Federal Law
1.

Minimum Wages
The FLSA requires employers of covered employees
who are not otherwise exempt to pay these employees
a minimum wage of not less· than $4.25 an hour.
Employers may pay employees on a piece-rate basis,
as long as they receive at least the equivalent of
the required minimum hourly wage rate.
Employers
of tipped employees, i.e. employees who regularly
receive more than $30.00 a month in tips, may
consider the tips as part of wages.
However, the
tip credit may not exceed fifty (50) percent of the
required minimum wage.

2.

overtime
The FLSA requires employer to pay covered employees
1 1/2 times their regular rate for each hour or
fraction of an hour of work in excess of forty (40)
during any given workweek.
The FLSA does not
require employers to pay overtime for hours worked
in excess of a daily maximum, nor does it specify
overtime for work performed on Saturdays, Sundays
or holidays.
No employee may waive his right to
overtime.
a.

Workweek - A workweek for FLSA purposes is a
fixed and recurring period of 168 hours
comprising seven consecutive 24 hour periods •.
It does not need to coincide with a calendar
week.
The schedule of payment (e.g. daily,
weekly, biweekly) does not affect the workweek
basis of overtime computation.

b.

Regular Rate - Employers must average certain
payments into an employees' hourly rate for
purposes of determining an employee's "regular
rate" for overtime purposes. The majority of
employer's overtime problems concern the
proper determination of an employee's regular
rate.
1.

Pay normally included in "regular rate"
computation:
i.

Pay for time worked-wages, salary,
commissions or piece rates;
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ii.

incentive bonuses;

iii. cost-of-living allowances;

2.

iv.

premiums for "dirty" work; and,

v.

other payments considered by the
employee as part of his regular
compensation.

Pay normally excluded from IIregular rate"
computation:
i.

Premium
pay
under
collective
bargaining agreement, for work on
Saturday, Sunday, or holidays;

ii.

pay for time not worked
e.g.
vacation, holidays, sick leave;

iii. pension
or
health
contributions; and,
iv.
3.

insurance

outright gifts.

Records, Notices and Inspections
a.

Records - The FLSA requires employers to make,
keep and maintain records of persons employed
and of wages, hours and other aspects of
employment.
The following records must be
maintained for three years:
i.

Payroll and other records containing
information required by the recordkeeping regulations;

ii.

Sales and purchase records relevant to
determining whether a
company meets
FLSA's "business volume" test;

iii. Collect bargaining agreements;
iv.

Plans, trusts, employment contracts, and
union contracts involving exclusions from
regular pay rates;

v.

Contracts
pertaining
to
"Belo-type"
contracts that guarantee fixed weekly pay
for fluctuating hours;
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vi.

Agreements
basing
overtime
pay
on
piecework, hourly, or basic rates; and,

vii. Certificates and notices mentioned in the
recordkeeping
regulations,
including
certificates authorizing the employment
of learners, apprentices, handicapped
workers, students, homeworkers, and child
laborers.
(29 CFR 516.5).
The following records must be maintained for
at least two years:
i.

Basic employment and earnings records
such as timecards or "production cards";

ii.

Hourly, daily, weekly or pay period wage
rate tables, or piece-rate schedules;

iii. All schedules of the employer that
establish the hours of days of employment
of individual employees or of separate
work forces.
These schedules can be in
any form,
such as notices,
company
letters, or office memoranda; and,
iv.

All customer orders or invoices, incoming
or outgoing shipping or delivery records,
bills of lading, and non-cash billings to
customers, which the employer retains or
makes in the course of its business.

b.

Investigations - section 11 (a) of the FLSA
gives the Secretary of Labor the authority to
investigate and gather data regarding the
wages,
hours
and
other
conditions
of
employment. This includes the power to enter
an employer's facilities, inspect records and
to interview employees.
An employer is
obligated to produce for inspection any
records which are relevant to a determination
of wages paid, hours worked or tasks performed
by employees.

c.

Notices - The Department of Labor has prepared
a poster addressing employees' rights under
the FLSA.
It addresses requirements for
minimum wage,
overtime,
child labor and
training wages. The poster also specifies how
the FLSA may be enforced.
Employers are
required to display the poster where employees
can readily see it.
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4.

Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was technically an
amendment to the FLSA of 1938.
It covers any
employee who is subject to the FLSA minimum wage
standards.
It provides that an employer may not
discriminate "between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages to employees in such establishment
for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,
and which are performed under similar working
conditions, except where such payment is made
pursuant to (i) seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production, or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than
sex .... "
In a nutshell, this law prohibits an employer from
paying a lower wage to women than to men or viceversa for substantially equal work. Whether work
is substantially equal depends on whether its
performance requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility.
Those are the key concepts in
determining equality of work.
The inclusion of unequal rates of pay in a
collective bargaining agreement which results in
one sex being paid less for substantially equal
work is a violation of the Equal Pay Act. A union
cannot cause an employer to discriminate.

5.

Davis-Bacon Act
a.

Coverage:
Covers mechanics and laborers
engaged in construction of public buildings or
public works whose specifications require an
expenditure of more than $2,000.00.
The Act
also applies to certain other federal laws,
such as the Federal Aid Highway Act and the
Area Redevelopment Act.

b.

Requirements:
Payment of minimum wages as
established by the Secretary of Labor.

c.

Enforcement:
The Comptroller General is
authorized to wi thhold payments to the
contractor if necessary to make good any
underpayments to employees.
In addition, if
the amount withheld is insufficient to cover
the back pay owing, the employee may bring an
individual action against the contractor.
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d.

6.

Penalties:
The names of contractors who do
not observe the requirements of the Act are
placed on a list of contractors who are barred
from receiving federal contracts, which is
distributed
to
all
departments
of
the
government for a period of three years.

Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act
a.

Coverage: Employers who have contracted with
a government agency to manufacture or supply
articles in any amount exceeding $10,000.
Only those employees engaged in producing or
furnishing the contract articles are covered.

b.

Requirements;

The Walsh-Healy Act requires:

i.

The payment of minimum wages as set by
the Secretary of Labor;

ii.

The payment of 1 1/2 times the basic rate
for hours worked in excess of 40 a weeki

iii. The maintenance of sanitary and nonhazardous working conditions and complete
payroll records; and,
iv.

7.

That any minors who are employed be over
16 years old.

Child Labor
The child labor provisions of the FLSA are designed
to protect the educational opportunities of youths
and prohibit their employment in jobs and under
conditions detrimental to their health and wellbeing.
The
FLSA restricts
the hours
of work and
occupations for youths under age 16.
These
provisions set forth 17 hazardous occupations
orders for jobs declared by the Secretary of Labor
to be too dangerous for minors under age 18 to
perform.
The permissible jobs and hours of work,
by age, in nonfarm work are as follows:
i.

youths 18 years or older may perform any job
for unlimited hoursi
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ii.

Youths age 16 and 17 may perform any job not
declared hazardous by the Secretary of Labor,
for unlimited hours;

iii. Youths age 14 and 15 may work outside school
hours in various nonmanufacturing, nonmining,
nonhazardous
jobs
under
the
following
conditions: no more than 3 hours on a school
day, 18 hours in a school week, 8 hours on a
nonschool day, or 40 hours in a nonschool
week. In addition, they not begin work before
7 a.m. nor work after 7 p. m. ,except from June
1 through Labor Day, when evening hours are
extended until 9 p.m.
Youths age 14 and 15
who
are
enrolled
in
an
approved
Work
Experience and Career Exploration Program may
be employed for up to 23 hours in school weeks
and 3 hours on school days (including during
school hours) .
Notwithstanding the above, youths may at any age
deliver newspapers, perform in radio, TV movies,
etc.; work for their parents in wholly owned
nonfarm businesses (except those deemed hazardous
by the Secretary of Labor) or gather evergreens and
make evergreen wreaths.
Employers must keep records of the date of birth of
any employees under age 19, as well as daily and
weekly hours worked, daily and weekly start and
quitting times and the employee's occupation.
B.

state Law Obligations
1.

Overtime
An employee working more than forty (40) hours in
a workweek must be paid for hours in excess of
forty at a rate of at least of one and one-half
times the hourly wage rate at which he is employed.
KRS 337.285.
Employers are not required to pay
time and one-half for hours worked over eight in
one day.
(There is an exception for the
construction of public works requiring payment of
"prevailing wages" under KRS 337.540. See below).
This provision does
not apply,
however,
to
employees of retail
stores
engaged
in work
connected with selling, purchasing and distributing
merchandise, or to employees of restaurant, hotel
or motel operations or to employees exempted from
the overtime provision of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act,
29 U.S.C.
sections 213(b) (1),
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213(b) (10) and 213(b) (17).
Also exempted are
employees whose function is to provide twenty-four
hour residential care on the employer's premises in
a parental role.
2.

Minimum Wage
The minimum hourly wage in Kentucky, effective July
15, 1991, is four dollars and twenty-five cents
($4.25) unless provided otherwise by statute. KRS
337.275. For example, a different rule applies to
employees engaged in an occupation in which they
customarily receive more than twenty dollars per
month in tips.
Also, an employee under twenty
years of age may be paid minimum wage of three
dollars and sixty-one cents ($3.61) an hour until
he has been employed a cumulative total of ninety
days at that wage. KRS 337.275(3) (a) and (c).

3.

Payment of Wages
Employers must, no less often than semi-monthly,
pay employees all wages earned to a day not more
than eighteen days prior to the date of payment.
KRS 337.020.
An employee who quits or is
discharged must be paid all wages earned no later
than the next normal pay period or fourteen days
after leaving, whichever last occurs. KRS 337.055.
It is unlawful for an employer to withhold any part
of an employee's wages unless authorized to do so
by local, state or federal law or when a deduction
is expressly authorized in writing by the employee
to cover insurance premiums, hospital and medical
dues, or other deductions not amounting to a rebate
or deduction from the standard wage. This includes
deductions for union dues authorized by collective
bargaining agreements negotiated between employers'
and employees' representatives.
KRS 337.060(1).
However, employers may not deduct from the wages of
employees any fines, cash shortages in a common
money till, breakage, or losses due to defective
workmanship, lost or stolen property, or damage to
property if such losses are not attributable to an
employee's willful or intentional disregard of
employer's interest. KRS 337.060(2).

4.

Records, Notices and Inspections
Every employer must keep a record of the amount
paid each pay period to each employee, the hours
worked each day and each week by each employee, and
other information required by the Commissioner.
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KRS 337.320(1). Such records must be kept on file
for at least one-year after entry, and shall be
open to inspection of the commissioner or his
representative "at any reasonable time."
KRS
337.320(2). In Cabe v. Kitchen, 415 S.W.2d 96 (Ky.
1967), it was held that the one year period is not
a limitation upon the right of the Department of
Labor to inspect the employment records of an
employer.
Employers subject to Kentucky's wage and hour
statutes must post summaries of wage and hour laws
and regulations issued by the Commissioner in a
conspicuous and accessible place on the premises.
such notices are furnished to employers by the
state on request without charge. KRS 337.325.
Every employer must permit the Commissioner or his
representative to question any of his employees at
the place of employment and during work hours
regarding wages paid to and hours worked by such
employee or other employees. KRS 337.340.
5.

Lunch and Rest Periods
Employers must grant employees a "reasonable period
for lunch" as close to the middle of the employee's
scheduled work shift as possible but in no event
sooner than three hours nor later than five hours
after the work shift commences.
KRS 337 . 355.
However, this provision shall not negate any
provision of a collective bargaining agreement or
other mutual agreement between an employer and
employee.
I

Employees must be provided a rest period of at
least ten minutes during each four hours worked in
addition to the regularly scheduled lunch period.
No reduction in compensation may be made for such
rest periods
for
either hourly or salaried
employees. KRS 337.365.
6.

Wage Discrimination Based on Sex
a.

Discrimination Prohibited
Kentucky has its own Equal Pay Act, KRS
337.420
through
337.433.
It
is
distinguishable from federal equal pay law
which
prohibits
an
employer
from
discriminating between employees on the basis
of sex for "equal work on jobs the performance
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of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions", with certain
exceptions. 29 U.S.C. section 206(d) (1) .
Kentucky law, on the other hand, prohibits
discrimination between employees on the basis
of sex "for comparable work on jobs which have
comparable requirements relating to skill,
effort and responsibility." KRS 337.423(1).
While Kentucky's·· Equal Pay Act is certainly
not the equivalent of the "comparable worth"
theory (under which the value of dissimilar
jobs are analyzed and compared), the statutory
language is clearly more liberal than federal
law in that it prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex for work which is merely
"comparable,1I rather than "equal. "
The
expansive reach of this statute has not been
tested in the courts.
b.

Coverage
The statutory coverage of KRS 337.423 does not
apply to "any employer who is subject to the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended, when that act imposes comparable or
greater requirements than contained in KRS
337.420 to 37.433." However, an employer must
file with the Commissioner of the Department
of Workplace Standards a statement that it is
covered by the FLSA, KRS 337.423 (1) .
The
Kentucky Department of Labor's position is
that an employer covered by the FLSA is exempt
from coverage under KRS 337.423.

7.

prevailing Wages
Federal and state prevailing wage laws refer to the
particular wage that "prevails"
in a
local
community for a particular classification of
workers,
requiring
federal
and
state
labor
secretaries to conduct wage studies to determine
the prevailing wage rate for particular projects
governed by statute.
The prevailing wage in a
community with union workers will
typically
approximate the wages paid to unionized workers in
various craft and labor classifications.
Prevailing wage laws generally have as their
purpose the protection of employees of government
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contractors.
Kentucky's prevailing wage statutes
are set forth at KRS 337.505 to 337.550.
a.

Applicability
Before advertising for bids or entering into
any contract for construction of public works,
every public authority must
notify the
Department of Workplace Standards in writing
of the specific public work to be constructed,
and must ascertain from the Department of
Labor the prevailing rates of wages for each
classification of
laborers,
workmen
and
mechanics for the class of work called for in
the construction of the public works in the
locality where the work is to be performed.
This schedule of the prevailing rate of wages
must be attached to and made part of the
specifications for the work, and must be
printed on the bidding blanks and made a part
of every contract for the construction of
public works. KRS 337.510(1).
The public authority advertising and awarding
the contract must include in the proposal and
contract a stipulation to the effect that not
less than the prevailing hourly rate of wages
shall be paid to all workers performing work
under the contract.
It must also require in
all contractors' bonds that the contract
include provisions which will guarantee the
performance of the prevailing hourly wage
clause in the contract. KRS 337.510(2).

b.

overtime
Workers employed more than eight
calendar day or more than forty
week must be paid not less than
half times the basic hourly rate
337.540.

c.

hours in one
hours in one
one and oneof pay. KRS

Records and Postings
contractors and subcontractors must keep full
and accurate payroll records covering all wage
payments, including the hours worked by and
amount paid to each employee each day_
Records cannot be destroyed for one year
following the completion of the public work,
and must be open to inspection by the
Commissioner at any reasonable time _
KRS
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337 . 530 (2) .'
Contractors and subcontractors
must post and keep posted in conspicuous
places at the work site a copy of the
prevailing rates and working hours for the
project. KRS 337.530(3).
8.

Child Labor
a.

What is "Gainful Occupation"?
Kentucky's
child
labor. statutes
concern
"gainful occupation"by children. . This term
does not include employment in farm work or in
domestic service in a private home; occasional
employment by a householder in connection with
the household such as grass cutting; the
delivery of newspapers on regularly scheduled
routes; employment as a performer in films,
theater, radio or television; or employment of
minors by their own parents. KRS 339.210.

b.

Minimum Ages
No minor under fourteen years of age shall be
employed in gainful occupation at any time,
except in connection with an employment
program sponsored by the school or school
district the child attends. The program must
be approved by the Department of Education.
KRS 339.220.
However, minors age eleven and
over may be employed as caddies at golf
courses, with certain restrictions.
KRS
339.225.
Minors under age sixteen may not be employed
during regular school hours, unless the school
authorities have made arrangements for him to
attend school other than the regular hours, or
he has graduated from high school.
KRS
339.230(1) .

c.

Hazardous and Special Occupations
A minor under eighteen years of age may not
be employed in any occupation, or during the
hours of the day, or more than the number of
hours per day or days per week, which the
Commissioner of Workplace Standards determines
to be hazardous or injurious to the life,
health, safety, or welfare of the minori in
connection
with
an
establishment
where
alcoholic beverages are distilled, rectified,
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compounded, brewed, manufactured, bottled,
sold for consumption, or dispensed, unless
permitted by regulations of the Alcohol
Beverage Control Board (except in places where
the sale of alcoholic beverages by package is
merely
incidental to
the main business
actually conducted). KRS 339.230(2).
There are many restrictions on. the gainful
occupation of minors between ages fourteen and
sixteen. These restrictions are set forth in
detail at 803 KAR 1:100, section 2(1) and (4).
d.

Hours of Work
There are no restrictions on hours or time of
work scheduled for minors who have graduated
from high school or approved vocational school
equivalent to high school; minors who are no
longer attending school and have not attended
school for the previous sixty days; minors not
required to attend school for the period
described
as
"school
not
in
session."
Enrollees
in
work
training
programs
established by a local board of education or
the federal government and approved by the
federal government shall be exempt for 803 KAR
1:100,
section
3(2),
except
under
no
circumstances shall a minor be employed more
than eight hours per day or more than fortyeight hours per week. 803 KAR 1:100, Section
3 (3) •

specific hour limitations on the employment of
minors can be found in 803 KAR 1:100, section
2(2) and section 3.
e.

Lunch Periods
No minor under eighteen years of age may be
permi tted to work for more than five hours
continuously without an interval of at least
thirty minutes for a lunch period, and no
period of less than thirty minutes shall be
deemed to interrupt a continuous period of
work. KRS 339.270.

f.

certificates and Records
Upon request, the local board of education
must issue to any minor under the age of
eighteen desiring to enter employment a
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certificate of age upon presentation of proof
of age.
Every employer shall be required to
obtain from any employee proof of age that the
employee is at least eighteen years of age.
KRS 339.360.
Every person employing minors under eighteen
years of age must keep a separate register
containing the names, ages and addresses of
such employees, and the time of commencing and
stopping of work for each day, and the time of
the beginning and ending ~ of the daily meal
period.
Also required of such persons are
continuous postings in the establishment
wherein any such minor is employed a printed
abstract of KRS 339.210 to 339.450, with a
list of the occupations prohibited- to such
minors and a notice stating the working hours
per day for each day in the week required of
them. Such records must be open at all times
to the inspection of school directors, of
pupil personnel and probation officers i and
representatives of the Department of Labor and
Department of Education. KRS 339.400.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

TITLE VII OF 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. [hereinafter Title
VII.].
A.

Facial Discrimination and the BFOQ Defense
1.

Background
A per se violation of Title VII occurs when an employer has a
policy that on its face expressly applies only to one group
(women) and not to another group of employees (men). See, e.g.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 400 U.S. 542
(1971)(employer refused employment applications from women,
but not men, with pre-school age children).
A facially
discriminatory employment policy based on sex, religion, or
national origin can only be accommodated under Title VII, if at all,
if the employer is able to prove that such a requirement is a bona
fide occupational qualification [hereinafter .BFOQ]. The BFOQ is
limited to hiring and assignments, and cannot be invoked as a
defense to any type of facial race discrimination.
.

2.
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187
(1991).
a.
The United States Supreme Court struck down as violative
of §703(a) of Title VII an employer's policy of barring all women,
except those medically documented as infertile, from jobs
involving either actual or potential lead exposure in excess of the
relevant OSHA standard. Because only women employees were
required to prove their inability to reproduce, the Court held that
the policy was facially discriminatory. Such policy could only have
been permissible if the employer established that sex was a bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) under §703(a)(1}.
b.
The Court narrowly construed the BFOQ defense in
holding that this exception to the Act's command of.
nondiscrimination reaches only to "certain instances" where sex
discrimination is "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation"

* The speaker acknowledges the invaluable work of Lee Guice, a third year law student at the University of
Kentucky College of Law, in the preparation of this outline.
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of the "particular" business. That is, the exclusion of all fertile
women, but not fertile men, from a particular job is permissible if,
and only if, fertility detrimentally effects female employees'
abilities to perform the particular job at issue. The Court found
that fertile women can participate in the manufacture of batteries
as efficiently as anyone else.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)(exclusion
c.
of women from position of guard in a maximum security male
prison upheld because women's employment would create "real
risks of safety to others if violence. broke out) and Western
Airlines, ,Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985)(exclusion of
persons over the age of 60 from position of flight engineer u'pheld
because "age-connected debility" might prevent a flight engineer
from assisting the pilot thereby causing a safety emergency
endangering airline customer safety), the Supreme Court
recognized a BFOQ for safety. However, in Johnson Controls,
the Court rejected the employer's attempt to bring its policy within
that exception. Although the employer claimed it was motivated
by a desire to in sure the "safety" of fetuses from the danger of
lead exposure, the Court limited the "safety exception" to those
instances wherein a third-pa'rty or customer's safety is "essential
to the business." It held that the unconceived fetLis' is neither a
customer nor a third party whose safety is essential to the
business of battery manufacturing.
In Johnson Controls, the Court stated that Title VII does
d.
not prevent an employer from trying to lessen the potential for
injury to a fetus caused by lead exposure. Title VII does prevent,
however, an employer from adopting sex-specific fetal protection
policies in its attempt to address that problem.
e.
In response to the employer's contention that compliance
with Title VII would expose the employer to potential tort-liability
for injury to the fetus, the Court said that "if, under general tort
principles, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the
employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer
has not acted negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable
seems remote at best."
f.
The specter that hiring fertile women will cost employers
more because of the potential for tort-liability to their, as, yet,
unconceived fetuses because of lead exposure was rejected by
the Court as a defense for the employer's discriminatory refusal to
hire women. "The incremental cost of hiring women cannot justify
discriminating against them."
t---

g.
Finally, the Court also relied on the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) [hereinafter the
PDA] for support for its decision because the PDA clearly
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establishes that discrimination based on a woman's ability to
become pregnant is facially sex based.
3.
Compare, Fleming v. Ayers & Associates, 948 F.2d 993
(6thCir.1991).
The Sixth Circuit held that the discharge of a female employee
motivated by the employer's desire to avoid the high future
medical costs for the employee's child (the baby was born
prematurely and suffered from hydrocephalus), did not violate the
PDA because it was not discrimination based on the employee's
gender. The Court reasoned that "[t]he fact that her pregnancy
ultimately produced her child does not make actions taken with
respect, to the child actions "because of or on the basis of" her
pregnancy." Id. at 996.

B.

Disparate Treatment or Intentional Discrimination

1.

,

I
I

'

Burden of Proof
a.
The Supreme Court defines disparate treatment
discrimination as encompassing those situations wherein the
employer treats a particular person less favorably than others
because of' the person's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive or intent is critical to the
success of such a claim.
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335,n. 15 (1977). In
a series of cases over more than twenty years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has' attempted ,to develop a practical framework that
provides "orderly wayu to inquire into what the Court has
described as the "elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination."
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
b.
(1972), the Court held that the plaintiff must first establish a
"prima facie" case by proving 1) that the plaintiff belonged to a
protected group, 2) that the plaintiff was qualified for the position
for which the employer was seeking applications, 3) that the
plaintiff was rejected, and 4) that the position remained open and
that the employer continued to seek applicants with the same
qualifications as the plaintiff had. The establishment of a prima
facie case creates an inference that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against the plaintiff because the plaintiff has
eliminated the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for failure
to hire, demotion or firing: that the plaintiff was unqualified for the
position or that the position was no longer available.
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
c.
450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme Court stated that after the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
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the employer to articulate, but not prove, some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. If the
employer does so, then the plaintiff must be given the opportunity
to prove, by a preponderance of all the evidence, that the
articulated, nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for
discrimination. The Burdine Court concluded that the ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times
with the plaintiff. The plaintiff may succeed in persuading the
court that s/he has been the victim of intentional discrimination
"either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory.
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Id., at 256.
2.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, _
(1993).

U.S. _ , 113 S.Ct. 2742

a.
The plaintiff alleged that he was demoted and discharged
from his position as a correctional officer at a halfway house
because of his race. At trial, the plaintiff established a McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case thereby giving rise to a presumption of
intentional discrimination. The employer, in turn, rebutted the
presumption by articulating two nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions - the severity and the accumulation of rules violations
committed by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff then successfully
convinced the trial court that the reasons proffered by the
employer were not the real reasons for the plaintiff's demotion and
discharge. Nonetheless, the trial court held that the plaintiff had
failed to carry his ultimate burden of proving that his race was the
determining factor in his employer's decision to demote and
dismiss him. It concluded that "although [the plaintiff] has proven
the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven
that the crusade was racially rather than personally motivated."
Id. at 2748.
b.
The U.S. Supreme Court concurred in the judgment of the
trial court. It held that if the employer carries its burden of
production by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions, the presumption of intentional discrimination that arose
when the plaintiff made out a prima facie case "drops out of the
picture." The trier of fact proceeds, then, to decide the ultimate
question whether the plaintiff has proven that the employer
intentionally discriminated against her/him.
The factfinder's
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the employer "(particularly
if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination." However, rejection by the court of the
defendant's proffered reasons does not entitle the plaintiff to a
judgment as a matter of law. It still remains for the factfinder to
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determine whether the plaintiffs proffered reason (intentional
discrimination) is correct. The trial court's determination of that
ultimate question must be reviewed by the appellate court under
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of. Civil
Procedure 52(a).
3.

Harris v. Forklift Systems, _

U.S. _'_,114 S.Ct. 367 (1993).

This case is reviewed in the material on "Harassment:
Sexual and Otherwise" prepared Linda Scholle Cowan.
C.

Disparate Impact Discrimination
The Supreme Court defines impermissible disparate
impact discrimination .as employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but .
that fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by a business necessity. Proof of
discriminatory intent is not required under the disparate
impact theory of impermissible employment discrimination.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States,431 U.S. 324, 335, n. 15.
There are no new U.S. Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit
cases to report.

D.

1991 Civil Rights Act and the Issue of Retroactivity
1.

Background
a.
Any new legislation raises the question whether its
provisions should be applied retroactively by the courts to
pending cases and pre-act conduct or only prospectively to
post-act conduct. With the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 (Pub.L. No. 102-166, Stat. 1071-1100) [hereinafter the Act]
the question of retroactivity was particularly problematic.
b.
With two exceptions, the Act did not include any express
direction in favor or against the retroactive application of its
provisions.
c.
The Congressional Record was replete with contradictory
memoranda and comments from various members of Congress
on the issue of the retroactive application of the Act.
d.
The United States Supreme Court has two lines of
seemingly contradictory cases on the appropriateness of the
retroactive application of congressional enactments. Compare,
Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974)(New
statute must be applied retroactively to a case pending on appeal
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at the time of enactment "unless doing so would result in a
manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative
history to the contrary. ") and Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988)("Retroactivity is not favored in the law
... [and] congressional enactments ... will not be construed to
have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.").
e.
The Act was passed in responses to at least five 1989
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting Title VII and
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights' Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. 1981)
[hereinafter §1981]. See, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989)(mixed motive/disparate treatment discrimination);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)
(business necessity defense/disparate impact discrimination);
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)(standing to challenge
consent decrees); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies Inc., 490 U.S.
900 (1989)( statute of limitations for challenges to seniority
systems); and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989)(intentional discrimination under §1981).
f.
In addition to amending Title VII and §1981, the Act also
amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(29 U.S.C. 621- 634); the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. 1988); and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.).
g.
The Act also responded to three 1991 decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244 1991)(extraterritoriality of Title VII); West Virginia
University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991)
(compensation for expert's fees); and, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991 )(mandatory retirement for state court judges is not
a violation of the ADEA).
2.
Landgraf v. US) Film Products, _
(1994).

U.S. _ . 114 S.Ct. 1483

a.
The Supreme Court articulated a test for determining the
appropriateness of applying a federal statute to events that
occurred prior to the law's enactment:
1..
Did Congress expressly prescribe the statute's
proper reach?
If yes, that expression of intent is to be followed by
2.
the courts.
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3.
If no, the court must determine whether the new
statute would have a retroactive effect. A statute does not
necessarily operate "retrospectively" merely because it is
applied in a case arising from conduct antedating - the
statute's enactment.
Factors the court looks at in
determining whether the rule operates retrospectively are
whether the new law would impair rights a party possessed
when the party acted, increase a party's liability for past
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions
already completed.
4.
If the statute does have a retroactive effect, the
"default rule," absent a clear expression of congressional
intent to the contrary, is that the statute does not govern
pre-enactment conduct.
b.
The Supreme Court also expressly stated that although
one provision of the 1991 Civil Rights Act might not be applied to
pre-enactment conduct under this test, "there is no special reason
to think that all the diverse provisions of the Act must be treated
uniformly.... " Id. at_
3.
Damages in Cases of Disparate Treatment [Intentional]
Discrimination
a.

Background.
1.
As originally enacted, Title VII only provided for the
award of equitable relief such as reinstatement to a
successful complainant. Monetary damages in the form of
compensation for economic loss (e.g., back pay, front pay
and interest on back pay) could be awarded, but
compensatory and punitive damages were unavailable.
Victims of sexual harassment were particularly prejudiced
by the exclusion of compensatory damages from the relief
a court could grant to a successful complainant. Often the
victim of sexual harassment does not suffer an economic
loss as a result of this type of unlawful employment
practice. .
2.
Section 102 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act provides
that compensatory damages are available for all victims of
intentional (but not disparate impact) employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the American's
with Disabilities Act (with caps). Punitive damages are
also authorized if the plaintiff shows that the defendant
"engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual."
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3.
Prior to the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
, the trial court in the Landgraf case found that the plaintiff
had been sexually harassed by a co-worker, but that the
harassment was not so severe as to justify her decision to
quit. Thus, she was not entitled to equitable relief because
her termination did not violate Title VII, and because Title
VII did not then authorize other relief, she was not entitled
to compensatory and punitive damages. The 1991 Civil
Rights Act became law while her appeal was pending.
The Supreme Court rejected her claim that her case
. should be remanded fora .determination of damages
under the newly enacted Section 102.
b.
Retroactive Application
Section 102(b)(1) Prohibited.

of

Punitive

Damages

in

1.
The Landgraf Court held that application of the
punitive damage provision to pre-Act conduct would be
retroactive in effect. Therefore, because there was no
clear congressional expression of intent to reach such a
result, the "default rule" in favor of prospective application
was adopted by the Court.

2.
The Court also pointed out that if there had been
an express congressional declaration of intent to apply the
punitive damage provision retroactively, a serious
constitutional question of a potential ex post facto problem
would have been created because punitive damages share
key characteristics of criminal sanctions.
c.
Retroactive Application of Compensatory Damages in
Section 102(a)(1) Prohibited.
1.
The Landgraf Court found that application of
compensatory damage provision of the Act to preenactment conduct would also operate retrospectively
even though it reached discriminatory conduct already
prohibited by Title VII.

2.
However, the Court found that compensatory
damages are quintessentially backward-looking. They
sanction wrongdoers by affecting the liabilities of
defendants. The Court reasoned that the right to receive
compensatory damages is also the type of legal change
that would have an impact on private parties' planning.
3.
And, in this particular case, because prior law
afforded no relief for an employee in the plaintiff's
situation, § 102 could be seen as creating a new cause of
action. Therefore, since Congress did not clearly express
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an intention to make the compensatory damage provision
retroactive, the Court applied the "default rule" in favor of
prospective application of a new law to conduct occurring
after its enactment.
4.

Jury Trial
a.

Background.
1.
As originally enacted, Title VII did not provide for
jury trials. Regardless of the type of discrimination (facial,
disparate treatment, or disparate impact) or the relief
sought, the plaintiff was only entitled to a bench trial.
2.
The 1991 Civil Rights Act §102(c)(1) expressly
provides that any party seeking compensatory or punitive
damages or an employer defending against such claims
for relief may demand a trial by jury.

b.
Retroactive Application of Jury Trial Provisions in
Section 102{c){1) Prohibited.
The Landgraf Court recognized that the jury trial provision
of the Act is a procedural change of the sort that would
ordinarily govern trials conducted after its effective date.
However, because §102{c) makes jury trials available only
"[i]f a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages," the jury trial option fell with the attached
damages provisions.
5.

Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
a.

Background.
In Patterson v. McLean, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the
1.
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's claims of racial
harassment, failure to promote, and discriminatory
discharge were not actionable under Section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. That section, according to the
Court, was restricted in its scope to forbidding intentional
racial discrimination in only the "making and enforcement"
of private contracts. It did not provide relief for racial
discrimination in post-contract formation conduct of the
employer.
2.
Section 101 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act clearly
overrules this constricted view of §1981. The Act defines
the term" make and enforce contracts" as used in § 1981 to
include lithe making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
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privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship." The Act also codifies the Supreme Court's
holdings in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454 (1975) and Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976) that prohibitions of §1981 apply to private,
nongovernmental contracts.
b.
Rivers v. Roadway Express, _
1510 (1994).

U.S. _ , 114 S.Ct.

1..
The plaintiffs filed a complaint under §1981 alleging
that the employer fired them on baseless charges because
of their race and because they insisted on the same
procedural protections afforded to white employees.
Before trial, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the
Patterson decision holding that §1981 does not apply to
conduct that occurred after the formation of the contract.
Relying on Patterson, the trial court dismissed the
plaintiffs' discriminatory discharge claims.
While the
plaintiffs' appeal was pending, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
became law amending §1981.
2.
Retroactive Application of the
Provision in Section 102 Prohibited.

Definitional

a.
In reliance on its decision in the Landgraf
case, the Supreme Court first determined that §101
would act retrospectively if applied to pre-Act
conduct because it enlarged the category of
conduct that is subject to §1981 liability (all aspects
of the contractual relationship, including contract
terminations).
The Court pointed out that
Patterson decision did not overrule any prior
decision of the Court. Its construction of §1981
was an authoritative statement of what the statute
meant before as well as after the decision. Thus,
§ 101 the Act did expand the type of conduct
subject to commands of § 1981.
b.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that § 101 should apply to their case because it was
"restorative" of the understanding of §1981 that
prevailed before the Patterson decision. "Our
decisions simply do not support the proposition that
we have espoused a "presumption" in favor of
retroactive application of restorative statutes." The
Court said that it still requires clear evidence of
intent to impose even a restorative statute
"retroactively." Id. at_.
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c.
The Court also held that Congress' decision
to "legislatively overrule" a Supreme Court case
does not, by itself, reveal whether Congress
intended the statute to apply retroactively to events
that would be otherwise governed by the judicial
decision. And, even assuming that the enactment
of §101 reflected congressional disapproval of
Patterson's holding, that does not demonstrate
congressional intent to apply the new definition to
past acts.
"Even when Congress intends to
supersede a~rule of law embodied in one of our
decisions with what it views as a better rule
established in earlier decisions, its intent to reach
conduct preceding the "corrective" amendment
must clearly appear." Id. at_
E.

Other Issues
1.

Jury Trial and Principles of Collateral Estoppel

a.

Background
In Parklane Hosiery Co. V. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court held that an equitable
determination can have collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent legal action and that this estoppel does not
violate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury
in suits at common law. In that case, a judgment had
been issued by a District Court and affirmed on appeal in a
suit in which a jury trial was not constitutionally required
(injunctive action by SEC alleging the issuance of a
materially false and misleading proxy statement). The
District Court's resolution of the issues in that case
collaterally estopped relitigation of the same issues in a
second, separate action, even though the plaintiff was
entitled to a jury trial in the second action(stockholder's
class action}.

b.
Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., 494 U.S. 545
(1990).
1.
Plaintiff brought an action under both Title VII and
§1981 alleging that the employer had engaged in both
discriminatory discharge because of his race and
retaliation because he fileq a charge with the EEOC. Title
VII claims are equitable in nature and do not require a jury
trial while the right to a jury trial attaches to the legal
claims arising under §1981.
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2.
The trial court determined that Title VII provided the
exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff, dismissed the
§1981 claims, conducted a bench trial, and granted the
employer's motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's
case. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the
dismissal of the §1981 claim was erroneous because Title
VII and §1981 are separate, independent, and distinct.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court's findings with respect to the Title VII claims
collaterally estopped the plaintiff from relitigating his §1981
claims because the elements of a cause of action under
the two statutes are identical.
3.
The United States Supreme Court refused to
extend Parklane Hosiery to this case and reversed. The
plaintiff had properly joined his legal and equitable claims
in one suit. It was only by virtue of the trial court's
erroneous dismissal of the §1981 claims that enabled the
court to resolve the issues common to both claims.
Otherwise, the common issues would have been resolved
by a jury. The Court found that it would be anomalous to
hold that a district court may not deprive a litigant of the
right to a jury trial by resolving an equitable claim before a
jury hears a legal claim raising common issues, but that a
court could accomplish the same result by erroneously
dismissing. the legal claim. Relitigation was the only
mechanism for completely correcting the error.
c.

Korte v. Diemer, 909 F.2d 954 (6thCir. 1990).
,

The Sixth Circuit held that a jury verdict in favor of a
county employee on her Equal Pay Act,· 29 U.S.C.
§206(d)(1), claim is binding as to her Title VII
discriminatory compensation claim. The Court rejected the
position of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits that the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII, although similar, are distinct as to
the proof required and the allocation of the parties' burden
of proof.
Instead, it held that "a finding of "sex
discrimination in compensation" under one Act is
tantamount to a finding of "pay discrimination on the basis
of sex" under the other. Conduct that a jury finds to be
"based on" sex, and not motivated by nondiscriminatory
reasons, cannot later be found by a district court to lack an
intent to discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 959.

2.

Statute of Limitations:
Government
a.

Background
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Equitable Tolling Against the

Section 2000e-16(c) of Title VII . provides than an
employment discrimination complaint against the federal
government under Title VII must be filed "within thirty days
of receipt of notice of final action taken" by the EEOC.
And, it is a well recognized principle that waiver of
sovereign immunity cannot be implied, but must be
unequivocally expressed. United States v. Mitchell, 445
U.S. 535 (1980).
b.

Irwin v. Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
1.·
The plaintiff filed his complaint against the VA 44
days after the EEOC notice was received at his attorney's
office, but 29 days after the date on which the plaintiff
claimed he received his letter. The EEOC notice expressly
informed the plaintiff of his right to file a civil action within
30 days of receipt of the notice. The plaintiff Claimed that
the letter to his attorney arrived at the attorney's office
while the attorney was out of the country so that the
attorney did not actually learn of the EEOC's action until
18 days after it arrived at the office.
2.
The Supreme Court held that since §2000e-16(c)
only specifies that the EEOC notification be "received,"
receipt by the claimant's designated representative is
sufficient. If Congress had intended to depart from the
common and established practice of providing notification
through counsel, it must do so expressly. The Court also
endorsed the principle that notice to an attorney's office
that is acknowledged by a representative of that office
qualifies as notice to the client.
3.
The Court embraced the general rule that once
Congress has made a waiver of sovereign immunity, the
rule of equitable tolling is applicable to suits against the
government in the same way that it is applicable to private
suits. However, the plaintiff gained no help from this
holding. The Court found that federal courts have typically
permitted equitable tolling against private litigants only
sparingly in situations where the claimant actively pursued
judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the
statutory period or where the complainant was induced or
tricked by the adversary's misconduct into allowing the
filing deadline to pass. This case involved only a "garden
variety claim of excusable neglect."

3.

Concurrent Jurisdiction
In Yellow Freight System, Inc., v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820
(1990), the United State Supreme Court held that because Title
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VII contains no language that expressly confines jurisdiction to
federal courts or ousts state courts of their jurisdiction, that is
strong evidence that Congress did not intend to divest state courts
of concurrent jurisdiction. As state courts have the inherent
authority, and are competent, to adjudicate federal claims, the
employee's timely filing in state court after receive of her "right to
sue" letter from the EEOC was sufficient.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 626(c)(1) and 633(b), expressly grants concurrent jurisdiction
to state courts.
4.

Damage Awards and Taxation
In United States v. Burke, _ U.S. _ , 112 S.Ct. 867 (1992),
the Supreme Court held that back pay awards in settlement of
Title VII claims are not "damages received on account of person
injuries" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code's
statutory exclusion of such damages from gross income. The
Court reasoned that nothing in Title VII as it was then written
purports to compensate the employee for any of the traditional
harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering,
emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential
dam~ges. Because the Court found that Title VII's sole. remedial
focus is the award of backwages, it does not redress tort-like
personal injury within the meaning of the statutory exclusion from
gross income.

5.

Retaliation/After-Acquired Evidence
a.

Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation
1.
Christopher v. Stouder Memorial Hospital, 936
F.2d 870 (6thCir. 1991).
The elements of ~ prima, facie case of retaliation
are that the plaintiff was engaged in activity
protected by Title VII, that the exercise of the
plaintiff's rights was known by the employer, that
the employer thereafter engaged in an adverse
employment action, and that a causal connection
·existed between the plaintiff's protected activity and
the employer's adverse action.
EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d
2.
985 (6thCir. 1992).
a.
A female temporary custodian was denied a
promotion to permanent status after she
complained to her employer about a disparity in
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pay between male and female temporary
custodians. She told the employer she thought it
was "breaking some sort of law" by that practice.
b.
The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of retaliation even
though the refusal to promote occurred before she
had instituted formal proceedings with the EEOC.
The Court endorsed the principle that it is the
assertion of statutory rights (e.g., nondiscrimination
because of sex in compensation) that is the
triggering factor for a claim of retaliation, not the
filing of a formal complaint. Because the plaintiff
alleged that the adverse employment actions
occurred after her protest, she had put forth a
prima facie case of retaliation.
b.

Effect of After-Acquired Evidence on Retaliation Claim
1.

Background
a.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
642 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held
that when an employer's adverse employment
decision rests on both permissible and
impermissible factors ("mixed motive"), and theimpermissible ground was a "substantial" factor in
the employment decision, the plaintiff has made out
a prima facie case of disparate treatment or
intentional discrimination.
Nonetheless, the
employer could avoid liability by proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate'
reason, standing alone, would have induced it to
make the same decision.
b.
Section 107(a) of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
While preserving the burden-shifting rules of Price
Waterhouse, makes significant changes in mixedmotive cases. Even though a permissible factor(s)
motivated the employment decision, if the plaintiff
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or
national origin was a motivating (not "substantial")
factor for the employment decision, employer
liability is established. The court may award
attorneys' fees and costs as well as injunctive and
declaratory relief. The burden then shifts to the
employer to demonstrate that the legitimate
reason(s), standing alone, would have induced it to
make the same decision. If the employer does not
meet this burden, the employer is subject to all of
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the relief available under Title VII including
damages (compensatory and punitive) and
equitable (e.g., back pay, reinstatement, hiring and
promotion).
2.
After-Acquired
Discharges.
a.

Evidence

and

Retaliatory

Background.
1.
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Company, 9 F.3d 539 (1993),
the Sixth Circuit Court held that the afteracquired evidence doctrine "mandates
judgment as a matter of law for an employer
charged with discrimination if evidence of
the employee's misconduct surfaces at
some time after the termination of the
employee and the employer can prove it
would have fired the employee on the basis
of the misconduct if it had known of it." Id.
at 541.
2.
Similarly, in Milligan-Jensen v.
Michigan Technological University, 975
F.2d 302 (1992), the Sixth Circuit ruled that
an employee who failed to include a OUI
conviction on her employment application
was precluded from recovering on her Title
VII action based on allegations of sex
discrimination and retaliation for filing an
EEOC charge. The Court found that the
employee suffered no legal damage by
being fired because falsification of the
application, if discovered during the
employee's employment, would have
resulted in the employee's termination.
3.
And, in Johnson v. Honeywell
Information Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 409
(1992), an employee's misrepresentations
as to her educational background on her
employment application barred her recovery
under the state's Title VII equivalent even if
the employer discharged the employee for
her opposition to violations of the law.

b.

Effect of 1991 Civil Rights Act
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Arguably, §107(a) allows the employee to
recover, at a minimum, attorneys' fees and
costs as well as to obtain injunctive and
declaratory relief because the employeeis
discharge was "motivated" by impermissible
reasons despite the presents of the
misconduct that would have, if known by the
employer, caused the employer to terminate
the employee.
Attorney's Fees
a.

Assessed Against Defendant
In Lilley v. BTM Corporation, 958 F.2d 746 (1992), the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the
plaintiff was unsuccessful in pursuing an age
discrimination· claim, his success in proving a retaliatory
discharge claim was sufficient to render him a "prevailing
party" eligible to recover reasonable attorney's fees.
Moreover, because the expenses the plaintiff incurred in
pursuing the unsuccessful age discrimination claim were
related to the retaliatory discharge claim on which he was
successful, his expenses in pursuing the age
discrimination claim were recoverable. See, generally,
Hensley v. Eckerhard, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).

b.

Assessed Against Plaintiff
In Noyes v. Channel Products, Inc., 935 F.2d 806
(1991), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
district court's award of attorneys' fees against an
unsuccessful plaintiff in·· a Title VII retaliatory discharge
case was an abuse of discretion. The Court said that
attorneys' fees should be awarded to defense counsel only
in the most "egregious circumstances." Id. at 810.

III.

THE KENTUCKY CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, K.R.S. CHAPTER 344.
A.

Facial Discrimination
There are no new Kentucky cases to report.

B.

Disparate Treatme.nt or Intentional Discrimination
1.

Burden of Proof
a.
Kentucky's Civil Rights Act has been construed to
be virtually identical to corresponding Title VII provisions.
Consequently, the Kentucky courts have followed federal
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case law when interpreting the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
See, Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Kentucky,
For example, the
586 S.W.2d 270(Ky.App. 1979).
McDonnell Douglas framework for proving intentional
discrimination (as modified by Burdine) has been applied
to cases alleging intentional employment discrimination
under KRS §344.040. Kentucky Center for the Arts v.
Handley, 827 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1991).
b.
An unresolved question, however, is whether the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Hicks case will also
become part of the Kentucky courts' analysis of the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
c.
As the Kentucky Civil Rights Act goes beyond
merely incorporating the antidiscrimination policies
embodied in Title VII, see Meyers v. Chapman Printing
Company, 840 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Ky. 1992), the Hicks
decision need not be adopted as further gloss on how a
plaintiff establishes a case of intentional discrimination.
2.

Mixed Motive Cases of Intentional Discrimination
a.
The Kentucky Civil Rights Act was not amended
when Congress adopted the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
Therefore, more differences now exist between the
provisions of the state's law and the federal law than
before. For example, in the Chapman case, the Kentucky
Supreme Court adopted the Price Waterhouse rule than
an employer can avoid liability in a mixed motive disparate
treatment case by showing the legitimate reason, standing
alone, would have induced it to make the same decision.
However, the 1991 Civil Rights Act legislatively changed
the Price Waterhouse the employer avoidance of liability
rule.
b.
The question then arose in First Property
Management Corporation v. Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d
185 (Ky. 1993), what effect did the changes in federal law
have on the rule for mixed motive cases brought under
Kentucky state law. The Kentucky Supreme Court stated
that the rules for federal cases tried in equity without a jury
are different from the rules for cases under the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act which are claims at law. However, it then
went on to hold that an employer is not free from liability
simply because it offers proof that it would have
discharged the employee anyway, even absent the lawfully
impermissible reason.
If the jury believes the
impermissible reason did in fact contribute to the
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discharge as one of the substantial motivating factors,
employer liability attaches.
3.
Hall v. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government, _
S.W.2d _ , WL 83226 (Ky.App.
1994); Kirkwood v. Courier Journal, 858 S.W.2d 194 (Ky.
1993); and Meyers v. Chapman Printing Company, 840 S.W.2d
814 (Ky. 1992).
These sexual harassment cases are reviewed in the
material on "Harassment:
Sexual and Otherwise"
prepared Linda Scholle Cowan.
C.

Disparate Impact Discrimination.
In Leonard v. Corrections Cabinet, 828 S.W.2d 668
(Ky.App. 1992), a black employee was disqualified from
applying for promotion due to a prior felony conviction.
The Court did not analyze the potential disparate impact
such a facially neutral policy might have on a protected
class. Instead, the Court summarily disposed of the
potential disparate impact discrimination claim by stating
that even if the employee could prove that black applicants
were disqualified at a higher rate than whites, "we know of
no established protected class involving persons with
felony records, and we decline to create one." Id. at 672.

D.

Other Issues.
1.
Statute
Violations.

of

Limitations

and

Continuing

a.
In Leonard v. Corrections Cabinet, 828
S.W.2d 668, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held
that state law governs the substantive limitation
period for federal civil rights action (one year - KRS
413.140(1)(a»), federal law governs when the
cause of action accrues and when the statute
begins to run.
b.
The cause of action for a discreet act such
as discriminatory discharge of a person accrues
and the limitation period begins to run at the time of
the discharge. The cause of action for a continuing
violation such as discriminatory pay arises each
time the employee is paid less than her/his
counterpart.
In Leonard the court found that even
c.
though the employee was told unequivocally that
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he could never be promoted because of his felony
conviction, each time he applied for promotion and
was denied, a new, discrete act occurred and the
statute of limitations began to run on that cause of
action.
2.

Removal
a.
In Gafford v. General Electric, 997 F.2d
150 (6th Cir. 1993), the Sixth Circuit was faced
with .a challenge .to its. subject matter jurisdiction
over an employment discrimination lawsuit under
Kentucky's Civil Rights Act.
b.
The employee brought suit in Jefferson
Circuit Court alleging the employer's failure to
promote her was a violation of KRS §344.040. The
employee sought unspecified amount of damages
to compensate her for lost wages and retirement
benefits, for mental and emotional anxiety and
stress, and for court costs and attorney fees. The
employer petitioned for removal in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky based
on diversity of citizenship and satisfaction of the
$50,000 amount in controversy requirement.
c.
The court held that when a plaintiff seeks to
recover some unspecified amount that is not selfevidently greater or less than the federal amountin-controversy, the defendant can have removal if it
proves that it is "more likely than not" that the
plaintiff's claims meet the federal amount-incontroversy requirement. Id. at 158.

3.

Waiver
In Kirkwood V. Courier-Journal, 858
a.
S.W.2d 194 (Ky.App. 1993), the court found that
the employee's failure to use a mandatory
grievance and arbitration procedure in her union's
collective bargaining agreement did not preclude
her from bringing race and sex discrimination
charges under Kentucky's Civil Rights Statute.
b.
Although an informed individual may waive
a statutory civil right by agreeing to submit a claim
against the employer to binding arbitration, Gilmer
V. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., _
U.S. _ ,
111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991), a waiver may not be
accomplished prospectively on behalf of an
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individual by that employee's union or collective
bargaining unit.

4.

Retaliation - A Prima Facie Case
a.
In Mountain Clay, Inc. v. Commonwealth
of Kentucky, Commission on Human Rights,
830 S.W.2d 395 (Ky.App. 1992), the court found
that the employee had established prima facie case
of retaliation when the employer filed a lawsuit
seeking to enjoin the Human Rights Commission
from holding a hearing on the employee's
complaint, seeking to hold the employee liable
personally for the employer's costs of defending
against the complaint, and seeking to require the
employee to post bond in a sufficient amount to
cover those employer expenses. The circuit court
dismissed the employer's suit as premature.
b.
The Commission found, and the court
would not disturb the finding, that the employer
filed the suit to expose the employee to fears of
extreme financial hardship and to coerce her into
dropping or foregoing her complaint.

c.
The court also refused to recognize a per
se violation of due process when the Commission
hears a case in which it has been named an
adverse party. The court pointed out that if it
accepted such an argument, an employer who is a
defendant in a civil rights action could file suit
naming the Commission as an adverse party and
then argue that the Commission could not hear the
action because it was so named.
5.

Attorney Fees
a.
In Meyers v. Chapman, 840 S.W.2d 814,.
the Kentucky Supreme Court endorsed the trial
court's determination of plaintiff's attorneys' fee
award. The trial court arrived at the fee for
prosecuting the plaintiff's two causes of action by
determining the appropriate number of hours
reasonably expended by each of the plaintiff' three
attorneys. It multiplied that number by its finding of
an appropriate hourly rate. The total sum was then
reduced by 15% because of the "degree of
success achieved" by plaintiff's attorneys. The jury
had decided for the employee on her sexual
harassment cause of action, but against her on her
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gender-based discharge claim. The trial court
arrived at the fee for the "attorney fee litigation" by
calculating the appropriate number of hours,
multiplying by a lesser rate than it approved for the
principal litigation and then reduced the total by
75% because it found that only some of the hours
spent on the attorneys' fee litigation were
necessitated by the defendant's attack.

b.
The court sustained the award of attorneys'
fees even though they were substantially more
than the plaintiff's total recovery. It found that if
attorneys' fees were restricted to the size of the
claim there might be no incentive to pursue
worthwhile claims.

c.
The court rejected the argument that
compensation should have been enhanced
because the plaintiff's attorneys represented her on
a contingency fee basis.
IV.
THE AGE DISCRIMiNATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967,29 U.S.C. 621 et
seq. [hereinafter the ADEA].
A.

Facial Discrimination.
1.

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).

The U.S. Supreme Court held that appointed state judges
in Missouri who were subject to a state constitutional
mandate compelling retirement at the age of 70 were not
covered by the ADEA. They fell within the ADEA's
exclusion for appointees "on a policymaking level."
2.

Section 321 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.

a.
This section extends the protection of the ADEA
against employment discrimination to certain previously
unprotected state officials: (a) members of an elected
official's personal staff; (b) those appointed to serve the
elected official on a policy making level; and (c) those
appointed to serve the elected official as an immediate
advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or
legal powers of the office.
b.
The newly covered state employees have no trial
right. Disputes are to be resolved through an EEOC
administrative action with review by a Court of Appeals.
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c.
Elimination of the state employee exemptions
overrides the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft.
B.

Disparate Treatment or Intentional Discrimination
1.

Availability of Disparate Treatment Theory
In Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins, _ U.S. _ , 113
S.Ct. 1701 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
disparate treatment theory is available to a employee
under the ADEA.
=~... -

2.

Employer Liability Under Disparate Treatment Theory
a.
Employer liability depends on whether age actually
motivated the employer's decision. Whether the employer
relied on a formal, facially discriminatory policy based on
age or was motivated by the employee's age on an ad
hoc, informal basis, age must actually have played a role
in the employer's decision-making process and had a
determinative influence on its outcome. Id. at 1706.
b.
The Hazen Court held that an employee does not
prove a violation of the ADEA merely by proving that the
employee was discharged to prevent his pension benefits
from vesting. The Court reasoned that age and years of
service are "analytically distinct," so that an employer
might take account of one while ignoring the other.
Consequently, a decision based on years of service is not
necessarily an impermissible age-based decision under
the ADEA. [CAVEAT: The employer's action did violate the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §510.]

C.

Disparate Impact Discrimination
1.
In its Hazen decision, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly
stated that it has never decided whether a disparate impact theory
of liability is available under the ADEA and it would not do 50 in
the context of the Hazen case. Hazen Paper Company v.
Biggins, 113 S.Ct. at 1706.
2.
In Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867 (6thCir.
1990) the Sixth Circuit recognized the availability of the theory of
disparate impact discrimination under the ADEA. It said that to
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing
disparate impact, the employee must identify a specific
employment practice used by the employer and then establish its
adverse effect by offering statistical evidence. Once an age
discrimination plaintiff does that, the defendant must articulate a
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· legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, such as business necessity
or job-relatedness, for its practice. If the employer does so, then
the plaintiff must show either that the employer's proffered reason
was a pretext for discrimination or that an alternative employment
practice exists that would serve the employer's legitimate interests
without such a disparate impact.
D.

Other Issues
1.

Collateral Estoppel - Administrative
a.
In Astoria Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991), the
plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC referred
his claim to the state agency responsible for such claims
under state law. That agency found no probable cause to
believe that the plaintiff had been terminated because of
his age. That decision was upheld on administrative
review. Instead of appealing the administrative agency's
decision to state court, the plaintiff filed an ADEA suit in
federal district court grounded on the same factual
allegations considered in the state proceedings.
b.
The United States Supreme Court held that a
judicially unrEwiewed state administrative finding has no
preclusive effect on the age discrimination proceedings in
federal court.

2.

Jurisdiction
a.
Sections 626 (c) (1 ) and 633(b) of the ADEA
expressly grant concurrent jurisdiction to state courts.
b.
A federal employee complaining of. age
discrimination does not have to seek relief from the
employee's employing agency or the EEOC at all. A
federal employee can present the merits of herlhis claim to
a federal court in the first instance. 29 U.S.C. §633a(d).
See, also Stevens v. Department of the Treasury, 500
U.S. 1 (1991).

3.

Damages
a.
The § 7(b) of ADEA provides for liquidated
damages in the case of a "willful" violation.
In Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins, 113 S.Ct.
b.
at 1708 - 1709, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that the
definition of "willful" it articulated in Trans Work Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), was applicable to
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an informal disparate treatment case where age entered
into the employment decision on an ad hoc, informal basis
rather than because of a formal policy.
c.
A "willful" violation of the ADEA occurs if the
employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the
matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.
Hazen Paper Company v. Biggens, 113 S.Ct. at 1708.
4.

Waiver
a.
In
Gilmer
v.
Interstate/Johnson
Lane
Corporation, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the United States
Supreme Court held that an age discrimination claim was
subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement in a securities registration application the
plaintiff, a securities representative, had to fill out in order
to register with the NYSE.
b.
The Gilmer court distinguished its earlier decision
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
In Gardner-Denver, the issue was whether an employee
whose grievance had been arbitrated in compliance with
an arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement
was precluded from thereafter bringing a Title VII action
based upon the same conduct. The Court held that the
Title VII claim, an individual statutory claim, was not
precluded by arbitration of the collective contract rights.
Gilmer, in contrast, involved the issue of the enforceability
of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. In GardnerDenver the employee had not agreed to arbitrate the
statutory claims whereas the employee had so agreed in
Gilmer. And, the arbitration clause at issue in Gilmer was
entered into "voluntarily" by the employee and not by his
collective bargain representative. Finally, the Court found
that the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA] was at issue in
Gilmer, but not in Garnder-Denver. The FAA, according
to the Court, reflects a 'liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements."

V.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION

A.
Title VII and Homosexual, Sexual Harassment
Discrimination or Harassment Based on Sexual Orientation.
1.

v.

Homosexual, Sexual Harassment
a.
Demands by a homosexual supervisor or co-worker
are actionable as impermissible sexual harassment under
Title VII. The earliest case recognizing the possibility of
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such a cause of action is Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D. D.C. 1977). The Barnes court said in dicta that
homosexual advances might give rise to a claim of sexual
harassment under Title VII, but bisexual advances would
not. See, also Hensonv. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(11thCir. 1982); and Wright v. Methodist Youth
Services, 511 F.Supp. 307 (N.D.III. 1981).
b.
However, there seems to be a presumption that the
alleged perpetrator is heterosexual, see, e.g., French v.
Mead Corp., 33 F.E.P. Cases 635 {S.D. Ohio
1983),which can be overcome by showing that the alleged
harasser has "homosexual proclivities," Joyner v. AAA
. Cooper Transp., 597 F.Supp. 537 (M.D.Ala. 1983), aff'd,
749 F.2d 721 (11thCir. 1984).
2.
Discrimination or Harassment Because of Sexual
Orientation
a.
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against
homosexual employees, Williamson v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d .69 (8thCir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1089 (1990); transsexual employees, Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471· U.S. 1017 (1985)(plaintiff fired from her
position as a pilot due to her change in sex from male to
female); or employees perceived to be homosexual, Smith
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir.
1978).
b.
Title VII does not prohibit harassment, even of a
sexual nature, of homosexual employees or those
perceived to be homosexual employees, Polly v. Houston
Lighting & Power Co., 803 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.Tex. 1992).
B.
State Statutes and Employment Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation,
See, Norris and Randon, "Sexual Orientation
and the Workplace: Recent Developments in Discrimination and
Harassment Law," 19 Employee Relations L.J. 233 (1993).
1.
Prohibitions Against Discrimination Based on Sexual
Orientation.
a.
California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Vermont,
Washington,
and Wisconsin. specifically
prohibit
discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation.
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b.
All of the state statutes define sexual orientation to
include heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality.
[New York is considering a statute that would also prohibit
discrimination because of asexuality.]
Perceived sexual orientation is protected in
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New
Jersey and Wisconsin.

C.

California, Connecticut, and New Jersey have
d.
express • provisions that state . that affirmative action
programs on the basis of sexual orientation are not
required and none of the other states expressly requires
the implementation of affirmative action plans.
e.
Except for New Jersey and Washington, there is a
statutory exception for religious and charitable
organizations.

f.
Massachusetts explicitly states that its statute is
not an endorsement or approval of homosexuality or
bisexuality. The statute does not legitimize marriage
between homosexuals and does not require health
insurance or other employee benefits for "partners" of
homosexual employees. In addition to such proviSions,
Connecticut's statute provides that its statute is not to be
read to require the teaching of homosexuality or
bisexuality in educational institutions.
California and Vermont have prOVISions that
g.
maintain the orthodox classification of "marital status" and
the definitions of "family or dependent" in an employment
benefit plan.
2.
Prohibitions Against Prohibiting Discrimination Based
on Sexual Orientation.
'
Colorado has a statute that specifically prohibits any
protection on the basis of sexual orientation. Oregon
considered such a statute, but rejected it.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Dealing with state and federal administrative agencies
occupies an increasingly larger percentage of the time of
human resources professionals.

B.

The agencies most
professionals are:

C.

II.

frequently

encountered

by

such

1.

Federal and state agencies enforcing civil rights
statutes (e.g., Title VII, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Americans with Disabilities Act,
and KRS Chapter 344).

2.

Federal and state agencies enforcing the wage and
hour laws (Fair Labor Standards Act and KRS Chapter
337) .

3.

The Kentucky Division of Unemployment Insurance,
Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources, enforcing the
unemployment insurance laws (KRS Chapter 341).

Knowing the formal and informal procedures of the
agencies involved gives the human resources professional
an advantage in successfully dealing with these agencies.

CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
A.

Responding to charges filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
1.

Title VII Charges.
a.

Governing law: Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.)

b.

How charges are filed.

c.

(1)

In writing and under oath or affirmation
[42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)].

(2)

On a form provided by EEOC.

Time limit for filing charges - within 180
days of the alleged unlawful employment
practice (except in "deferral" states such as
Kentucky where one has 300 days to file the
charge). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

J-1

d.

e.

State filing requirement - In states such as
Kentucky which has "deferral" status, no
charge may be filed with EEOC "before the
expiration of sixty days after proceedings
have been commenced under the state or local
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated..
"42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(c).
( 1)

Thus in order to timely file an EEOC
charge in Kentucky, the Charging Party
must have filed with an appropriate state
or lo~al agency within 240 days in order
'that the' required 60 days for -state
proceedings may have run prior to filing
with EEOC.

(2)

Not necessary that the "filing" with the
state or local agency be timely (180 days
in Kentucky) in order to preserve the
right to file with the EEOC.

The investigation.
(1)

Normally by interrogatories, requests for
documents,
and
sometimes
on-site
inspection of records and interviews of
personnel.
(a)

Responding to interrogatories
requests for production.
1

J-2

and

EEOC is entitled to information
relevant to the charge but you
should limit the information
you provide to only that which
is relevant.
a

Restrict
information
provided to the narrowest
department or entity at
the level the unlawful
action was taken (e. g . ,
if
personnel
decisions
for a plant are made at
that plant, information
relating to company-wide
practices
outside
the
plant are probably not
relevant to the charge).

b

Restrict document production to those documents

directly relevant to the
claimed unlawful act
e . g. ,
do
not
produce
entire personnel files instead make EEOC tell
you
what
specific
documents they want.
c

(b)

Remember that everything
you
produce
will
be
available to the Charging
Party if he should later
decide to bring a Title
VII lawsuit.

Interviews of personnel.
I

Whether to allow interview of
non-management
personnel
on
working time - no requirement
that you do so but it gives you
more control.

2

Right
to
have
counselor
management
representative
present at interview of any
management
or
supervisory
employee.

3

You may be able to negotiate
presence at interview of nonmanagement employees.

4

Control the access of the
investigator while he is on
your premises.

(c )

EEOC has subpoena power to coerce
the production of information if
necessary but it is reluctant to
exercise that power.

(d)

The right way and the wrong way to
say "no" to the investigator's
demands for information.
I

Be firm but polite.

2

Be prepared to compromise.

3

Appear reasonable.
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4

f.

g.

Require
EEOC
to
put
all
requests in writing and respond
to all requests in writing.

The determination of probable cause.
(1)

A determination as to whether there is
reasonable cause to believe the charge is
true is supposed to be made after
investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

(2)

In theory, after 180 days from the filing
of the charge, the EEOC ~s suppos~d to
issue a right to sue notice to the
Charging Party.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1).
(a)

In practice, this is never done
unless the Charging Party requests
it.

(b)

In
certain
circumstances,
the
employer may want
to
consider
requesting that the right to sue
ietter
be
issued
prior
to
a
determination being made.

(3)

If the EEOC determines that there is not
reasonable cause to believe the charge is
true, it will dismiss the charge and
issue a notice of right to sue to the
Charging Party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

(4)

If the EEOC determines that there is
probable cause to believe the charge is
true, it will attempt conciliation.

Conciliation
(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) provides that
"[ i] f the Commission determines
that there is reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is true, the Commission
shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by
informal
methods
of
conference,
conciliation, and persuasion."

(2)

Since EEOC looks to a "make whole"
remedy, conciliation is usually equated
with capitulation.
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(3)

(4)

However, where the EEOC regards the
charge as "weak", there is usually some
opportunity for compromise.
(a)

Neutral employment reference.

(b)

Backpay without reinstatement.

(c)

Reinstatement without backpay.

If
conciliation
is
successful,
a
conciliation -agreement wil1 be prepared
and signed by the
Charging Party,
Employer and EEOC.
(a)

Although EEOC will assert that all
of its provisions are "boiler-plate"
and mandatory, they are not.

(b)

Make sure that the provisions of the
agreement are clear and unambiguous.

(c)

Consider provisions whereby:

(d)

h.

1

Charging Party agrees to keep
the terms of the agreement
confidential.

2

Charging Party agrees not to
ever apply for employment with
the Company.

3

Charging Party releases the
employer from any and all
claims against the employer
arising out of the employment
relationship
(a
general
release) .

Some EEOC District Directors will
not
approve
general
releases,
confidentiality clauses, etc., as a
part of the formal conciliation
agreement but will not object to a
separate
agreement
containing
provlslons between the Charging
Party and the employer.

The Right to Sue Notice.
(1)

Not issued if EEOC decides to file a suit
on behalf of the Charging Party.
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i.

j.

(a)

Several years ago, it was very
unusual for the EEOC to file suit on
behalf of the Charging Party unless
there were pattern and practice or
class implications to the charge.

(b)

Currently, EEOC's policy is that
there is a presumption in favor of
such suits.

(2)

If EEOC does not file suit on behalf of
the Charging Party, it will issue a Right
-to Sue Notice to the Charging Party even
where it has found no probable cause.

(3)

The Charging Party has 90 days from
receipt of the Notice of Right to Sue to
file a Title VII suit in the U.S.
District Court or state court.
(a)

Receipt in the past could be proven
by certified mail receipt form in
the EEOC file.

(b)

Current practice is not
notices certified mail.

to

send

Responding to EEOC Charges.
(1)

No response, other than answers to the
EEOC interrogatories, is required.

(2)

Particularly if you
have a
strong
defense, you will probably want to file
wi th EEOC a position statement at some
time
prior
to
the
probable
cause
determination being made.
(a)

Frequently, EEOC will solicit a
position statement as a part of the
interrogatories to the employer.

(b)

Position statement should address
each and every allegation of the
charge.

Responding to a "cause" determination.
(1)

While there is no statutory or regulatory
provision for appealing from a cause
determination, it should be considered.
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2.

(a)

It should be addressed
District Director.

to

the

(b)

It should address both the facts and
the law as to every basis cited for
the probable cause determination.

(c)

Even if the appeal is denied or not
even considered by the District
Director,
it will
be
the
top
document of the file which goes to
EEOC's attorneys .to determine if
EEOC will file suit on behalf of the
Charging Party.

Charges under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).
a.

Discrimination
in
Governing
law:
Age
Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 621 et
~).

b.

How charges are filed - same as Title VII.

c.

Time limit for filing charges - wi thin 180
days of the alleged unlawful employment
practice (except in "deferral" states such as
Kentucky, where one has 300 days to file the
charge). 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).

d.

Time limit for filing suit in state or federal
court:
(1)

Not before 60 days have elapsed since the
filing of a charge with the EEOC (and in
a deferral state, 60 days after a charge
has been filed with the state agency).
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) and 29 U.S.C. §
633(b).

(2)

Probably not later than ninety (90) days
after the receipt of a notice by EEOC
that it has dismissed a charge or has
otherwise terminated its proceedings. 29
U.S.C. § 626(e).
(a)

But note that at least one court has
held that despite the fact that the
Civ.il Rights Act of 1991 deleted
references to the two and three year
statutes of limitation and created a
90 day right to sue notice period,
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the former limitations periods are
still applicable.
Simmons v. Al
Smith Buick Co., 63 FEP 958 (E.D.
N.C. 1993).
(b)

e .-

f.
B.

-~

Also note that at least one court
has held that, unlike Title VII, a
right to sue notice is not a
prerequisite to suit.
Adams v.
Burlington Northern R. R. Co., 63 FEP
679 (D.C. Kansas 1993).

ADEA does ~~ not require any investigation or
determination of probable cause
only
conciliation.
( 1)

However, in practice the EEOC tends to
process an ADEA charge the same as a
Title VII charge.

(2)

The EEOC may bring a civil action on
behalf of the Charging Party if it
chooses to do so.

Employers should respond in the same fashion
as to a Title VII charge.

Responding to charges filed with the Kentucky Commission
on Human Rights (KCHR) and the Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Human Rights Commission (LFUCHRC).
1.

2.

Governing law:
a.

KCHR - KRS Chapter 344 (Kentucky Civil Rights
Act) and 104 KAR 1:020 et seq.

b.

LFUCHRC - KRS Chapter 344, Ordinance No. 16692, and the Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the LFUCHRC.

How the Complaint (same as charge under Title VII)
is filed.
a.

Written sworn complaint KRS 344.200; 104 KAR
1:020, Section 1(2)(a) and (c).
( 1)

It is sufficient under Title VI I that
charge merely be signed by a Charging
Party who "declares under penalty of
perjury" that the charge is true.

~-

.~~.

'. --.:.
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_.~

'it,.

(2)

But under state law, it is necessary that
the signature be notarized.

3.

Time limit for filing Complaint:
Within 180 days
of the alleged unlawful employment practice.
KRS
344.200(1); Section 2.010 3. of the Rules of
Practice and Procedures of the LFUCHRC.

4.

Interrelationship of state and federal law.
a.
c.

b.

5.

It is the common practice of both the state
deferral agencies (KCHR and LFUCHRC) and the
EEOC to dual file all complaints/charges with
each other.
If either of the state agencies elects to take
jurisdiction and investigate a charge, the
EEOC holds its investigation in abeyance until
the conclusion of the state or local agency
processing.
(I)

Typically, the EEOC simply adopts the
disposition of the charge made by the
KCHR or LFUCHRC.

(2)

Both the KCHR and LFUCHRC have work
sharing agreements with EEOC under which
the Kentucky agencies are reimbursed for
investigating charges for the EEOC.

(3)

Accordingly,
you
will
much
more
frequently be involved with the Kentucky
agencies than EEOC.

Procedure of the KCHR and LFUCHRC.
a.

From the
filing of the charge through
investigation, probable cause determination,
and conciliation, there are only these two
significant differences between the processing
by the Kentucky agencies and the EEOC.
(1)

KRS 344.210(1) mandates that within 60
days of the filing of the complaint,
unless
it
has
been
dismissed
or
conciliated, the matter must be set for a
hearing.
(a)

In the past, the mandate was ignored
and waivers were obtained from the
employer as to the setting of the
matter for hearing.
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(2)

b.

(b)

However, a recent case decided by
the
Kentucky
Court
of
Appeals
decided that KRS 344.210(1) was
mandatory.

(c)

Consequently, all cases are now
being set for hearing within 60 days
of the complaint being filed
however, cases are typically set for
dates months in the future to give
adequate time for investigation and
conciliation.

Once conciliation has failed, the major
difference in procedures appears - unlike
the EEOC which either files suit in court
on behalf of the Charging Party or issues
an authorization to the Charging Party to
file suit, the KCHR and the LFUCHRC
conduct
formal
hearings,
determine
whether a violation has occurred, and
direct remedies for such violations.

Hearings before the KCHR and LFUCHRC.
(1)

Conducted under
regulations.

(2)

Conducted before hearing officers who may
be Commissioners or outside persons
(normally attorneys) hired to conduct the
hearing.

(3)

The case for the Charging Party is
normally presented by an attorney for the
Commission.

(4)

At the conclusion of the hearing, parties
are typically given the opportunity to
present proposed findings of fact and
conclusions
of
law
to
the
hearing
officers.

(5)

The hearing officers normally present
proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law to a
full
meeting of
the
Commission for adoption or modification
and the issuance of an order.

(6)

Very important to present all facts
favorable to the employer at the hearing
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their

own

procedural

as no further evidence will be taken on
appeal.

c.

C.

(a)

Either
party
may
appeal
the
Commission's order to the Circuit
Court of the county where the
alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.

(b)

On appeal, the Court's scope of
review is extremely limited - "the
findings of fact of the Commission
shall be conclusive unless clearly
erroneous. in view of the probative
and substantial evidence on the
whole record." KRS 344.240(2).

Discovery
hearings.

by

employers

in

preparation

for

(I)

KRS 344.260 and 344.200(7) appear to
provide for discovery by either party
before the KCHR.

(2)

Neither Ordinance No. 166-92 nor the
LFUCHRC's Rules of Practice and Procedure
expressly provides for discovery by
employers, but in practice employers have
generally
been
allowed
to
take
depositions.

(3)

Employers
may,
at
least
after
a
determination of cause has been made,
obtain access to the investigative files
of the KCHR and LFUCHRC under the
Kentucky Open Records Act and of the EEOC
under the federal Freedom of Information
Act.

General Observations.
1.

Proceedings before the EEOC, KCHR and the LFUCHRC
are adversary proceedings and should be approached
from that standpoint.
a.

Do not be mislead into thinking that the EEOC,
KCHR, or the LFUCHRC or their staffs are
simply objective fact-finders.

b.

Where there is any doubt at all, the staffs of
those agencies will favor the Charging Party.
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c.

Accordingly, it is imperative that you present
the employer s side in its most favorable
light - do not expect the agency staffs to
solicit or present evidence favorable to the
employer.
I

2.

The quality of due process that the employer will
receive at hearings before the KCHR and the LFUCHRC
is not high, and to the extent that the employer
can steer the proceedings to the EEOC and thus
ul timately to the federal courts rather than to
hearings before the KCHR and the LFUCHRC, it will
normally want to do so.

3.

Nothing is gained by alienating the staffs of the
agencies.
a.

Be firm when you believe you are right, but -

b.

Be courteous and polite to the staff members.

c.

Establish a personal rapport with them.

III. WAGE AND HOUR CLAIMS
A.

B.

C.

The Agencies.
1.

Federal - Wage and Hour Division of the Employment
Standards Administration of the U.S. Department of
Labor.

2.

Kentucky
Division of Employment Standards
Mediation of the Kentucky Labor Cabinet.

&

Governing Law.
1.

Federal
Fair Labor Standards
U.S.C. Section 201 et seq.).

2.

State - KRS Chapter 337.

Act

(FLSA)

(29

The administrative process.
1.

The investigation.
a.

Nearly always
complaint.

b.

Request for payroll records.
(1)

the

result

of

an

employee

Even though Kentucky employers are only
required to keep wage and hour records
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for one year (KRS 337.320), if they are
retained, the Kentucky Labor Cabinet has
the right to inspect them.
Cabe v.
Kitchen, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 96 (1967).

c.

2.

(a)

The Kentucky Division of Employment
Standards & Mediation has taken the
position it can inspect records five
years old if it chooses.

(b)

Frequently Kentucky investigators
are satisfied with auditing one or
two years of records - this is an
area where
there
is
room
for
negotiation with the investigator.

(2)

The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act
requires the retention of most wage and
hour records for three years and federal
investigators
typically
audit
three
years.

(3)

If an employer can in good faith assert
that records beyond one year are in
permanent storage and can be retrieved
only with some difficulty, frequently the
investigator will only ask for those
records readily available.

(4)

To the extent that the employer can
reduce the number of years audited, it
has substantially reduced its potential
liability.

Come
into compliance
immediately
the
limitations periods run from the date a
lawsuit is filed against the employer - not
from the date the investigation commenced.

Assessment against the employer if a violation is
found.
a.

Request that the assessment be made in writing
detailing the amounts due to each employee for
specific time periods.

b.

Explore the possibilities of settlement.
(1)

Most wage & hour claims are settled.

(2)

Immediately after the assessment is the
most opportune time to settle.
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(3)

(4)

c.

3.

Pressures on the agency to settle:
(a)

Litigation is time-consuming - by
the time the agency is prepared to
file suit, much of the back wages
may be cut off by the statutes of
limitations.

(b)

The agency loses control of the
process once it is recommended for
litigation or hearing.

Pressures on theemployer:(a)

Liquidated damages if case goes to
trial and employer loses.

(b)

Expense of litigation.

Possible settlement strategies:
(1)

Agree to pay the complaining employee all
back wages but no one else.

(2)

Agree to pay current employees all or a
portion of back wages due but not former
employees (who the agency knows will be
dif'ficult to locate anyway).

(3)

Agree to pay former employees only if
they individually petition the agency for
relief.

If case cannot be
assessment is made:
a.

b.

settled

at

the

time

the

Federal - the case will be submitted to the
Solicitors of the U.S. Department of Labor by
the Area Director with a recommendation for
litigation.
( 1)

Employer may then try to conv ince the
solicitors that its legal or factual
position is correct or

(2)

Settle it with the solicitors prior to a
suit being filed.

State-
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IV.

(1)

The Commissioner of Workplace Standards
makes findings of fact which become a
final order in fifteen days.

(2)

Either
party
suffering
from
these
findings may petition for a fact-finding
hearing
to
be
conducted
by
the
Commissioner or his authorized agent.

(3 )

An appeal may be taken to the circuit
court from the determination of the
Commissioner but no new evidence may be.
taken and the scope of the court's review
is very limited.

(4)

Accordingly, there is not much room for
maneuver under the state proceedings once
the
matter
passes
the
point
of
assessment.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIMS
A.

The Agency
Division for Unemployment Insurance,
Department for Employment Services, Kentucky Cabinet for
Human Resources.

B.

Governing law - KRS Chapter 341 and 903 KAR 5:010 et seq.

C.

The administrative process.
1.

Claim by former employee is made at an unemployment
insurance office.

2.

Notice of Claim is sent to former employer (Initial
Claim for Unemployment Insurance Benefits - Form UI
- 401).
a.

Form contains information provided by employee
and elicits information from employer with
regard to the circumstances of the termination
of employment.

b.

If an employer receives this form, it means
that the employer is believed to be the most
recent employer of the claimant for whom the
claimant has worked in each of ten weeks
(whether or not consecutive) and that the
employer will therefore be the one whose
account will be charged with any benefits.

c.

If the employer has indicated he was separated
for any reason other than lack of work, there
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will be a fact-finding interview date and time
on the form.
d.

3.

4.

5.

Employer should complete the reverse side of
the form, gl v1ng reason for discharge and
indicating whether it will attend the factfinding interview.
(1)

If you intend to contest the payment of
benefi ts, you should attend the factfinding interview if possible.

(2)

If you c-annot atterid--the-interview, you
must
ensure
that
the
"Employer's
Statement" on the form is completed in
detail describing the reason for the
discharge.

Fact-Finding Interview.
a.

Not conducted under oath.

b.

Interviewer will ask claimant and employer to
state their positions as to reasons for
discharge.

c.

Not normally necessary to be represented by
counsel at this stage.

Notice of Determination.
a.

Form is mailed to both parties.

b.

Provides the initial determination
eligibility for benefits.

c.

Appeal from Determination.

as

to
I:

(1)

Either party may appeal the Determination
by sending a letter to the Division's
local office
(address shown on the
Determination) postmarked no later than
15
days
after
the
date
of
the
Determination.

(2)

If such an appeal is filed, a hearing
before a Referee will be scheduled.

Referee Hearing.
a.

Both parties will receive a notice
date, time, and place of hearing.
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of

the

b.

Telephone hearings.

(1)

Sometimes the Appeals Branch of
Division
sets
Referee
Hearings
telephone.

(2)

You need not, and usually should not,
accept a telephone hearing.

the
by

c.

Subpoenas will be issued by the Division on
behalf of either party to compel attendance of
witnesses.

d.

Conduct of hearing.
(1)

In theory, the party having the burden of
proof puts on its case first.
(a)

In practice, the employer always has
to put on is case first.

(b)

In misconduct cases, the employer
clearly has the burden of proof and
the obligation of putting its case
on first and being cross-examined by
the claimant or his representative.

(2)

Following the employer's proof,
the
claimant will put on his proof followed
by cross-examination by the employer or
his representative:

(3 )

If either side is unrepresented by
counsel and incapable of putting on its
proof, the Referee will elicit proof that
appears appropriate.

(4)

Normally, at the close of proof, the
Referee will allow each party to make a
closing statement.
(a)

Employer should make a closing
statement stating concisely why
should
be
denied
the
benefits
claimant.

(b)

The appropriate sections of the
statutes and a short summary of the
proof that was developed should be
cited showing why the employer's
position is correct.
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(5)

e.
6.

7.

It is important to remember that this
hearing is your only opportunity to put
on evidence and you must therefore give
it your best effort.
(a)

Have witnesses present with firsthand knowledge of the facts
although Referees are not precluded
from accepting hearsay evidence at
hearings,
it
will
not
prevail
against
non-hearsay
evidence
introduced by the other side.

(b)

If witnesses are not going to be
available on the hearing date, make
a timely request for a change of
hearing date.

(c)

Referee Hearings are tape-recorded.

Subsequent to the hearing,
issue a Referee Decision

the Referee will

Appeal of the Referee Decision to the Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission.
a.

Either party may appeal the Referee Decision
to
the
Kentucky
Unemployment
Insurance
Commission by sending a
letter to the
Commission, which letter must be filed with
the Commission within fifteen days of the
mailing date of the Referee Decision.

b.

The Commission will notify the parties of a
date for the filing of written arguments by
the parties
(normally 10 days
for
the
appellant and 7 days thereafter for the
appellee) .

c.

It may, but seldom does,
schedule
arguments before it by the parties.

d.

The parties may request a copy of the taperecording of the Referee Hearing for their use
in preparing their arguments.

e.

After reviewing the written and/or oral
arguments of the parties, the Commission will
issu~ its decision to the parties.

oral

Appeal of the decision of the Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Commission to the Circuit Court.
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D.

E.

a.

Either party may appeal the decision of the
Commission to the Circuit Court of the county
where the claimant was last employed.

b.

Such appeals are heard by the Circuit Court on
the record in a summary fashion.

c.

Circuit Court will not reverse a decision of
the
Commission
if
it
is
supported
by
substantial evidence.

Whether
to
be
represented
by
legal
Unemployment Insurance proceedings.

counsel

in

1.

Prior to an amendment to KRS 341.470, corporate or
partnership employers could not be represented in
such proceedings by a non-attorney.

2.

However, KRS 341.470(3)(b) provides that corporate
and partnership employers may be represented by an
officer
or
manager
of
the
corporation
or
partnership.

3.

Employers should carefully consider the use of
legal counsel to represent them in such proceedings
particularly where it appears that the claimant may
file other claims, charges or lawsuits against the
employer.
a.

The outcome of the unemployment insurance
proceedings will not have res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect in subsequent
KRS 341.420(5).
proceedings in other forums.

b.

Even though the proceedings do not have a res
judicata effect, the psychological effect of
defeating the employer in the unemployment
insurance
proceedings
may
encourage
the
employee to file other claims, charges or
lawsuits against the employer.

c.

Also note that statements made under oath in
unemployment insurance proceedings may be used
for impeachment of witnesses in subsequent
proceedings.

General Considerations.
1.

Always request a copy of the tape of Referee
Hearings whether they are appealed or not.
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a.

It contains testimony under oath which may
well be inconsistent with the testimony of the
former employee in subsequent proceedings
before other agencies or courts.

b.

The tapes are destroyed in approximately 60
days if no appeal has been taken.

2.

The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission
prepares for sale at cost the Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Digest, a syllabus of Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Decisions, the latest having been
prepared in 19~1.-

3.

Definition of "misconduct".
a.

The general definition is provided by the case
of Boynton Cab Company v. Neubeck, Wis., 296
N.W. 636 which has been adopted by the
Kentucky courts:
Conduct evincing such willful or
wanton disregard of an employer's
interests as found in deliberate
violations or disregard of standards
of behavior which the employer has
the right to expect of the employee,
or in carelessness· or negligence of
such degree or recurrence as to
manifest equal culpability, wrongful
intent or evil design, or to show an
intentional
disregard
of
the
employer's interests or of the
employee's duties and obligations to
his employer.

b.

The .Kentucky legislature has further defined
"misconduct" by non-exclusive· example to
include:
Falsification
of
an
employment
application to obtain employment
through
subterfuge;
knowing
violation
of
a
reasonable
and
uniformly enforced
rule
of
an
employer; unsatisfactory attendance,
if the worker cannot show good cause
for absence or tardiness; damaging
the employer's property through
gross negligence; refusing to obey
reasonable instructions; reporting
to work under the influence of
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alcohol
or
drugs
or
consuming
alcohol or drugs on employer's
premises
during
working
hours;
conduct endangering safety of self
or co-workers; and incarceration in
jail following conviction of a
misdemeanor or felony by a court of
competent
jurisdiction,
which
results in missing at least five (5)
days work.
- KRS 341.370(6).
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HIV POSITIVE PERSONS AND COMMUNICABLE DISEASES:
Employment and Workplace Considerations

I.

Introduction
Throughout history! persons with certain communicable
diseases have been discriminated against by the larger society. The
Bible tells of the ostracism of lepers, and during more modern
times, victims of tuberculosis and other contagious diseases were
shunned and feared. In recent years, the discovery of the human
immunodeficiency virus, which causes acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS), has provoked a new wave of fear. Since the AIDS
virus was first discovered in the United States in 1981, the public
has become increasingly concerned with the spread of this deadly
disease. Statistics show that in 1981, 164 people in the U.S. had
died from AIDS; in 1993 the death-toll is estimated to be between
53,000 and 76,000. 1
In addition, although once believed to be a disease limited
to male homosexuals, AIDS now infects an ever-increasing number of
heterosexuals of both sexes. As of March, 1992, an estimated 12,881
individuals (or approximately 25% of the total number infected) had
acquired the virus through heterosexual contact. 2
Because the disease is terminal and communicable, a fearful
public has sometimes attempted to isolate the infected individual
from society at large or to otherwise discriminate against AIDS
sufferers. This outline will address legal issues as they relate to
employment of persons infected with the HIV virus that causes AIDS
and persons with other communicable diseases.

lKrugel, Charles A. AIDS and the ADA: Maneuvering Through a
Legal Minefield, July 1993 Labor Law Journal 408.'
2

Id. at 409.
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AIDS and HIV
The cause of AIDS is the human T cell lymphotropic virus
type III (often referred to as HIV or HTLV-III). A person infected
with HIV but who is otherwise asymptomatic is sometimes referred to
as being HIV-positive. Medical researchers believe that many
persons are infected with HIV but develop antibodies and do not
develop further complications. A minority of HIV-positive
individuals (perhaps as few as 30%) develop AIDS-related complex
(ARC), and a smaller number (estimated as low as 10%) develop AIDS.
Persons with AIDS have a severely impaired immune system and are
thus susceptible to a variety of other illnesses. There is
presently no known cure for AIDS, although several treatments have
had limited success in prolonging life and in delaying the onset of
more serious complications. AIDS sufferers typically die within
five years of diagnosis, not of AIDS itself, but of one or more of
the many diseases which the victim's impaired immune system cannot
overcome. The diseases that can result from AIDS include pneumonia,
cancer and brain degeneration resulting in dementia.
The AIDS virus is found in bodily fluids of infected
individuals, including in blood, semen, feces, tears, saliva, human
milk and urine. The principal means by which the virus is
transmitted between individuals are: (1) sexual contact (2) sharing
of contaminated needles (3) transfusions of infected blood or blood
products (a cause now virtually eliminated in the United States
through improved methods of testing the supply of blood or blood
products) and (4) perinatal transmission from an infected mother to
infant, either in utero or through breast feeding.
Most medical experts, including the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), conclude that the disease cannot be transmitted
casually, such as by shaking hands, sharing toilets or through
food, and there is also believed to be a very low risk of
transmission even where there is limited contact with bodily fluids
of an infected individual, such as through mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation or human bites. Despite these findings, however, the
recent highly publicized case of an infected dentist who apparently
II.
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transmitted the disease to several patients through dental
regarding
treatment r has raised new ques tions and fears
transmission.
Blood tests can determine the presence of HIV in an infected
individual. TypicallYr two types of tests are used. First r an
inexpensive screening test determines whether blood infection is
present. A more expensive r confirmatory test may then be used to
verify the positive screening test result.
A positive result
indicates only that the individual has been exposed to the virus r
and not that the individual will develop either ARC or AIDS.
Moreover r the antibodies that cause a posi ti ve result on blood
tests do not develop immediately upon exposure to the virus. An
infected person may test negative for several months after
exposure.
III.

Statutory Framework
A. Federal law. At least five federal statutes have some
degree of application to the issues posed by communicable diseases
in the workplace. Two of them r the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. 701 et. seq.) and the Americans With Disabilities Act (42
U.S.C. 12101 et. seq.) (ADA)
apply directly to employment
discrimination against individuals with a communicable disease.
Although both of these statutes are designed to prevent
discrimination in the workplace r they differ somewhat in their
substantive provisions r and significantly in the scope of their
applicability and available remedies.
1.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. This statute
provides that " [n] 0 otherwise qualified individual with a
disability ... shall r solely by reason of her or his disabilitYr be
excluded from the participation inr be denied the benefits ofr or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal Financial Assistance .... "
The scope of this Act limits its applicability to employers
receiving federal monies. Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
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Act, an individual may bring a private right of action, and
remedies include back pay and attorneys' fees.
2.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. This
statute was
specifically designed
to prevent
employment
discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability".
A qualified individual is one "with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."
The ADA defines disability as one of the following (a) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of the individual; (b) having a record
of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an
impairment.
The Act expressly states that an employer may not
discriminate against an individual wi th a contagious disease unless
the disease poses a "direct threat" to others.
It is generally
agreed (and at least one court has observed in dicta) that positive
HIV status and AIDS-related conditions would be encompassed by the
Act's definition of a contagious diseases. See Robbins v. Clark,
946 F. 2d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir. 1991).
Discrimination may exist when "reasonable accommodation" is
not made. This includes: "(A) making existing facilities used by
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules ... and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabili ties." Employers need not make reasonable accommodation if
to do so would present an undue hardship to the employer, which is
defined as requlrlng significant difficulty or expense, when
considered in light of the size and financial condition of the
employer, as well as other factors, and also takes into account
whether the accommodation would disrupt the employer's business.
Medical examinations are permitted under ADA only if they
are administered to all employees, if they are required only after
an employment offer has been made and before commencement of the
employee's duties, and where the reasons for the examination are
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job-related and consistent with business necessity. If exams are
undertaken, the results must be kept in a separate confidential
file.
Because of lobbying efforts by the restaurant and
hospitality industrYI the ADA permits discriminatory treatment of
food handlers suffering from contagious diseases provided the
disease appears on a list to be compiled by the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) of infectious and communicable
diseases that are transmitted through the handling of food. Despite
the exemption, the employer is to determine whether there is a
reasonable accommodation that will eliminate the risk of
transmission of the disease through food handling. If such an
accommodation exists that will not pose an undue hardship on the
employer, the employer must provide the accommodation. If no
reasonable accommodation without undue hardship is possible the
employer may refuse to assign the person to a food handling job.
Although this exemption was intended to afford some comfort to food
service employers l i t is unlikely that AIDS or HIV posi ti ve
infection will appear on the list to be maintained by DHHS 1 in
light of the generally accepted fact that these diseases are not
transmitted through food.
In contrast with the Rehabilitation Act, the scope of ADA is
extremely broad. Any employer with 25 or more employees is covered;
after July 26, 1994, any employer with 15 or more employees will be
. covered. The ADA provides for recovery of attorneys' fees, as well
as for compensatory and punitive damages.
I

l

3.
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1971, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461 (ERISA). Although a comprehensive
discussion of ERISA is beyond the scope of this outline this
statute includes prohibitions against discharging or otherwise
discriminating against employees for the purpose of interfering
with their right to claim benefits under an employee benefit plan.
In a recent case, Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007
(W.D.Mo. 1984), a U.S. District Court awarded damages to an
l
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employee who was discharged by the employer to avoid the economic
consequences of the employee's medical condition (multiple
sclerosis) to the employer's self - funded medical plan. AIDS is also
an expensive medical condition, and cases have raised the issue of
the rights of employers to limit benefits payable for AIDS-related
expenses under medical benefit plans. These issues are discussed
separately in Section VIII of this outline.
4.
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 651
et. seq. <OSHA). Al though no reported decisions have as yet
involved issues posed by AIDS as they relate to the protections
afforded by OSHA this statute could be used as the basis of a
claim by uninfected persons whose assigned tasks place them in
contact with infected co-workers or other individuals. As an
employer considers whether a contagious employee poses a "direct
threat" to others (as contemplated by ADA) it must also determine
whether requiring the other employees to work with infected
individuals is consistent with its duty to furnish a hazard-free
workplace. OSHA also precludes employers from retaliation against
employees who refuse to perform assigned tasks that the employees
reasonably believe pose a danger.
OSHA has also promulgated guidelines for reducing the risk
to health care workers of exposure to blood-borne illnesses. These
guidelines are discussed separately in Section VII B of this
outline.
I

5. Family and Medical Leave Act 29 U.S.C. 2601 et. seq.
(FMLA) . This statute requires that employees receive up to 12 weeks
of unpaid leave, either continuous or intermittent, under certain
circumstances including a serious health condition. The EEOC has
not yet addressed the issue of whether reasonable accommodation
under the ADA could require medical leave in excess of the maximum
prescribed by the FMLA. Because of the serious nature of AIDSrelated illnesses however, it is possible that in the absence of
I

I
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a showing by the employer of undue hardship, leave beyond that
mandated by FMLA could be required.
B.

State statutes.

1. Handicap discrimination laws. Most states have
statutes which prohibit discrimination against handicapped
individuals. The definition of handicap and the level of protection
afforded varies from state to state, and has resulted in disparate
results when AIDS-based discrimination cases are decided. Some
statutes specifically exempt discrimination against individuals
with contagious diseases from the prohibited conduct.
2. AIDS-specific statutes.
Some states, including
Kentucky, have enacted statues which specifically prohibit
discrimination against persons infected with AIDS. The Kentucky law
prohibi ting AIDS -based discrimination is included in the Equal
Opportunities Act (K.R.S. 207.130 et. seq.) which, among other
things, generally prohibits discrimination in employment because of
a handicap.
Under the Act, an employer may not "fail or refuse to hire,
discharge or discriminate against any handicapped individual with
respect to wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms and
conditions of employment ... on the basis of the results of a human
immunodeficiency virus-related test, unless the absence of human
immunodeficiency virus infection is a bona fide occupational
qualification of the job in question; nor shall any employer limit,
segregate or classify handicapped individuals in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any handicapped individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise affect employee status ... on
the basis of the results of a human immunodeficiency virus related
test, unless the handicap or absence of human immunodeficiency
virus infection, constitutes a bona fide and necessary reason for
the limitation, segregation or classification." K.R.S. 207.150.
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In addition, K.R.S. 207.135 specifically grants the
protections of the anti-handicap discrimination statute (K.R.S.
207.130 to 207.240) to persons with AIDS, AIDS-related complex
(ARC), or human immunodeficiency virus. This section of the law
prohibits any person from requiring an AIDS test as a condition of
employment or continued employment unless the absence of the virus
is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job in
question. The burden of proof as to the BFOQ is on the employer,
who is required (i) to ascertain whether the employee is currently
able to perform the duties of the job in a reasonable manner or
whether the employee will pose a "significant risk" of transmitting
the virus to others in the course of normal work activities and
(ii)
to establish that there is no means of reasonably
accommodating the employee's AIDS status short of requiring the
test. K.R.S. 207.135(2) (b).
The statute further provides that if an employer asserts
that an AIDS-infected individual is not otherwise qualified for the
job, the employer has the burden of proving that no reasonable
accommodation can be made to prevent the likelihood of exposure of
others to a significant possibility of becoming infected. K.R.S.
207.135(3) (c). Finally, the statute prohibits discrimination
against licensed health care professionals on the basis that they
treat or provide care to AIDS-infected individuals. K.R.S.
207.135(d) .
Federal Case Law
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
subject of AIDS and employment discrimination. Moreover, much of
the case law pertaining to communicable diseases in employment
developed prior to passage of the ADA, either under. the
Rehabilitation Act or various state anti-discrimination statutes.
In light of the comprehensive scope of ADA, however, practitioners
should expect courts to grant at least as much protection to
employees with communicab"le diseases in cases brought under ADA as
has been afforded under these older statutes.
IV.
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A.
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. The leading
case dealing with contagious disease in the workplace was decided
under the Rehabilitation Act. In that case, School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), reh'g. den. 481 U.S. 1024
(1987), the United States Supreme Court was presented wi th the case
of an elementary school teacher who had been discharged after
suffering a relapse of tuberculosis. The Court's determination
centered on whether the teacher's continued presence In the
workplace constituted a significant risk of passing the disease to
others. The Court outlined four factors to be considered in such a
determination. They are: (1) the nature of the risk (i.e., how the
disease is transmitted); (2) the duration of the risk (how long the
carrier is infectious); (3) the severity of the risk (the potential
harm to others); and (4) the probabilities that the disease will be
transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.
B.
AIDS-Based Discrimination. Most of the reported
decisions have found that it is illegal to discriminate against an
employee on the basis of AIDS or HIV-positive status. An early
federal case, Chalk v. United States District Court of Central
California, 840 F. 2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) is typical. In that case,
Chalk, a certified teacher of hearing-impaired students, was
removed from his teaching assignment and offered an administrative
position after having been diagnosed as having AIDS. In reversing
the district court's finding in favor of the school board, the
Ninth Circuit, basing its decision largely on Arline, issued an
injunction allowing Chalk to return to the classroom. In its
holding, the court observed that since the disease cannot be
casually transmitted, the risk to the students was minimal.
Similarly, in the now well-known case of Cain v. Hyatt, 734
F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990), a federal district court found that
Hyatt Legal Services had illegally discriminated against one of its
regional partners by relieving him of his duties with~n a week of
his being diagnosed with AIDS. The court, interpreting the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, found that there was no actual
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risk of infection to others in the workplace. The plaintiff was
awarded damages for mental anguish and humiliation, backpay, and
punitive damages.

r

C. No Discrimination Found. In a minority of decisions,
courts have declined to find that AIDS was a handicap or that the
employer's conduct was discriminatory. In Hilton v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 936 F. 2d 823 (5th Cir. 1991), the plaintiff's
employer refused to return him to his position after ARC-related
illness forced absence from his job. He sued under the Texas Human
Rights Act alleging discrimination. The Fifth Circuit found that
the plaintiff was not a handicapped person under the Texas Act. In
so doing, the court strictly construed the statute, noting that the
physical conditions in the statute referred to physiological not
pathological conditions. The court determined that AIDS was an
"invisible, pathological" condition. The court also noted that the
plaintiff's illness made him unable to perform the duties of his
job. This last ground for the decision appears to be a sound one,
and could alone have supported the decision. In light of ADA and
the majority of cases which find that AIDS does constitute a
disability, employers should likely not rely on the highly
technical distinction as to physical condition drawn by the Hilton
court.
HIV testing was involved in another case where no
discrimination was found. In Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of
Hospital District No. I, 909 F. 2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990),
interpreting Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the defendant
hospital fired the plaintiff for refusing to disclose the positive
result of a private HIV test he had taken. The hospital
successfully argued that it needed the results in order to
undertake reasonable accommodation of the employee's condition. The
court further determined that the plaintiff - employee's actions
rendered him otherwise not qualified to perform his duties. This
case is significant in that it involves an infected health care

=
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worker and thus, presumably, a higher risk of transmitting the
infection to others.
V. State Case Law. Most litigation related to AIDS- and
communicable disease-based discrimination in the workplace has
occurred at the state level. Many of those cases hold that
employees with AIDS are handicapped persons for purposes of state
anti-discrimination laws.
A.
AIDS-Based Discrimination. A typical state case is
Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 261 Ca. Rptr.
197 (Cal. App. 1989). In that case, the plaintiff, a three-year
employee of Raytheon, was diagnosed as having AIDS and was
hospi talized for several weeks. After receiving permission from his
doctor to return to work, he sought to do so, but was required to
submit to a physical examination. Through the examination, the
employer I s medical advisor became aware of his condition and, after
a thorough review of medical literature about the disease and its
transmission, cleared the employee to return to work. Despite the
medical findings, the employer delayed his return to his dutiesi
eventually, the plaintiff developed Kaposi s sarcoma, a cancer
associated with AIDS. At that point, the employer refused
reinstatement, citing as its reason the fact that he had AIDS and
that co-workers would be exposed to the risk of contracting the
disease from him.
The employee filed complaints alleging discrimination based
on physical handicap. The state administrative agency found that he
had been discriminated against on this basis, and the employer
appealed. The California Court of Appeals for the Second District
found in the employee's favor, indicating that an employee with
AIDS was suffering from a physical handicap and that the risk of
transmission to co-workers had been exaggerated by the employer.
I

B.
positive HIV Status. Additional questions are presented
when the employee does not have AIDS or, in fact, any symptoms, but
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has merely tested positively for the HIV virus. Several state court
opinions have discussed this issue, and reached differing
conclusions. In Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390S.E. 2d
814 (W.Va. 1990), an employee who advised his supervisor of HIVpositive test results was subsequently discharged and filed a
discrimination claim against the employer. The federal court
receiving the complaint certified the question to the West Virginia
Supreme Court as to whether an HIV-positive person was handicapped
wi thin the West Virginia anti-discrimination statute. The state
court found that HIV-positive status was a protected handicap under
the statute even in the absence of symptoms. The court emphasized
that the medical condition would have a strong negative impact on
"socialization", which the court found to be a "major life
function
An opposite result was reached in Burgess v. Your House of
Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E. 2d 134 (N.C. 1990). There, the North
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the discharge of a restaurant cook
who had tested positive for the HIV virus. The court in Burgess
found that the language of the state statute was not intended to
protect persons with HIV. It is important to note also that the
North Carolina statute contained a communicable disease exemption,
i.e., a provision that pe~itted discrimination against ~ersons
with communicable diseases. Also, the qourt noted that the
legislature had made subsequent modifications to the statute
without adding a provision protecting HIV-positive individuals. (In
1989, however, North Carolina enacted the Communicable Disease Law,
N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 130-A-148, which now protects HIV-positive
individuals. )
Also of note is the fact that following the Court's·
decision in Arline, the Department of Justice reversed an earlier
analysis of the issue of whether an employee is disabled if the
discrimination suffered was the result of fear of contagion. The
department's more recent opinion indicates that the federal
definition of "handicapped" would encompass asymptomatic carriers
of HIV as well as sufferers of AIDS. See Application of
11 •
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Rehabili tation Act's Section 504 to HIV - Infected Individuals,
Memorandum of the u. S. Department of Jus tice, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 195, at D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988).
C.
False Perception of HIV Infection. Yet another category
of cases involves employees who have neither AIDS nor HIV, but who
are falsely rumored or perceived to have AIDS or HIV. Courts are
divided as to whether these individuals should be afforded the
protection of state handicap anti-discrimination laws. In a typical·
case, Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486 N.W. 2d 657 (Mich. 1992), an
employer fired a waitress who was rumored to have AIDS. The
employer first required her to submit medical evidence indicating
she did not have the disease. She did so, but refused to return to
work due to the humiliation she claimed to have suffered, and then
filed a· complaint of discrimination. The court found for the
employee, finding first that AIDS was a handicap under Michigan
law, and then finding that it is the employer's conduct, "the
employer's belief or intent - and not the employee's condition"
that must be examined. Id. at 660.
In contrast to Sanchez, the case of Rose City Oil v.
Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 832 S.W. 2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) holds that employer conduct based on false perception of AIDS
is not discriminatory. In that case the court found that the
plaintiff had no condition that would be protected under the
statute.
No Kentucky cases have been reported in which the issue has
been addressed. It is important to note that the Kentucky statute
does not expressly address the issue of perceived, rather than
actual, disabilities. HIV positive persons are specifically
protected, however, even in the absence of symptoms. Moreover,
under the ADA an individual is regarded as disabled even if he or
she is only perceived to have an impairment, which is defined by
regulation as a~ inability to perform a major life activity that
the average person in the general population can perform, or can
only perform wi th significant restrictions. See Regulations to
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Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. part 1630 (1992) (hereinafter cited as
"ADA Regulations") .
VI. EmDlover Defenses to Discrimination Claims. In addition to
asserting that the AIDS-related or other communicable disease is
not a disability or handicap under applicable law, employers may
defend against claims by asserting that reasonable accommodation
cannot be made due to undue hardship, or that despite reasonable
accommodation, the infected person poses a direct threat to others.
A. Direct threat. The employer may discriminate against
an individual with a communicable disease if that individual would
pose a direct threat to others in the workplace. This has been
defined to mean a significant risk of substantial harm to the
health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be reduced
to an acceptable level or eliminated by reasonable accommodation.
The fear of workplace transmission of AIDS is simply not
supported by experience. Through August of 1991, the CDC had
confirmed only 28 cases of AIDS through occupational transmission.
This represents a total of less than 0.003% of all reported cases
of AIDS. Moreover, there are no known cases of casual transmission
of the disease in the workplace. Despi te the relatively small risk
of transmission, however, the nature of tasks performed by health
care workers involving contact wi th bodily fluids and tissues makes
the fear of infection a reasonable one. For this reason, many of
the cases interpreting whether a "direct threat" exists involve
health care employment.
The "direct threat" defense requires an employer to engage
in a risk analysis. The EEOC has stated that the employer should
consider the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the
harm, the likelihood that the harm will occur, and the imminence of
the potential harm. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1630.2(r) (1992). This analysis
is a departure from pre-ADA cases, in which employers were
permitted to restrict a health care worker's activities when faced
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with virtually any possibility of infection to others. In Estate of
Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, 592 A. 2d 1251 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991), for example, a "no risk" standard was
applied to permit the employer-hospital to ban a surgeon with AIDS
from performing invasive procedures. This case could well have had
a different outcome under the ADA, since the CDC has issued
guidelines which suggest case-by-case study by a medical review
board and the consistent use of certain prescribed safeguards by
all health care workers. See generally, Prewi tt, R.B., "The Direct
Threat Approach to the HIV-Positive Health Care Employee Under the
ADA," 62 Miss. L.J. 719 (Spr. 1993).
In general, the CDC guidelines attempt a determination of
whether a given health care task renders others "exposure prone to
transmission of infection by the health care worker." The
guidelines, coupled with increasing knowledge about AIDS and the
methods by which it is transmitted, have resulted in decisions more
favorable to the employee than that rendered in Behringer.
For
example, in In re Westchester County Medical Center, No. 91-504-2
(Dep't. HHS App. Bd. April 20, 1992), an administrative proceeding,
an HIV-positive pharmacist was permitted to continue his regular
duties- including preparation of intravenous materials - when the
judge determined there was no significant risk of transmission of
the disease.
B. Reasonable accommodation.- Once a significant risk of
transmission is determined to exist, the employer must examine
whether the risk of infection to others can be negated by
reasonable accommodation. Reasonable accommodation initially
invol ves analyzing the job's functions to determine which are
considered essential
and which are marginal.
Reasonable
accommodation may include restructuring the job, i.e., reallocating
or redistributing nonessential job functions of the infected
worker. It may also involve altering when or how essential
functions of the job are performed, but does not require
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elimination of essential job functions. 29 C.F.R. app. Sec.
1630.2 (0) (1992).
If the infected employee cannot be reasonably accommodated
in his original position, the ADA appears to require that he or she
be reassigned to another vacant position if no undue hardship to
the employer would result. However, reassignment will not
substitute for a less drastic form of accommodation. See Chalk v.
United States, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988), in which the
reassignment of a teacher with AIDS constituted illegaldiscrimination since the classroom position posed no significant
risk of infection to others. A similar result was reached in the
Westchester case discussed above.
C. Undue hardship. An employer is not required to make
accommodation if to do so would result in an undue hardship to it.
In interpreting this part of the statute, courts are to look not
only to the type of accommodation being sought, but also to the
effect of the accommodation on the employer, the ability of other
employees to perform their duties, and the impact on the employer's
ability
to
conduct
its
business.
ADA Regulations
Sec.
1630.2 (p) (2) (v). The analysis requires the court to determine first
whether the disabled employee can perform the required job duties
with an accommodation, and then whether the accommodation imposes
an undue hardship on the employer.
In Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987), a
case decided under the Rehabilitation Act, the court evaluated the
means of accommodation proposed by the applicant, and then
determined that those alternatives would be costly, potentially
unsafe, and would often leave the individual without sufficient
work to do. The court found the proposed accommodation to be an
undue burden on the employer, and accommodation was therefore not
required. Similarly, in Davis v. united States Postal Service, 675
F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Pa. 1987), the court stated that the employer
was not required to violate existing contracts in order to reassign
a disabled employee who was otherwise unqualified for reassignment.

K-16

The amount of additional expense necessary to establish an
undue hardship will be a function of the size and assets of the
employer. Moreover,
if additional funds
to pay for the
accommodation are available from another source (such as a
government program, tax credi ts or from. the employee seeking
accommodation), those resources will be taken into account in
determining the employer's actual
cost of
the proposed
accommodation. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2{p).
Al though, as· in Dexler, the actual cost of accommodation
will be considered in determining whether an undue hardship exists,
an employer's concern over anticipated or future costs-including
higher insurance costs - has not been recognized by courts. In State
Div. of Human Rights ex reI. McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E. 2d
695 (N.Y. 1985), another pre-ADA case, an employer claimed that an
obese employee would cost the employer more in future health care
costs, citing studies that connected obesity with greater risk of
health problems. The court rejected this argument stating that
employment can be refused only when the condition is related to
performing the job duties. Judicial guidance is not yet available
on the issue of when an employer may find that the employee's
anticipated absence from work constitutes an undue hardship, but in
light of the McDermott decision and ADA regulations, the employer
seeking to avoid Ii tigation should base its actions on current
attendance patterns, rather than anticipated absences.
A significant issue that has not yet been judicially
determined is the right of an employer to take what might otherwise
be discriminatory action against an employee with a communicable
disease due to adverse public reaction to the presence of the
employee in the workplace. This issue could arise in the context of
retail (especially food service) businesses as well as in the
health care area. Despite the medical evidence that AIDS is not
transmitted casually or through food, customers may choose not to
patronize establishments where an infected worker may handle their
food or deliver their health care. Congress attempted to address
this issue for restaurants by including the narrow food-handlers'
$
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exemption in the ADA; however/ this portion of the statute will be
of limited use to employers unless AIDS and related diseases are
found to be transmittable through food - a finding that appears
highly unlikely in light of currently available data.
Can an employer suffering substantially reduced revenues
claim that to continue to employ an infected individual in a
customer-contact or food-handling position is an undue hardship?
Regulations have already established that the irrational fears and
prejudices of co-workers and resulting disruption of 'business will
not constitute undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. 1630.15(d). In light of
this regulation/ claiming undue hardship based on an unfounded
public perception seems risky. A better course of action would be
support for public education as to the methods by which these
diseases are/ and are not/ transmitted.
VII.

Other Employment Issues

A. HIV testing. An issue frequently raised in the area of
health care employment is when/ if ever/ it is permissible to test
employees for the presence of HIV. Calls for mandatory testing
intensified recently when the infection of several dental patients
by Dr. David Acer became front-page news. One of those patients,
Kimberly Bergalis, is believed to be the first patient to have
become infected with AIDS from a dentist.
Following this publicity/ several pieces of federal
legislation were proposed to require that health care workers be
tested for the presence of the virus, and that the public be
advised as to the test results. No mandatory testing or disclosure
laws were enacted; however, an amendment by Senators Robert Dole
and Orrin Hatch was passed by both houses and requires each state,
as a condition to receiving federal public-health funds, to adopt
CDC guidelines or a substitute measure, in its health care
licensing laws.
Virtually all professional medical associations and the CDC
oppose mandatory testing/but support voluntary testing. The
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primary opposition to mandatory testing is the extremely low
incidence of transmission of HIV from health care worker to patient
and the fact that adherence to the guidelines described above is
believed to further reduce the risk.
Employers who are contemplating a mandatory testing
requirement will need to consider several key issues including
(for public employers) Fourth Amendment rights
the right to
privacy and state and federal discrimination policies. As a
preliminary inquiry the employer must establish a need for the
testing i.e' that the job for which testing is a requirement
interacts wi th others in such a way as to present a risk of
transmission of blood-borne disease.
If the employer can establish that such a risk exists a
court will likely require that it further establish that the risk
cannot be eliminated or reduced to acceptable levels through
adherence to established safety guidelines. This should be easier
to establish for positions in the health care industry where the
risk of exposure to blood and bodily fluids of others is high.
l

I

I

I

l

l

l

1.
Preventive Care Guidelines. Both the CDC and OSHA have
issued guidelines intended to minimize the risk of transmission of
blood-borne illnesses in the workplace. (It is interesting to note
that although the threat of HIV has received wide publicitYI the
hepatitis B virus (HBV) is more readily transmittable in the health
. care arena than is HIV). For a description of these guidelines see
generally Huebner "Mandatory Testing of Health Care Workers for
AIDS: When positive Results Lead to Negative Consequences" 37
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 339 (1992). These detailed recommendations are
intended to be applied universally by health care workers and would
reduce both the risk of transmission of infection from worker to
patient and the risk of transmission from patient to worker. These
guidelines can be especially helpful to health care employers who
are faced with the issue of whether reasonable accommodation for
HIV infection can be accomplished without undue risk of
I

I

I
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transmission to others
and whether
employees in high risk areas.
I

to

undertake

testing

of

2.
Privacy Rights.
In determining whether mandatory
testing is appropriate l courts seem likely to apply a balancing
test l weighing the employee's right to privacy and
Fourth
Amendment rights (if applicable) against the public safety issues
presented. The right to privacy applies not only to the employer's
right to require testing l but also to the subsequent disclosure of
test results.
In most cases where the court was presented wi th a challenge
to mandatory testing based on the right of privacYI the right to
test was upheld. In Plowman v. United States Department of Army
698 F. Supp. 627 {E.D.Va.1988)1 the Army tested a civilian employee
without his consent and advised his supervisors of the result. The
court found no violation of privacy rights. SimilarlYI in Local
1812, American Federation of Government Employees v. Department of
State l 662 F. Supp. 50 {D.D.C. 1987)1 no violation of a privacy
right was found where the Department of State required HIV testing
as part of a medical fitness program. In that easel the court also
noted that although an individual may experience psychological
difficulties as a result of receiving adverse test results l those
concerns do not raise constitutional privacy issues.
Other courts have recognized a privacy right, but have found
it outweighed by the compelling state interest in protection of
·uninfected persons. See, e.g' Harris v. Thigpen 727 F. Supp. 1564
(M.D. Ala. 1990), regarding testing of prisoners and Johnetta J.
v. Municipal Courtl 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1990).
Courts appear more willing to find violation of a right of
privacy when the issue is raised in the context of disseminating
test results l rather than the employer's right to test at all. In
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. wis. 1988), the court found
that a prisoner had a right to privacy that precluded discussion of
his test results with other prisoners and non-medical personnel.
See also Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 {D.N.J.
I

I

l

l
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1990); but see In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, 595 A. 2d.
1290 (Pa. Super Ct. 1991), where strictly controlled disclosure on
a need-to-know basis did not violate privacy rights of an HIVpositive physician.
3. Fourth Amendment Considerations. Fo~rth amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure can also be a
challenge to mandatory testing in the context of public employment.
Blood testing has been found by the U. S. Supreme Court to be a
personal search subject to Fourteenth Amendment protections.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In at least one case,
these constitutional protections have been found to outweigh the
need for mandatory HIV testing of employees, in light of the low
risk of transmission of disease in the workplace context presented.
Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 686 F.
Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988).
B. Protection of Workers. OSHA requires that employers
provide employees with a workplace free of hazards that pose a risk
of death or serious harm. While most AIDS litigation has focused on
the infected employee and his or her rights to remain employed,
OSHA S provisions require employers to take appropriate precautions
to assure the safety of all employees in the workplace. In the case
of uninfected employees, this means adopting procedures that
minimize the risk of infection by co-workers or others, such as
patients in a health care setting.
OSHA has promulgated guidelines to reduce the risk of
transmission of AIDS and other blood-borne diseases. 29 C.F.R. Sec.
1910.1030(d) (3). Under these guidelines, health care employers are
required to implement a plan to control exposure to these diseases.
The plan would include providing employees with protective
equipment,
sterilizing and disinfecting the workplace at
appropriate intervalS, providing designated areas for disposal of
potentially contaminated wastes, training workers in proper safety
procedures and providing RBV vaccinations to employees free of
I
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charge. Compliance with these guidelines will be monitored by OSHA
through its inspection process and penalties for noncompliance may
be assessed. 29 U.S.C. Sees. 657, 666 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
VIII.

Limitation of Health Care Benefits of Infected Persons
The rapidly increasing number of infected individuals and
the relatively high cost of AIDS treatment (estimated at upwards of
$85,000 in lifetime costs per victim) have led insurance companies
-to attempt- to-reduce • their exposure to AIDS.,.related claims. Many
private insurers now employ underwriting criteria such as blood
tests or questionnaires intended to screen out persons who may
develop AIDS or related diseases.
Unlike private insurance companies, employers who provide or
sponsor group health benefits to employees generally base their
decision to insure an employee on his or her employment status with
the employer, not on the likelihood that he or she will develop
HIV infection. As employers have become increasingly concerned
about the high cost of AIDS-related claims (especially since they
have a lesser ability than insurance companies to keep the
potential AIDS-claimant out of the insured pool) ,some have sought
to control or limit these costs through reducing or limiting
benefits for these claims. In several instances, litigation has
resul ted over the issues of whether, and to what extent, health
care benefits for AIDS can be limited.
In many instances workplace-based health benefits are funded
by the employer, plan participants, or some combination of the two,
with little or no third party insurance protection. These selffunded plans are governed not by insurance law but by the employee
benefits regulatory framework of ERISA.
In McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F. 2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. den. sub. nom. Greenburg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482
(1992), a five-year employee was diagnosed with AIDS. At the time
of diagnosis his employer maintained a heal th benefi t plan that was
provided through group health insurance purchased from an insurance
company. The coverage had maximum lifetime benefit limits of $1
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million. Seven months after the AIDS diagnosis, the employer
replaced the insurance plan with a self-funded plan, which
contained a lifetime benefits cap for AIDS of $5,000. No other
benefit limitation for a specific disease or condition was
implemented.
The plaintiff brought
sui t
under
an
antidiscrimination provision contained in Section 510 of ERISA. Summary
judgment was granted for the employer, who argued that it had
imposed the cap for cost containment, and the decision was affirmed
by the Fifth Circuit.
Similarly, in Owens v. Storehouse, Inc. , 984 F. 2d 394
(11th Cir. 1993), the court upheld an employer's right to cap its
AIDS-related coverage under a self-funded health benefit plan. The
cap was imposed after five employees had been diagnosed with AIDS.
In that case, the court specifically rejected that the employer's
fiduciary duty under ERISA precluded establishment of the benefits
cap, and also found that ERISA pre-empted state law that might have
afforded the plaintiffs additional protection.
It is important to note that both Greenburg and Owens were
decided before the effectiveness of the ADA.
Although early
indications based on legislative history led commentators to
suggest that benefit caps such as those upheld in Greenburg and
Owen would still be permissible under ADA, EEOC regulations now
prevent exclusions and limitations on benefits that are a
subterfuge for disability-based discrimination. EEOC Regulations to
Implement the Equal Emplovroent Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R.
1630.16 (f) (1993) .
Several cases resulting in reinstatement of higher benefit
limits have been settled since the adoption of these regulations.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Connecticut Refining Co., EEOC Chg. Nos. 161-930253, 0254 (3/9/94) and Estate of Kedinger v. IBEW Local 110, 63
Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) Par. 42,783 (D.Minn. 1993). In light of the
regulations and these settlements, employers who wish to justify
benefit caps for AIDS should seek to maintain parity with benefits
offered for other catastrophic diseases.

IX.

Summary
How can an employer meet its fair employment obligations

when faced with the possibility of an applicant or
serious communicable disease? First, employers
policy for the handling of applicants and employees
diseases that complies with applicable laws and is
the approach the employer wishes to take on this

employee with a
should adopt a
with infectious
consistent with
issue.
Also a

wri t ten job description should be developed for each posi tion,
clearly setting forth the necessary qualifications, including any
that could be affected by an individual's
Essential and non-essential job functions

infectious
should be

status.
clearly

distinguished.
During the recruitment process, it is not advisable to ask
applicants generally whether they have a disabilitYi however, the
employer could provide the applicant with the job description and
advise him or her that the employer wishes to make reasonable
accommodation for disabled applicants and employees as required by
law.

The application should ask whether the applicant has any

disabilities that would require accommodation in order to perform
the job's required duties. Based on the applicant's response, the
employer should evaluate whether reasonable accommodation is
possible, or whether it would pose an undue hardship.
Applicants who will be otherwise qualified with or without
reasonable accommodation must be evaluated on the same basis as
non-disabled individuals throughout the remainder of the hiring
process.

If an applicant has been offered employment,

a medical

exam may be required, but only if it is job-related and serves a
business necessity.

Results must be kept confidential and in a

separate file.
Health care employers have a special responsibility to
also evaluate whether the nature of the job's duties will pose an
undue

risk

to

others

of

transmitting

a

serious

communicable

disease. Those employers should determine the extent to which they
believe that testing for the presence of infection is necessary to
assure that no undue risk exists.
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If testing is undertaken,

the

results should be kept confidential and disclosed only on a needto -know basis consistent with the employer I s responsibility to
others, such as patients or co -workers. Employers whose work
involves food handling will want to determine whether the
corrununicable disease exemption from the ADA I S provisions will apply
to the disability presented.
Once an employee is on the job, if his or her disability
status changes, or medical condition worsens, the employer must
. evaluate anew whether reasonable aCCOrn:tfiodation can be made. In some
instances, this could involve decreased responsibilities and
reassignment to a completely different job.
In light of recent regulation and until additional judicial
guidance is available, health benefit plans should be evaluated to
determine whether the benefits offered are non-discriminatory. At
a minimum, employers should avoid singling out one disease or
disabili ty for coverage limi ts that differ substantially from other
types of illnesses.
Finally, because in the case of contagious diseases such as
AIDS any discriminatory treatment for the disabled employee must be
based on the nature of the disability itself, not on co-workers
fears or perceptions, the employer may want to consider ongoing,
pro-active educational programs for its workforce, including
explanation of the ways that these diseases are, and are not,
transmitted.
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I. INTRODUCTIONl
A.

The Need For Action

Prior to 1980, the thought of developing strategies, utilizing
resources, or attending seminars in preparation for violence in the
American workplace, would probably have seemed a waste of time and
effort. Our presence here today is a reflection of the fact that
the nature of what was once thought of as sacrosanct -- the
American workplace -- has undergone a dramatic transformation over
the last decade.
Employers' concern and awareness of this issue is growing
across the country. Some, however, even in view of the escalating
violence seen regularly on the evening news, still harbor an "it
couldn't happen in our organization" attitude.
In an effort to
create a sense of reality for anyone who consciously or
unconsciously shares this minority view, let's begin with some
troubling statistics.
Not a month goes by without a violent incident in the American
workplace.
The National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health reports that homicides are the key job safety issue to be
dealt with in the 1990 's, with a current average rate of 15
workplace murders each week in the United States. Violence is the
leading cause of occupational fatalities among all workers and the
leading cause of death for women.
The Institute reports that
homicides account for 12% of the workplace deaths, and that about
41% of the women killed on the job in the last decade were homicide
victims.
Today, more than 1000 Americans are murdered on the job each
year. This is 32% more than the annual average in 1980. More than
2 million employees suffer physical attacks on the job each year
and more than 6 million are harassed or threatened in some way.
The human devastation represented by these statistics are
shared with us regularly by the media. For example:

*

An unemployed man with a shot gun and pistol opened fire

*

An employee of a marketing company shot himself and a coworker in a suburb of Maryland.

*

A custodian doused a company bookkeeper and set her on
fire because his paycheck was late.

killing four and wounding
unemployment office.

four

in

a

California

lThe author acknowledges the contributions of Lisa May Evans, Law Clerk,
Dinsmore & Shohl, who assisted in the preparation of this outline.
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*

A Federal Express pilot attacked three co-workers in
flight in the cockpit of a DC-10.

*

A purchasing manager in Chicago stabbed his boss to death
over a disagreement about how paperwork should be
handled.

*

A disgruntled technician who had quit his job came back
to the lab where he worked with a 9mm Glock semiautomatic pistol. By the time he had finished shooting,
two were dead and two were injured.

Workplace violence is a non-discriminating·phenomenon.
The
potential for violence exists in any type of organization from a
high-tech fiber optics laboratory to a Chuck E. Cheese restaurant.
In a survey conducted by the
Society for Human Resource
Management, of the 479 American companies polled, 67% reported that
there had been incidents of violence in their workplace.
The
following is a list of other interesting statistics from the study:
TYPE OF INCIDENT
75%

Fist fights, altercations

17%

Shootings

8%

Stabbings

6%

Sexual Assaults
TARGET OF ATTACK

54%

Employees by employees

13%

Supervisors by employees

7%

Employees by customers
REASON FOR ATTACK

38%

Personality conflicts

15%

Family problems

10%

Drug or alcohol abuse

8%

Non specific stress

7%

Firing/layoffs

L-2

2%
Source:

B.

Violent criminal history

The Society for Human Resource Management, Alexandria, VA

Factors Influencing the Increase of Workplace Violence.

A TIME/CNN poll in April of this year reported that 30% of
Americans see workplace violence as a growing problem, 18% have
witnessed violence at work, and another 18% are worried about
becoming victims themselves.
The effect of these real fears on
productivity and other areas can not be overstated.
Experts state that various factors are influencing the
increase in workplace violence in America. Many of today's workers
feel powerless, demoralized, and under-valued, and as a result,
become very violent and angry when confronted with increasingly
stressful situations.
According to James Fox, the Dean of the
College of Criminal Justice of Northeastern University, ". . . more
and more ex-employees are angry and are taking out their anger in
a violent way. U
While the obvious influence of increasing violence in society
as a whole is yet another factor, experts also blame the fact that
work environments have become harsher, the rate of layoffs has
increased, and workers often feel that they are not valued and have
an ongoing sense of insecurity in relation to their jobs. Experts
state that because many workers gain their self-esteem through
work, they naturally feel threatened when their jobs are in
jeopardy. Employers need to understand that, in this situation,
employees feel cornered and much like frightened animals.
As a
result, they may feel that the only alternative is to lash out at
the tormentor.
A recent article in the Occupational Safety and Health
Reporter stated that, U[e]mployees are about twice as likely to be
attacked in the workplace by customers as by co-workers, with
nearly 68% of such violence attributed to clients, patients, and
other strangers." The article contained the results of a report
issued by the Northwest National Life Insurance Company.
Several surveys also suggest that the increased use of drugs
and alcohol are viewed as contributing factors in the rise of
workplace violence. The availability of guns and pervasiveness of
violence in the media have also been considered to be factors,
though to a lesser degree than drugs and alcohol.
The real point is that no one knows who is or will become,
under varying circumstances, the volatile employee. A naive belief
that it cannot or will not happen at your place of business only
serves to create a false sense of security which will potentially
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jeopardize your safety and the safety of others on your premises.
The issue remains that the time to plan for the violent event is
now, before confronted by a volatile employee.
In an effort to combat the problem of increasing workplace
violence, a report from the National Safe Workplace Institute (a
non-profit research, education and service organization located in
Chicago,
Illinois),
recommended
that
employers
implement
"responsive" policies and procedures. The report also stated that
most employers wait for a violent event before seriously addressing
the problem of workplace violence; and most have been slow to view
workplace violence as a separate issue, and instead, lump it with
other human resource or security matters.
In businesses and organizations all across America, private as
well as state and federal government agencies have begun to take
action to address this issue. While no one has all of the answers,
experts have been busy designing comprehensive plans and strategies
to reduce employer exposure from potential violence and potential
law suits.
The United States Surgeon General, Dr. M. Joycelyn
Elders, has outlined steps employers can take to create work
environments that foster more harmonious relationships between
employees.
This is in the wake of state court decisions holding
employers liable, in tort, for failure to protect their employees,
customers, clients, and others lawfully on their premises from
known dangers.
While the threat to human life and safety is the paramount
concern to be addressed in any plan to reduce workplace violence,
other costs, in the form of lost productivity, health care costs,
lawsuits, higher worker's compensation premiums and other expenses
can also be substantial.
The National Safe Workplace Institute
estimates that workplace violence cost employers 4.2 billion in
1992.
Therefore, employers are being directed to plan for
workplace violence in the same way they plan for changes in the
market or future growth.
The overall plan should be a forward
looking, calculated and thorough analysis of the individual
workplace and the organizational culture, as well as the
characteristics of the individuals routinely on the premises.
C.

Presentation Objectives

While no plan of action can be developed to eliminate
workplace violence, the first step in any plan must include an
understanding of the risks, responsibilities and liabilities.
The objectives of this presentation will be to:

*

Discuss the state of the law regarding employer liability
for workplace violence. This will include a discussion
of the limited case law and statutory law in this region
and trends which are developing nationwide to expand
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employer liability for injuries arising out of violent
incidents in the workplace.
*

Summarize the information available to help employers
identify potentially violent employees and potentially
dangerous environments.

*

Present an overview of strategies employers can use to
reduce the risk of workplace violence.

*

Discuss ways to develop a response plan for handling
crisis situations.

II. LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO
REDUCING THE RISK OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
Because crime is becoming more foreseeable, the duty to
protect against it is being placed on employers more and more often
as laws continue to expand in favor of employees across the
country. Just as the sexual harassment laws have emerged to place
a greater responsibility on employers for the acts of employees,
courts are beginning to erode generally accepted principles which
had, in the past, served to limit employer liability.
While in general, the legal impetus for this change is
beginning in the courts, many state statutes are also being used to
place additional duties upon employers.
For instance, in 1991,
California adopted a law which requires employers to respond to
known dangers in the workplace. While the law was not necessarily
intended to apply to workplace violence, it is hard to avoid the
possibility of it being used by a plaintiff, where there is
evidence that the employer knew of a risk and failed to take
action.
As it stands, employers must consider a wide range of legal
consequences in making hiring, disciplinary and termination
decisions. In developing programs to deal with workplace violence,
employers often find themselves in a "Catch-22" position.
They
face potential lawsuits under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
Title VII or other anti-discrimination legislation, based on whom
they do not hire, and they face potential liability for negligent
hiring, retention or supervision or other laws if the person they
do hire subsequently becomes involved in a violent incident.
The issue often boils down to the question of "which way to
you want to be sued?" The fact of the matter is that the tension
between anti-discrimination laws, privacy laws; and the employer's
obligation to provide a safe work environment must be carefully
balanced.
In the end, the safety of an employer's workers,
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customers, and others lawfully on the premises must be the primary
concern, above and beyond any other laws.
A.

The Americans With Disabilities Act and Other
Anti-Discrimination Legislation.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), which was
enacted in 1990 and took effect in 1992, limits the degree to which
an employer can refuse to hire, discipline or terminate a
potentially threatening employee. Under the ADA, an individual
with a disability is one who has a mental or physical impairment
thatsubstantiallyClimitsone<or more inajor·life activities, has a
record of such impairment, or is regarded . as having such an
impairment.
A mental impairment is defined as "[ a] ny mental or
psychological disorder".
The EEOC issued a Technical Assistance Manual to assist
employers in determining their rights and responsibilities under
the ADA. According to the Manual, ". . . personali ty traits, such
as poor judgment, quick temper, or irresponsible behavior, are not
themselves impairments." The Manual further states that,
"[s]tress" and "depression" are conditions that mayor
may not be considered impairments, depending on whether
these conditions result from a documented physiological
or mental disorder.

*

*

*

For examDle:
A person suffering from general "stress"
because of job or personal life pressures would not be
cons idered to have an impairment.
However, if this
person is diagnosed by a psychiatrist as having an
identifiable stress disorder s/he would have an
impairment that may be a disability.
While formal diagnosis of a mental disorder usually triggers
ADA protection, such protection can also be available where there
is a perception that a person has a mental disability, absent any
diagnosis.
For example, if an employer regards an employee as
being unstable or paranoid, or in some way limits the person based
on unsubstantiated fears, the employer may be liable for
discrimination under the ADA. Again, making appropriate decisions,
in light of this piece of legislation, creates quite a "Catch-22"
for employers, since any violations of the Act, even for alleged
safety reasons, subjects employers to significant liability,
including punitive damages.
There are key issues to understand in order to be able to make
an accurate assessment of what is allowed under the ADA and the
rights that employers have as they make key employment decisions.
First, in spite of having a qualifying mental disorder, an employee
has to be otherwise qualified for the job.
An employer is not
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required to hire or retain an individual who is not qualified to
perform the job.
In establishing qualifications, the individual
has to be able to perform all of the non-discriminatory standards
and requirements of the job. An employer's standards that require
all applicants to be able to tolerate normal stress, come to work
on time, obey supervisors' orders, and get along with people, for
example, are acceptable as non-discriminatory standards under the
ADA.
Secondly, the employer has to be able to make a reasonable
accommodation for the disability, without having to suffer undue
hardship, substantial cost or undue disruption of the workplace.
Generally, it is the duty of the individual with the disability to
request a reasonable accommodation.
However, it is not the
employer's obligation to implement the accommodation requested. A
recent federal decision held that the Act does not require an
employer to implement the best possible accommodation.
The Act
only requires that any accommodation made be reasonable and
effective in light of the circumstances.
Reasonable accommodations have to be able to be made without
undue hardship, excessive cost, or undue disruption of the
workplace.
An undue
hardship is an action that requires
"significant difficulty or expense" in relation to the size of the
employer, the resources available and the nature of the operation.
The ADA has another provision, the direct threat provlslon,
which can be used where an employer has reliable medical data upon
which to believe that the employee's presence in the workplace
creates a risk of substantial harm to others. However, even under
these circumstances, the employer must first determine whether a
reasonable accommodation can be made to reduce the risk.
If so,
the employer has a duty to make such an accommodation.
If no
reasonable accommodation can be made, the employer has no duty to
hire or retain the employee.
To date, there have been no reported ADA challenges to
employment decisions involving potentially violent employees.
However, as more and more employers begin to understand their duty
to carefully screen and monitor workplace behavior to protect
themselves from liability, this area will probably become more
litigated in the future.
In addition to ADA prohibitions, other anti-discrimination
legislation on both the state and federal levels also restrict what
information may be sought and used for employment decisions.
Particularly, many states limit access to criminal records. Some
states only allow the use of criminal convictions where there is a
direct relationship between the crime committed and the employment
position being sought.
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B.

Privacy Considerations

In order to make informed decisions about a prospective
employee, employers need access to as much information as possible
about the personal, professional and medical history of the
individual.
An employer's abili ty to obtain information about
applicants has become hindered by prior employers' hesitancy to
provide information other than their rank and file due to fear of
defamation or invasion of privacy law suits.
Since legal liability is beginning to flow from hiring
decisions, obtaining information is a key part of the process
employersmust undergo to learn as. much about prospective employees
as reasonably possible.
Employers, however, need to be mindful of
their legal limitations in this area.
In regard to medical records, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that there is a "limited privacy interest" in the confidentiality
of a patient's medical records.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977). Neither Ohio nor Kentucky laws clearly define the extent
of this right. In both states, statutor£ law limits the extent to
which physicians may disclose information to third parties.
Ohio law has gone as far as to allow third parties who induce
the disclosure of confidential medical information to be liable in
damages. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 243 F. Supp.
793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). More recently, a Magistrate Judge with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held
that the confidentiality of medical records was protected by the
doctor-patient privilege and the United States Constitution. The
Magistrate Judge sanctioned the defense attorneys in the case who
obtained the plaintiff's medical record for the hospital it
represented.
The decision also held that a health-care provider
can
not
reveal
medical
information
absent
a
patient's
authorization.
There are, however, some limited circumstances under which an
employer can gain access to medical records. First, after an offer
of employment is made, an employer can require an employee to
submi t to a medical examination if there is a question as to
whether the employee is "fit for duty" (if such examinations are
required of all applicants).
Such examinations can also be
required after employment, where the employee's performance is
perceived as creating a threat to his or her safety, or the safety
of others. (Keeping in mind that reasonable accommodation may have
to be made for any disability which qualifies under the ADA.) The
examining physician in this situation, in most states, cannot
disclose any information beyond whether the employee is fit for
duty.
Most states also have an exception to the general right of
privacy in medical records which allows a physician to disclose
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privileged information when it is necessary to protect the
individual or public welfare.
For instance, where a physician
knows that a public transportation employee is currently using
drugs or alcohol, he or she has a duty to report such information.

III.
A.

LEGAL ISSUES RESULTING FROM
VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE.

Negligence Theories

A wide range of theories areevoi~ing to hold employers liable
for injuries resulting from violent workplace incidents across the
country.
While Ohio and Kentucky laws have not gone as far in
expanding employer liability for workplace violence as other
states, a discussion of recent trends from these other states will
help give an indication of potential future liability.
Under the negligent hiring,
superv~s~on
and retention
theories, an employer may be found vicariously liable for injuries
caused by violent or criminal conduct of its employees, both within
and outside of the scope of employment, where the employer knows or
should know that the employee poses a risk of harm to others.
Generally, employers have a common law duty to exercise reasonable
care, in view of the circumstances, in relation to employees or
prospective employees who may present a threat of injury.
If
successful under these theories, victims can hold employers liable
for substantial compensation and punitive damages, including lost
earnings, lost benefits, reimbursement for medical expenses, etc.
Across the country,
jury awards and settlements have been
substantial, with one District of Columbia company settling for 16
million, and a 3.5 and 2.5 million dollar jury award in two New
York cases. Red v. Product Dev. Corp., No. 89-1119 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1990) (unpublished opinion); Smith v. Nat'l R.R. Passen. Corp., 856
F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1988); Haddock v. City of New York, 75 N.Y.2d 478
(1990).
Interestingly enough, Kentucky courts were among the first to
recognize a cause of action for negligent hiring. Ballard's
Administratrix v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 128 Ky. 826,
110 S.W. 296 (1908).
Under the theory of negligent hiring, the
employer is held liable for the conduct of his or her employees,
even when they may be acting outside the scope of their authority.
For example, where the employer is found in breach of a duty to the
injured party by hiring an individual who later becomes violent,
where the employer knew or could have determined by reasonable
investigation that the individual posed a threat of harm, most
courts will award damages to the injured party.
More and more courts are beginning to allow individuals to
bring actions under this theory, even in cases where the worker's

L-9

compensation laws should apply. For example, a Kentucky court has
held that an employer could be liable for negligent hiring where a
worker injured a co-worker. Ballard's Admix., 128 Ky. 826, 110 S.W.
296.
Similarly, while not discussing the issue within the context
of workplace violence, the Ohio Supreme Court has hinted at the
possibility of extending liability for acts outside the scope of
employment, where the employer knew of the potential threat to
third parties. In the Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 61 Ohio St. 3d
486 (1991), the court stated that:

An employer has a duty to provide its employees with a
safe work environment and, thus, may be independently
liable for failing to take corrective action against an
employee who poses a threat of harm to fellow employees,
even where the employee's actions do not serve or advance
the employer's business goals.
The court's statement in this case represents a significant
change from past Ohio law which held that in order for an employer
to be liable for the acts of an employee, the employee had to be
acting within the scope of employment and in furtherance of the
employer's business.
While the Ohio court's decision involved
sexual harassment, there is no logical reason why the same
rationale could not be made applicable in a case of workplace
violence.
When it comes to protecting employees from injury by third
parties, there is authority in Kentucky that indicates that a court
could hold an employer liable under extraordinary circumstances.
In Thoni Oil Benzol Gas Stations, Inc. v Johnson, 488 S.W.2d 355
(Ct. App. Ky. 1972), the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that
while,
" [a] bsent extraordinary circumstances an employer has no
duty to anticipate injury to an employee through the
criminal acts of third persons
[w]hen the
conditions of employment are such that they invite attack
upon
employees
by
creating
highly
unusual
and
unreasonable exposure to danger without the employment of
reasonable protective measures, there is justification
for imposing liability upon the employer when injury
results."
Finally, in a recent Minnesota case, a female employee
informed her supervisor that she had been threatened by a male coworker.
The company delayed firing the co-worker, even though
management knew that he had been convicted of a violent crime
before. The man eventually killed the female worker and her estate
was allowed to sue under the theory of negligent hiring.
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Negligent retention is where an employer retains an employee
whom the employer knows is unfit and fails to take any corrective
or protective action.
A classic example of the potential for
exposure under this theory was presented in a recent case involving
a Cincinnati Metro Bus driver. The driver had several arrests for
DUI while driving his personal car.
Cincinnati Metro initially
stated it could not terminate him for offenses incurred while
driving his personal vehicle.
Later, perhaps after a conference
with their attorney, they changed their position.
Potentially,
Cincinnati Metro could have been liable under the theory of
negligent retention if the driver injured third parties while
operating a bus under the influence of alcohol.
Negligent supervision is harder to define since the need for
supervision arises because of past incidents known either at the
time of hire or after employment. It is usually added to a claim
of negligent hiring and/or negligent retention to increase damages.
Under this theory, employers are held liable for negligently
supervising unsafe or dangerous employees, where they have failed
.to respond to complaints about an employee's behavior, or have
assigned employees with kno\vn or suspected tendencies to certain
jobs.
For instance, in one recent Ohio case, a construction worker
raped a nine-year old girl. The plaintiffs, in addition to their
claim of negligent hiring, claimed that the general contractor was
liable for not supervising the contractor whom he knew was alone
with the girl in an empty apartment building. Peters v. Ashtabula
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 89 Ohio App. 3d 458, 626 N.E.2d
1008 (1993).
While there is very little case law on this issue in this
area, there has been a cause of action allowed for negligent
security in some states.
This liability is created where the
employer was aware of a potentially dangerous situation and failed
to provide adequate security to protect its patrons, customers, or
others lawfully entering its premises from the potential threat.
Again, while this theory has not been substantially litigated in
Ohio or Kentucky, the increase of violence may lead to the creation
of a duty on the part of those who are aware of past incidents of
violence in a particular circumstance, or on certain premises, to
protect others from that potential threat. The Kentucky courts have
alluded to the possibility of allowing such claims to be brought
under extraordinary circumstances. See, Thoni Oil Benzol Gas
Stations, Inc. v Johnson, 488 S.W.2d 355 (Ct. App. Ky. 1972).
Finally, negligent failure to warn is another tort which would
allow an employer to be found liable for negligently failing to
warn employees or supervisors of an individual's suspected
dangerous propensities.
This theory may also allow a former
employer who fails to disclose an employee's violent or similar
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misbehavior to prospective employers during reference checks to be
liable for negligent failure to warn.
Both the Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have held employers liable for negligently failing to warn
employees of unusual risks of violence. The Second Circuit held
Amtrack liable where its management had knowledge of an employee's
past violent tendencies and failed to discipline him or notify his
supervisor. Smith v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 856 F.2d 467
(2d Cir. 1990).
The employee eventually shot his supervisor in
another incident after he was reprimanded for taking an
unauthorized break. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that an
employer has a duty to inform employees of all perils which he
knows or should reasonably know. McCalman v. Illinois C.R. Co.,
215 F. 465 (6th Cir. 1914).
Based on the evolution of these theories, it seems that the
employer's duties include informing employees of any threat by
other employees, customers or clients, as well as taking
appropriate precautions to protect them from injury.
B.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

The "General Duty" Clause of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act requires that employers provide a place of employment
that is free from "recognized hazards" likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to workers.
In an effort to address the
increasing incidents of violence in the American workplace, OSHA
laid out its policy on workplace violence in a May 1992 memo that
stated that employers could be cited, under the General Duty
Clause, for failing to adequately protect employees from acts of
violence in the workplace.
The first of these citations went to a Chicago psychiatric
hospital in September of 1993.
The workers at the hospital
suffered from various physical injuries including fractures, bites,
torn cartilage and head injuries.
The patients included gang
members and others who had histories of acting out in violent ways
or in psychotic rages.
OSHA proposed a $5,000 fine against the
hospital for exposing workers to serious physical injury during
"seclusion/restraint" incidents.
OSHA has also issued citations to one organization for "not
protecting its workers who drive vans and buses to shuttle
developmentally disabled adults and children to and from homes and
their work or school," since this exposed them to, "the hazard of
being assaulted by passengers," according to a recent BNA report.
The report also noted that another organization was cited for
having staff work alone at night in one of its group homes, since
this exposed the workers to assaults by residents.
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The BNA reports also indicated that according to one OSHA
official, only "recognized" dangers will be cited by OSHA.
"Criminal acts of violence that are not 'recognized' as part of the
nature of doing business and are 'random antisocial acts which may
occur
anywhere'
would
not
subject
the
employer
to
a
citation . . . . "
C.

Worker's Compensation as a Limit to Liability.

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior in Ohio, an employer
can be liable for the intentional, malicious acts of an employee
performed within the scope of employment. Weibold Studio, Inc. v.
Old World Restorations, Inc., 19 Ohio App.3d 246, 484 N.E.2d 280
(1986).
Traditionally, in order for the doctrine to apply, the
employee must have been acting in furtherance of the business of
the employer. In Kentucky, the courts have limited this doctrine
and held that even if the employee is acting within the scope of
employment:
[T]he well-settled-rule in Kentucky is that ' i t is not
within the scope of a servant's employment to commit an
assault upon a third person and the master is not liable
for such an assault, though committed while the servant
was about his master's business.'"
Flechsig v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (citing
Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Harder's Admin'x, 281 Ky. 345, 136
S.W.2d 42, 45 (1940».
The doctrine of respondeat superior was developed to allow
innocent third parties to recover from employers, who were
perceived to have "set things in motion" by hiring the employee,
without having to prove any negligence on the part of the employer.
Generally, as workplace violence continues to grow, the doctrine of
respondeat superior liability is expanding to allow both employees
and third parties to bring actions where. the employer is found to
have known or been able to determine with reasonable investigation,
that an employee had violent tendencies. As discussed earlier, the
Kerans decision may have put the final blow on the doctrine as a
means of limiting employers' liability for intentional injuries
caused by their employees.

~...

Because both Ohio and Kentucky have worker's compensation
statutes which govern injuries arising out of the employment
relationship, the doctrine of respondeat superior would usually
only come into play for injuries by employees to non-employees.
However, there are certain situations not covered under worker's
compensation such as supervisor assaults on employees, personal
disputes that are not connected to employment, or injuries to
employees from intoxication or self-inflicted violence.
Because
the Ohio and Kentucky statues require the employee's injury to have
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occurred within the scope of employment, certain employee injuries
may fail outside the scope of those provisions.

IV. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL OFFENDERS
Experts say that in almost every case of workplace violence,
the individual had given multiple clues to multiple people.
Learning to identify those signs is a key to reducing the risk of
harm from workplace violence.
Applicant screening is the first chance that aricemplbyer·has
to identify a potentially volatile employee.
This is also the
potential basis for future claims of negligent hiring.
But, as
discussed earlier, applicant screening also poses many challenges,
as concerns for liability under discrimination laws and privacy
laws also have to be weighed. Studies show that up to 42% of job
applicants are untruthful on their applications, so verification of
the job applications can be an important first step for identifying
potential offenders. Failure to follow through in an investigation
can be deadly.
For instance, the United States Postal Service
failed to follow up on a special designation on the military
discharge of a postal worker who killed four workers in Michigan in
1991. Had it done so, it would have found that the worker had run
over another officer's car with a tank in a fit of anger.
Another method often used to identify potentially volatile
employees are psychological tests.
According to experts, however,
psychological tests are not good predictors of a volatile employee.
They are rarely done at the time when the potential offender
reaches the point of becoming violent.
A seemingly normal
individual can become violent after he loses his wife, is
humiliated by a co-worker, and then discharged for insubordination.
It is difficult, if not impossible to determine in advance, at
what point an individual will "lose it."
On the other hand,
experts studying workplace violence have developed a profile of a
violent employee.
Offenders tend to be:

*

Male

*
*
*
*

35 years of age or older
White
few interests outside of work
a fascination with guns or the military
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*
*
*

possible history of violence

*

drug and or alcohol abuse

*
*
*

has violent influence on the work force

*

often violates company policies

*

withdrawn, loner

a history of family problems

a tendency to hold grudges and blame others for
problems

chronic~lly

discontented

has an unstable work record

These profiles have also sparked controversy. Jess Kraus, a
UCLA epidemiologist who served on a federal panel on workplace
violence, was quoted in a recent TIME Magazine article as saying,
"relying on profiles carries a two-fold risk: that people will be
wrongly tagged as dangerous simply because they match the list, and
others will be mistakenly disregarded because they don't."
According to Kraus, more accurate predictors are paranoid behavior,
depression or suicidal tendencies, and the filing of unreasonable
grievances and lawsuits.
Experts also note some behavioral tendencies that give clues
that an employee may be becoming volatile:

*

implied or express warnings that
Verbal threats,
"something" will or may happen, should be taken
seriously.

*

Physical ac.ts of intimidation or harassment of other
workers.

*
*

Attempting to gain access to unauthorized areas.

*

An individual focuses on a specific target of revenge or

Bizarre thoughts, paranoia, or indications that the
individual's perception is
skewed,
or where the
individual demonstrates a perception that he or she has
been unjustly denied an entitlement or humiliated by a
seemingly insignificant act.
an escalating
supervisor.

grudge

against
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another

employee

or

V.

DEVELOPING STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE
RISK OF A VIOLENT INCIDENT

Experts and consultants recommend several options to employers
as a way to reduce the risk of workplace violence.
While most
acknowledge that workplace violence cannot be eliminated, since
many of the factors contributing to the epidemic are not within the
control of the employer, there are programs both preventive and
remedial which can be implemented to assist both before and after
an incident in the workplace. While strategies differ among the
experts, most, if not all, agree that workplace violence . is
predictable, since the offender always leaves a trail.of clues~·
In implementing any preventive workplace violence program,
employers should consult with human resource personnel, security,
upper management, supervisory staff and legal counsel. The bottom
line is that it is easier to deny employment to someone than to
fire someone.
There is also a greater risk in terminating
employment and greater defenses to denying employment.
The more
potentially violent employees screened out in the interview
process, the less risk of a violent outburst by an employee.
There are steps employers can take before a violent incident
occurs:
1.

Screening of applicants.
Employers may want to engage in a
more thorough screening of applicants for employment by
reference checking, testing, and complete interviewing.
( a) Interviews: Conduct in-depth interviews with applicants.
Questions should be consistently asked of all applicants or
those applying for certain positions, and carefully phrased to
avoid potential discrimination charges. While individuals may
not voluntarily supply information on applications or during
interviews, they may be more likely to respond to direct
questions. Ask applicants questions such as: Have you ever
been disciplined or discharged for theft or a related offense?
Have you ever been disciplined or discharged for fighting,
assaul t or related behavior? Have you ever been discharged or
disciplined for insubordination or for violating safety rules?
While knowledge of a mental illness alone cannot be used as a
basis for denying an applicant, specific questions relating to
past behavior or reactions to situations specific to the job
can be used.
(b) Application forms:
Should satisfy state and federal
equal employment opportunity requirements. Require applicants
to sign the form indicating that the information is accurate
and truthful.
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(c) Background investigation: Obtain the applicant's signed
agreement to allow the employer to perform a background
investigation.
If the employer can verify the job-related
need for obtaining an applicant's criminal conviction record,
such information should be requested.
(d) Verify references and past employment:
Gather as much
information as possible from prior employers and obtain copies
of required and/or claimed licenses and credentials.
Employers might note that courts are beginning to look at the
documentation of the. screening process in evaluating negligent
hiring claims.
Courts are· beginning to find liability for
seemingly small oversights.
2.

Comprehensive written plan for dealing with emergency
situations. This plan should include such things as charts of
company officials to be contacted in the event of an
emergency; evacuation plans; telephone numbers for building
security, medical staff, and local hospitals; appointment of
employees on each floor to coordinate activities in case of
emergency.
(a) Emergency training:
Emergency training should be
conducted with at least two employees per department, floor
level, or other physical division. Training two individuals
increases the likelihood of always having someone on site with
necessary training. Training should include evacuation plans
and procedures
for
fires,
bomb threats,
earthquakes,
tornadoes, violent employees or other persons, or other
potentj.ally violent circumstances. Training can be conducted
either by company or building security, or fire/police
department representatives. Employers may also want to have
key employees trained in CPR.
(b) Checklist: A checklist can be devised and made available
to all employees on how to handle situations such as bomb
threats or menacing phone calls or visitors.

3.

Emergency Procedure for Employees. Educate all employees on
emergency procedures and who they are to contact providing
names and phone numbers.

4.

Referral Policy. On-site Employee Assistance Programs (EAP)
should be prepared to provide necessary support after a
crisis.
If an employer does not have an EAP, then local
agencies or counselors should be identified and used as
contacts in the event of a crisis.
Depending upon the
particular situation, employees can either be referred to the
agency or counselor(s), or support professionals can provide
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on-site services. If a violent event does occur, professional
emotional support must be readily and immediately available.
5.

Employee Assistance Programs.
EAP's can play critical roles
in prevention and crisis management. EAP' s can provide Human
Resource professionals trained in crisis management and can
assist in preventive training and follow-up counseling.
Noting the strong relationship between job stress and
workplace harassment and violence, Surgeon General M. Joycelyn
Elders urged employers to educate their employees on how to
resolve conflicts as a way to curb the growing epidemic of
violence. She recommended education and conflict resolution
programs as among some strategies that employers might use to
reduce workplace violence.
Employers need to be aware that
there are some situations in which confidential information
obtained through an EAP is required to be disclosed.
These
include when employers or physicians learn of an employee or
client's potentially dangerous behavior that may endanger
others.
(See Tarasoff v. the Regents of the University of
California) Legal counsel should be contacted to clarify the
employer's responsibilities in this area.

6.

Policies against harassment.
Clearly communicate written
policy
against
harassment
including
enforcement
and
disciplinary action for violations. Zero tolerance.

7.

Train supervisors.
Indications of a troubled employee
can be hard to detect. Supervisors need special training
in order to be skilled and knowledgeable in this area.
Incidents of previous violence, etc., should signal the
need for additional observation of the employee.

8.

First line supervisors.
Usually the first line supervisors
are the primary target of workplace violence and are the
agents of the employee who are in the best position to
deal most frequently with employees. Therefore, their
ability to handle confrontations, stress, and conflicts
can gravely impact the degree to which a small incident
can grow into one leading to workplace violence.

9.

Tiahten security proarams. Create a safe workplace with
prohibitions on weapons and tight disciplinary action for
violations. Clearly communicate these policies with all
employees on a routine basis.

10.

Grievance Procedures. Strong grievance procedures need to be
in place to deal with problems and allow employees to express
their views.
Discuss. ways to eliminate concerns.
Solicit
employee involvement in the development of creative solutions
so that the employee feels empowered and listened to.
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Employers need to allow some
concerns, along with access to
employee is not left with one
frustrate their objectives and

constructive way to channel
greater resources, so that an
person to deal with who can
make them feel disempowered.

11.

Work Environment. Part of the reason the workplace has
become so hostile is because of the negative way that
employees perceive they are being treated. As employers
downsize and place greater demands on fewer employees,
they should also be mindful of a need to offer additional
compensation in the form of money or perks or special
privileges to make the employees feel more appreciated.

12.

Handling Terminations.
Offer outplacement service.
The
economy is bad and employers need to make employees feel that
there is hope for future employment, as a way to defuse
potential feelings of frustration and hopelessness, which are
often precursors to acts of violence.

HOW TO HANDLE THREATS
Employers should establish procedures for employees to follow
in circumstances such as bomb scares, employees or others with
weapons, or verbal threats of violence.
A checklist can be developed for threats received over the
phone. Most threatening situations, especially those of immediate
threats, will need intervention from trained professionals such as
the company or building security police, or the local police
department.
All employees
circumstances.

should know who

to contact and under what

IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS
In the event of a crisis in the workplace, it is recommended
that:
1.

Employers keep employees informed of what is happening in
order to reassure and provide needed support. Communications
should be immediate, as thorough as possible, and ongoing.
Management needs to remain visible and supportive.

2.

Human Resources representatives need to be especially
sensitive to employee concerns. Depending upon the incident,
Human Resources may need to assist in grief counseling,
communicating with families that may be involved, and
providing appropriate referral services.
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3.

Establish peer-support group to enable employees to counsel
each other.

4.

Identify employees that may be especially debilitated due to
a crisis in the workplace and ensure they receive necessary
emotional support.
Such employees may be either directly
affected by the crisis or just recovering from an unrelated
trauma.

By taking these basic steps, employers may lessen the
likelihood of violence occurring in the workplace or at least
decrease the possibility of serious harm to a number of employees
.. and third parties . Unfortunately, however, violent episodes are
often unpredictable.
The key then is to be prepared for the
possibility of violence in the workplace with the realization that
no company, no manager, and no employee is immune from this very
real problem..
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WRONGFUL TERMINATION - SOME PRACTICAL THOUGHTS
by
MARVIN L. COAN
Hummel & Coan
The Seventeenth Floor
Kentucky Home Life Building
239 South Fifth Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3268
(502) 585-3084

I.

ll.

"SELECTING" THE RIGHT PLAINTIFF
A.

You must have a plaintiff whom the judge and jury will like in order to secure
a favorable verdict, unless the facts are so overwhelmingly in your favor that
you cannot help but prevail. Such is not usually the case when it comes to
going to trial, as most of those type cases tend to be settled.

B.

Make sure the plaintiff will have a sufficient amount of damages to justify
filing suit and possible trial. For example, a minimum-wage plaintiff who
works at a fast food restaurant is probably not a good plaintiff in most situations since the person can easily get another comparable job within a matter of
days within that industry.

C.

DO NOT take a case involving a wrongful termination thinking that it will be
easily settled. These type cases are vigorously defended, as most employers
do not want to send out any signal that they are easy marks in this type of
litigation.

IMPORTANT POINTERS
A.

Always request a jury trial in your Complaint because employers are concerned about the prospects of having to justify their actions to a jury. In these
type of cases, it is almost malpraotice not to seek a jury trial unless the judge
is so obviously oriented to this type of litigation, which would be a rare situation.

B.

If the employer does not try to take plaintiffs deposition prior to expiration of
30 days after service of the summons, always file a notice to take the depositions of all key defendant employer personnel involved in the termination
decision of plaintiff. Under Rule 30.01 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant employer may notice plaintiffs deposition first. Only in
rare circumstances outlined in Rule 30.02(2) may the plaintiff obtain permission to take a deposition within the period prior to 30 days from service of
summons.
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ID.

C.

Always schedule the depositions of all key defendant employer personnel
involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff on the same day, one right after
the other, so there can be no coordination of the reasons for the contested
termination. Hopefully, by taking these depositions in this manner, some of
the defendant's own witnesses will create factual disputes that will be helpful
in overcoming any motion for summary judgment. See Steelvest. Inc .. et al.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 485 (1991).

D.

When your client's deposition is to be taken, spend a great deal of time with
the person going over all documents, including the allegations in the Complaint. Make sure there is a thorough practice deposition with all of the hard
questions asked. This will enable the plaintiff to do a good job at the deposition, which is very critical to the success of the case. Often the defense attorney will form an opinion about whether the plaintiff will be a bad or good trial
witness and whether there will be a lot of good ammunition for impeachment
at trial based upon how plaintiffs deposition turns out.

THEORIES OF RECOVERY
A.

Contracts for permanent employment are very difficult to prove unless there is
written documentation and there is strong evidence that the employee provided
sufficient consideration for such a promise. Other jurisdictions have in some
rare instances found there was a contract for permanent employment in situations where a plaintiff gives up stock ownership or where they have been
seriously injured while working on the job. For the most part, these type of
cases should be avoided.

B.

A contract for a fixed term of a year may be oral or in writing with the written contractual agreement often being able to be proved through something as
simple as a letter at the time of hire expressing plaintiffs salary in an annual
sum. See Humana. Inc. v. Fairchild, Ky., 603 S.W.2d 918 (Ct.App. 1980);
Putnam v. Producers' Livestock Marketing Ass'n, Ky., 75 S.W.2d 1075
(Ct.App. 1934). These type of documents are very valuable and would clearly
enable you and your client to get to a jury for a determination. However, see
Judge Heyburn's new decision in McNutt v. Mediplex of Kentucky, Inc., 836
F.Supp. 419 (W.n.Ky. 1993).

C.

Promissory estoppel may also be used as a theory with it being most likely to
be successful in the situation where a plaintiff gives up a job and moves with
family from one state to another. This is not to say you cannot use that theory
simply where a move occurs within the same locale, but in that type of situation the theory would appear to be stronger if the plaintiff is giving up a good
job with superior salary and benefits, as well as a significant amount of tenure
or potential for advancement. While Kentucky apparently has no employment
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cases directly on point known to this author using such a theory, the theory
has been used recently in other type matters. See Lichtefeld-Massaro v. R. J.
Manteuffel, Ky., 806 S.W.2d 42 (Ct.App. 1991); McCarthy v. Louisville
Cartage Co .. Inc., Ky., 796 S.W.2d 10 (Ct.App. 1991).
D.

Any and all claims involving wrongful termination premised upon the employer's breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing do not have
much prospect for success in Kentucky, although other jurisdictions have
recognized these type of claims. See Webster v. Allstate, 689 F.Supp. 689
(D.C.W.D.Ky. 1987); Harvey v. ITW. Inc., 672 F.Supp. 973 (D.C.W.D.Ky.
1986).

E.

The parties may enter a contract which is terminable only for cause provided
that there is specific proof that was their intent. See Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Co., Ky., 655 S.W.2d 489 (1983).

F.

Oral promises of employment will under certain circumstances enable a plaintiff to get the case to a jury for a determination. See Hammond v. Heritage
Communications. Inc., Ky., 756 S.W.2d 152 (CLApp. 1988). However, in
these type of cases, defense of the statute of frauds under KRS 371.010 will be
raised and must be considered in advance to avoid summary judgment. See
Audiovox Corp. v. Moody, Ky., 737 S.W.2d 468, 470-471 (Ct.App. 1987).

G.

A plaintiff may be ab1e"under certain limited circumstances to use an Employee Handbook or Policy and Procedure Manual as a means of pursuing a claim
for wrongful termination. Unfortunately, the leading case in Kentucky is not
favorable. See Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., Ky., 738 S.W.2d 824 (CLApp.
1987). You should always look at such documents when the employee comes
to your office to discuss the potential case. Look thoroughly to see whether or
not there is clear language in the document explaining that it is not a· contract
and that all employees are terminable at will. You should also look carefully
at any section dealing with discipline and termination in order to see if there is
a progressive discipline scheme which is followed or noL In certain circumstances an employer may have a progressive discipline scheme, but will also
reserve unto itself the right to deviate from it and terminate the employee for
any reason it deems appropriate. These are very tough cases, but under some
limited circumstances where the employer may have the established custom of
following a progressive discipline system and the handbook or manual requires
it to be done, a judge may allow the case to go before the jury for a determination.

H.

An employee may, of course, pursue a wrongful termination claim based upon
a termination that violates public policy as set forth in the Constitution or a
statute. The landmark case in this area, which is a must to understand this
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theory, is Firestone v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Sup.Ct, 1984). Basically,
in Firestone the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that an employee cannot
be terminated for pursuing a workmen's compensation claim, as that right was
protected by statute and is a clearly-articulated public policy which must be
followed. The cause of action was premised upon a combination of KRS
446.070 and the violation of public policy expressed in the statute. However,
please note in this decision that if you premise your claim on a statute setting
forth a public policy which provides its own remedy, you must use that statute
exclusively and not the procedure via KRS 446.070 set forth in Firestone.
There are many public policies that can be found within the KRS. For example, see KRS 61.102 (whistleblowers), KRS 337.015 (leave of absence to employee that adopts child under age of seven), KRS 427.140 (garnishments), and
KRS 29A.l60 (jury service).
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS
A.

Although the Kentucky Supreme Court appears to be "in the middle" within all
jurisdictions throughout the country when it comes to protecting plaintiffs in
wrongful termination litigation, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has appeared to
be somewhat more sympathetic. See Willoughby v. Gencorp. Inc., Ky., 809
S.W.2d 858 (Ct.App. 1990); Ovemite Transport Co. v. Gaddis, 793 S.W.2d
129 (Ct.App. 1990).

B.

It will be very important to instruct your client to keep a good and detailed
record of all efforts made to secure other employment after termination since
the plaintiff does have the burden to mitigate damages (i.e., where applied,
copies of applications, with whom he spoke, etc.). It appears as though the
Kentucky Supreme Court in most situations will find this question of mitigation of damages to be a "classic jury question." See Lewis v. Bledsoe, 798
S.W.2d 459 (Sup.Ct. 1990).

C.

From an evidentiary standpoint, the Court of Appeals in Willoughby, supra, at·
862, ruled that the trial Court erred in excluding the testimony of two other
workers who alleged that they were harassed and treated wrongfully after they
sustained a work-related injury and sought benefits. This could be a very
crucial piece of evidence in terms of getting your case to the jury so similar
employer practices must be considered and proved.

D.

Make sure you think about whether your claim is premised as a breach of
contract action or a tort claim which was brought out as a subject of interest to
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Lewis, supra, although the parties did not
preserve the issue for appeal. Certainly, if you are using solely a contract
claim theory, there can be no claim for punitive damages as a result of a
breach of contract. See KRS 411.184(4). On the other hand, if there is a tort

M -8

claim theory, you may be able to seek and prove punitive damages provided
that you specifically comply with KRS 411.184 in terms of both the allegations
in your Complaint and the proof at trial. You will also need to consider KRS
411.186 in this regard.
E.

Consider carefully how your jury instructions are worded, as it could make an
important difference in how the jury understands what they may do for the
plaintiff during deliberations. See First Property Management v. Zarebidaki,
Ky., 867 S.W.2d 185 (1994); Overnite Transport Co., supra, at 132-133.

F.

BEWARE of res judicata being applied from any Unemployment Insurance
decision which is affirmed by a Circuit Court. This may prevent a successful
wrongful termination action thereafter.

G.

An excellent reference to use, which is relatively inexpensive, is the two-volume set, Unjust Dismissal by Larson & Borowsky, from Matthew Bender.
This is updated yearly. Also, you may want to join the National Employment
Lawyers Association, which has its national office at 535. Pacific Avenue, San
Francisco, California 94133, (415) 397-6335.
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Mter-Acquired Evidence of Employee
Misconduct: Affirmative Defense or
Limitation on Remedies?

W

hat can·an employer
do with evidence of employee misconduct discovered long after· a
challenged employment decision was .
made? Can it be used as an affirmative
defense? Does it limit a plaintifrs damages? Or is it completely irrelevant?
While employers are often ecstatic
when evidence such as resume fraud
or work-related misconduct is uncovered during the course of litigation,
their attorneys would be well-advised
to temper this enthusiasm. In the 11th
Circuit, such evidence may only limit
plaintifrs remedies, rather than support dismissal of the suit.

Eleventh Circuit
Rejects Summers

However afteracquired ev ide nee is
used, it is important
that the employer
demonstrate that in
preVlOUS cases
termination resulted
for the same
infraction

The Summers Rule
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 864 F.2d 700
(10th Cir. 1988), is the seminal case
regarding an employer's use of "afteracquired evidence," or evidence discovered after commencement of an employment discrimination action. SumlDers brought a suit alleging age and
religious discrimination after his dismissal based upon insubordination and
poor interpersonal skills. During discovery, and over four years after his
disch!lrge, State Farm discovered that
Summers had falsified company records in 150 separate instances. In its
motion for summary judgment, State
Farm argued that Summers would have
been fired for these falsifications immediately upon discovery regardless
of any other alleged illegal motivation.
Although the after-acquired evidence
could not have been a "cause" for the
termination, the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals held that it was highly rele. vant to plaintifrs claim of injury and
precluded the plaintifffrom recovering
any relief. The court then made the
following statement,· which has heen

by Elizabeth Pryor Johnson
quoted approvingly by a .number of
courts: 1
To argue . • . that this after-acquired evi-

dence should be ignored is utterly unrealistic. The present case is akin to the hypothetical wherein a company doctor is fired
because of his age, race, religion, and sex
and the company, in defending a ciVil rights
action, thereafter discovers that the discharged employee was not a "doctor!' In our
view, the masquerading doctor would be
entitled to no relief, and Summers is in no
better position.

Id. at 708 (footnote omitted). The 10th
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of State Farm because the plaintiff suffered no legal
damage as a matter of law.
Since Summers, after-acquired evidence has been used by the courts2 in
two ways: 1) as an_ affirmative defense
to liability,3 and 2) as a limitation upon
plaintiffs remedy.4 The 11th Circuit
has adopted tbl! latter apprQach.
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The court of appeals for the 11th
Circuit squarely addressed the Summers issue in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir.
1992). Plaintiff Neil sued her former
employer for causes of action under the
Equal Pay ActS and Title VII. During
her deposition, Neil admitted that she
had pled guilty to possession of cocliine
and marijuana, despite the fact that
she had checked the "no" box on her
employment application after the question: "Have you ever been convicted of
a crime?"
After discovering this evidence, the
defendant filed a motio~ for partial
summary judgment on the ground that
the after-acquired evidence of Neil's
convictions and application fraud constituted legitimate grounds for termination irrespective of any alleged illegal motives. Neil countered that motion with evidence that other people
who had lied on their employment
applications had retained their jobs.
The district court denied the defendant's motion on the ground that, inter
alia, a material issue of fact existed as
to whether Neil would have been hired
had she responded truthfully in the
application.
On appeal, a divided panel of the
11th Circuit rejected the Summers approach to the extent the defendant
employer relied on it as an affirmative
defense to Title VII liability. Calling
the Summers rule "antithetical to tbe
principal purpose of Title VII:' the
court reasoned that it ''iI:tvites employers to establish ludicrously low thresholds for 'legitimate' termination" and
might encourage "rummaging through
an unlawfully-discharged employee's
background for flaws." As the court_
saw it, "the law governing after-

acquired evidence should not ignore
the time lapse between the unlawful
act and the discovery of a legitimate
motive." [d. at 1180-81.
This holding should come as no surprise. The 11th Circuit has rejected
. several previous attempts to rationalize adverse employment decisions with
information unknown to the decisionmaker at the time the decision was
made. See Joshi v. Florida State Univ.
Health Ctr., 763 F.2d 1227, 1235 (11th
eir.) (noting that the applicant's qualifications were not considered at all in
that case, and therefore the defendant
could not rely on the superior qualifications of other candidates to explain its
hiring decision), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
948 (1985); Eastland p. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 626, modified,
714 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1983)
(rejecting the defendant's attempt to
justify its hiring decision on the ground
the applicant chosen had superior qualifications because the decisionmaker
was unaware of those qualifications
prior to hiring decision), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1066 (1984).
Although the 11th Circuit's holding
has some logical appeal in that the
relevant motive issue ought to be what
the employer actually knew at the time
of its decision, the opinion does not
reflect the current trend in the caselaw
on the issue. Most courts in other
jurisdiction.s have granted summary
judgment when presented with undisputed facts showing that either the
employee would never have been hired
or termi~ation would have resulted6
upon discovery of the evidence of misconduct.7

The determination of backpay, however, is more complicated. The 11th
Circuit rejected the argument that the
backpay period should end on the date
of discovery of the after-acquired evidence, and concluded that, to terminate the backpay period, the employer
must prove that it would have discovered the evidence prior to what otherwise would be the end of the backpay
period in the absence of the challenged
employment decision and the litigation. tO This conclusion provides yet
more incentive for employers to conduct aggressive independent investigations to verify information given in'
resumes and employment applications.
Of course, in the case of post-hiring
employee misconduct, it will be extremely difficult to prove that such
evidence would have been discovered
absent the termination, because it is
the termination itself (and resulting
litigation) which normally brings such
matters to light. To that end, the 11th
Circuit may have created a virtually
insurmountable evidentiary hurdle for
employers to overcome in halting the

A Glimmer of
Hope for Employers
The 11th Circuit did, however, embrace the Summers approach to the
extent it impacts upon the relief available to a successful Title VII plaintiff.
In what the dissent called the creation
of "an enormously complicated body of
law," the court discussed the Summers
impact upon the remedies available
under Title VII and the Equ(ll Pay
Act. 8
The court explained that if the aftera·cquired evidence would have caused
the plaintiffs discharge, then reinstatement, front pay, and injunctive relief
would not be appropriate because such
remedies would go beyond the makewhole relief available under Title VI1.9
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backpay period.

Resume Fraud
V. Work Misconduct
Judge Godbold filed a dissenting opinion in Dunn and stated that he would
have upheld summary judgment for
the employer on the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the
suit. l l More interestingly for employment lawyers, however, Judge Godbold
also distinguished a resum~ fraud case
(the Dunn facts) from a case in which
the employee is properly hired, and the
employer discovers work misconduct
after the suit is filed (the Summers
facts). Thus, Dunn may not be applicable in the latter situation.
The majority of cases applying Summers involve resum~ fraud. There are,
accordingly, relatively few decisions
applying Summers when an employee
has been properly hired, is discharged
for an alleged illegal motive, and the
employer subsequently discovers work
misconduct unrelated to the proffered
reasons for discharge. For now, employers and counsel will have to be

guided by the resume fraud decisions.
'JYpically, in resume fraud cases, the
employer makes alternative arguments:
First, had the employer known of the
misrepresentation, it never would have
hired the plaintiff; and second, regardless of its hiring decision, the misrepresentation itself would have constituted
sufficient grounds for dismissaL The
first inquiry is inherently speculative,
which probably explains why courts
are more comfortable relying upon the
second argument. The courts which
have addressed this second argument
have generally granted summary judgment for the employer when there are
undisputed facts demonstrating that
the employee would have been fired
had the misconduct been known. Under this line of cases, summary judgment is appropriate when the misrepresentation or omission was
material, directly related to the qualifications for the job, and relied upon by
the employer in making the hiring
decision. 12
However after-acquired evidence is
used-as an affirmative defense or as
a limitation upon remedies-it is important that the employer demonstrate
that in previous cases termination resulted for the same infraction.13 If the
employee can show that another employee received less severe discipline
for the same misconduct, or that the
employer did not follow its own policies
consistently, then the discharged employee has created a genuine issue of
material fact precluding summary judgment.1.
Evidence to support the employer's
summary judgment motion should incIud~ when possible: 1) Copies of personnel handbooks and policy manuals
clearly stating that the employee's misconduct directly violated company policy and would have resulted in immediate termination;15 2) an affidavit
from the personnel director stating
that plaintiff would have been fired
immediately had the employer known
of the misconduct; and 3) any instances
in which employees have been terminated ··under similar circumstances.
Deposition testimony from the plaintiff
that the plaintiff was aware of the
company policy prohibiting the misconduct and understood the significance
and the likely adverse consequences
had the employer been aware of it,
would also be helpful.1 6 Employers who
are not relying upon violations of spe-

cific company policies and cannot proffer any evidence of terminations made
under similar circumstances are unlikely to prevail on summary judgment.n

The Civil Rights Act of 1991
How after-acquired evidence will be
treated in a mixed-motive case brought
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 18
has not been definitively resolved. The
EEOC takes the position that afteracquired evidence cases should not be
analyzed as mixed-motive cases, because the latter analyze the employer's
liability, and the former, the employer's
remedy only.1 9 The 11th Circuit has
indicated that it would take a similar
position. Although Dunn was brought
under Title VII prior to its amendment,
the court stated that its analysis was
"fully consistent" with the mixedmotive provisions of §107 of the act.20
In the 11th Circuit, therefore, employers will probably face the same evidentiary hurdles in cases brought under
the new Civil Rights Act when invoking the after-acquired evidence
defense as. the defendant faced in
Dunn.

Conclusion
The 11th Circuit has not yet addressed the issue of how Summers
should be applied in the case of a
properly hired employee when evidence
of misconduct is discovered after litigation commences. Although the recent
trend in the caselaw is to grant summary judgment when there is no issue
of fact that the employee would have
been fired had the employer known of
the misconduct, the decision in Dunn
suggests a contrary result. It appears.
more likely that the 11th Circuit will
continue to hold that Summers' usefulness lies only in its limitation upon
plaintifrs remedies. Nonetheless, until
such time as the court of appeals is
presented with this specific issue, and
given the strength of the caselaw in
other jurisdictions and the vehemence
of the dissent filed'in Dunn, attorneys
representing employers should consider
asserting the Summers rule as a basis
for summary judgment in cases where
the employer discovers, after commencement of the litigation, that a properly
hired employee has engaged in misconduct sufficient to warrant termination,
though that misconduct was not known
to the employer at the lime of the
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termination. 0
1 E.g" Washington v. Lake County, 762
F. Supp. 199,202 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affd, 969
F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Churchman v.
Pinkerton's, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 519 (D.
Kan.1991).
2 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission takes the position that afteracquired evidence of employee misconduct
is not a complete defense to liability and
may be used, therefore, only to limit damages to the period between the unlawful
termination and the date termination would
have resulted for a nondiscriminatory reason. EEOC General Counsel Memorandum
on Civil Rights Act of 1991, dated Feb. 22,
1993,34 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) atE-I.
3 See, e.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Info.
Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992);
Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250
(7th Cir. 1992); Agbor v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 60 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA)
1142 (0. Utah 1993); O'Day v. McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466,
1468-69 (0. Ariz. 1992); Guzman v. United
Airlines, Inc., 53 FAIR EMPL. PHAc. CAS.
(BNA) 1419 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying Massachusetts statute).
4 See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co.,
968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992); Smith v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 60 FAIR
EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1225 (S.D. N.Y.
1993) (denying summary judgment; jury
may consider misconduct in assessing damages).
5 Efforts to invoke the Summers defense
in Equal Pay Act and sexual harassment
suits have met with little success. See, e.g.,
Boyd v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prod., Inc.,
No. Civ. A. 91-0083-H, 1992 WESTLAW
404398 (W.O. Va. Dec. 11, 1992) (rejecting
Summers' applicability to plaintifrs ability
to recover unpaid equal wages and liquidated damages in Equal Pay Act claim);
Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., 53 FAIR
EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1047 (D. Utah 1990)
(refusing to consider Summers in sexual
harassment suit, noting that being qualified
for the job is not an element of the cause of
action).
e Employers· should take care to note
they must prove they would have fired the
employee, not simply that they could have
done so. E.g., Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971
F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992).
7 See supra note 3.
S It should be noted, however, that the
c01,lrt's statement that "the effect of afteracquired evidence on Title VII remedies is
best decided on a case-by-case basis," Dunn,
968 F.2d at 1181, is sure to promote further
confusion in this area.
9 Dunn, 968 F.2d at 1181-82.
1Q The 11th Circuit's creation of an additional evidentiary burden for employers to
overcome in order to halt the backpay
period goes beyond even the EEOC's position. The EEOC has taken the position that
the backpay period ends upon the date of
discovery of the misconduct. See supra note
2.
11 Judge Godbold also participated in the
Sixth Circuit decision holding that Summers could be used as a complete defense.

See Johnson u. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc.,
955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992) (Godbold, J.,
sitting by designation) (even assuming violation of state civil rights act, resume fraud
barred any entitlement to relieO. The Dunn
court explicitly rejected the standing argument. Dunn, 968 F.2d at 1181 n.10.
12 Johnson u. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc.,
955 F.2d at 414.
13 E.g., Churchman u. Pinkerton's, Inc.,
756 F. Supp. at 518.
14 See, e.g., DeVoe u. Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782
F. Supp. 546, 552-53 (D. Kan. 1992); Grzenia
u.Interspec,Inc., No. 91C 290, 1991 WEST·
LAW 222105, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1991);
Punahele u. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 487, 490·91 (D. Colo. 1991).
]5 Kristufek u. Hussmann·Foodseruice Co.,
.
61 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. {BNA) 72 (7th Cir.
-~ 1993), illustrates the danger of having an
employment policy which provides only that
a particular act of misconduct "may be"
grounds for dismissal as opposed to "will
be" grounds for dismissal.
16 See Churchman u. Pinkerton's, Inc.,
756 F. Supp. at 520·21.
17 See Mackey v. Board of Pensions, No.
91C 5739, 1993 WESTLAW 11674 (Jan. 15,
1993).
18 Pub. L. No. 102·166, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991).
]9 See su.pra note 2.
20 Dunn, 968 F.2d at 1184 n.17.
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This column is submitted on behalf of the Labor and Employment
Law Section, John W. Robinson Iv,
chair, and Kevin E. Hyde, editor•
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Resume Fraud as a Defense to
Bias Claims
by Gregory A. Hearing
In the last several months, several significant court decisions have come down regarding the significance of the discovery of resume fraud in bias claims_ In addition, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently issued a policy memorandum which adopted the holdings of
recent cases with regard to an employer's
discovery of after-the-fact evidence in bias
claims.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided two cases on this issue in July and
August. In the first case, Washington v. Lake
County, No. 91-1819 (7th Cir. 1992), the
court announced the standard it will apply
in these types of cases. Factually, Eddie
Washington, a jailor at the Lake County Illinois Sheriffs Department who was fired
in 1987 filed suit, alleging that he was terminated due to his race. During the pendency of the suit, the Lake County Sheriffs
Office determined that Washington falsified
his employment application by concealing
two criminal convictions. The district court
for the Northern District of Illinois held that
even if Washington was the victim of race
bias, he was not entitled to relief because
Washington lied on his employment application.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit announced
that a routine policy of rejectingbias claims
under a "would-not- have-been-hired" theory
is misguided. Instead, the court stated that
"the appropriate issue in an employment discrimination case where the plaintiff lied on
his application and was later fired for an
unrelated reason, is whether the employer,
acting in a race-neutral fashion, would have
fired the employee upon discovery of the misrepresentation, not whether the employee
would have hired the employee had it known
the truth." The court said that the proper
inquiry is whether Washington was treated
differently than similarly situated employees because of his race. The court placed the
burden on the employee in such cases to
show that he would not have been fired in
a resume fraud situation. The court determined that Washington did not produce
such evidence and dismissed his claim.

In a decision following closely upon the
heels of Washington, the Seventh Circuit further refined its earlier pronouncement on
the significance of resume fraud in bias
claims. In Reed v. AMAX Coal Co., Nos. 901127 and 92-1730 (7th Cir. 1992), the court
held that employers must offer proof that
they would have fired an employee for a
resume fraud so that employers cannot
avoid "Title VII liability by pointing to minor rule violations which may technically
subject the employee to dismissal, but would
not, in fact, result in discharge."
The facts of the Reed case showed that
EliusReed was hired by AMAX Coal Company after submitting an application in
which Reed failed to disclose a felony conviction. The job application contained a provision that falsification on the application
was grounds for dismissal. Reed was subsequently dismissed in 1982 for sleeping on
the job. Reed believed that he was dismissed
because of his race and filed a charge of
discrimination with the Illinois Department
of Human Rights. During the pendency of
his charge, AMAX discovered Reed's falsification. Reed's charge was rejected and he
filed suit in federal district court. The district court entered judgment for AMAX on
the ground that Reed had lied on his job
application, finding that was grounds for dismissaL On appeal, the Seventh Circuit said
that the type of proof the court would require from an" employer claiming that it
would fire an employee for resume fraud is
proof that other ~mployees were fired in similar circumstances in the past. The obvious
problem with this requirement is that if the
employee is the first to have lied on the
application and been caught, then the employer has no past history to rely upon as
proof.
In another recent case involving this issue, the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado granted judgment in favor of an employer in a, sex and national
origin bias claim. In Bonger v. American
Water Works, No. 90-C-1592 (D.C. Colo.
1992), American Water Works learned for
the first time that Bonger did not have a
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college degree while Bonger's lawsuit for sex
and national original discrimination was
pending. In 1988, Bonger, a hispanic
woman, applied for the position of Director
of Human Resources at American. On her
application, she represented that she had a
college degree. Two years later, Bonger was
fired for allegedly poor performance. Bonger
sued alleging sex and national origin discrimination, but during the pendency of action, American discovered that Bonger did
not have a college degree. American submitted an affidavit insisting that it would have
fired Bonger for misrepresenting that she
had a college degree and has consistently
had a policy that resume fraud was grounds
for termination. The district court determined that American sQowed that it would
have fired Bonger had it known of her resume fraud either before or at the time of
her termination and therefore granted American's motion for summary judgment.
Not to be outdone by the recent case law,
the EEOC, on July 7, 1992, adopted a guidance memorandum which included a section setting forth its policy on the effect of
discovery of after-the-fact evidence in bias
cases. The EEOC memorandum states:

and non-pecuniary damages, the memorandum points out" that if an employer's sole
motivation was discriminatory and that it
acted with malice or with reckless indifference to the claimant's rights, after-the-fact
evidence would not operate to shield the employer from having to pay punitive damages
to the claimant.
The Eleventh Circuit recently spoke on
this issue in Wallace v. Dunn Construction
Co., Inc., No. 91-7406 (1992 WL 180276)
(11th Cir. 1992). In Wallace, one ofthe plaintiffs, who was suing DU:nn for, inter alia, sex
harassment under Title VII, lied on her employment application by failing to disclose
criminal convictions. Dunn discovered this
evidence after deposing the plaintiff. Dunn
moved for-partial summary judgment on the
grounds that the after acquired evidence of
the plaintiffs application fraud was a legitimate cause for her termination, irrespective
of any unlawful bias. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied the motion and Dunn took an
interlocutory appeal.

If the employer produces proof of a justification discovered after-the-fact that would
have induced .it to take the same action, the
employer will be shielded from an order
requiring it to reinstate the complainant·
or to pay the portion of back pay accruing
after the date that the legitimate oasis for
the adverse action was discovered, and the
portion of compensatory damages (in
charges based on post-1991 Act conduct)
that would cover losses arising after that
date. If the date of the discovery is unknown, then an appropriate percentage reduction should be made, based on an assessment of the approximate date of the
discovery. Thus, if a complainant is terminated for discriminatory reasons, but the
employer has an absolute policy of firing
anyone who commits theft, then the employer would not be required to reinstate
the charging party or to pay compensatory
damages for Injuries arising after the date
that the theft was discovered, or back pay
accruing after that date.

A copy of the EEOC Guidance Memorandum can be found at 131 DLR (BNA) E1E19.
Although the EEOC guidance memorandum would cut off the amount of pecuniary
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The Eleventh Circuit reversed but set
forth certain limitations as to the extent of
the significance of after acquired evidence.
The court held that the plaintiff could not
be awarded any prospective relief such as
front pay, reinstatement, or injunctive relief
_ but could be awarded backpay unless. Dunn
could show that it would have discovered .
the application fraud prior to the end of the
backpay period. The court specifically rejected the argument that backpay should be
cut off on the day that Dunn actually discovcovered the application fraud. The court rejected that approach on the ground that a
bias victim should never be placed in a
worse position than if she was not in a protected class because, without the lawsuit,
the employer would not have discovered the
fraud. The court said to hold otherwise
would have the effect of providing the em-

ployer a windfall. Nevertheless, the court
stated that the after acquired evidence
should have the result of reducing the attorneys' fee award if the plaintiff prevails.
No indication was given in the opinion as
to whether the Wallace court considered the
EEOC policy memorandum on this subject
even though it was issued approximately
one month before the court's opinion was
issued. It is therefore unknown what effect,
if any, the EEOC's policy memorandum will
have on cases in this jurisdiction.

Gregory A. Hearing is an attorney with· the
Tampa law firm of Thompson, Sizemore &
Gonzalez, P.A" representing management in
the area of labor and employment law. Mr.
Hearing is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the
University of the South and received his juris doctorate from the Florida State University College of Law with honors. He is a
member of the Labor and Employment Law
Section of The Florida Bar.
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HYPOTHETICAL # 1
Company A is

a

company

incorporated

principal place of business in New York.

and with

its

Company A does business

and has employees in every state in the nation.

Employee B is a

former employee for Company A in the state of Florida.

Employee B

has an agreement with Company A that provides that an employee will
be give~ an opportunity to improve any unsatisfactory performance.•
The agreement specifically provides,

however,

that Company A

reserves the right to terminate an employee immediately in the case
of fraud, dishonesty, or falsification of company records.

The

agreement also provides for an internal appeal process, but without
right to counsel, access to documents, and sworn testimony.
Company A had reason to suspect that Employee B was
falsifying information on company documents and engaging in other
fraudulent practices.
terminated Employee

After an internal investigation, Company A
B without warning for

documents, dishonesty, and fraud.

falsifying company

B filed suit in state court

against A alleging breach of his employment contract, violations of
ERISA, RICO violations, defamation, and tortious interference.

In

addition to Company A, Employee B named his immediate supervisor,
several members of upper management, and other employees in the
suit.

Issues:
1.
are

Removal.

state

cTaims

Although there are some federal claims, there
against

nondiverse

joinder?
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defendants.

Fraudulent

2•

Mediation.

3.

Counterclaims.

4.

Counsel for B begins to informally contact non-management

employees of A, as well as individual customers.
5.

Employee B applies for unemployment compensation on the

basis that there has been no misconduct in connection with his
work.

During the hearing,

the hearing officer will not allow

Company A to testify from the records regarding
dishonesty,

fraud,

and falsification

instances of

of company documents and

grants B his unemployment compensation.

Does the unemployment

decision have any collateral estoppel or res jUdicata effect on
this

lawsuit?

Should

the

employer

appeal

the

unemployment

compensation award?
6.

Employee B serveS Company A and the individual defendants

with voluminous discovery requests seeking nationwide discovery of
information about other employees.
7.

There is an ongoing investigation of B by an independent

state regulatory agency.
·S.

How should Company A respond?

How should the parties react?

Motion practice.
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HYPOTHETICAL # 2
HYPOTHETICAL
You are counsel for a MegaCorp, a large national corporation
with branches in every state.
On returning from vacation one
Monday, you are met by the usual pile of mail, along with several
frantic phone messages from the Human Resources Manager for one of
the local branches in your territory. When you return her call,
she tells you that she has spent the last week dealing with a
highly sensitive situation involving allegations of sexual
harassment.
It seems a female employee has made a very serious charge
against one of her coworkers,. John Groper (who is not her supervisor) •
She claims that when she first began working in a small
local office with Groper over a year ago, he cornered her in a room
and tried to force himself on her.
The attack was only stopped
when· Groper overheard a customer enter an outer office. The female
employee never reported the incident because she thought the
situation would improve, she says.
The atmosphere did not improve, however I and the female
employee also alleges that throughout the last year, she has had to
endure frequent remarks of a sexual nature from Groper.
For his
part, Groper vigorously denies every allegation, asserting that the
female employee was motivated by jealousy of his better work
performance and a desire to be transferred to a more prestigious
location. Groper adds that he believes MegaCorp is on a crusade to
fire him based on unsubstantiated allegations. "You'll hear from
my lawyer," he tells the human resources manager.
The human
resources manager needs your advice.
1.

At this early stage, what is your first move?

2.

If you separate the two employees, whom should you
transfer? How do you handle the move?

On your advice, MegaCorp beglns an investigation of Groper.
No one can corroborate the attack (the customer is nowhere to be
found), but two other coworkers report that Groper made sexual
comments at work and inquired into their sex lives in a manner that
made them uncomfortable. One employee from another office alleges
that Groper "pulled" her onto his lap at a social event and touched
her inappropriately.
A witness at that event suggests that the
woman voluntarily sat in Groper's lap.
Groper has retained
counsel, who threatens to sue MegaCorp and any person associated
with the case if he is discharged.
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3.

What is your next move?
Groper's employment
contract maintains employment at will.
Do you
discharge Groper?

4.

During the investigation of the accusation, it comes
to light that the accuser has filed two other
allegations of sexual misconduct, one against her
child's daycare provider and another against her
chiropractor.
Does this affect your course of
action?

5.

Groper's counsel asks for the names of his accusers
and documents relating to their accusations.
He
maintains that without access to these documents a
discharge would be manifestly unfair and "violate
due process." What, if anything, do you reveal to
Groper's lawyer?

The human resources manager recommends that Groper be
discharged. Meanwhile, Groper sues the first accuser for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
6.

MegaCorp has a policy of indemnifying employees sued
for actions in the course of their employment. Do
you pay for the accuser's defense of Groper's
lawsuit? If so, should you also pay for her pursuit of a counterclaim against Groper?

7.

Are there conflict of interest problems here? Who
should MegaCorp retain to represent the accuser?

8.

Assume the accuser complains that she has been
treated unfairly in the investigation and in her
transfer to a new job and hints about going to the
EEOC. Does this affect the answers to the last two
questions?

MegaCorp receives a subpoena for all documents, notes, tapes,
etc. relating to the investigation, including the personnel file of
the accuser. Meanwhile, Groper's lawyer accuses MegaCorp of being
"scum" and threatens to go to the press to expose how his client
has been railroaded. The employees involved express their concern
for their own privacy.
9.

How do you respond to the subpoena?
How do you
protect the privacy of the individuals involved?

10.

What other measures would you pursue to protect the
confidentiality of the documents released in re-
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sponse to the subpoena?
help or hinder MegaCorp?

How would a "gag order"

The human resource manager is concerned, as you are, that when
Groper's discharge is final, he will sue MegaCorp.
11.

What actions can you take now to fend off further
litigation?

12.

Groper has threatened to sue each and every manager
involved in the· investigation.
Do you have an
obligation to notify employees that they may be the
subjects of future litigation?

13.

In planning to defend an action by Groper for
defamation, breach of contract, wrongful discharge
and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
what is your theory of the case? What legal theories would you pursue to defend the action?
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I.

IDENTIFYING THE CLIENT.
A.

RELEVANT RULE*
Rule 1.13 organization As Client.
(a) A
lawyer
employed
or
retained
by
an
organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an
officer, employee or other person associated with
the organization is engaged in action, intends to
act or refuses to act in a manner related to
representation that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of
law which reasonably might be imputed to the
organization,
and
is
likely
to
result
in
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary and in the
best interest of the organization. In determining
how to proceed,
the lawyer shall give due
consideration of the seriousness of the violation
and its consequences, the scope and nature of the
lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the
organization and the apparent motivation of the
person involved, the policies of the organization
concerning such matters and any other relevant
considerations.
Any measures taken shall be
designed to minimize disruption of the organization
and the risk of revealing information relating to
the
representation
to
persons
outside
the
organization.
Such measures may include among
others:
(1)

asking reconsideration of the matter;

(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on
the matter be sought for presentation to
appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority
in the organization including, if warranted by
the seriousness of the matter, referral to the
highest authority that can act in behalf of
the organization as determined by applicable
law.
*
"Rule" refers to both KBA Rules of Professional Conduct and
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
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(c) If, despite the lawyers efforts in accordance
with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can
act on behalf of the organization insists upon
action, or a refusal to act, that is a clear
violation of law and is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer
may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
(d)
In dealing with an organization's directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity
of a client when it is apparent that the
organization's interests are adverse to those
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also
represent
any
of
its
directors,
officers,
employees,
members,
shareholders
or
other
consti tuents, subject to the provisions of Rule
1.7.
If the organization's consent to the dual
representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent
shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be
represented, or by the shareholders.
The

comment

accompanying

Rule

1.13

anticipates

potential

conflict between the interests of the corporate client and the
interests of its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and
other constituents.

Such conflicts create unique problems for

counsel representing the corporate entity,
through

these

ethically

constituents.

represent

counsel will

the

Thus,

corporate

necessarily engage

in

which can only act

order

client,

to

i.e.

in contact,

properly
the

and

employer,

investigation and

advice with persons who may have or develop adverse interests
during the course and scope of the representation.
The Comment clearly indicates that at such times, the lawyer
must advise any individual constituent whose interest the lawyer
finds adverse to that organization that the conflict exists, that
the lawyer does not represent the individual constituent and that
constituent

may

wish

to

seek
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independent

counsel.

Most

importantly, both the constituent and the counsel must realize and
acknowledge - and act accordingly - that discussions between them
may not be privileged.
The parameters and prescriptions of Rule 1.13 are not limited
to

formally

incorporated

businesses.

The

"organizations," which can include partnerships,
'franchisees,

unions,

trade

associations,

and

Rule

refers

to

joint ventures,
other

distinct

separate entities. 1
The difficulty of

the

Rule

is

demonstrated by Oliver v.

Kalamazoo Board of Education, 346 F. Supp. 766 (W.O. Mich. 1972)
wherein the Court imposed a duty on the attorney representing a
school board to maintain confidentiality as to individual members
who "are the only available conduit of information between the
client corporate body entity and the attorney."
II.

CONTACT WITH CURRENT AND/OR FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AN ADVERSE
CORPORATE PARTY
A.

RELEVANT RULE
Rule 4.2 Communication With Person Represented by Counsel
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate
about. the
subject
of
the
representation with a party the lawyer knows
to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of
the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do
so.

Comment [2] to the Rule states as follows:
In the case of an organization, the Rule prohibits
communications by a lawyer for one party concerning the
matter in representation with persons having a managerial
responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with
any other person whose act or omission in connection with
that matter may be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose
statement may constitute an admission on the part of the
organization.
If an agent or employee of the

N -4

organization is represented in the matter by his or her
own counsel,
the consent by that counsel to a
communication will be sufficient for purposes of this
Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f).
B.

ABA FORMAL OPINION 91-359, MARCH 22, 1991
1.

EX PARTE CONTACT WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AN
ADVERSE CORPORATE PARTY DOES NOT VIOLATE RULE 4.2

The Comment to Rule 4.2 separates the inquiry as to a present
employee

into

three

categories:

managerial responsibility on

(a)

an

employee

who

has

a

behalf of the employer-corporation,

(b) an employee who is one whose act or omission in connection with
the matter that

is the subject of the potential communicating

lawyer's representation may be imputed to the corporation, or (c)
an employee whose statement may constitute an admission by the
corporation. 2

However,

neither the text

Comment mention former employees.

of

Rule

4.2

nor

its

Thus, given that "the effect of

the Rule is to inhibit the acquisition of information about one's
case," the Opinion held that Rule 4.2 should be strictly construed
so as not to cover former employees. 3

Al though "the concerns

reflected in the Comment to Rule 4.2 may survive the termination of
the employment relationship,,,4 by delineating categories of corporate

employees

who

communication,

the

communication

with

may

Comment
all

not

be

to

Rule

other

the

subject

4.2

of

ex

parte

"clearly implies

employees

on

'the

matter

that
of

representation' is permissible without consent."s
The Opinion cautioned, however, that an attorney considering
contacting a former. employee of an adverse corporate party must not
"seek

to

induce"

the

employee

attorney-client privilege. 6

to

violate

the

corporate

In addition, the contacting attorney
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must observe other applicable rules.

As examples, the Committee

cited Rule 4.1 (truthfulness in statements) and Rule 4.3 (contact
with unrepresented persons).7
2.

APPLICABILITY OF THE ABA OPINION

The scope of Rule 4.2 has been the subject of conflicts among
the courts and, as the ABA noted, judicial interpretation of Rule
4.2 varies. 8
thus

The ABA's position is not binding on the courts and

attorneys wishing' to contact former

employees

of

adverse

corporate parties should check the interpretation of the Rule in
their jurisdiction.

For example, in Porter v. Arco Metals, Div. of

Atlantic Richfield,

642 F.Supp.

prohibited

with

contact

1116

"present

(D.Mont.
or

1986),

former

the Court

employees

with

managerial responsibilities concerning the matter in litigation."
The responsibility for knowing which employees are covered by the
Rule rests squarely on the contacting attorney.9
"Whether an employee falls into any of [the] three categories
is inevitably an issue affected by a host of factors . .

These

include at least the terms of the relevant statutory and common law
of the state of the corporation's incorporation; applicable rules
of evidence in the relevant jurisdiction; and relevant corporate
documents affecting employees' duties and responsibilities. 10

As

the Committee points out, attorneys should also be aware that the
Comment to Rule 4.2 covers non-employees

(e.g.

independent con-

tractors) insofar as their statements may bind the corporation. 11
C.

KBA ETHICS OPINIONS KBA E-65 AND E-213 12

Opinions of the Kentucky Bar Association clearly indicate that
a

lawyer

representing

a

party

N-6

adverse

to

a

corporation

or

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------------------------

-

governmental entity may not contact any employee "having access to
confidential

matters"

of

the

entity without

prior

consent

of

opposing counsel. D
KBA E-213 states that the attorney may contact "employees who
are not managing agents and hourly wage earners who have no access
to privileged or confidential information."

However, the text of

the opinion states as follows:
"If any attorney can independently determine
that a management employee or hourly wage
earner does not have any access to privileged
or confidential information, they may be
contacted by an adversary attorney."
Where
however,

such

an

independent

determination

cannot

be

made,

KBA E-213 requires an inquiry through the appropriate

officials of the corporation.

Since the corporation would be

represented by counsel, the appropriate inquiry should be directed
to counsel.
The opinion offers no further guidance on counsel's ability to
"independently determine" whether an employee would have access to
privileged or confidential

information.

Clearly,

the attorney

risking contact with the employee to determine whether such access
exists risks inadvertent or unintentional violation of the Rule.
D.

SHONEY'S, INC. V. LEWIS
The Kentucky Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 4.2 in

its January, 1994 decision in Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis, No. 93-CA286-0A (January 31, 1994).

There, the Court ruled that meetings

between Plaintiff's counsel and two employees - a general manager
and a relief manager - without consent from or notice to opposing
counsel violated the Rule.

The contacts occurred following actual
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notice to plaintiff's counsel that the defendant employer was
represented.
The Court relied upon the following Comment to the Rule in
finding the violation:
(2)
In the case of an organization, this Rule
prohibits communications by a lawyer fo·r one
party concerning the matter in representation
with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with
any other persons whose act or omission in
connection with that matter may be imputed to
the organization for purpose of civil or
criminal liability or whose statement may
consti tute an admission on the part of the
organization.
SCR 3.130 Rule 4.2, comment 2 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
The Court concluded that the "senior managerial" employees involved
"are precisely within the group of persons provided for in the
comment."
In fashioning a remedy for the violation of the Rule, the
Court both disqualified Plaintiff's counsel and suppressed the
evidence gathered in violation of the Rule stating:
"Wi th respect to the statements wrongfully
obtained, the only satisfactory remedy is
suppression ... 14
E.

ONE STATE-THREE STANDARDS
1.

CONTACT WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES PROHIBITED

In Public Serv.

Elec.

&

Gas

v.

Associated Elec.

and Gas

Insurance Services, 745 F.Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990), the defendant
insurance company sought to

interview former employees of

the

plaintiff in order to determine the extent of its liability for
environmental
sites.

The

clean-up
district

costs
court

at

plaintiff's

broadly
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coal

interpreted

gasification
Comment

2

as

extending to

"any individual whose acts or omissions

'may'

be

imputed to the organization,,15 and held that Rule 4.2 prohibits
informal

contact

with

an

adverse

corporate

party's

former

employees.
As the court observed, "The Rule, as described in the comment
protects the organizations [sic] interest in the acts and
omissions"
limited

that may be

to

imputed to the corporation and is

statements .16

Thus ,

although

a

former

not

employee's

statements made during an informal conference will not themselves
be imputable to the corporation 17 , a former employee could testify
to actions taken during his employment that could be imputed to the
corporation .18
acts]

is

For this reason,

"the harm caused by [imputable

the same whether the witness

is a

present or former

employee. ,,19
In contrast to the ABA opinion, the P.S.&G. court felt that
the twin policy goals of Rule 4.2,

(1) to protect the corporate

attorney-client relationship and (2)
from

extracting

"damaging

to prevent trained lawyers

concessions

from

the

unshielded

layman, ,,20 outweighed the need for liberal discovery.
The P.S.&G. court did not limit its ban on informal contacts
to

only

those

situations

where

the

contacting

attorney

can

determine that the corporate party may incur liability as a result
of ex parte communications with former employees.

Rather,

the

court held that such an approach is unwieldy and should be abandoned in favor of a blanket ban against all ex parte contacts with
former employees.
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2.

CONTACT WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES ALLOWED

In Curley v. Cumberland Farms Inc.,

134 F.R.D.

77

(D.N.J.

1990), plaintiffs, employees at defendant's chain of convenience
stores,

alleged that

employee

interrogations

to

recover

store

losses were conducted in such a manner as to constitute a pattern
of extortion under state and federal RICO laws.

Plaintiffs sought

to interview 80 of defendant's former "Loss Prevention Specialists"
(employees authorized to conduct interrogations), none of whom were
known to have had direct contact with the plaintiffs, but could
provide

information relative to plaintiffs' claims.

Defendants

sought a protective order to prevent plaintiffs' attorney's contact
with defendant's former employees.
The court first determined that the former loss prevention
specialists were not management-level employees. 21
court

s~rmised

Second,

the

that the actions taken by the 80 former employees

were unlikely to be imputed to the corporation because none were
known to have had contact with the plaintiffs.

Indeed, plaintiffs'

claims were not based on an imputation theory.
contended

that

any

information

received

Rather, plaintiffs

by

the

former

loss

prevention specialists would constitute mere evidence of an alleged
unlawful management-level policy. For this reason, the court found
that the former loss prevention specialists were comparable to
"witnesses
accident.

to

an

accident

who

did

not

participate

in

the

,,22

Although it was conceivable that actions taken by some of the
80

former loss prevention specialists could be imputed to the

corporation, this was largely because lack of information prevented
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the plaintiffs from discovering the extent of the former employees'
relevant knowledge. Under these circumstances, the court found a
broad interpretation of Rule 4.2 would unduly infringe on the
"truth-finding process" and "extract an enormous price unwarranted
by the ethical concerns. ,,23

The court thus declined to follow

P.S.&G., and held:
[I]informal interviews of former nonmanagerial
employees of a corporate defendant are not ethically
prohibited by RPC 4.2 unless the person's act or omission
is believed to be so central and obvious to a
determination of corporate liability that the person's
conduct may be imputed to the corporation. . . . If it
is not reasonably likely that the person may be a central
actor for liability purposes, nothing in RPC 4.2
precludes
informal
contact
with
such
a
former
employee. 24
As concerns admissions, the court concluded that statements
made by former loss prevention specialists would not constitute
admissions under FRE 80l(d) (2) (D)

(statements made by employees

during the existence of the relationship)
(statements

made

by co-conspirators

nor FRE 80l(d)(2)(E)

during

the

course

of

the

conspiracy) and thus were not prohibited.
3.

CONTACT WITH "ALTER EGOS" ALLOWED

The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, adopted a
third approach to regulate
party's current employees.
A.2d 180

(1991),

extremes

prohibiting

ex parte contact with a

corporate

In New Jersey v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 589

the court specifically rejected "bright line"
all

ex

parte

interviews

with

employees.

Instead, the court held that ex parte contact could not be made
wi th any corporate employee whose acts

or omissions would be

binding on the corporation or imputed to

the corporation

for

purposes of its liability, as well as any employees who are imple-
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menting the advice of corporate counsel.

Consequently, it rejected

both the "bright line" prohibition in P.S.&G., and the so-called
"control group" test utilized in Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.
The court cited and effectively adopted the approach utilized by
the New York Court of Appeals in Niesig v. Team I, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).
III. INTERVIEWING CLIENTS' EMPLOYEES
A.

RELEVANT RULES
Rule 1.13: Organization As Client

*
(d)

*

*

*

*

In dealing with an organization's directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity
of a client when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those constituents
with whom the lawyer is dealing.

Rule 4.3:

Dealing With Unrepresented Person

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply
that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person
misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding.
Rule 4.4: Respect For Rights Of Third Persons
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly
use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay or burden a third person, or knowingly
use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person.
These Rules clearly guide counsel when representation of the
organizational client calls on counsel to engage in contacts with
that organization's employees.
the

employee that counsel

The lawyer must specifically advise

represents

the employer,

and,

where

necessary, advise the employee that the interests of the employer

N -12

are

adverse

and

that

the

employee

should

consider

obtaining

counsel.
Rule 4.4 prohibits violating the "legal rights" of persons.
The Comment states that while it is impracticable to catalogue all
such

rights,

"they

include

legal

restrictions

obtaining evidence from third persons."

on

methods

of

Clearly, rights enjoyed by

persons pursuant to the Rules of Civil- Procedure would become
relevant.
B. Johnnies Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770 (1964).
The National Labor Relations Act imposes additional affirmati ve duties on counsel when interviewing or interrogating employees
of a client.
a

Where that client is unionized, or even subject to

unionization effort,

the Act places

special

restrictions

on

interviews of employees who enjoy rights under the Act.
Specifically, when investigating a labor related matter, the
specific purpose of the questioning must be communicated to the
employee.

In addition, the employee must be given assurances of no

reprisals regardless of whether. the information provided, if any,
ultimately proves harmful to the employer.

The investigation must

be conducted in an atmosphere free from anti-union animus, must
occur in a non-coercive fashion.

The questioning must only be

relevant to the specific issue involved in the instant matter, and
cannot include the probing of the employee's subjective state of
mind.

Finally, the investigation must be entirely voluntary on the

part of the employee.
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IV.

EX PARTE CONTACT WITH NLRB OFFICIALS
NLRB Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, Part

102, Subpart P, prohibit ex parte communications with the Regional
Director, members of the Board, administrative law judges, hearing
officers and support staff involved in preparing decisions in the
following situations:
1.

After a formal hearing is opened on a pre-election

or post-election petition filed under 9(c)(1) or 9(e) of the NLRA.
(102.128(a-b».
2.

After a decision is issued on unit clarification,

certification amendments or post-election proceedings in which no
formal hearing was held. (102.128(c».
3.

After a hearing on a jurisdictional strike is opened

pursuant to section 10(k) of the NLRA. (102.128(d».
4.

After a complaint or notice of hearing is issued in

an unfair labor practice proceeding or after it is known that a
complaint

or

notice

will

be

issued,

whichever

occurs

first.

(102.128(e»
5.

By

specific

Board

order

in

any

proceeding.

(102.128(f».
Communications

not

prohibited

by

the

rule

include

those

authorized by Board rule (102.130(a», questions about the status
of a proceeding (102.130(b», communications that the parties agree
may

be

made

ex

parte

(102.130(c»,

settlement

proposals

(102.130(d», and general communications not specifically related
to the on-the-record proceedings (102.130(e».
The NLRB prohibition against ex parte communication applies to
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any "interested person" (102.126, 102.127(a», and also prohibits
knowingly causing others to violate the rule.

(102.126, 102.131).

Violation of the rule against ex parte communication can cause
the offending party's claim to be "dismissed, denied, disregarded,
or otherwise adversely affected."
attorney's

(102.133(a».

In addition, an

privilege to practice before the Board can be revoked

or suspended. (102.133(b».
V.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR ATTORNEYS
A.

RELEVANT STATUTES
1.

§ 203 (b,c,f) of the Labor-Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §433 (b,c,f) (1982):

*

*

*

*

*

(b) Every person who pursuant to any agreement or
arrangement with an employer undertakes activities where
an object thereof is, directly or indirectly -(1) to persuade employees to exercise or not
to exercise, or persuade employees as to the manner
of exercising, the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing; or
(2) to supply an employer with information
concerning the activities of employees or a labor
organization in connection with a labor dispute
involving such employer, except information for use
solely in conjunction with an administrative or
arbitral proceeding or criminal or civil judicial
proceeding;
.
shall file within thirty days after entering into such
agreement or arrangement a report with the Secretary,
signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding
principal officers, containing the name under which such
person is engaged and doing business and the address of
its principal office, and a detailed statement of the
terms and conditions of such agreement or arrangement.
Every such person shall file annually, with respect to
each fiscal year during which payments were made as a
resul t of such an agreement or arrangement, a report with
the Secretary, signed by its president and treasurer or
corresponding principal officers, containing a statement
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(A) of its receipts of any kind from employers on account
of labor relations advice or services, designating the
sources thereof, and (B) of its disbursements of any
kind, in connection with such services and the purposes
thereof. In each such case such information shall be set
forth in such categories as the Secretary may prescribe.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
require any employer or other person to file a report
covering the services of such person by reason of his
giving or agreeing to give advice to such employer or
representing or agreeing to represent such employer
before any court, administrative agency, or tribunal of
arbitration or engaging or agreeing to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of such employer with
respect to wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of
employment or the negotiation of an agreement or any
question arising thereunder.

*

*

*

*

*

(f) Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed as an amendment to, or modification of the
rights protected by, section 158(c) of this title.
2.

§ 204 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §434 (1982):

Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to
require an attorney who is a member in good standing of
the bar in any State, to include in any report required
to be filed pursuant to the provisions of this Act any
information which was lawfully communicated to such
attorney by any of his clients in the course of a
legitimate attorney-client relationship.

B.

WHO MUST DISCLOSE: PERSUADERS VS. ADVISORS

In International Union UAW v. Dole, 869 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir.
1989), attorneys formulated a personnel policy for their client,
Kawasaki Motor Corp., designed to discourage unionization.

The UAW

claimed that the law firm's preparation of the policy constituted
persuader activity under the LMRDA and thus reporting was required.
The court held that the policy formulation fell within the 203(c)
exception for advice.

In its holding,

Secretary of Labor's position that:
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the court

adopted the

(1)

If an arrangement can be properly characterized as

advice then the services fall under §203 (c)
whether

"the

object"

of

the

service

regardless of

performed

involves

employee persuasion. 25
(2)

"'An activity is characterized as advice if it is

submitted orally or in written form to the employer for his
use, and the employer is free to accept or reject the oral or
written material submitted to him.'
C.

,,26

WHAT MUST BE DISCLOSED

In Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211
(6thCir.

1985),

attorneys

who made

anti-union

speeches

to

a

client's non-union employees prior to election were "persuaders"
for the purposes of

§203(b) and thus required to comply with the

reporting provisions.
Appellants stipulated that they had acted as persuaders but
argued: (a) that the persuader-attorneys had identified themselves
as representatives of management and thus the goal of§203(b) to
publicize persuader activities is not furthered by subjecting the
firm to the reporting requirements; (b) under §203(c), the firm is
not obligated to disclose other clients for whom it performs no
persuader activities; (c) information required by the annual report
is protected by the
§204j

broad attorney-client privilege delineated in

(d) the disclosure requirements are unconstitutional.
The Sixth Circuit rejected each of these arguments reasoning

that the goal of §203(b) is not limited simply to publication of
persuader activities.

"Rather, Congress determined that persuasion

itself was a suspect activity and concluded that the possible evil
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It

could best be remedied through disclosure.

was hoped that

persuasive activity would be curbed by subjecting persuaders to
glaring publicity.

,,27

(Cf.

Donovan v. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964

(8th Cir. 1985».

Furthermore, "[T]he purpose of section 203(c) is

to clarify what is implicitly in section 203(b) -- that attorneys
engaged in the usual practice of labor law are not obligated to
C

report under section 203 (b) . ,,28

However, once an attorney "crosses

the boundary between the practice of labor law and persuasion, he
is subj ect to the extensive reporting requirements.
Law Firm)

,,29

(Cf. Rose

(S203(c) is a limitation of the content of the report

which is unaffected by the activity giving rise to the duty to
report)

.30

The Court further held that the attorney-client privilege
protected by S204 is identical to the common law attorney-client
privilege and thus exempts only communications from the

reporting

requirements and does not protect against the disclosure of the
facts

required

by S203(b).31

(Cf.

Rose

Law

Firm)

(attorney-

persuaders not required to report advice given clients
clients

themselves

requirements)
Finally,
"maintaining

would

not

be

subject

to

the

if the

reporting

.32

the court held that the governmental interest in
harmonious

labor

relations"

is

compelling

and

outweighs the moderate chill on First Amendment rights occasioned
by the reporting requirements of S203(b)
(statute

should

be

construed

consti tutional rights). 34
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to

.33

avoid

(Cf. Rose Law Firm)
infringement

of

VI.

ADVISING MANAGEMENT DURING UNION ORGANIZATIONAL/ DECERTIFICATION ELECTIONS
A.

THE UNION VIEW
"While employers are, of course, entitled to legal advice

and counsel, the range of attorney services has deviated far beyond
the mere provision of legal representation. Attorneys now operate
as strategists_for employer _ 'yoteno' campaigns and often observe
neither the law nor professional ethics in so doing.

Lawyers also

conduct seminars where they teach not only election strategies but
also how an employer can encourage and campaign in deauthorization
and decertification elections.

Under the law, employer prompting

of these efforts is prohibited,

but attorneys have nevertheless

taught employers how to do so without being discovered." Address by
Jules Bernstein of the Washington, D.C. firm, Connerton, Bernstein
&

Katz. 35
B.

THE MANAGEMENT VIEW
"Employers need effective counsel in order to comply with

the complex provisions of the NLRA."

Note,

Liability of Labor

Relations Consultants for Advising Unfair Labor Practices,
Harv .

L.

Rev.

529 ,

54 a .

An employer's right to counsel

"precious right and is to be preserved and given effect."

1983
is a

NLRB v.

Guild Indus. Mfg. Corp., 321 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1963).

In St.

Francis Hospital, 263 NLRB 834 (1982), the Administrative Law Judge
observed that any improper intrusion on an employer's right to
counsel would result in the "commission of more, rather than fewer,
unfair labor practices by uninformed parties."
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Id. at 848.

C.

BOARD REACTION
1.

RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY

The Board has authority to promulgate rules governing the
discipline of attorneys practicing before it. (See e.g., NLRB Rules
and

Regulations

and

Statements

of

Procedure,

Rule

102.133(b)

("Board may censure, suspend, or revoke the privilege of practice
before the Agency of any person who knowingly and willfully makes
or solicits the making of a prohibited ex parte communication") and
Rule 102.66(d)(2)

("misconduct of an aggravated character, when

engaged in by an attorney [at a hearing or before an agent of the
Board] shall be grounds for suspension or disbarment by the Board
from further practice before it"».
However,

despite

the

high

profile

of

attorneys

and

professional consulting services providing employers with advice in
labor relations,
policy,

the Board has yet to

formulate a

for dealing with such practices. 36

rule,

or a

As the above cited

rules indicate, the Board has confined its disciplinary authority
"to conduct which either takes place at the hearing or is closely
connected with it. ,,37
2.
The

RECOURSE UNDER THE NLRA

Board's

puni ti ve . 38

As

authority
a

result,

under
the

the

Board's

NLRA

is

ability

remedial,
to

deal

not
with

attorney's who advise management who commit unfair labor practices
is severely limited.

Absent repeated,

willful violations,

the

Board is hard-pressed to characterize any limitations imposed on
attorneys under the NLRA as remedial. 39

Of course, the prospect

of a bargaining order has a significant deterrent effect on pre-
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election

misconduct.4~

Naming employer's counsel in a complaint is a maneuver which
should be given careful thought by the Board and charging party.
The

Fifth Circuit

"intimidatory

and

Court

of

coercive"

Appeals

has

restraint

described

on

the

this

as

an

attorney-client

relationship.41
The Board will hold outside consultants responsible for the
unfair labor practices committed by them.42
has

entered

into

an

unpublished

In one case, the Board

settlement

agreement

with

a

consulting firm by which the firm agreed to cease and desist from
interfering with the rights of workers to join a particular union
"or any other labor organization. ,,43

To date,

the majority of

cases naming consultants as codefendants for violations of the Act
involve situations where the consultant directly contacted employees and had a past history of engaging in such unlawful conduct.
In NLRB

v.

Selvin,

527

F.2d

1273

(9th Cir.

1975),

the

court

enforced the Board's order that the consultant-bargaining agent
bargain in good faith.

The same consultant had been involved in

approximately nine cases, working as a bargaining agent for various
employers, before she was actually named as a party and subjected
to a Board order. 44
In St. Francis Fed. of Nurses & Hlth. Pro. v. NLRB, 729 F.2d
844

(D.C. Cir.

1984), management employed a consulting firm for

advice on how to resist an organizational effort on the part of its
non-unionized nurses.
but

advised

The firm did not directly contact employees

supervisory

personnel

how

to

lawfully

approach

employees and persuade them to vote against unionization. The union
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sought to hold the consulting firm directly responsible for unfair
labor practices committed by hospital supervisors at the firm's
direction.
The federal court upheld the Board's determination that the
consulting firm could not be held liable under the Act for acts
committed by the hospital supervisors.

However,

it was not the

court's determination that a consulting firm can never be directly
responsible for violation of the Act.

Rather, it was found that

the firm did not advise the supervisors to commit unlawful acts of
interrogation.
a.

Agency Theory

In Bill Scott Oldsmobile, 282 NLRB 1073 (1987), an employer
was held to have violated §8(a)(1) when its attorney interrogated
several

employees

in preparation

for

hearing concerning unlawful discharges.
each

an unfair

labor practice

Although the attorney told

employee that there would be no reprisals for information

provided, the attorney failed to inform several employees of the
purpose of the interview and to ensure that participation in the
interview was voluntary. 45

The Board issued a cease and desist

order directing management to refrain from interrogating employees
without first informing them of the purpose and voluntary nature of
the interview.
(D.C.

Cir.

(Cf. Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 712

1981)

(employer

can

compel

employee

to

submit

to

limited, pre-arbitration interview as long as the interview does
not pry into protected union activities)).
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D.

Rule 1.2(d) and (e) Scope of Representation

I

*

*

*

*

*

(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage,
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with
a client and may counselor assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope,
meaning or application of the law.

I
I[
r

BAR DISCIPLINE

I

(e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects
assistance not permitted by the rules of professional
conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the
client regarding the relevant limitations of the lawyer's
conduct.
Comment: Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions -[6]

A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the

actual consequences that appear likely to
conduct.

result from a client's

The fact that a client uses advice in a course of action

that is criminal or fraudulent does not, of itself, make a lawyer
a

party to

the

course of

action.

However,

a

lawyer may not

knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct.

There

is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal
aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which
a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.
[7]

When the client's course of action has already begun and

is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate.
The lawyer is not permitted to reveal the client's wrongdoing,
except where

permitted by

Rule

1.6.

However,

required to avoid furthering the purpose,
gesting how it might be concealed.

the

lawyer

for example,

is

by sug-

A lawyer may not continue

assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposes
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1\
is legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent.
Withdrawal from the representation, therefore, may be required.

[
I~

I'
I
I'
I'
I,

[,

I
t;

I:
1_:

i,
I,
I;

I~
I:

r:
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I

I

I
I'

I:
I'
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Formal Ethics Opinions
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1
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I.'

Opinion KBA E-65
Question: -

Mayan attorney contact an opposing party to obtain information
relating to a pending controversy, without the consent of opposing
counsel?

Answer.

No.

References:

Canon 9.22; DR 7-104
_

i.

OpInfDn: (May 1973)

Defendant's attorney gave notice to take depositions of three plalntllIs. On
the day of the scheduled deposition, the plalntlfi's attorney, upon being advised of an
Illness to one of the plaintiffs by the wife of such plalntllI, who was also a.party to the
action, notified the chief counsel for the defendants approximately two hours before
the scheduled depositions. The chief coun~l preferred to take all three plaintiffs'
depositions at the same time, so he agreed to postpone the depositions and to notIfY
his co-counsel of such a decision.
.
In rel1a:nce upon the agreement with the defendant's chief counsel, the
plalntllIs' attorney did not appear for the depositions, nor did either of the-plaintiffs.
The defendant's co-counsel had been advised at least one hour before the scheduled
deposItions that they would not be taken.
Defendant's co-counsel, with one of the defendants, then searched out the
plalntllIs and Inquired of the nature of the illness and attempted to determine whether
or not In fact the plaintiff was ill or was tending to other business. No leave of court
was obtained and no effort was made to contact the plaintiffs' attorney prior to
contacting the plaintiff.
The defendant's co-counsel Interrogated the plaintiff concerning the advice
he had received from the plaintiffs attorney about attending the deposition and
communications between them about the deposition. Defendant's co-counsel later
testified as a witness In support of his motion to dismiss the case and for an affinnative
award of counsel fees and expenses for attending the deposition.
The issue arises as to whether or not it was proper to communicate with an
adverse party pending litigation without the consent of his counsel.
Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics holds:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel. .. but should deal only with his
counsel.
And. DR 7-104 states:
(a) During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not...
(1) Communicate 01' cause another to communicate on the subject of

N - 29

representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer
in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or Is authorized by law to do so.
Through the years. the ABA has dealt with Canon 9 in numerous situations.
In ABA Fonnal Opinion 187 (193"8). the Committee held:
It is clear from the earlier opinions of this Committee that Canon 9 Is
to be construed lIteraI1y and does not allow a communication with an
opposing party. without the consent of his counsel. though his purpose be
merely to investigate the facts.

It Is evident from reading the earlier opinions and later ones that this Is the
clear intent of the Canon. ABA Informal Decision C-426. Issued March 16. 1961. held
that the materiality or the Immateriality of the Information which the attorney might
obtain from the adverse party in a statement would have no bearing on the question'
of ethics involved. And. later in ABA Informal Decision C-517. issued February 15.
1962. the Committee again held for Its strict application and listed but two exceptions
to such application: (1) If the attorney for the other party consents to the contact, then
contact will be proper, and (2) If Information vital to the settlement of the case Is not
communicated by the other attorney to his client.
Despite the increased liberality of the Civil Rules and fonns of discovery. the
rules do not contemplate discovery of privileged information between attorney and
client. While it is the duty of an attorney to represent his client zealously. It is also his
duty to represent him within the bounds of the law.
IUs also proper to note that Canon 22 provides that the conduct of the lawyer
before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and
fairness. Clearly this includes trust in one's opposing counsel and acceptance in good
faith of what he conveys to you. The results of gross mistrust in the legal profession
are Immeasurable.
.
The reasons for the prohibition upon communications are clear and
convincing. They arise out of the nature of the relation of attorney and client and are
Imperative to the rights and interests of the adverse party and his attorney. To
preserve the proper functioning of the legal system. as well as to shield an adverse
party from improper approaches. the Canons and Disciplinary Rules are to be strictly
applied.
.

I
I
I'
I .

I,
I

!
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Opinion KBA E-213
Question 1:

Maya lawyer who has a sult pending against a corporation or
governmental entity contact the Prcsident. General Manager. or
other employee having access to confidential matters without prior
consent of the other lawyer?

Answer 1:

No.

Question 2:

Maya lawyer who is presently suing a corporation or governmental
entity contact employees who are not managing agents
and hourly wage earners that have no access to privileged or
confidential information?

Answer 2:

Yes.

References:

Opinion KBA 65; DR 7-104

OptniDn: (March 1979)
The general proposition of communicating with one of adverse interest Is set
out In DR 7 -104(A)(l). which simply states that an attorney shall not communicate on
the subject of the representation with the party he knows to be represented by a lawyer
unless he has prior consent of the lawyer representing the other party. The general
application of DR 7-104 is set out In Opinion KBA E-65.
The question before us today Is to what extent this restrictive communication applies to employees ofa corporation. Beyond a doubt, the restriction would apply
to any corporate officer. member of the Board of Directors or any management
employee with access to any privileged or confidential Information of the corporation.
If any attorney can Independently determine that a management employee or hourly
wage earner does not have any access to privileged or confidential information. they
may be contacted by an adversary attorney.
If an opposing attorney cannot truly find out the relationship of any
employee with the employer corporation and whether or not the employee has any
access to privileged or confidential information. It will be necessary to inquire through
the proper officials of the corporation. Since the proper officials of the corporation are
represented by an attorney. the proper individual to contact before questioning any
doubtful employee would be the opposing attorney for the corporation or governmental agency.
To paraphrase Canon 7 of the Code. even though a lawyer has a duty to
represent his client zealously. It must be within the bounds of the law. The Rules of
Civil Procedure prOvide for discovery of relevant information from any employees of
any corporation. Therefore. If there Is any question concerning the relationship of an
employee to the corporation or governmental entity. It Is necessary to contact the
attorney of the corporation before taking any statements from the employee or from
ques tlonlng any employee of the adversary corporation.
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Employment Litigation: Insurance
coverage and Ethical lSsueS

The insurance defense lawyer representing insurers and
insureds in employment-related matters is subject to the same
rules of professional ethics as are all other lawyers;
however, the mlique r",lat iQnship of counsel, insurer, insured
and often, insured'", employees I presents soms special problems
in the application of those rules in insurance litigation.
This outline discu.8ses the current ethical rules and how they
apply in insurance related rttaL:ters.
II .

I
I
I
I

The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1986) ("Model
Code") and the W:.d",l R\\les of I?rofessional Conduct (1983)
("Model Rules"), loI'bich has superseded the Model Code in most
states, provide the genel'al principles for resolution of
ethical issues.
'rhe typiG"l ethical dilemma faced by an
insurance
defense
lawyer.
comes
from
multiple
party
representation: an attorney representing multiple clients who
are co-plaintiffs OJ::' Go-defendants in the same litigation (the
problem being adverse intel:ests which lead to a confllet of
interest for the attorney in question.)
Courts will often
permit this multiple repr-esentation to occur, partly because
the potential for conflicting loyalties is less compared to
the benefits of multiple representation.
However, the duty of undivided loyalty that an attorney owes
his or h",r client can be compromised in this type of
situation. The Model Code and Model Rules are sensitive to
this duty and provide some guidailce concerning this potential
conflict.
However', nejt:her give specific guidance when a
conflict of inter'est exists between an insurer and insured.
Ethical Consideral:ion 5- 17 in the Model Code identifies the
insurer/insured situation as a, typical problem, which requir",s
a caee-by-case analysis to determine the "chance of adverse
effect" of differing intE'n:ests On the lawyer's judgment.

Canon 5, the conD ict of. interest canon of the Model Code and
Rule 1.7 "Conflict of IntE)):est: Genel'al Rule", of the Model
Rules set forth the duty of. undivided loyalty and address the
conflicts that arise from simUltaneous representation of
multiple clients, c~noll 4. of the Model Code sets forth the
duty to preserve cl ient cont idenceS .
Carlon 9 dictates the
avoidance of the appearance (If impropriety.
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A.
The Model Code specificall1' addresses concurrent adverse
representation conflicts in its Disciplinary Rules, at DR
5-105, which provides, in pertinent part:
(Al
A lawyer' shall decline proffered
employment
if
the exercise of his
independent professional
judgment in
behalf of a client will be or is likely
to
he
adversely
affected
by
the
acceptance of the proffered employment,
or it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except
to the extent: permitted under DR 5105 (C) .

!
I

I
I
!
I

(B) A lawyer fihall not continue multiple
employment. i f
the exerc:ise of his
independent pLote£sional
judgment in
behalf of a cl ien.t will be or is likely
to
be
adversely
affected
by
his
representation of another client, or it
would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except
to the extent pennitted under DR 5-

t.

I
I

105(C) .

In the situations covered by DR 5and (BJ, a lawyer may represent
multiple cli€nts if it is obvious that he
can adequately repn:.sent the interest of
each and if ~ach consents to the
representation after full disclosure of
the,
possible
effect
of
such
representation on the exercise of the
lawyer's
irldependent
professional
judgment on behalf of each.
(e)

105 (1'.)

Disqualification is therefore called for, absent common client
interests and client consent, if representation would either
result in the representation of "differing interests" or an
adverse effect on an i,~torney' s judgment on behalf of a
client. The Mode). Code defines the term "differing interests"
to "include eve1.-Y interest that will adversely affect either
the judsment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether
'it be a conflictl.!)g,
inconsistent,
diverse, or other
interest." Mode Code, Definitions.
The Code also provide's a number Of Ethical Considerations that
provide guidance for th(! insurance defense counsel.
The first of the ecthi.cal representations stated under Canon 5
provides for the duty oj' loyalty:
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BC 5-1
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be
exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the
benefit of his client: and f!"ee of compromising influences and
loyalties.
Neither his personal interests, the interest of
other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
The following ethical considerations apply specifically to
rep!"esentation of multiple parties and are provided below, in
pertinent part:
BC 5-14
Maintaining the independence of
professional judgment required of a lawyer
precludes his acceptance of continuation of
employment. that wi.ll adversely affect hl.s
judgment on behalf of ()r dilute his loyalty to
a client.
This problem arises whenever a
lawyer is asked to represent two or more
clients who may bave differing interests,
whether
such
interests
be
conflicting,
inconsistent, diverse or otherwise discprdant.
EC 5-15
If
a
lawyer
is
requested
to
undertake o~· to continue representation of
multiple clients having potentially differing
interests,
he must
weigh carefully the
possibility that. hip judgment may be impaired
or hi s loyal';:y divided i f he accepts or
continues the employment.
He should resolve
all doubts against the propriety of the
representation.
A lawyer should never
represent in litigation multiple clients with
differing interests;
and
there are
few
situations in which he would be justified in
representing in l i tigation mult: iple clients
with potentially differing interests ...

In those instances in which a lawyer
is justified in ~epresenting two or more
clients havi.ng differing interests, it is
nevertheless essent iiil that each client be
given the oppo:rtunity t.o evaluate the need for
representation freE' of any potential conflict
and to obtai.n other counsel if the client so
desires.
Thus before a lawyer may represent
mult.iple clients,· t.he lawyer should explain
fully to each client the implicat.ions of the
common repl:'9sentation and should accept or
continue employment. only if the clients
consent.
If
there
are present
other
circuffistanceJs t.hat might cause any of the
mUltiple clients to question the undivided
loyal ty of t.he lawYGr, the lawyer should also
advise all clien~s of those circumstances.
Ee 5-16
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Be 5-17
Typically
recurring
situations
involving pot.entially differing interests are
those in which a lav/er is asked to represent

I
,

• •. an insuTed and in:mrer
Whether a
lawyer can fairly and adequately protect the
interests of multiple clients in these and
similar sit.uations de !;lend upon an analysis Of
each case.
In certain circumstances, there
may exist little ChaliCE! of the judgment of the
lawyer being adveraely affected by the slight

\

!

possibility that the interest will become
actually differing; ill other circumstances,
the chance of adverEe effect upon.the-lawyer's
judgment is not unl.ikely.

:a •

[

~..Q9~LRI,!.ls:l.$u~.Lg I;Q.~§1>.iQn<Jl_C;.Qllgu ct~

The Model Rules, like the Model Code specifically provide
a standard fol.- attorneys to reference
concurrent adVerse representation.

concerning

Model Rule 1.7, on ·:'onflict of Interest states:

lawyer shall not represent a
thE) revresental::i.on of that
\\'111 be directly adverse to
another client, unless:

(a) a
client
client

if

I
I
!

(1)
the lawyer reasonable believes
the
representation
will
not
adven,ely aff<?ct the relationship
with the other client; and
(2)
each
client
con5ultation.

consents

after

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a
client if tll6 representation of that
clierlt may be materially limited by the
lawyer'l> responsibilities to another
client or to a t.hird person, or by the
lawyer's own interest, unless:

r.

(1) the Lal'lyer reasonably believes
the
::::ep!~et'entat:lon
will not be
adver:;ely affected; and

(2) the
client
consents
after
cooBuL taticn.
When representation
of multiple clients in a single
matter
is
undertaken,
the
consultation
Shall
include
e):planat;>'Qr" of the implications of

I,
I•

I
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I

the COlThllOn representation and the
advantagefl and risks involved.
The term "differing interests" is not used in the Model

I

Rules.
Instead, the Model Rules prohibit an
from representing int.,rests that are "directly
or accepting employment when "r'epresentation
client may be materially limited by the
responsibilities to anothe;t' client."

However, when a lawyer reasonably believes that the
representation will be adversely aftectad is not clear . .
According to the comments, to Model Rule 1.7, this
reasonable belief exists when a "disinterested lawyer
would conclude that the client should not agree to the
representation under the circumstances."
In addition,
the Model Rules list the following facts to be considered
in determining whetller representation of one client will
have a "directly adveJ:se" affect on another client: (a)
duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with
the client or client: involved; (b) the functions being
performed by the la-I'Iyer; (e) the likelihood that actual
conflict will arise; and (d) the likely prejudice to the
client. Mode Rules. Rule 1.7 Comment.

I.

I
I
I

attorney
adverse"
of that
lawyer's

Conflicts of interest pot~ntially affecting the representation
are inherent in situations in whiCh an insurance carrier has
agreed to provide a defenSE! for its insured. Analysis of any
conflict sitl.lat.ion must be'gin with the question of client
identity.
A.

I

ABA Formal Opinion 2B2, issued in 1950, states that a
lawyer may et.hicalli' undert.ake the dual representation of
the insurer and the insured in the defense of a third
party action aga:inst the insured, based on the
commonality of interest:
From an analysis of their respective undertakings in the
insurance contract it is evident at' the outset that a
community of interest exists between the company and the
insured gro~Ting out of the contract of insurance with
respect to any action brought by a third person against
the insured withill t.he policy limitations. The Company
and the inell:red ilr", virtually one in their common
interest.
'
Some authorities and many practitioners hold that in the
typical liability Hituation, the lawyer provided by the
carrier repl'e8ents both insured and insurer and the
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lawyeI" is ethically obligated to pI"otect the interest of
each.
See JilQ.9.;?.rd_-Y,-,_rili1D1Qy~rlL~g.lli'lty co., 164 Cal.
App. 3d 602, 609, 210 Cap Rptr. 578, 582 (1985).
Although both insurer and insured will sha);"8 the goal of
defeating the claim, they still may have different
interests
with
rr,cspect
to
trial
tactics
and/or
settlement.
When the interest of the insurer and the
insured diff0r, the p~'evailing view is that the insurance
defense lawyer's duty of undivided loyalt.y is owed to the
insured. Et.hical consideration 5-1 explicitly states the
lawyer's obligation under Canon 5 of the Model Codes is
to serve t.he client with undiluted loyalty. The Comment
to Model Rule 1,7, states: "Loyalty is an essential
element in the lawyer's relationship to a client".
Therefore, if differing interests of the insurers and the
insured arise, then the lawyer's ethical duty of
undivided lo>ralty to the client is o\l'sd to only the
insured. See e. g, §1;i.,Q.l'lp_n_v. W~J;:_er!}_JLh:'!LW.9..lJ£Ul~ Co.,
682 P.2d 725, 736 (Mont. 1984). ABA Formal Opinion 1476
(1981) statefJ: "when a liability insurer retains a lawyer
to defend an ;i.nsured, the insured is the lawyer's
client."

Hmlever,
thil!'
situa.tion is still not free from
difficulty.
The situation is still one in which the
lawyer is being compensated by a third party (the
insure!:) and must analyze his or her ability to put aside
any loyal ties he or she TIlay feel t.o the company. In this
situation, 1'.ule 1. '} (b), provided above, would still
apply, becallse thE! lal<.-)'er may feel loyalty to the
insurance company, Which mar lawyer must reasonably
believe that the representatlon will not be adversely
affected and the client must consent after full
disclosure.
B.

£-auS~;;L,.Q1'JgJ;.~n.ti~;L_';_Q.J.JDj.ct
I ml1!J:_~J a l!.1!.. ;In.F'_llXl1lQ-,.

Jii.t.ll<l..tionlL__':Wvol.Ying tb&

There is no presumpti.on of a conflict situation simply
because multiple plaintiffs or defendants are represented
by the same attonlt"y; actual evidence of a conflict is
required before the queAtion of disqualification of
counsel arises, In £.b.'iLIJ:e.LMJ.1.J;."-._.In~. Co., 160 Ill. App.
3d 146, 155, 513 N.!!:, 2d 490, 496 (1987), the lllinois
Appellate Court for the Fifth District: explained that
"(A) conflict cannot be inferred merely because an
insurance company is asserting noncoverage in a separate
suit."
Rather; the "test is whether
not there are
conflicting interests based upon the allegations found in
the complaint", Sele also Ka.rt:.fgrci]\.Qki.Q.QI1L.i'nd JndemlJit~
QQ..~_.Y~ •.E.Q.!l.tgX, S2E So2d 255, 268 (Miss. 1988).

I
(

!
!
I
!
I

t
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I
I

or

I.
\
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Therefore, conflictl; of interest arise when there is a
factual question which will decide whether the insured is
covered by the policy. ThEl insurer has an interest in
resol ving the factual questions against coverage ( even
though this result [nay undermine the insured's defense.

The followin9 are typical situations that may give rise
to a conflict of interest:
1.

In cases where cove~·age may be at issue, the
insurer will mak~ a "reservation of rights", where
it will provide a defense to the claim raised, but
may not indemnify. In this situation, the insurer
must both (1) notify the insured that it is
undertaking the defense, subject to a reservation
of rights, promptly after the potential Coverage
conflict has been discovered and (2) specifically
outline the ax~ct nature of the coverage conflict.
Not:. to do so, will prejudi.ce the insured and may
subject the ~nsurer to li.ability.
See e.g.,
S~:j.~mL.Y_.--.'dgJ'J.lj;'~·J;ILCfj~J.L<ll.ty__ .a.mLSJL~....Q.CL..., 33 (i F. 2d
14 (8th eir. 1964); ~Ll'a).ll,JrS'_J;".Q.\lrY_l_ns. Co LL......Y:~
H..i!k':L.f~.l9.in~'@1:..:i,JJ9_~Q..Q~,
B04 F. 2d 520 (9th Cir.
19 B6) .

In cases where the inaurer provides for the
insured's defense while asserting a reservation of
rights, some courts may require the insurer to pay
for ind~pendent cOllnsel to repreaent the insured so
<IS to avoid allY confl icts of interest.
The most
often c;ited a,lS" for this approach is B.ill1 ~_Q
t'~..J"g@J:..?J,--_{:rJ;;illJ._lJl1iQ!L.v:~---..ClliJ:Ij.JLI nsu r iU1.Q.a_:[llQ •
208 Cal. Rpt:r 494 (4th Dist. 19B4), where the
insurer ncltified the insured that it 'Was retaining
counsel to defend the insured, but was doing so
under 11 reserlation of rights.
The California
Court of Appeills stated that "A conflict arises
once the insurel: takes the view a coverage issue is
present." 208 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
HO~lever, most courts taking this approach will not
order such an action simply because the insurer has
asserted 11 res·ervation of rights. The grounds for
contesting coverage must rely on the assertion of
factual or legal theories that conflict with
positions asserted bi' the insured.
In l!i..9.Qee v .
.s.lJ'p~j;JJ;!X.J;9...w;-.1_,·176 Cal App 3d 221,221 Cal. Rptr.
421, (4th ·Dist. 1985), where the basis for the
reservation oj: l'ights was a coverage issue, M9.Q.rua
held that the rese·rvation of rights did not ipso
facto create c\ conflict of interest between the
il1sureland
the
insured
that
required
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di~quaU.ficati(ln

of the insurer-designated counsel..
221 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
McGee limited the Cumis
rule to apply only where the reservation·of rights
is "based on the nature of the insured's conduct,
which as dev€loped at trial would affect the
determination of coverage."
221 Cal. Rptr., 42324.
See alsc.. ~tc~.t~1.i~.r~ and---.r;g.1D,laUY....J~Q.'-'_-Y...
.e1!p_E;l.lli.r._c.Q\J.rt, 216 Cal. App 3d 1222, 265 Cal Rptr.
372, 374 n3 (1~89).
Also, in. 19.~Ln!J1,gXaL.l!Qill'i.......l.T)£!_:"-y--,-..Qbio_c.g.§Jlli.l.f;,~
Xn§li~9_DQ~_£~, SJ2 F.2d 1037 (7th eir. 1987), the
court held tha~ under Illinois law, the insurer's
conducting the defense under a reservation of
rights did not creat.e a conflict of interest. Tews
arose in the context of th .. ins-urer's action for a
declarator~{ judgment on the insurer's duty to pay
the fees and costs DE independent counsel in
defending a third party suit, as well as the
insurer's rigbt
to control the
third party
litigat:io'll.
The court held th~t the insurer's
denial of coverage of any of the claims in the
third pa rty complaint did not give ri se to a
conflict of interest. It also stated; "we will not
anticipate that counsel selected by Ohio (the
insurer) at its expense w.ill violate the strict
fiduciary duty owed to Tews and Ohio. 832 F. 2d at
1039.
2.

I
I
I

r;;.tgimlLf..QL@I]]i'!.5L~_~.Jn_.~xc.~p-9.L'p_Q,lli.Y--lirni~_...

Another difficult cor-fliet situation arises when
damages in excess DE policy limits are claimed
against t.he in:o;ured. In !>y'~.iJ;:.k..Y....__ l9'.91.Q.Qill, 258 Cal.
App. 2d, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968), the "classic"
case with regard to ethical obligations of the.
insurance dei<;l1se lawyer resulted.
There, the
policy limits were $10,000 and the defense lawyer
rej ected a settlement offer Of $12,500, despite the
insured'~ oEEer to pay the additional $2,500.
The
case went to trial and resulted in a judgment
against the insured for $225,000.
The insured
succe;;sfully sued the la\f,yer who had rElpresented
beth the insJ.:red and the insurer.
In a si.t.uation where the set.tlement offer is in
excess of the policy limits, and there is a
rsasonablec possj,bi J i t.y of winning t.he case, the
insurer wi::" 1 ~lant to proceed to trial and a
conflict may result for the lawyer. If the case is
won, the ins·J.rer has saved the amount of the
settlement; if lost, the insurer's liability is
locked in at t.he policy limit.
Hovlever, for the
insured, t.rial instead of settlement wi thin the
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policy linuts is a serious risk. The insured could
become liable t'Ol" payment of whatever is over the
policy limits. See Wur,nicke, T.MUt~l Trian.sJ&t
~.t...an(ti'll:.dI;1~_Q.L~E.t.hiG$!l
rru;>Lefl~.ati.Qn
by
the.
.J1lliUL~JLJ)~f~ruH?,--"l;&~,

31

Fo£--.th~---.J2§'fen~

2

(1989) .

3.

I

I
I

I

~t1J~.rum.LJ.§.§-'J.~~

An insured may contract away his or her rights to
be part of a settlement and the following situation
might reSult.
III llitc!:ID.llLY~..fu!.QgiDa, 533 So. 2d
194
(Ala. 1988), a lawyer was sued for legal
malpractice after he had settled a medical
malpractice claim against an insured doctor without
the knOwledge or. consent of the doctor. Although
the settlement was within policy limits, and cost
the doctor no defense or other financial costs, the
doctor claimed that his reputation was injured.
Although the Alabama Supreme Court recognized that
the ins.:ured alone was the lawyer's client, the
court found that the lawyer had not breaChed his
duty of loyalty to the client. The court relied on
the tel.lr.s of the insurance contract, which gave the
insun~r exclusive control over settlement.
In New
York, as well, if the policy provides the insurance
company t.lle absolute right to settle the action,
counsel can settle the c:ase without the insured's
consent.
EJ'lttP~tl.Y__~122Jllon,
517 N.Y.S.2d 632,
633-34 IN.Y. App. Div. 1987).
But see lV;:.\iD.1L.Y......_J:~:.Q~rlWr 735 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987':, where a Missouri court held that
the att.orneys ~lho settled a case without the
insured'fE consent breached their duty to the
insured as his i'lt.torney. The court reasoned that

[T)he obligations of an attorney to
his client 'are in nO way abridged
by the fac:t Lhat an insurer el'rtploys
him to repr'esent an insu:r:ed.' '"
The attor.ney mles the insured the
same obligation of good faith and
fidelity as if the insured had
retained t.h~· attorney personally and
at his own expense.
735 S,W.2d at
73,.

Both the Model Rules and the Model Code prohibit
gl:OUp set tlementE; in civil cases without disclosure
to and the CO:lsent and participation of each
client.
Mode

Coj~

DR 5-106(A) states:
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(A)

lawyer who r-epr-esents two or
clients shall not make or
participate in the making of an
aggregate settlement of the clainw
of or against his clients, unless
each client has consented to the
settlement after being advised ot
thf~
existence and nature of all
cl,lims involved in the proposed
settlement, of the total amount of
the
settlement,
and
of
the
par.ticipation of each person in the
settlemen,:.

more

Model Rule 1.8(6) provides:

A Lawyer who represents two or more
clients shall not participate in
maldI1g an aggregate settlement of
the
claims
of
or against the
clients. . . .
unless
each
client

consents
including

after

consultation,

disclosure
of
existence ... od the nature of al.l
claims or pleas involved and of
participation of each person in

settlement.

I

the
the
the

the

If anything is te· be learn",d from examining the conflicting
rulings of courts on multiple representation questions, it is
that conflicts of intereflt should be avoided, if possible, and
if unavoidable, then they must he immediately addressed.
A.

I

l.~Jl..tiJ.:isAtiQ[L.9L.l_~J<!.te.L

Timely identification of potential conflicts can protect
an attorney trom the need to withdraw as counselor from
possible disqua~ifjcation. There are options available

to deal with the conflicts. such

as client consent, but

the attorney mu~t make an early identification of the
issues, in crd",r to take advantage of the options
available.
B.

Cl.t~J1L.~.QDRStl1L

The insured mJlet be info:nned of an actual or potential
con'fHct of intel:est.
In T9mg~\l!L.Y.........Arn~ll~ Mut. ln~
Co--,-, 517 A.2n 1053, 10S5 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986), the
Appellate Cou::-t of Connecticut held that when a conflict
problem arif;es, it is the "attorney's duty to withdraw

N - 44

I
Ii
I
I

I

from the repl:esentaLiml or to disclose the conflict of
interest."

I

Represerltation :in conflict situations is permitted by
both the llfodel Rules and the Jliodel Code, but only when
there is both fully counseled client consent and a
reasonable belief on the part of the lawyer that the
conflict is not insunnountable.
In some cases, client
consent will therefore suffice and in other cases, it
will not and should not even be sought.

However, a stand8.rd reservation of rights notice may not
be sufficient: to gi '''e the insured notice Of the' specific
conflict U'lat may e:<ist. In T~~s;.JL.E.arj)).!;t:t:JLJnc. 90 .. y.
N~il;:~,
744 S.W.2d GOl (1987), McGuire, an insured
driver, was involved in an accident that occurred while
he was drivillg a company vehicle in the course of his
employment. The comp.my sent a non-waiver reservation of
rights letter to McGUire, who signed it. Subsequent to
that t the i.nsurance company took a statement from
McGuire, which \~as the basis for its de!ense of noncoverage against 11(;Gu ir~.
The insurance company then
sent a letter informing McGuire that the policy limit
might not cover him, but that it would defend him in the
lawsuit Idttwut waiving any of its rights and that
McGuire ~}as at liberty to engage counsel of his own
choice at hh: own expense. Judgment was rendered against
McGuire and Texas Farmers refused to satisfy the
judgment. H(;Guire., rgued that Texas Farmers was estopped
f);om denying cO-vel'age because the insurance company
failed to advise 11cGuire of the specific conflict before
it secured a Eecond statement from him.
The Texas Court of Appeals agreed with McGuire, but the
Texas Supreroe CQUrt reversed.
'l'he court held that the
doctrine of estoppe.l could not be used to create coverage
when none existed by the terms Of the policy. However,
the lawyer f.or both the insurer and insured wail still
subject to disciplinary action, because of inadequate
discloe;-ure and consent:.

In American Bar Association (ABA) Informal Opinion 1476
(August 11,
19811,
the ABA Committee advised on
disclosure and conS'3nt in an employment-related insurance
defense mattel:;,
In the actioll, tile plaintiff alleged that he had
sustained injury as a result of a tort inflicted by the
employee in thi" C~lurse of employment.
The employ,;;,r
maintained liability insurance,
and the insurance
extended to e:nployees acting within· the scope of
employment.
The employer and employee knew from the
outset that the la1<:yer vias assigned to represent both of
them. The lasurance company did not raise (lny questions
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of coverage applicabilit.y. Neither the insurance company
nor the lawyer caud ouod or advised the employee at the
outset that Eacts could exist to create conflicting or
di vergent interest between employee and employer or
between
employee
and
insurance
company or
that
information
gained
by
the
lawyer
during
the
representation and affecting insurance coverage might be
gi ven to the insurance company.
In the course of a
conversation with the lalA'Yer, the employee related facts
indicating tbat the employee may have acted outside the
scope of his elnployment and that, under the terms of the
insurance contract, the employee, may not be entitled to
the protection of the employer's liability insurance.
The· employee made the disclosures in th<l belief that he
was doing so in a lawyer-client relationship, and
apparently without understanding the implications of the
circumstances he related to the lawyer.
The lawyer
learned ·similar but more limited information when
interviewing another ~Iitness. The lawyer believed that
the insurance company may have a contractua.l right to
deny protection to the employee "because of scope of
employment circumstances. It is also possible that the
employer could invoJ(e scope of employment c.i.rcumstances
to defend ag~inst his own liabilities to the plaintiff.

I:
I

!
!

The Committe.., advised that the lawyer should not reveal
to the insurance company the information gained by the
lawyer from either the employee or the witness, when the
revelation migl.1t result in denial of insurance protection
to the emploY€ie, without: the employee's consent, after
full disclosure of the consequences of such revelation.
The Committee recognized that when a lIability insurer
retains a lawyer to def.end an insured, the insured is the
lawyer's client. ABA Informal Opinions 728 (1963), 822
(1965) and 7e3 (1965)""
The Committee stated that "Among
a lawyer' 8 to:t"ernost professional l:'esponsibilities are
fidelity to a client and preservation of confidences and
secrets of a clients. T'hese responsibilities exist even
if a person other than the client is paying the lawyer's
fee. "

With the history of the Hodel Code and now the adoption of the
Model Rules, the attor:ney i.s given much more latitude in
determining whether its repl-esentation of both the insured and
the insurer is p):..:,per, howe'Jer { the insurance defense case
should always be studiE,d carefully.
Attorneys in multiple
party rl?presentat ion si tuations should always take care to
identify
any possible conflicts· as early in their
representation of clients as possible and act quickly to
resolve the possible conflict as soon as evidence of it
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arises.
Acting in good faith compliance with the ethical
rules will always plac~ the attorney in the best possible
position to defend against disqualification motions or
subsequent malpractice <"<etions.

I'

I
I'

I
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AITORNEY EX PARTE INTERVIEW
OF THE FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AN
OPPOSING PARTY:
A TWO-HAT PERSPECTIVE

I
I
I
I
I

By Kathleen ChancIer and Wendy Chemer Maneval
,

I.

Today, despite numerous cases and commentaries on the subject, the
ethical and legal responsibilities of attorneys regarding ex parte
contracts with former employees of an opposing party remain unclear.
Litigators of both the plaintiffs and defense bars grapple with both sides
of this problem. They frequently wear both "hats" (sometimes, eVen in
the same case): the hat of counsel seeking information ex parte from
former employees of an opposing party and the hat of counsel for the
fonner employer seeking to block any damaging information provided
in such contacts.

I.

!.

Copyright 1994, Kathleen Chanc1er and Hendy Cherner tlaneva1
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HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
HAT 1: Counsel Seeking Information from Former Employee.
[.

Your client is woman who has sued her company for sexual discrimination.

I.

You have heard that a number of your client's former co-workers (some managers, some clerical
workers), have left employment with the defendant. Your client tells you that these witnesses have
information pertinent to her case. In order to access this information, must you (a) prepare a notice of
deposition, coordinate the schedules of all counsel involved, incur the expense of hiring a court
stenographer, prepare in depth for a full deposition, participate in a formal deposition, and review the
transcript or can you (B) pick up the phone and call the witness.

I

HAT 2: Counsel of Former Employer
Now, change hats. You represent the company that is a defendant in a sexual discrimination case. You
get a call from the corporate personnel manager who informs you that she just leamed that the plaintiff'S
attorney has been calling around and conducting ex parte interviews with various former employees,
many of whom have material evidence in the case. She is afraid that they will disclose damaging
confidential information or change their stories after talking with the plaintiffs attorney. Do you have
any recourse?
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ETIDCAL REQUIREMENTS

ntis dilemma is based upon the ethical rules
in the codes of professional conduct of attorneys
adopted by the courts in each state. For example,
Rule 4.2 of the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which has been
adopted or used as a paradigm for the edtical rules in
at least 40 states and the District of Columbia, provides in portinent part:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall
not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized to do so.

Accordingly, it is the Opinion of
the Committee tltat a lawyer representing a client in a matter adverse to a corporate party that is
represented by another lawyer
may, without violating Model
Rule 4.2, communicate about the
subject of the representation
with an unrepresented former
employee of the corporate party
without the consent of the
corporation's lawyer.
The ABA Committee's opinion is merelyadvisory and does not constitute law.
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JUDICIAL OPINIONS

The official ABA comment on this rule
states in pertinent part:
In the case of an organization, this
Rule prohibits communications by a
lawyer for one party concerning the
matter in representation with persons
having a managerial responsibility on
behalf of the organization, and with
any other person whose act or omission in connection with that matter
may be imputed to dteorganization for
purposes of civil or crimina1liabilityor
whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.
This rule specifically prohibits ex parte communications with certain employees of an opposing
party. 11 docs not explicitly apply to former employees of a party.
Importantly, the ABAStanding Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, in a solely
adviroly opinion, has determined that the rule does not
cover former employees. The Committee emphasized:
While the committee recognizes that'
persuasive policy arguments can be
and have been made for extending the
ambit of Model Rule4.2 to cover some
former corporate employees, the fact
remains that the text of the Rule does
not do so and the comment gives no
basis for concluding that such coverage was intended.
Especially, where, as here, the effect
of the Rule is to inhibit the acquisition
of information about one's case, dte
Committee is loath, given the text of
Model Rule 4.2 and its Comment, to
expand its coverage to former employees by means of liberal interpretation.
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Despite the language of the Rule and
the advisory opinion of the ABAStanding Committee, some courts have extended the application of Rule 4.2 of its counterpart to ex parte
communications with former employees of a
party. The courts dealing with this issue have
taken three approaches. A minority ofcourts have
prohibited such contacts outright. Some courts
have validated all such contacts. Other courts,
however, have, validated such contacts only
under certain conditions: (I) when dte attorney does not inquire into privileged matters;
(2) when the attorney abides by rules of professional conduct regarding contacts with
(3) when the acts or
unrepresented parties;
omissions of the former employee did not give
rise to the matter at issue and cannot be used to
impute liability to the fonner employer.
Courts' interpretation of the rule, rather
than being simply inconsistent, appoar to be
based upon the factual context in which dte issue arises. Courts tend to interpret the rule expansively when the former employees contacted
were high-level or confidential employees or
had an active role in the subject matter of the
litigation. Courts tend to narrowly interpret this
provision when the ex parle interviews wcreconducted with lower-level former employees who primarily constitute fact witnesses.
Due to the wide range of factual contexts in which these issues arise, some courts
have articulated a number of factors to be considered in determining whether such ex parle
communications violate theethica1 rules. These
courts have considered: (\) dte positions of
the former employees (especially whether they
were managerial); (2) whether the former employee was privy to communications between
the fonner employer and its counsel concerning the subject matter of the litigation or issues
involved in the lawsuit; (3) whether the former
employeccould impute liability on the ocqmtticns;
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(4) whether the employee could make statements that
would constitute admissions on the part of the organization; (5) the nature of the inquiry by opposing
counsel; and (6) the time that has elapsed between
the end of the employment and the ex parle interview. One court has suggested that, when this analysis indicates a substantial risk of disclosure of privileged matters, the attorney should carefully instmct
the employee not to divulge attorney-client confidences and, in eertain circumstances, should notify
counsel for the former employer prior to conducting
any ex parte interviews.
Courts also face fonnidable problems in attempting to fashion a suitable remedy for the damage
caused by ex parle contacts (e.g., the disclosure of
information protected by the attorney-client privilege
and/or the imputation of liability tothe former employer). Courts and affected parties may have difficulty ascertaining what information was actually provided during such a contact. Courts may require the
offending attorney to provide opposing counsel all
notes of the interviews or statements obtained during
the interviews. Courts will be reluctant to do so, however, if such documents contain trial strategies or other
attorney work product information. Thus, it may be
difficult for a coart to craft an appropriate order precluding evidence (and the fruits of the evidence) obtained through ex parle communications from being
introduced at trial. Some courts have imposed the
draconian penalty of attorney disqualification; this punishment, however, may not remedy the harm inflicted
to the opposing party (e.g., new counsel may obtain
the same information from the file or discussions with
the disqualified attorney).
COMPETING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS _
A primary reason for this continuing
dilemma is that there are competing policy considerations at issue. Courts and commentators have had
. difficulty harmonizing these important values through
a workable rule.
The extension of this rule to former employees is based upon five primary policy objectives:
(1) to protect parties and witnesses from overreaching by attorneys, (e.g., the prevention of harassment,
intimidation and manipulations of witnesses); (2) to
preserve the integrity of the attorney-client relationship; (3) to avoid the disclosure of privileged information; (4) to help facilitate settlement by channeling disputes through lawyers accustomed to the negotiation process; and (5) to avoid uncertainty with .
regard to the legal and ethical responsibilities of lawyers.
In contrast, the allowance of such ex parte
contracts enables the parties to reduce the cost and
burden of the discovery process (and often to prosecute
their rights) and furthers the litigation objective of permittingequal access to information.
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STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE
UNCERTAINTY
As a general rule, courts will permit such contacts as
long as privileged matters are protected and the attorney making the exparle contact abides by the ethics rules on contacts with uurepresented persons.
Nevertheless, litigators of both "hats" need to consider available strategies to deal with the uncertainty
in this area.
Attorneys seeking information need not subject their clients to the expense involved in taking
depositions of each witness previously employed by
a party or risk disqualification.
First, an attorney seeking to interview
former employees may seek court approval prior to
the interviews. While this may be the safest approach,
it does have detrimental side effects; die attorney must
apprise opposing counsel of the witnesses to be interviewed. Of course, opposing counsel may quickly
conduct his or her own interviews and gain a tactical
advantage. In addition, such information may be tantamount to disclosure of trial strategy.
Second, litigators should engage in a risk
analysis to determine likelihood that an ex parle contact will pose an ethical violation. The attorney should
consider the following factors: (I) whether the person is likely to be represented by corporate counsel;
(2) the person's position widl the former employer;
(3) the level and nature of die person's participation
in the incidents dmtgave risk to the litigation; (4) die
nature of the inquiry and the type of information that
the person is likely to possess; and, (5) the time interval from the end of employment to the interview.
Third, if the risk presented by the ex parle
communications appears to be too great, the attorney may request permissions from opposing counsel
to conduct an informal interview in opposingcounsel's
presence. Opposing counsel may agree to this interview if the only alternative is a deposition of the wit-

ness.
Fourth, at die inception of the interview, the
attorney should clearly disclose to the person being
interview the following information: (1) the
attorney's name and fum; (2) the client who is represented; (3) the basic controversy; and, (4) the purpose of die interview. In addition, the attorney should
inquire as to whether the person is represented by
counsel in connection with the matter. The person
should be informed that the interview is completely
voluntary and that they may choose to have their own
attorney present during the interview. The person
interviewed should be instructed not to disclose any
information regarding advice from or communication with corporate counsel.
Attorneys representing the furmeremployer
may also take certain steps to protect their clients
against the adverse effects of ex parle interviews of
former employees.

First, as soon as practicable after the inceptiooof a lawsuit, the attorney should identify al\ current
and former employees who may have relevant information regarding the subject matter of the lawsuit.
Second, the auomey should, as soon as practicable, conduct interviews of all pertinent individuals. The attorney should provide the witness with
basic information regarding the litigation and identify the attorney's role in the litigation (as attorney
for the employer). The attorney may offer to present
the witness, if necessary, at a deposition. Further, the
attorney should explain that the corporation intends
to keep the information derived form the interview
confidential.
Third, during the interview, the attorney
should inform wimesses that they are under no obligation to discuss any matters with opposing counsel except under subpoena. Also, the attorney may
ask witnesses to permit the attorney to represent them
at any interview with opposing counsel.
Fourth, the attorney should consider obtaining formal statements from these witnesses. Such
statements would be admissible in a trial, for example,
to impeach the credibility of witnesses who decide to
change their stories after speaking with opposing
counsel.
Fifth, the attorney should request copies of
any and all statements made by such witnesses to opposing counsel in ex parle interviews.
Sixth, if there are certain witnesses who cannot be interviewed without impairing the employer's
position or the attorney-client relationship, the attorney should seek a protective order to prevent opposing counsel from conducting ex parle interviews.
In sum, the ethical and legal responsibilities
of attorneys with regard to ex parte contacts with
former employees of an opposing party remains uncertain. The competing policy considerations and the
failure of the courts to develop a workable rule indicate that this dilemma will not be resolved in the ncar
future. The above strategies, while admittedly imperfect, may assist litigators in determining what course
of conduct should be pursued to assure that they observe their ethical and legal responsibilities in this
situation.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW - ETHICS HYPOTHETICAL - Burger Queen
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Client Martina Polles has come to you for legal advice. You had represented her
earlier through the public defender's pro bono referral program and defended her
on a marijuana possession charge. Her case went to trial 'and she was found
guilty, but you were able to have her sentence set up for a 12 month probation.
Martina is now working as an Assistant Food Preparation Manager at a local
Burger Queen. The last time you saw her she looked well and was very happy
with her new job. Today she seems extremely distraught.
Martina tells you that she was moved from the day shift to the evening shift at
Burger Queen. One afternoon several weeks ago Martina's boyfriend Bernie
Gamara and one of his male friends drove her to work. They sat in the parking
lot for a while before her shift started. While the three of them were sitting in
the car, two men approached and began talking with the man in the back seat.
They conversation went on for some time and when the two men walked away
several police officers approached and arrested the two men who had been
talking to the man in the back seat. A bag of cocaine was found on one of the
men who had been talking outside the car. The man in the back seat was also
questioned and the car was searched. The man in the back seat had two fifty
dollar bills on him. He was arrested and traces of cocaine were found on the
bills.
Neither Martina nor her boyfriend were arrested, but when she entered the
Burger Queen to start work, Bill Sleeze the night manager called her over and
said he had seen her in the car where the arrests had been made. Sleeze and
Martina had a good and friendly working relationship, but he now expressed
serious concern about her ability to keep working if her probation officer learned
of her "involvement" with the men who were arrested. Later that night, Sleeze
and Martina were alone in the Burger Queen cleaning up after hours. Sleeze
began talking about how lonely he was and then noted howlonely Martina would
be if her probation were revoked and she was put in jail. This conversation
pattern followed for several successive nights and was accompanied by the night
manager's added expressed concerns about whether he had any obligation to
"explain" the arrest situation to his superiors or possibly to Martina's probation
officer. Finally, on the fourth night Sleeze was alone with Martina in the kitchen
and told her that his worries for Martina over the arrest situation would be
greatly relieved if she were to prove her sincerity to her job by making love to
him. Martina reluctantly participated. The sexual contacts have continued for
about 10 days.
Martina is very upset and wants your advice on how to deal with the drug arrest
and her "problem" with her supervisor. She is very much in love with her
boyfriend and she does not want to jeopardize her relationship with him. She
wants to keep her job and finish out her probation, but feels trapped. You are
very busy, but agree to handle her situation. You advise her that you will give it
some thought and that she should come back to your office in three days. She
thanks you, pays you $25 and leaves.
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The next day you have lunch with Joe Schmoe from the law firm's corporations
and securities law department. He tells you that he has been talking to a new
corporate client on what could tum out to be a big acquisition deal. The client is
CEO for Mega Burger Restaurants and they are hoping to take over the smaller
Burger Queen Restaurant chain. Mega's offer is being considered in a somewhat
friendly atmosphere but Giant Burger Restaurants are also pursuing a takeover of
Burger Queen. Giant's offer is being received in a fairly hostile fashion by Burger
Queen. Schmoe thinks the deal is about to close is favor of his client Mega
Burger. Burger Queen is considered to be well run and very successful fast food
chain. You see two other clients at lunch and begin talking to them, not
finishing your conversation with Schmoe.
The next day Martina shows up at the reception desk and insists on speaking to
you. She comes into your office in tears and says there is something else that
she has to tell you. Her boyfriend, who she has lived with for three years, tested
positive for the HIV virus about 8 months ago and is failing physically as a result
. of AIDS. She cares deeply for her boyfriend and does not want others to know
that he has AIDS. She says she is telling you this in strict confindence and
wants to keep the "AIDS thing" quiet. Yet she worries whether she should say
anything to the Burger Queen night manager, Sleeze. She has continued to have
intercourse with him over the past two nights. She tells you that above all she
wants to keep her job, not go to jail, and be with her boyfriend as he deals with
his physical situation.
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What are the ethical! professional responsibility issues?
What obligations do you have to what parties?
What do you advise the client?
Do you say anything to your partner Joe Schmoe?
Do you have any obligation to the night manager, Sleeze?
Do you have any obligation to Burger Queen?
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Do you have any other obligations?
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EMPLOYMENT LAW - ETHICS HYPOTHETICAL - Melton Union Bank
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Your firm has represented Melton Union Bank for many years. Today the
bank personnel officer, Terry Minate, has come to you concerned about a
recent conversation he had with the chair of the bank's board of directors,
Ed Straightarrow. You have grown up in Melton, Kentucky and are
familiar with most of the bank's officers and directors. Before Minate gets
to your office, you recall ...
George Melton, sometimes known to his friends as "Gorgeous George"
Melton has been the chief operating officer of the Melton Union Bank for
over 23 years. He and his father started the bank and George is very
protective of it. Over the past three to four years he has been known to
lose his temper at bank board meetings, often over relatively minor
issues. He has always been known to "party hard" and carries somewhat
of a reputation for being a drinker. Last year Melton became estranged
from his wife of 21 years after she filed a domestic violence petition
against him. She later dropped the charges. The bank's loan officer,
William Cash, (known as "Big Bill" to many) had a close friendship with
Melton. They shared an apartmC?nt until a few months ago. Both Melton
and Cash are sportsmen and both are officers in the High Range Gun Club
which'is located about 15 miles south of town. Melton and Cash had been
known to be "drinking buddies" ever since high school. Two years ago
Melton, Cash and another gun club member Ed Schwartz were deer
hunting. By the accounts of both Melton and Cash, Cash's gun
aCCidentally discharged when he laid it down to cross over a fence and
Schwartz was fatally wounded in the head. The coroner ruled it to be an
accidental death.
With that the bank personnel officer enters your office and tells you the
latest, including the recent conversation he had with the bank board chair
Ed Straightarrow. Four months ago, Melton and Cash had a heated
argument outside of Melton's office at the bank. Ed Straightarrow, chair
of the board, apparently heard about it from two bank employees. Soon
after that time Melton went to visit Straight arrow and told him that it was
apparent that Cash was juggling bank books and had embezzled money
from Melton Union. He had no direct proof, but said that he would get the
auditor to run a check on Cash next weekend. At this point Straightarrow
became very upset and contacted Minate, the personnel officer. Together
they decided to wait and "let it blow over". However, four days later
Melton approached Cash's desk and told him, "you're fired as of this
minute, but before you leave you need to put the money you have stolen
back in the till." Cash left his desk and the bank. Melton never contacted
Minate to complete the normal employee termination paperwork.
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No one saw Cash until about two weeks later at the Melton Union Bank
annual picnic at the High Range Country Club. Cash arrived and spoke
quietly to a few people. He then walk,ed directly over to Melton and said,
"You know I pack a rod and I'm going to put you and all of the rest of your
stinking bank employees in the same kind of grave that we put Schwartz
in." He then turned away a drove off in his Nissan Pathfinder 4X4. Mary
Sure, the bank safe deposit box department manager overhead Cash's
comment to Melton. Attending the same church as Ed Straightarrow, she
. decided to go directly to him. On hearing her story. Straightarrow
admitted that he had been extremely embarrassed for some time with the
actions of both Melton and Cash. Immediately after that Straight arrow
contacted bank personnel officer Minate. He apologized to Minate for
maybe "getting into his area" but noted that when the safe deposit
manager pressed the matter with him again about a week ago he was very
explicit with her. When Minate asked Straight arrow what he meant,
Straightarrow noted that he told the safe deposit manager, "This bank
has a spotless history and reputation and doesn't need someone creating
morale problems. so if that little incident at the annual picnic bothers you
so much you should just look for another job."
You tell Minate not to take any action for a few days and that you will get
back with him by the first of next week. Later that afternoon you get a
call from Ed Straightarrow, the Melton Bank board chair. He wants to talk
with you the first thing tomorrow about some bank employees "who are
getting a little out of line."

I'
I
Ii
i
I'

I
Ii
!I
I:
f'

To whom do you owe your primary responsibility as counsel for the bank?
What actions, if any, should you take given what the personnel officer has
told you?
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What counsel should you give to the personnel officer?
What should you plan to say to the bank board chair tomorrow?
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